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Abstracts:
This study analyses the intimate relationship between foreign 
policy and nation-state building in Algeria since independence. It 
assumes that foreign policy stands as a part and parcel of the proc­
ess of building a state and cementing national feelings in a society 
that emerged through a long period of colonisation and a violent str­
uggle for liberation.
This thesis is sub-divided into six chapters to highlight the link 
between foreign policy and the nation-state building process:
Chapter One underlines the conceptions of the Algerian ideologists 
with regard to affirming the existence of an Algerian nation and a 
state well before French colonisation. It also attempts to locate the 
political forces that emerged as nation-builders and ascertain their 
achievements.
In chap ter Two, the decision-making process is scrutinized through the 
study of the main actors and institutions forming the foreign community 
and the interference in formulating and conducting the country's foreign 
policy.
Sovereignty, as one of the basic foundations of a nation-state unit, 
constitutes the theme of the third Chapter and is analysed through 
the efforts of the Algerian leaders to assert their country's sovereignty 
vis-a-vis its former metropole, France.
Chapter Four relates the state’s security and territorial integrity to 
the regional context, notably to Algeria's relations with her neighbours 
which have been marked by ideological differences and territorial disputes. 
Chapter Five deals with the efforts of Algeria to establish her identity 
on radical and technocratic perceptions of Arabo-Islamism at home and on 
a deep attachment to the policy of non-alignment abroad.
Finally, Chapter Six focuses on the link between foreign policy and 
national economic development as it has been conceived by the state's 
technocracy and assesses the successes and failures of the economic policy 
as well as Algeria's role in North-South debates.
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Remarks on the collection of data for this research
For some foreign observers, it might appear quite easy for an 
Algerian to gain access to a wide variety of Algerian sources including 
interview, unpublished primary sources and on the spot observations. I 
must, however, admit that in the course of my research, I found a number 
of difficulties in obtaining the necessary material for reasons inherent 
in the secretive character of the decision-making process in Algeria. 
Beside the nonavailability of satisfactory records of members of the 
Algerian political elite, lack of published memoirs of exiled opponents 
or retired personalities, there had been a great hesitation, if not 
unwillingness, from many high officials to assist me. Also unfortunate 
was the period in which most of the research work took place ( 1980-1983), 
Indeed, because of the instability of the political personnel due to 
changes inherent in a transitional period, many of these officials who 
initially agreed to be interviewed finally declined my requests.
Political uncertainty, rivalries between groups, matters of promotion or 
fear of reprisals may have been, in many cases, the reasons behind this 
reluctance.
Despite several trips to Algeria and long sojourns there - all 
self-sponsored - and some efforts made through connections, I was not 
very successful in gathering data from the foreign ministry and gaining a 
direct access to its archives or documentary sources. Nevertheless, with 
the help of Mr Ghazali (whom I warmly thank for his assistance and 
kindness), I was able to interview M. Abada and M. Baghli, former 
directors at the Foreign Ministry and M. Ogab, a party official.
Although they showed a certain deal of sympathy, their contribution did 
not go beyond the level of officiality, a matter which did not help me to 
get deep insights into the foreign decision-making process. However, I
feel obliged to thank them for agreeing to be interviewed and for their 
highly intelligent discourse. In similar vein, I must thank M. Baba-Ali, 
Nasri and Semmache.
Sensitive information related to chapters one, two and four have 
been essentially drawn up from discussions with a few people that helped 
me and specifically requested not to be mentioned in this thesis or to 
have information expressly attributed to themselves. Regretfully I must 
comply with their wishes but I would like them to find here a sincere 
gratitude.
A great deal of other data derived from various official publica­
tions, and state-owned newspapers. Despite its ritual discourse and 
official status, El-Moudjahid proved a valuable source of information to 
analyse declarations and actions of the Algerian government. The 
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Africa Contemporary Record and Africa 
Confidential appeared fundamental and indispensable for any study on 
Algerian politics. Among the libraries well endowed with material on 
Algeria, and whose facilities I used on many occasions, were the 
Bibliothèque Nationale and the Institut des etudes politiques in Algiers; 
the valuable Centre de recherche sur les Sociétés Hediterrang«nnes at 
Aix-En-Provence; the bibliothèque des sciences humaines Cujas and 
the institut des etudes politiques both in Paris and the very
useful libraries of St Anthony College/ Oxford; the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, London. Books on Algeria were also found at the 
Universities of Bamberg, Erlangen and Wurzburg in West Germany as well as 
in Liège in Belgium. As expected for a study on Algeria, works in 
French have been used extensively and all translations from French as 
well as from Arabic and Spanish are mine unless otherwise indicated.
Sources in German language have been made accessible to me by my
German born wife who happens to be a teacher of English. Finally, French 
transliterations of Algerian names have been used in this thesis to avoid 
confusion over patronymics.
L'Histoire est le mirroir du passe et L'echelle 
(grâce a laquelle on s'élève) du présent. Elle est la 
preuve de l'existence des peuples, le livre ou s'inscrit 
leur puissance, le lieu de resurection de leur conscience, 
la voix de leur nation, le tremplin de leurs progrès. 
Lorsque les membres d'une nation etudient leur histoire, 
lorsque les jeunes prennent connaissance de ses cycles, ils 
connaissent leur réalité" et alors les nationalités vivantes 
et insatiables du voisinage s'aborbent par leur propre 
nationalité. Ils comprennent la gloire de leur passe et
la noblesse de leurs ance très e: n'acceptent ni les 
dénigrements des depreciateurs, ni les atteintes des 
falsificateurs ni les médisances des gens du parti pris.
Sheikh Mubarak Al M i l i 1
A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality 
as a healthy man of* his bones. But if you break a 
nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but 
getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to 
no philosopher, to no preacher, until the demand of the 
nationalist is granted. It will attend to no business of 
unification and liberation. Conquered nations lose their 
place in the world's march because they can do nothing but 
strive to get rid of their nationalist movements by 
recovering their national liberation.
Bernard Shaw^
^Ta rikh al jazair, 1929.2John Bull's Other Island (London, Constable and company 
Ltd., 1930, 293p.) p p . xxxiv-xxxv.
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Theoretical Framework
Both decolonization in the early 1960s and the North-South 
confrontation combined with the energy crisis in the mid-1970s produced a 
great deal of writings on the politics of the Non-Western world, 
especially the new state which had emerged through a more or less violent 
process of liberation. However, a survey on the works devoted to these 
states reveals a neglect of studies on their foreign relations. The 
paucity of empirical studies appears striking although a relatively 
limited number of these new states have attracted the attention of 
scholars and students alike. The focus of academic research has 
generally been on the foreign policies of great or medium powers or on 
world economic issues. As a result, the literature concerning the 
external policies of the third world in general and of the new states in 
particular is still a teething one and thus subject to further investiga­
tion . *
To our knowledge, Algerian foreign policy remains modestly explored. 
Only two major works have been devoted to the analysis of this theme as a 
whole so far but covering events only up to 1978.2 Such a lack is quite 
surprising when reviewing French-speaking literature on Algeria, 
considering this country's important relations with France, its weight in 
the Maghreb and active role in the North-South skirmishes. The emphasis 
has instead been put on analyzing its domestic policies, especially the 
model of economic development. Moreover, the interest of French 
academics in Algerian politics is perhaps declining, while Algerian 
scholars and students have been quite cautious to avoid dealing with the 
study of the Algerian foreign-policy making as they probably felt this
2subject was too sensitive. However, it seems that the lack of data on 
the Algerian foreign-policy decision making proved in many cases the 
major discouraging factor.
In the field of international relations, attempts have been made to 
explain the process of foreign policy and construct models for the 
analysis of individual cases, but the analytical findings remain quite 
elusive and as far as the new states are concerned no generally accepted 
theoretical framework exists which can be applied to a single case-study. 
It seems, however, misleading to think that theoretical models con­
structed for the study of Western industrialized states could be 
satisfactorily applied when analayzing the external behaviour of the new 
states•
'Foreign-decision-making' theories as they had been outlined by 
Frankel, Snyder and al; or the 'bureaucratic approach' as formulated by 
Henry Kissinger and developed by Allison and Halperin focused on a 
well-defined decisional unit, assuming the availability of information on 
the values, choices and behaviour of the decision-makers and on the 
structures, regulations and operations of the decision-making process.'* 
In many new states, foreign-decision-making is highly centralized and 
secretive; political institutions are very weak, bureaucracies not well 
articulated, and the influence of public opinion and pressure groups 
minimal. The authoritarian character of many of them renders the task 
of obtaining detailed accounts on decisions quite difficult and in 
addition documentary material is scant, information on the political 
elite relatively scarce and free press rarely exists. Like in many new 
states, the media in Algeria are state property which one could use as an
3indicator of the government's view on foreign policy issues, but much of 
the information provided emphasizes political and economic achievements 
of the regime as well as the ritual revolutionary rhetoric.
Professor Rosenau's pre—theories and theories of foreign policy 
offer a more complex and broader model for the analysis of the state's 
external behaviour through operationalizing five sets of variables: 
individual, role, government, societal and systemic. 'Individual' or 
'idiosyncratic' variables refer to the values that distinguish one
decision-maker from another; 'role' variables are related to the
expectations of the society; 'governmental' reflect the influence of 
political structures; 'societal' concern factors such as political 
culture and economic capabilities; and 'systemic' variables pertain to 
external influence.^ Although this model may be theoretically
attractive; it remains difficult to operationalize its cluster of
variables when dealing with either Western or new states. The
specification of the variables appears confusing and sometimes overlap-
ping as it seems difficult to determine clearly into which set of
variables the data properly fit; and in addition to the failure of
explaining how the various variables interact with each other, the
distinction between the decision-maker's values and those stemming from 
the roles they occupy proves hard to ascertain, especially in the case of 
the new states where there is a significant lack of data on 'role' 
variables. With regard to these states, Rosenau's ranking of the
variables in accordance to their potency presents a number of methodo­
logical problems. It seems difficult to distinguish between 'large' and 
small countries and between 'open' and 'close' political systems and the 
criteria such as geography and physical resources given by Rosenau are
4not sufficient to do so. If it is true that the classification of 
states rests on a wider number of variables such as surface, population, 
military, economic capabilities and so on, it nevertheless depends on 
one's point of view in the final analysis.^
Lastly, the stress on the potency of 'individual' factors in the new 
states seems over-exaggerated. Although Algeria lacked solid political 
underpinings, it is not easy to state that the 'determinants' of her 
foreign policy are primarily idiosyncratic. We will not be concerned 
with whether idiosyncracies are more important than the geographic, 
historical and cultural factors but instead why some 'determinants' 
created more incentives fpr the Algerian leadership to play a greater 
role in world politics and adopt a more 'militant' foreign status than 
other new states and why foreign policy has been more important to the 
nation-state building in Algeria than elsewhere.
Many political scientists agree that the process of foreign policy 
in general, results from an interaction between domestic and external 
environments, while acknowledging that domestic and foreign policies are 
still ill-defined and the distinction between the two elements is 
markedly blurred.^ And as far as new states are concerned, it is
assumed that foreign policy is largely an extension of the domestic 
political environment and/or responding more to internal conditions than 
to external problems.7 The separation between the two areas which had 
been fundamental in the traditional theory of international relations is 
no longer clear in our era where states are increasingly interdependent. 
Thus the conception that sovereign states pursue 'national' interests and 
objectives unrestrained proved • too simplistic and irrelevant in the
5context of a world gradually dominated by transnational politics. 
Therefore as it was argued no state operates solely according to its own 
objectives.
With regard to the newly created states, many political writers 
underlined the limitations upon and deficiencies of their foreign 
relations such as strategic location, the degree of domestic stability, 
limited environment and resources as well as the continuing link between 
a former metropole with its former colony and the constraints of the 
international system.® By the same token, the classical theory of
'balance of power' which assumes that power or capabilities are the most 
important source of a state's foreign policy is of a little interest, 
especially with regard to the new states.®
Foreign policy is much more complex and consisting . of a number of
variables, factors and conditions, the potency and accuracy of which vary
from one country to another and over time. In the case of the new states,
1 U ( Athe formulation of foreign policy remains vague. While^ authors as
Padhyaya, Crabb for instance conceived foreign policy as the state's 
exercise of choice of ends and means, Cowan and Good stress instead its 
objectives.^ This is a sheer simplism, for states are neither entirely 
free to make choices with regard to the objectives to be achieved abroad 
nor are they unrestrained in the pursuit of their objectives. In the case 
of Algeria, the 1976 National Charter also defines the country's foreign 
policy as "the reflection of its domestic policy".^ This is apparently 
inadequate, for not all national policies can or need be extended abroad.
6Studies on Algerian external policies reveal also some analytical 
deficiencies. Both Grimaud, and Lauff to a greater extent, paid little 
attention to the analysis of the foreign policy decision-making while 
Bouzidi remained silent on how domestic and foreign factors affect each 
other in spite of arguing that Algerian external relations were strongly 
shaped by a combination of these two sets of factors. ^ Derradji's brief 
essay seems to postulate that the formulation and the conduct of this 
country's foreign policy could operate somehow regardless of domestic as 
well as foreign constraints. Most important in his conceptions are the 
determinants that accounted for the shaping of this policy such as 
geography, economy and revolutionary past.^3 The listing and even the 
specification of variables that might conceivably affect foreign policy 
does not seem sufficient to apprehend meaningfully the state's behaviour 
if other crucial considerations such as values, objectives and means of 
the foreign policy decision makers are not well ascertained. The 
analysis of elite's attitude appears essential although not exclusive, in 
the case of new states where a centralized and relatively small ruling 
elite has been monpolizing much of the state's executive machinery. 
Given the difficulty of obtaining detailed accounts on the attitudes and 
decisions of the ruling elites, a mere study of internal and external 
determinants or factors that may affect the shaping of the state's 
external relations seems far from constituting a serious alternative for 
the analysis of the decision-making process and its main actors.
In many academic works that used the 'determinants' analytical 
framework, the boundaries between domestic and foreign determinants are 
not clearly stated, and what are labelled "foreign determinants" are not 
well defined. Does the latter refer to the structures and patterns of the
7international system or merely to the policies and objectives of the 
super-powers? Whatever the merits of a study combining Domestic and 
Foreign determinants, there is still a need of assessing their 
interaction in order to explain not only how they affect the decisions of 
foreign policy matters but also why they are potent in a given 
nation-state unit and not in another. And even if this exercise is 
completed, there may be a risk that potency and accuracy of the 'determi­
nants' selected will be affected by the researcher's own perceptions. 
One possibility that may attenuate this bias consists perhaps in 
extending the field of investigation from an individual case study to a 
comparative foreign policy analysis. A pluralistic approach may offer a 
more useful assessment of the quantification, differentiation, articula­
tion and operationalization of the various 'determinants',under analysis, 
a process that may lead to a more acceptable global generalization.
To overcome some analytical shortcomings when dealing with the new 
states, some scholars suggested that foreign policy in these states 
should be considered not as an independent variable, but as a subsidiary 
of internal, domestic considerations, and others rightly drew the 
attention on the reciprocal relationship between nation-state building 
and foreign policy.14 In a study devoted to the Algerian external 
relations under Ben Bella (1962-1965), Mortimer ably stressed that the 
orientation of the Algerian foreign policy in world politics in its early 
stage, was an extension of its domestic experience and a continuation of 
the original revolt of the colony against its economic and human 
condition.^ Indeed, on independence, Algeria like many newly independ­
ent states, found herself facing the challenge of constructing a viable 
nation-state. The emerging elites were confronted with daunting tasks
8and stark choices, as they had to make the transition from the colonial 
status to a formally sovereign and independent state. The building of 
durable and self-reliant nation-states whether it involves socio economic 
change, the setting up of political and public institutions, or 
consolidation of the legitimacy and authority of the government appears 
to be the major challenge the post-colonial ruling elites have been 
facing. Many of them discovered that formal independence was not by 
itself enough, as they lacked the capacity to achieve the prime aim of 
their external objectives and policies. Generally various burdens - such 
as national disintegration exacerbated sometimes by deep tribal and 
ethnic divisions; economic backwardness characterized by a severe lack of 
capital, skilled manpower and modern techniques, unresponsive and 
unsuitable political institutions dominated by authoritarian and personal 
rule and inefficient bureaucracies - had drastically limited the impact 
of many new states on world affairs, while links with their former 
metropoles or other major powers to acquire aid and protection has 
impaired their capacity to act as sovereign states. The question
whether these problems and shortcomings are structural, as suggested by 
the dependency school, or stemming from the traditional predicament as 
assumed by the modernization approach theorists, is beyond the scope of 
this study. But one contention of our thesis is that colonial
experience and the armed struggle for liberation constitute the most 
predominant feature of these countries which like Algeria, had undergone 
this double process. The tackling of nation-state building differed 
from one state to another according to the manner by which they reacted 
to colonial domination. Because independence came as a result of a 
violent armed struggle against colonialism, revolt against the colonial
9past and order has been more pronounced in Algeria than in other former 
colonies which achieved independence at the close of a war such as India, 
Indonesia or Syria, or through a more or less peaceful process, such as 
Morocco, Tunisia or Nigeria.
The focus of this study rests on the assumption that in Algeria, 
like in other countries that shed the yoke of colonialism through an 
armed struggle, the notable feature is the crucial role the state assumed 
in the process of social change, and foreign policy is but an integrated 
part in this process. The specific socio economic and political set up 
has been conducive to the adoption of policies directed against foreign 
domination be it political, economic or cultural. Prom the task of 
creating a modern sovereign state to cementing national unity and 
identity, the paramount objective of the Algerian ruling, elite has been 
to complete the country's decolonization. For the Algerian leaders, 
French colonialism had been responsible for the acculturation and 
depersonalisation of the Algerian people and for the country's economic 
undei— development and dependence despite political sovereignty. It was 
as an expression of a continuing revolt that Algeria set out to mould 
from the ruins of the 'ancien régime' what she claimed to be a socialist 
society, and to adopt what she regards as an anti-imperialistic oriented 
foreign policy.
Once foreign policy has been conceptualized as a valuable means 
contributing to the process of nation-state building, it remains to 
determine what its specific uses are. Rather than simply playing the 
role of asserting the legitimacy of the regime and the cohesion of the 
leadership, or merely serving as a seductive means to divert the people's 
attention from domestic problems, foreign policy in Algeria seems to us
10
ultimately linked with four basic issues of nation-state building: 
sovereignty, security, identity and economic development. This study 
emphasizes the interaction between these issue-areas on the one hand, and 
between each and the external environment on the other. The sovereignty 
of the state, for instance, could be more asserted if national security 
and territorial integrity are better ensured and the recovery of identity 
may help cement national feelings within the community while economic 
capabilities may strengthen the state's sovereignty and security. By 
implication, the four sets of issues have an external counterpart which 
has to be taken into account. As for Algeria, the state's sovereignty was 
restrained by links with France; security by tensions with her neigh­
bours, Morocco in particular; identity by the acculturation resulting 
from a long colonial experience; economic development by foreign capital 
and the mechanisms of the international economic relations. The
interaction is far more complex and is by no means static and rigid. The 
potency and accuracy of the variables whether domestic or foreign tend to 
change as demands and constraints change not only within the home polity 
but also on the international level. Emphasis on the setting up of 
state structures and economic development for instance had been more 
significant during the Boumedienne era than under Ben Bella, and the 
concentration on domestic issues and on the assertion of national 
identity more pronounced at the present time than in the past.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROCESS OF NATION-STATE BUILDING
The process of nation-state building has commonly been regarded by 
political scientists as fundamental and even vital for the existence of 
the new states, and also for their survival for the reason, that in many 
former colonies, loyalties to the nation are believed weak and political 
institutions and administrative structures far from being definite and 
well-established. If with regard to the existence and survival of a 
national unit, the nation-state building has been essential, the ways to 
achieve it not only differed from one country to another but appeared 
peculiar in the case of the newly independent states in terms of standard 
and criteria by which political literature in the West defines the 
concept of nation-state. This is particularly evident in the view of the 
conception that has been drawn essentially from the European experience 
of nationalism at a time when many of the new nations were labelled as 
uncivilized and in the case of Algeria as the country of 'Barbarians'.
On a moral basis, the Algerian leaders rejected this conception, 
stressing the great antiquity of their people and its civilization, while 
in practise, they attempted to cement national feelings and build a 
modern state so as to lay the material basis for their nationhood. In 
their views, however, these tasks did not aim at building a nation-state 
but at ensuring the perennity of the nation and reviving the Algerian 
state which had been destroyed by French colonialism. The achievement 
of these objectives proved from the outset, difficult given the lack of 
national consensus which resulted from the fragmentation of the political 
elite. This difficulty was, nevertheless, surmounted by the emergence 
of the army as a political institution (a role conferred upon it by 
revolutionary legitimacy) and by the ascendancy of the technocracy by
16
virtue of competence and expertise. It was then around this coalition 
of officers and civilian technocrats that the process of building a 
modern nation-state has been carried out and expressed through a rapid 
economic development based on socialist principles and a strong and 
centralized state which has left a little room for mass participation and 
political mobilization.
A. THE HISTORICAL SEDIMENT 
1• Past and Present: a difficult linkage
A modern nation may be defined according to Carl Friedrich as "any 
sizeable population or group of persons which can be called independent 
(i.e., not ruled from the outside); cohesive; politically organized (it 
provides a constituency for a government which exercises effective rule 
within it); autonomous (it accords with the government which claims 
consent, compliance and support as to make its rules effective); and 
internally legitimate.”  ^ In view of these criteria of independence, 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the national authority; and if we 
consider as Professor Gellner suggested - the relation between the nation 
and the state as fundamental for the constitution of a nation in the 
modern sense (though some nations had preceded the birth of their own
states) - few newly-independent countries could boast to encompass
2well-defined nations in the sense of Friedrich's definition. It was
'Quoted in K.W.Deutsch and W. Foltz (eds) : Nation-building 
(New Haven, Connecticut, 1963 ), pp. 11-12.
E . Gellner: Nation and nationalism (London, Basil
Blackwell, 1983), p.3. For a distinction between
the concepts of nation-state and state-n a t i o n , see Pflanze, 
0: Nationalism in E u r o p e , 1848-1871 (in Journal of
politics , ( 28), 1966 ), pp. 129- 1 43 and P.D.Curtin:
Nationalism in Africa 1945-1965 (ibid p p . 143-153). Recent 
studies on the state and its relation to foreign policy 
could be found in the special issue on the state in
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even argued that in some newly—independent countries virtually no 
nation-state exists yet.-* In the case of Algeria, colonialism and the 
war of liberation as a reaction to it, were believed to have constituted 
the expression of Algerian modern nationalism which led to political 
independence and ultimately paved the way for the construction of a 
would-be modern nation-state. But if modernity were conceived only in
temporal terms and only in the light of the European experience as a 
standard-bearer, Algeria and other former colonies would not only fall 
into a particular category, (in comparison with the European nation-state 
models as empirical and well-established units), but would also emerge as 
a new phenomenon in the life of the people of these new states them­
selves. The question that may promptly spring to mind is whether these 
peoples, and particularly their elites, felt their existence as a nation 
when they engaged in a battle to put an end to colonial domination or 
only after gaining political independence. Whatever the option one may 
choose, the implicit idea is that this sequence of nation-state belongs 
to contemporary history. The result from this intellectual exercise may 
be the acknowledgement of the absence of a past for these people before 
the relatively recent rise of the nation-state feelings; or in the 
eventuality of the existence of this past, there may have been a neglect 
of relations between past generations and present ones, as what matters
most for contemporary political science are recent history and achieve- 
aments.
Daedalus (108), 1979; G. Ben-Dor: State and
conflict in the Middle-East. Emergence____ of____ t he
post-colonia 1 state (Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1983 ).
JC . Le g u m : commun a 1 conflict and international intervention 
in Africa in C. Legum and al . : Africa in the 1980s (New 
York, McGraw Hill cy, 1979, p p . 23-65) p.23.
4Zartman argues that traditional nation- tribes did exist but 
without modern relevance. I.W.Zartman: Characteristics of
In Algerian official discourse there has been a strong protest 
against the assumption that colonization was a *mission civilizatrice1 • 
In Algeria, it was argued, there had been both a nation and a state well 
before the French conquest in an attempt to stress the historical 
continuum of the country as society and people.5 This affirmation 
evidently breaks a way from the French colonial conception that pre-
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colonial Algeria was a ‘desolated land where nothing existed.' It al so
refutes the assumption of many foreign writers on Algerian history, 
especially French ethnological literature, that no Algerian nation 
existed prior to the nationalist awakening in this century. The reasons 
given by these writers were the inability of a nation to develop 
(Gauthier), because of the congenital impotence of the Berbers 
(Montagne), the conflicts between nation-building and tribal life 
(Zartman), the continuous local resistance to central authority (Amin), 
and the lack of preconditions for modern nationalism such as a middle- 
class, intelligentsia, written language and urban life (Gellner).7
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ter of A l g i e r s , April 1 964 in Annuaire del 'Afrique du 
(CNRS/CRESM Aix-en provence, 1964); National charter 
(FLN document, Algiers, popular editions of the ANP, 
; Resolution sur la politique c u l t u r e l l e , ordinary 
on of the FLN's central committee, June 1981. 
ement made on the occasion of the celebration of the 
nary of French domination of Algeria, quoted in C h . 
ron: Histoire de 1 'Algérie contemporaine (Vol.2,
1954, Paris, PUF), p.406.
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, p.7; R. Montagne: La vie sociale et politique des
re s (Paris, Alcan, 1931), p.9j I .W .Z a r t m a n : Interna- 
relations in new Africa (P r e n t i c e 'Ha 11 , Inc., 
Jersey, 1966), p.109; E. Gellner:
(London, Basil and Blackwell,
Englewood Cliffs, N.
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1983) and "Tribalism and social change in North Africa" in 
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Maghreb in the modern world (London, Penguin, 1970), p.95.
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Moreover, claims of the absence of nationhood were sustained by reference 
to the lack of unity and cohesion between tribal resistance to French 
colonial rule in the nineteenth century and the intense factionalism that 
characterized the Algerian modern nationalist movement.
It appears difficult to explain tribal fragmentation and the
divisions within the nationalist movement with accuracy with regard to 
the existence or absence of an Algerian nation. The task may be quite 
easy, however, if one takes into account only the socio-economic and 
cultural elements as criteria for differentiation. It was elements of 
the Algerian ‘évolués1 for instance - coming from the urban middle class 
and having a better access to French culture - who advocated assimilation 
and doubted the existence of a nation in contradistinction with the
conceptions of segments that originated from a religious and traditional 
background. Furthermore, the argument that the impact of colonization 
alone had been responsible for these conflicting attitudes may prove 
fallacious against evidence that not all French-educated natives did 
advocate assimilation or reject their own identity and personality which 
they regarded as being different from those of the French settlers. To
understand this cultural pluralism or rather the existence of sub­
cultures in colonial (and present time) Algeria better, the examination 
of the history of this country may be useful. Unfortunately, it is
See also Ch.-A. Julien: Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord
(Paris, Payot, 1951); Alazar et al.: Histoire et
Historiens de 1 'Algérie collection du Centenaire de
1 'A 1 g er ie, 1830-1930 (Paris, Alcan, 1931); Larnaude, M: 
L'Algérie (Pari s , ed . Berg e r -Levrau11 , 1950 ); Hahn, L:
Nationalism to N ati on hood (Public Affairs Press, Washington 
D.C., 1960); Peyrouton, M: Histoire generale du Maghreb
(Paris, ed. Michel Albin, 1966); Vatikiotis, P.J.: 
"Tradition and political leadership: the example of
A l g e r i a ” in I.W.Zartman (ed.): Man, state and society in 
the contemporary Maghreb (London, Pall Mall Press, 1974),
p p .309-329.
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precisely the interpretation of this history that gave an abysmal 
latitude to the complexity of apprehending meaningfully disagreements 
over the existence or the absence of a nation. Those denying its 
existence could hardly be accused of lack of intellectual knowledge 
because what was perhaps unaware to many natives was not only the history 
of Algeria itself, but may be also the existence of feelings of belonging 
to a well-defined national unit. In either case, cultural alienation 
has been made the chief responsible, therefore simplifying the quest for 
an acceptable answer.
Until now, the history of Algeria has not been officially written, 
notwithstanding brief and sometimes incomplete accounts provided by basic 
history textbooks that have been used at schools and colleges. And 
outside the official circles, there has been a remarkable lack of 
contribution of Algerian intellectuals and academics to the writing of 
this history, despite substantial efforts made in recent years.' 
Despite these shortcomings, the relation of the present time process of 
building a nation-state with Algeria's historical roots may be of 
significant interest to understand the socio-psychological environment of
'contemporary attempts to shed light on this history could 
be found in the writings of some Ulema (Doctors of Muslim 
Law) such as Ben Badis's articles published by this 
association's periodicals between the two world wars, the 
valuable accounts of Sheikh Mubarak A1 Mili: Taarikh al 
Jazair fi Al-Qadim wa al-Jadid (1928) (History of Algeria 
in the present and the future (1929), Sheikh Tewfik 
Almadani: Taarikh al Jazair (History of Algeria, 1932).
Among the much recent contributions worth mentioning are 
the studies of two senior Algerian diplomats: M. Lacheraf: 
Algérie, Nation et société (Paris, Maspero, 1965); 
Bedjaoui, M: La Revol ut1on Algérienne et le droit
(Association des Juristes Démocrates, Bruxelles, 1961). 
Also important are the highly instructive lectures of M. 
Kassim Nait Belkacem, a former Minister of Religious 
Affairs, and his book: Shakhsiyat al jazair al dawliwa wa 
mawhibatuha al alamlya (Algeria's international personality 
and vocation) Constantine, Dar al Kitab, 1985).
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the Algerian people and its elites, especially because the exaltation of 
nationalism as a unifying force and the prominence of the state in both 
domestic and foreign affairs may not be satisfactorily apprehended 
without a retrospective analysis of Algeria as a country and people. 
The difficulty in undertaking such an analysis has been felt by both the 
members of the Algerian ruling elites and the intelligentsia given 
diverse interpretations that had led to divergent conclusions and 
sometimes to radically opposed standpoints. This lack of consensus 
reflects the crisis of identity Algeria has been facing since independ­
ence. Dissonances between Arabic-educated segments and Francophones as 
well as conflicts between Muslim fundamentalist groups and those 
favouring secularism and modernization have been exacerbated by the 
emergence of the Kabyle cultural protest. The acuity of this crisis was 
such that it was recently publicly recognized by the minister of 
religious affairs.1
The approach of the Algerian leaders toward the task of state-nation 
building may not have been without apparent deficiencies, not because of 
lack of awareness however, but perhaps because the task of asserting the 
nation-state feelings has been so daunting that some deficiencies proved 
difficult to avoid, especially as the historiography of Algeria is hard 
to assess with accuracy given lack of archives, written documents as well 
as the falsification of the Algerian history by colonial discourse.
In le Monde September 4, 1980.
Since independence, Algerian authorities have been involved 
in negotiations with both Turkey and France to recover a 
vast amount of important archives and documents relative to 
Algerian history taken away by these two former metropoles. 
The issue has not been settled yet.
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A striking example of the complexity of this approach may be 
provided by two declarations of the late President Boumedienne, made to 
legitimate the regime's efforts to build a strong and modern state in 
Algeria. The priority given to this task was crucial because as he 
explained "we cannot achieve anything without first constructing the 
state. Our revolution is not comparable to others such as those of the 
USSR, China or Cuba, because there was never a state in Algeria."' This 
assumption, however, contrasted with his affirmation in another speech 
that the Algerian state "had been dismantled by c o l o n i a l i s m " T h i s  
incoherence may not be fortuitous but stems rather from a different 
outlook with regard to issues at stake. If the reference to the
inexistence of a state in Algeria, for instance, may be used to justify 
the regime's Jacobinist tendencies, the affirmation of its existence may 
respond to the necessity of asserting Algeria's identity and personality.
However, this dichotomy indicated perhaps more this complexity of the 
search for the self than a mere desarticulation and anomaly in Algerian 
national ideology.
Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first president, had a clearer 
position on the absence of state traditions in Algeria, but just like his 
successor, he believed that this lack resulted from colonial occupation 
of Algeria. The comparison he drew with the cases of Morocco and
Tunisia were of high interest but unfortunately his elaboration did not 
go beyond common generalities. According to him, Algeria unlike her 
neighbours "had no state tradition. This situation resulted from the form 
of colonization our country had known. Tunisia and Morocco had, from
'interview to P. Herreman in le M o n d e , April 4, 1968.
^Speech at Batna, February 24, 1968 in Les discours de
President Boumedienne (Ministry of Information,
( 2 )  ,  p • 6  2•
Algiers)
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the beginning, preserved the national state (as) it was only added to 
Tunisian and Moroccan departments a corresponding French department. 
Thus, many Tunisian and Moroccan administrators acquired experience in 
authority. It must be added that the nationalist movement in these two 
brother countries had found an important support from functionaries and 
high civil servants of the state. In the aftermath of the independence 
of these two countries, the problem of transfer of power proved 
relatively easy. These militants have been already at the drive of the 
state machinery whilethe elimination of elements that collaborated with 
colonialism was carried out in a quiet fashion. It has not been the 
same in Algeria where the nationalist movement had only slightly been 
marked by Algerian administrators - many of whom occupied minor posts."^
2. The perennial character of the Algerian nation
In exploring their past, the Algerian leaders like those in other 
former colonies, may have inevitably made somehow inaccurate accounts of 
their own history or created myths of past greatness and idealized 
traditional values, but this emphasis on glorious inheritance may have 
been psychologically necessary to bolster the newly-won independence of 
their countries. The emphasis on nationalism for instance may help
cement the unity of the Algerian people and spur the legitimacy of the 
ruling elites as it serves to conceal linguistic differences and social 
disparities. Therefore, it was not surprising to find a consensus among 
the members of these elites on the unity of the Algerian people and on 
the existence of an Algerian nation before and after the colonization of 
the country. As El-Moudjahid asserted, this history did not start on 
November 1, 1954 (the date of the outbreak of the insurrection) nor since
^Rapport to the FLN Congress, April 1964 in Annuaire de
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the colonial conquest or the arrival of the Arabs. It did not start 
with the Roman conquest. It stretches over twenty-five centuries, since 
our people emerged from prehistory and called themselves the Amazigh,
i.e. the freemen."'
The refutation of the interpretation of Algerian history by 
ideologists of colonization is therefore clearly ascertained in the great 
antiquity of the Algerian people. It is also a form of revolt against the 
'status of indigenat’, the concept of second-class citizenship elaborated 
by colonial ideology. To French colonial acculturation highlighted by 
the precepts" 'our Fatherland, France' and our ancestors,'the Gaullois', 
the Algerians opposed the existence of their own self as a different 
nation with its own history, culture and institutions. Until independence 
in 1962, Algerian history, it was claimed, was marked by a major feature: 
the preservation of the national identity and resistance to foreign power 
invasions. And even when the country was dominated by foreign powers, 
partially in ancient times, or completely under French colonial rule, 
revolts against the foreign grip never ceased. As the National Charter 
asserted: "toutes les tentatives du colonialisme de nier l'existence de 
la Nation Algérienne pour mieux perpétuer sa domination, se sont heurtees 
a la resistance et a la vigeur de cette nation plusieurs fois 
séculaire." The sense of independence of present time Algerians is
therefore given a historical dimension that goes beyond the insurrection 
against French colonialism. But Algeria's fall to foreign submission, 
it was claimed, meant neither the absence of economic development, 
internal dynamics, national genius, nor a need of colonization to get 
access to human civilization and progress. Although Algeria witnessed a
1 El-Moud jahid December 20 , 1983.
^National Charter, p.19.
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succession of states and kingdoms at certain times or had been a mosaic 
of small kingdoms at others, feelings of nationhood were believed to have 
unyieldingly subsisted throughout the country's history.
The nation-state sequence and process of resistance to foreign rule 
dates back to the third century when Algeria was unified under the state 
of Numidia which - established by the Berber Chief Massinisa - was 
thought to have endowed the country with geographical setting and 
national character.1 it was because this state was strong and its chief 
ambitious that the Romans attempted through repeated invasions to divide 
it and control its naval fortifications and merchant sites. By 208 BC, 
Numidia became a Roman vassalage until the fifth century when Bizantine 
rule took over for 100 years. Both Roman and Bizantine domination
concentrated on the coastal fringe (the useful Berberie) while many 
Berber tribes remained in the mountains of Kabylia and the Aures 
resisting foreign penetration. In these strongholds, Christian
influence had been practically negligible as the Berbers were able to 
preserve their dialect, values and way of life. Only in the cities near 
the coast and the adjacent land were integrated into the Roman empire; 
thus some natives were brought within the sphere of Mediterranean 
civilization and were in contact with Christianity and Judaism. 
However, Romano-Berber social and cultural aspects and Judaism as 
outlined in foreign studies of Algerian history, were of little interest 
for Algerian ideologists. Most important for them was the stress on the 
unshaking resistance of the Algerian people, its deep-rooted values,
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although there has been a significant lack of analysis of the Berber 
social and economic life. This lack was perhaps inevitable because the 
cultural patrimony of Algeria was mainly of oral expression.
The crucial episode in Algerian history was certainly the time the 
country and the rest of North-Africa came under Arab rule in late seventh 
century at the time when the Arab caliphat was assumed by the Umayyads 
established at Damascus. The Algerian ideologists speak of the
'arrival' of the Arabs who brought with them a new religion and 
civilization which were welcomed by the Berber natives after an initial 
resistance inherent in their traditions of liberty. Diverse interpreta­
tions that the Arab arrival was a form of colonization or invasion are 
rejected vehemently as the ideologists stress that Algerians not only 
quickly embraced the new faith, but also contributed to its expansion 
over Europe and the Sahara southwards.1
In contrast to Berberist militants - who became more active with the 
1980 cultural protest in Kabylia -resistance by Berber tribes to the Arab 
conquerors is minimized and the Kahina - a chieftain from the Aures 
mountains, considered by the Berber militants as a heroine of the Berber 
resistance - is assumed to have later tolerated Islam as she demanded 
that her two children embrace the new religion. Furthermore, there is a 
belief that Arab and Muslim civilization had contributed to Algerian 
identity, and Islam in particular, is seen as a fundamental element in 
cementing Algerian nationalism and strengthening the unity of the
1The epic contribution of the Berbers to this expansion was 
associated with the conquest of the Spanish Visigothic 
Kingdom in 711 by warriors of Berber descent led by Tarik 
ibn Zayd. Their penetration of Europe reached as far as 
Poitiers in Southern France in 732.
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Algerian people. Not only was the Arab-Muslira civilization thought to 
have contributed to the maturity of the Algerian nation, but it was also 
seen as having invigorated it with other elements constituting the 
nation: cultural, linguistic, spiritual, centralization of the country's 
economy, the whole sustained by a strong desire for independence and 
constant attachment to freedom.^ The people that emerged from this 
historical experience were conceived neither as a mixture of Berbers and 
Arabs nor as a juxtaposition of different races and ethnical groups.^ 
As the National Charter put it, Algeria "is not an assemblage of peoples 
or a mosaic of desperate ethnical groups. This symbiotic relationship
between Berbers and Arabs was thought to have been facilitated by
similarities between their ways of li fe and by the assumption that
Berbers may have themse Ives originated from the Yemen.” ^
The prosperity of the new Algeria emerged with the Fatimid rule that 
stretched all the way from Morocco to Egypt after sweeping away dynasties 
of Berber origin the Idrisids established at Fez and the Aghlabids of 
Ifrikiya. Foreign writers on Algerian history noted that the crumbling of 
the fatimid empire in the eleventh century -resulting from the 
plundering invasions of Arab Bedwin tribes, the (Beni Hilal and Beni 
Solaym) , the collapse of the Berber Senhadja tribe, the Zirids, (which 
assumed the vice-royalty in the Maghreb when the Fatimids moved to Cairo)
National Charter, p.20.
For Ahmed Taleb, the current foreign minister, the 
Algerians are Berbers more or less Arabized in Annuaire de 
l'Afrique du N o r d ,
3President CHA DL1
(10), 1972, p . 386.
observed that two thirds of the Berber 
dialect are Arabic or of Arabic origin (interview to Saint 
Prost in Pari s - Match, December 4-10, 1981). IBN KHALDUN,
the great sociologist of Medieval Maghreb (XIV) could write 
that the two races had lived in the Maghreb for so long 
that it is hard to imagine they have lived somewhere else 
(D i scour s sur l'Histoire u n i v e r s e l l e , (translation Vincent
Monteil, Paris, Sindbad, 1978), p.9.
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and the succession of ruling tribes formed and dissolved through the 
basis of assabiya, a form of familial or clanish solidarity and esprit de 
corps - severely hampered the constitution of a modern state confined to 
the geographical delimitations of present time Algeria. While by the 
end of the eleventh century, Morocco, for instance, was unified under one 
Islamic kingdom set up by a Berbei— speaking tribe the Almoravids 
(Murabits) established at Marrakesh, Algeria remained disintegrated as 
much of its Western part came under the rule of the Almoravid chief Ibn 
Tashfin, while Bougie on the East was under the reign of the Banu Hamad. 
By mid-twelfth century, the Almoravids dynasty was swept away by the 
Almohads (Muwahidun) who succeeded in bringing most of the present time 
Maghreb under a unified rule until it was disintegrated a century later. 
Since then, it was assumed that in contrast to Tunisia which had been 
governed by a single dynasty, the Hafsids, Algeria remained fragmented. 
The most important kingdom resulting from the dissolution of the Almohad 
empire was set up by a Zenata group, the Zayanids (Abd al wadids) in 
Tlemcen in Western Algeria and which lasted more than three centuries 
(1241-1554) while Bougie in Western Algeria was attached to the Hafsid 
empire in Tunisia. And while Algeria and Tunisia came under the
authority of the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century, an Alawite 
dynasty claiming Arab Sherifian descent succeeded the Marinids in Morocco 
and managed to hold the whole country from 1660 until it became a French 
protectorate in 1912. For many historians, this feature explained
Morocco's relative success in surviving as a separate national entity, 
strengthening the socio-economic structures of the Makhzan state and 
consolidating national integration.
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In Algerian official ideology, the disintegration of the country 
into several kingdoms that lasted until the arrival of the Ottomans, did 
not prevent, however, the aspiration to national unity. These kingdoms 
were believed to have exercised authority over the mainland (through 
allegiance), undergone a certain level of socio-economic development, and 
were able to affirm their sovereignty vis-a-vis other nations.1
This interpretation contrasts with writings of foreign historians, 
some of whom considered these kingdoms as static tribes whUVdid not erect 
a state with delimited frontiers and administrative structures, but 
mainly a political and commercial centre around which gravitated a 
certain number of tribes that enjoyed a relative autonomy.* 3 The 
North-African tribal units were also thought to have represented a 
sub-culture within the Arab-Islamic world, and while they identified 
firmly with Islam, they remained, it was assumed, on the margin of a 
wider society, universalistic and non-tribal, as primary loyalties 
(familial, religious brethren) were predominant.3 Moreover, the evolution 
toward forms of a modern state, or at least of a European-type of feudal
1The recent discovery of coins believed to have belonged to 
these states in the eleventh century led El-Moujahid to 
assert the significance of money as an attribute of the
sovereignty of these states (El-Mouj a h i d , November 23-24, 
1934, p.12). See also recent works of Algerian histori­
ans: Dr. A. Dhina: A1 mamlaka A1 Abd al wadiya fi Aassray
Abi Hammu Musa wa ibn Tashfin al awal (the Abdelwadid
Kingdom under the rules of Abu Hammu Musa and Ibn Tashfin
I) Constantine, Dar Al Kitab, 1985, and M. Ben Amir a : Dawr 
Al zenata f i al haraka al madhablya fi al Maghrib (the role
of the Zenata in the formation of the ideological movement 
in the Maghreb) (Constantine, Dar Al Kitab, 1985). 
^Gallissot, R: Pre-colonial Algeria (in Economy and Society, 
(4), 1975, p p .418-445) and Lacoste, Y: General
characteristics and fundamental structures of medieval 
North-Africa (in Economy and S o c i e t y , (3), 1974, 1-17).
3Geliner, E: Tribalism and social change in North-Afr1c a , 
p.110 and L.C.Brown: 'changing cultures and new
loyalties in N o r t h - A f r i c a • (in Lewis, W.H.: French-speaking
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state was prevented it was assumed, by the perpetual shift in the tribal 
balance of power, by the preservation of cohesion within tribal 
communities and conflicts between settlers and nomads as well as by the 
dichotomy between state and society that existed during the Ottoman rule 
in Algeria. *
The Turkish era constituted an important phase in Algerian history 
and sensibly marked its course. There is a consensus that the Ottoman 
corsairs were called upon by the North-Africans to protect them from 
incessant expeditions of Christian Spain after the Reconquista and 
France, and as a result, the Barbarossa brothers Kheir Din and Aruj as 
commanders of the ottoman navy extended the sea power of the Turks to 
North-Africa with the exception of Morocco. Algiers became important to 
the Turkish empire as an advanced base from which they could launch 
operations against European Christians, but with the decline of the naval 
power of the Ottomans, the Turkish Deys at Algiers held a purely local 
power. The regency, under the nominal suzerainety of the sublime porte, 
was a kind of an oligarchic military republic with a central authority 
established in Algiers (Dey) and three Beylikal provinces: Central 
Algeria (Titteri), Oran (West) and Constantine in the East.
In the studies of foreign historians, the Deys' authority was 
assumed to have been based on the militias of the Turkish Janitors and a 
few powerful tribes which being exempt from taxes and endowed with public 
land (Makhzan) served as tax collectors for the Beylikal authorities. And 
while many tribes of the hinterland (Bled a Siba or zone of dissidence) 1
1Laroui,A: History of the Maghrib (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1977), p.252> Camau, M: Pouvoirs et
institutions au Maghreb (Paris, Ceres production, 1978), 
p.100 and Knapp,W: North-West Africa (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1977), pp.58-59.
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did not recognize the suzerainety of the Regency (Bled al-Turk) , others 
dominated by powerful families (Soff) grudgingly paid a tribute to the 
Dey. The latter's failure to unify all the tribal communities resulted 
from the desire of many tribes to preserve their autonomy thus increasing 
the country's political fragmentation.1 This division in the home
polity and the marginalization of the natives in socio-economic-political 
life were categorically refuted by the Algerian ideologists asserting 
that the state was able to extend its administration to the mainland 
through institutions, political and cultural organisms directed by 
Algerians.^ However,the rejection of the disfunctional decentralization
of authority as outlined by many writers, has not been sustained with 
satisfactory insights of the state and societal structures. It was simply 
asserted that the Turks had melted with the native population and did not 
constitute a caste distinct and aloof from the rest of the society as it 
was argued by foreign historians. The Algerian ideologists believed 
that it was during this ottoman era that the modern Algerian state 
emerged, given domestic prerogatives (political organization and 
administration), status of sovereignty and independence the Regency 
enjoyed at that time. Examples of treaties and conventions signed by 
the Regency and other foreign powers were cited in abundance to sustain 
the status of a sovereign nation. In these treaties, it was referred to
In particular Ch-A. Julien« Histoire de 1 'Algérie 
contemporaine . See also Gallissot, Pre-colonial A l g e r i a ,
and Lacoste, J: general characteris11c s .
^FLN Committee Central's resolution on cultural policy, 
P . 7 .
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as the 'state' or the 'Republic' of Algiers by other nations such as 
France, Britain, Spain and the USA with which the Regency had established 
diplomatic and consular relations.1
However, negative aspects that existed at that time were said to 
have resulted from the decay that touched the entire Muslim world and not 
only from the ottoman rule. In this vein, the French conquest of Algeria 
was conceived as the result of incessant attempts of invasions and 
colonization made at the time of the crusa d es From the Algerian point 
of view, the main reason for Algeria's fall into French hands was the 
diminished power of the Regency after the destruction of the Algerian 
fleet when supporting the ottoman navy to suppress the Greek rebellion 
three years before the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. An extensive 
rhetoric underlines the Algerian people's resistance to French colonial­
ism and its opposition to the gall ic iza t iofif the country. Regional 
resistances led by Bey Ahmed in Constantine and Emir Abdelkader in the 
West, at the beginning of the French conquest and revolts in some parts
FLN's Resolution on cultural policy, p.7.; M. Kassim's 
valuable and pioneering work on this subject: Shakhsiyat A1 
Jazair A D a w l i y a .
Also articles on the occasion of President Chadli's visit 
to the USA in April 1985, for instance: G. Boutaleb: 'il y 
a 100 ans, 1 ' Algerie reconnaissait lei Etats Unis'
(Algerie-Actualite's, N.1018, April 18-24, 1985) p.19; M.
Bagtache: 'les relations Alge'ro-US avant 1830' in El
M o u j a h l d , April 17, 1985, p.12.
In addition to the treaty signed between the Regency and 
the USA in July 5, 1795, for instance, H •M • Queen Elizabeth
provides evidence on a treaty signed between the British 
and the Algiers Regency in 1765 , as she recalled when 
visiting Algiers in Autumn 1981, that "our common history 
goes back to ancient time. As maritime nations we had
always traded and sometimes fought each other. ..the 1765 
treaty envisaged from that time and forever peace and 
friendship between the British Queen and the Kingdom of 
Algiers. I believe we can say that the two parties
respect this treaty signed more than two hundred years ago" 
(quoted in M. Boualem: la question du Sahara occidental, 
Algiers, opu, 1983).
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of the country such as those waved by the Ouled Sidi Sheikh in 1864, 
Sheiks Al-Mokrani, Al-Haddad, Boumama, the Zaatchas and the Ouled Nail in 
early 1870s, were not conceived as tribal and disparate or lacking 
national consciousness as it was advanced by many foreign historians but 
as an expression of a national resistance of a people deeply attached to 
its fundamental Arabo-Islamic values. The resistance of Emir Abdelkader 
after 1830 in particular was thought to have channelled the resistance of 
an Algerian state which, through the Emir's rule and administrative 
control, encompassed two thirds of present time Algeria.
The emphasis on the Emir’s intellectual qualities and military 
abilities as he fought the French troops aimed at highlighting the fact 
that Algeria was at that time a modern state which had its own money, 
system of taxation, administrative structure and with a certain degree of
socio-economic development• The treaty of Tafna signed between
Abdelkader and General Bugeau, the commander of the French colonial
troops, in 1837 which put an end to the former's resistance was regarded 
as a legally binding and enforceable international treaty.
In their search for a glorious past, the Algerian ideologists made 
of the Emir an image of this past and the symbol of the country's long 
resistance against French efforts of depersonalization and acculturation.
In this vein, the nationalist movement that emerged at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was said to have originated from this strong and 
unaltered form of resistance to foreign domination and despite the 
existence of opposed movements, this nationalism was presented as 
Unitarian, as the different nationalist parties were believed to have 
militated for a common objective, i.e. independence and liberty of the 
Algerian people. Algerian nationalism was then conceived neither as
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recent nor as a production of Western colonialism as formulated in
studies related to the new states* It had, instead, been cemented
around three fundamental elements: the ancestral desire for independence, 
the Arabo-Islamic inheritance of the Algerian people and its unicity.
These features have to some extent marked present time Algeria's pursuit 
of a policy of independence and assertion of her identity. Moreover, if 
in the Algerian official discourse, French colonialism was seen as 
resulting in the destruction of the Algerian state, in the marginal­
ization of the Algerian people and in the fragmentation of the national­
ist movement which hampered the emergence of a coherent elite, this
colonialism, however did not destroy the Algerian nation as such, being 
only responsible for discontinuities in traditions of the state, the 
economic backwardness and crisis of identity new Algeria faced in the 
aftermath of independence.
B. THE COLONIAL PREDICAMENT 
1. Marginalization of the Nation
In the official doctrine, colonialism was depicted as a "long and 
somber night" and in the terms of an Algerian historian and diplomat as a 
"national crime, a series of destruction, expropriation of land, exiles 
and massacres."1 In very few countries of the non-Western world has the 
impact of colonization been so great, so deep and so crucial for their 
future as in Algeria. Until her independence she was unlike other
French colonies declared a French department and considered as a part of 
France. And in contrast to Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates which 
enjoyed a certain sovereignty and a local personality distinct from those
1Lacheraf,A: Algerie nation et s o c i é t é , p.38
belonging to France, Algeria saw her traditional sources of authority and 
societal structures destroyed, as the French once installed in the 
country set out to break, through violent oppression, the powerful tribes 
which had resisted them.^ The fragmentation of these social and
economic structures was accompanied by the transfer of most of the 
fertile land from the natives to European settlers whose implantation in 
Algeria became the basis for the colony of settlement. Through the
ordinances of 1844-1848 and the 1867 senatus consultus, French rule 
radically undermined Algeria's system of land tenure, a process that led 
to the dismantling of the state's foundations laid down by the Emir 
Abdelkader, the breaking up of the native land aristocracy leaving the 
rest of the population on the margin of history, deprived of its personal 
status, traditional culture, and material base.^
Throughout the French rule, the existence of a dual society became 
noticeable: on the one hand, a powerful minority of settlers dominating 
politically and economically the country and providing some privileges to 
a relatively limited small-educated elite of Muslims and on the other.
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'in 1830, a French par1iamentary commission reported that: 
'we have exceeded in barbarity the Barbarian we came to 
civilize' (quoted in C.H.Moore: North-Africa (Boston,
Little Brown & Cy, 1970), p.40.
M a r s h a l l  Bugeaud was also reported to have told the French 
national assembly in 1840 that "whenever there is a fresh 
water, fertile land, then one must locate colons, without 
concerning oneself to whom these lands belong." (quoted in 
A. Horne: Algeria, a savage war of peace (Penguin Books, 
London, 1977), p.29.
For a succinct analysis o
Algerian
the realities of French
» # see the work of the
u : formati on d u sous-
3 in particular (Algiers,
e , 1978), p p .164 and see
aiso: Aardes lcollecta J : éléments sur les structures
socio-économiques de 1 'Algérie a" travers l'étude de leur 
désarticulation par le developement du capitalisme durant 
la période coloniale, Algiers, 1974.
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the great bulk of the indigenous population lived in misery and 
illiteracy. The economic dualism consisted of the existence of an
agro-industrial sector dominated by the colons. On the eve of the 
Algerian war, 8000 of them held 2,392,000 hectares of the most fertile 
land producing much more than all the Muslim peasants who were confined 
to a traditional sector mainly agrarian characterized by archaic means of 
labour, aridity of the soil and very low income which came to provide a 
meagre means of subsistence for nearly ninety-five per cent of the Muslim 
population. Besides its specific aspect of a colony of settlement, 
Algeria became a huge market for French goods and a source of the 
Metropole's labour market as hundreds of thousands of Algerians worked in 
France sometimes in painful conditions. In addition, as a result of the 
forced conscription many young Muslims were believed to have died in the 
two world war campaigns fighting for France. The benefits the French 
colonialists bestowed from Algeria had been pictured by Algerian 
ideologists as a savage plundering of the country's human and natural 
resources.
The colonial dialectic was not limited to these economic aspects 
only, as the French attempted to eradicate Algerian traditional culture 
as well. Muslim natives were, then, legally barred from studying their 
own language and many Zawiya's cultural and educational centres of 
prosperous brotherhood associations came under constant harrassment and 
control of French colonial administration in an attempt to increase the 
gallicisation of Algeria. As a result, French-educated Algerians were 
prevented from getting access to their national culture unlike the 
Moroccan or Tunisian intelligentsia which enjoyed a bilingual education. 
However, the process of expanding French culture among the native
population had meagre results. In 1887 there were only seventy-nine 
French public schools attended by 8963 out of 500,000 Muslims in age of 
schooling.1 In 1948 less than ten per cent of the whole indigenous 
population could write any language and on the eve of the Algerian 
independence, only 2,500 out of 50,000 attending universities were of 
Muslim origin. In addition to its limited scope, the expansion of
schools for the natives touched only a few areas of the country 
concentrating mainly in the Kabylia region. The reasons stemming from 
the low budget allocated for education and the lack of human and material 
conditions did not conceal France's attempt to separate Arabs and Berbers 
on the basis of divide and rule.^ Berber particularism was stressed by 
the colonial administrators as well as French scholars as Kabyles in 
particular were presented as the most able recipients of Western 
civilization in comparison with segments of Arab origin depicted as 
inferior and less mobile and creative. The access of a certain number 
of Kabyles to French culture consolidated the 'fait Berber' which had to 
some extent detrimental effect on the unity of the Algerian people during 
the war against French colonial rule and most in post-colonial Algeria.
The situation was worsened by the persistent refusal of the settlers 
to grant constitutional rights to the indigenous population which were 
considered as second-class citizens and remained subject to a legal code 
of their own, the 'code of indigenat' until the second world war."* To 
deal with the natives, the French created the 'Arab bureaux' in 1848, a
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1Lacheraf, M: L'avenir de la culture Algérienne (in les 
temps modernes, (19), July 1963-June 1964) pp.720-745.
*Kaddac h e , M ï L'utilisation du fait Berbère comme facteur 
politique dans l'Algérie coloniale (in proceedings of the 
first Congress on Mediterranean studies of Arabo-Berber 
influence, edited by M. Galley, Algiers, SNED, 1973), 
pp.277-284.
^Preamble, Communal C h a r t e r , p.27.
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kind of administrative institution led by French officers well-endowed 
with executive powers such as military, legal and collection of taxes. 
In 1868, reforms were introduced into the administrative mechanisms and 
regulations though without abolishing segregation toward the indigenous 
population. As a result, the European-dominated areas were administered 
by communes de 'plein exercise', while those of predominantly native 
character came under the prerogatives of the 'communes mixtes' where 
authority was exercised by a European administrator, eventually 
benefiting from assistance from local notables or caids. With this 
sub-division, was created a double electoral college system: the first 
college comprised the European settlers in their status as French 
citizens and a relatively limited population of Muslim évolués, while the 
second college encompassed the whole indigenous population. Each 
college was entitled to select the same number of representatives to the 
French parliament. With this system, the unde:— representation of the 
Algerian Muslims became evident as one million of European settlers had 
voting rights equal to those of roughly eight million natives at that 
time (1948). Indeed, only two out of five members of municipal counsels 
were Muslim natives and earlier, in the 1901 poll to elect representa­
tives in the 'delegations financières' created to give Algeria financial 
autonomy, 93,000 voters out of a European population estimated at 630,000 
elected 48 representatives while only 90,000 of the indigenous population 
out of a total of 3,600,000 were permitted to vote and only for as few as 
21 representatives.' This discrimination confined the Muslims to their 
inferior status and prevented them from gaining substantial participation 
in the affairs of their own country, despite occasional reforms to 1
1 i b i d .
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improve their status. Even the policy of assimilation preached by the 
colonial establishment did not lure many Muslims to adopt French 
citizenship and renounce their personal status.
2• Fragmentation of the nationalist movement and the pursuit of
legalistic reforms
Initial protest against French colonial policy in early twentieth 
century emerged within segments of the Algerian-educated elite which 
began to realize that being able to get access to French culture and 
standard of life did not bring equal rights and privileges as those 
enjoyed by the minority oX European settlers. With the activities of 
Emir Ali a son of Emir Abdelkader and Khalid the latter's grandson, 
claims for the suppression of the 'code of indigenat' increased among the 
Algerian évolués, many of whom had gathered in a ' FedeVation des élus
indigenes' in the late 1920s. These aspirations became the driving
force of the assimilationist movement which represented segments of
Muslim-educated minority and urban middle-class. It's well known figure 
was Ferhat Abbas, a son of a Caid born in 1889 at Taher near Djidjelli on 
the constantinois littoral. Abbas trained as a pharmacist and in 1933 
was elected as departmental counsellor at Setif where he established a 
chemist shop. In 1946, he formed the Union De#mocratique du Manifeste
Algerien, UDMA, a party that claimed an Algerian state in which the
European settlers and the natives would have equal rights, thus
implicitly denying the existence of an Algerian nation • In an often
quoted statement made in 1936, Abbas said:"If I had discovered the
Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush from it 
as from a crime ... Men who die for a patriotic ideal are honoured and 
respected. My life is not worth more than theirs. But ... I would not 
die for the Algerian fatherland because this fatherland does not exist.
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I have not discovered it. I cannot find it. I have interrogated
history, I have interrogated the living and the dead. I have visited 
the cemeteries, no one has spoken to me of it ... No one moreover 
seriously believes in our nationalism, what one wishes to fight behind 
this world is our political and economic emancipation ... without 
emancipation of the natives there is no French Algeria."1 In the
official discourse in independent Algeria, the assimilationist movement 
was depicted as collaborating with French colonialism and being a 
contempt towards Algeria's traditions and culture.
In contrast, the reformist movement of the Ulama was accredited with 
some praise and honour. This movement, having its roots in upper
middle-class families with scriptural Muslim and Arabic education as well 
as ascetic inclinations, was largely influenced by the 'Salafiya* 
movement that spread in the Middle East and was directed against both the 
assimilationists and religious obscurantism, mysticism and deviationism 
that existed in Maraboutic circles and certain sects. Its most
prestigious leader. Sheikh Abdu A1 Hamid Ben Badis was born in December 
1889 of a wealthy family of Berber origin but with strong Arabic 
background. Ben Badis was educated at the Zitouna University in Tunis 
and spent some time in Cairo where he came into contact with the 
reformist movement and puritan doctrine preached by Sheikh Abdu, a 
disciple of the great reformist sheikh A1 Afghani whose activities aimed 
at restoring the grandeur of the original Islam in reaction to the 
decline of the Muslim world during the Ottoman rule. The plea of the 
Algerian ulema emerged with the observation made by Ben Badis that
Algerian society is "sick, in mortal danger, as regards its faith and its
1 In L'entente, February 23, 1936
41
language. It calls savagery courage, and weakness long-suffering. In
spite of the efforts of the progressive club and the recent rise of
Arabic writings, its culture is collapsing, like its economy• Its
learning remains pedantic and ossified. But Algeria is not dead and will 
not die. It has not been and will not be absorbed. The proof of this 
lies in its earlier and its recent history."1 The distinctiveness of 
the Algerian people, the affirmation of its own cultural identity was 
affirmed with force by Ben Badis who, in reply to Abbas's denial of the 
existence of an Algerian nation asserted that Algeria "has its culture, 
its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad like every nation of 
the earth, and next we state that this Algerian nation is not France, 
cannot be France and does not wish to be France."^ The separation between 
the two communities is also clearly asserted in Ben Badis' well known 
precepts: "Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, Algeria my country."
The main activities of the Ulama concentrated on helping arise a 
sense of religious and national consciousness among Algerian Muslims, 
around Ben Badis's precepts that the Algerian people are Muslim and 
belong to the Arab nation. Propagation of teachings of Muslim
fondements and Arabic language was carried out in Quranic schools or 
Medersas and through the publication of newspapers in Arabic such as A1 
Muntaquid (the censor) and the Shihab (the Meteor). However, like the 
assimilationist, the Ulama movement militated within the frame of 
legality for the sake of achieving their aims and were far from either 
calling for the complete independence of Algeria or for inciting 
rebellion and political activities against French colonial rule. This
1Quoted in I. Berque: French North Africa (London,
and Faber, 1967), p.228.
^Quoted in Horne, A: A savage war for peace, p.38.
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moderation was implicitly rejected by the Algerian state ideologists who 
retained mainly the positive aspects of the Ulama movement, i.e. its 
important contribution to the preservation of national values through 
resistance to attempts of depersonalization of the Algerian people. It 
was therefore not surprising to notice that in post-colonial Algeria the 
commemoration of the death of Ben Badis was made to coincide with the 
celebration of the national day of science and education (Yum al ilm).
More radical and more involved in political activities was the 
movement that originated in France within the circles of the Algerian 
immigrants and lately developed into a continuum - PPA-MTLD party - which 
had a wider nationalistic support and called for an Algerian constituent 
assembly, sovereign and elected by universal suffrage without distinction 
of any kind, evacuation of Algeria by French troops, and Arabization of 
schools. His main figure was Messali Hadj, born in 1898 at Tlemcen in a 
modest family. After serving in the first world war in the French army 
he worked in France in the well-known Renault car assembly plant in the 
Paris region. Together with Hadj Abdelkader, he founded the 'North- 
African Star' (ENA) in 1925-6 an organisation which demanded independence 
of Algeria. After its dissolution by the French authorities in 1932, 
Messali formed the 'Algerian people's party' (PPA) five years later and 
then the 'Movement for the Triumph of democratic liberties' (MTLD) after 
a long period of harrassment by the French. Messali shifted from his 
early communist convictions to supporting an Algerian nationalism largely 
inspired from the Panarabist movement advocated by the Lebanese Shakib 
Arslan that was sweeping the Arab world at that time. In contrast to
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Abbas, Messali emphasized separation of Algeria from France and unlike 
Ben Badis, his demands were aimed at setting up an Algerian state secular 
and modernist.
Besides these main movements, stood the Algerian communist party, 
but with no significant impact on the Algerian nationalist movement. 
The PCA, formed in 1924 as a branch of the French communist party the PCF 
and dominated by Europeans was granted autonomy in 1938 by the PCF at its 
Villeurbane Congress. The Euro-centrism of the party, its domination by 
non-indigenous elements and its political opportunism did not contribute 
to make of the PCA a genuine nationalist movement in the eyes of the 
Algerian ideologists. The responsibility of the PCF in the repression 
of Algerian demonstrators on May 8, 1945 on the day of celebration of the 
allies victory over Nazi Germany, accounted for the lack of PCA's 
credibility in Algerian official discourse and also was the standpoint of 
this party that Algeria was: "a nation in formation whose people will be 
an original mixture of European, Arab and Berber elements which have 
melted to constitute a new race: the Algerian race. But this nation has 
not attained its maturity yet.”'
In its diversity, the Algerian nationalist movement had nevertheless 
emphasized a legalistic approach in its political demands. This 
strategy was regarded as useful in the context of the emergence of the 
■front populaire' in France. Many Algerian nationalists came to regard
'statement made by 0. Ouzegane, a muslim native and a 
secretary of the PCA, quoted in Gallissot, P: les
conceptions de la Nation Algérienne (in Revue Algérienne 
des Sciences juridiques, economiques et p olitiques, (15)
1978, p p . 719-741) p. 727 . Ouzegane's statement resembles 
the declaration of Maurice Thorez, the leader of the PCF 
made on February 1 1 , 1939 that Algeria "was a nation in
formation, its national character as yet to emerge from the 
eventual form of a mixture of 20 races, the principal ones 
Arab, Berber, European and Jewish".
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the change of regime in their metropole as an encouraging sign for 
obtaining constitutional rights and betterment of the standard of living 
of the Moslem population. The democratic ideals exalted by the popular 
front in response to the emergence of nazism in Europe convinced them of 
the necessity to opt for a moderate attitude in order not to jeopardise a 
certain form of a struggle against the French right wing parties in 
France and the ultra of the European settlers in Algeria. Amid these 
optimistic feelings, demands for social and political reforms were 
presented in 1936 by delegates issued from the Muslim congress that 
gathered representatives from the Ulama, the UDMA and the PCA. But these 
demands were turned down by the French government and a year later the 
Blum—Violette project which aimed at granting French citizenship to some 
educated Muslims in Algeria without the abandonment of Muslim status and 
at providing the country with financial authority and civil personality, 
was rejected by the French parliament under pressure from the colonial 
lobby and settlers. As a result, the early optimism of the moderate 
segments of the Algerian nationalists was deeply shattered but not 
completely extinguished. The struggle for democratic ideals and liberty 
so cherished by the old generation of the Algerian nationalists 
especially Ferhat Abbas remained accurate and boosted by the stand of the 
free world in its conflict against Nazi Germany.
The impact of the world war on the Algerian nationalist movement, 
however, was quite paradoxical: whereas for the old generation of 
Algerian nationalists, the war was regarded as a symbol of the struggle 
for liberty and independence but in alignment with the Free World,' it
'it was perhaps this sense of commitment to liberal ideas 
that explained contacts the old guard of Maghrebi
nationalists including Ferhat Abbas had with General Murphy 
the Commander of the US troops during the landing of the allied
45
was a revealing factor for the young militants in the sense that the 
French empire in its grandeur and power was defeated by German troops in 
a humiliating fashion. This experience was valuable for the Algerian 
nationalists since it helped many of then exorcise feelings of inferior­
ity vis-a-vis the French and the courage they showed in the battlefields 
not only convinced them of their abilities to fight like others but also 
helped them to discover themselves and extirpate from their minds notions 
of 'indigenat' and second-class citizens. This new form of national 
consciousness as revealed by the impact of the second world war was also 
at the root of the outbreak of violence as expression of modern 
nationalism when on May 8, 1945 Algerians paraded in the streets to 
acclaim victory against the Third Reich and claim independence which was 
promised by France as a reward for their participation in the war against 
Nazism. These demonstrations were followed by violent French retaliation 
which left thousands of Moslems dead in Eastern Algeria mainly. These 
events not only marked a turning point in Algerian history but cemented 
the nationalism of many young Algerians and incited them to use violence 
to achieve the country's independence. The last blow to the legalistic 
approach of the old generation came with the failure to obtain political 
reforms given the firm opposition of the French settlers' lobby. 
Although the 1947 statute recognized for Algeria a civil personality, it 
did not, however, alter discrimination at all levels against the
forces in North-Africa • America's declared attachment to
the defence of the free world, the emancipation of peoples, 
and ideals of justice appealed to the old generation of 
Algerian nationalists in the sense of reaffirming the 
precepts of the great French revolution which marked the 
thought of many of the these nationalists. Most of them 
deeply resented the violation of basic civil liberties in 
Algeria by the country which gave birth to this 
enlightening revolution.
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indigenous population and did not grant Algeria autonomy as the country 
remained under the control of the 'gouverneur general' who was responsi­
ble before the French home office and not to the Algerian assembly. The 
elections to this institution in which the Algerian nationalist parties 
Pai"ticipated were rigged by the French administration to protect French 
sovereignty. As a result, the MTLD, the party with most wide popular 
support won only eight seats in the second college reserved for the 
indigenous population. The failure to obtain equal political rights and 
improve the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim natives, sealed the 
faith of the legalistic approach that the old Algerian nationalist 
movement had been pursuing. Therefore bitterly disillusioned by France's 
failure to live up to its promises, many of the moderate nationalists 
adopted a radical line with a new generation of Algerian nationalists.^
3. The y LN crisis of leadership and the emergence
of the General-Staff
a) Political attitudes towards the armed insurrection
Moves towards insurrection were initiated by the young militants 
regrouped within the OS (organization spéciale), the underground 
organization set up by the MTLD in 1947 to prepare the insurrection. 
But a few years later, the OS members - disappointed by the unworthy 
internal divisions within the MTLD over leadership of the party 
(centralists v Messalists); the moderate attitude of its leader and its 
inclination for personal rule? the divisions between Arabs and Kabyles;
 ^In his memoirs, De Gaulle observed that the 1947 reform was 
"having at first responded favorably to the Algerian
statute, but the Moslem masses and their political
leaders soon came to recognize that the reforms were 
spurious, and abandoning the hopes which had inspired them 
at the time of the liberation of France, concluded that 
their own liberation would never be won by legal means" (in 
Memoirs of h o p e , translated by T. Kilmartin, (London,
Weidei£e ld and Nicolson, 1971), p.14.
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and stimulated by the wind of revolutionary nationalism which began to 
sweep away the old colonial rule - set up the CRUA, the Revolutionary 
Committee for Unity and Action.1 A national liberation front (FLN) was 
issued from this committee and after a series of clandestine meetings, 
its founders broke out an armed insurrection on November 1, 1954 through
small but coordinated bands of insurgents that struck some French 
military and police garrisons and depots in various parts of Algeria. 
The members of the CRUA that set up the FLN known as the nine historic 
chiefs comprised a 6 men initial nucleus (Ait Ahmed, Ben M'Hidi, Ben 
Boulaid, Boudiaf, Bitat and Krim Belkacem) joined shortly after by Ben 
Bella, Khider and Didouche Murad. Although from different social
backgrounds, these revolutionaries came from relatively modest segments 
of the Algerian society and from all parts of Algeria. Ait Ahmed, Krim 
were sons of Kebyle caids, Ben Boulaid was a craftsman from Batna, Ben 
M'Hidi, Bitat, Boudiaf came from modest families in Southern Constantine 
and Ben Bella from Marnia, a little town near the Moroccan border and a 
family of small sharecroppers. None of them attained a high education
level with the exception of Ait Ahmed and only three of them had military 
training: Krim, Ben Bella and Ben Boulaid, these last two were decorated
'internecine conflicts had hampered the unity and the 
dynamism of the M T L D • In 1949, the members of the Kabyle 
faction within the party Bennai ouali, Amar Ould Hammuda, 
Rachid Ali Yahia were executed. Ait Ahmed was replaced by 
Ben Bella at the head of the OS perhaps in an attempt to 
prevent Kabyles assume leadership. In early 1950s, some
members of the M T L D 's central committee opposed Messali 
Hadj's personalization of power. The party's congress
held at Hornu in Belgium on July 1 5- 17 , 1953 decided the 
exclusion of the 'centralists' led by Hocine Lahouel from 
the party. To counter these decisions, the 'centralists' 
organized a congress on their own in Algiers shortly after 
and ousted two of Messali's aides Mezerna and Moulay 
Merbah. It was these dissensions within the MTLD that 
irritated the young militants of the 'OS' which emphasized 
radical nationalism to patch up these splits.
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during the Italian campaign as warrant officers in the French army. 
Because of their age (averaging 32 in 1954) none of them was engaged in 
political activities before the second world war and therefore had little 
similarity with the old nationalist movements. Their major unifying 
force had been the necessity to use violence to achieve independence, 
breaking away from the more or less pacifist attitude of the existing 
nationalist parties and stressing that the liberation of Algeria "will 
not be the work of one party, but of all Algerians."^
In the official language, the adhesion of the social strata to the 
cause was conditioned by the historical evolution of Algeria on the 
ground that "patriotic and anti-capitalist forces emerged from the 
middle-class, small urban craftsmen, workers and peasants given the 
weakness of the Algerian bourgeoisie which resulted from the policy of 
land expropriation, exodus, oppression and the decline of the Ulama as an 
institutionalized force".^ Basically most of the guerrilla forces of 
the national army of liberation (ALN) came from modest social backgrounds 
and mainly rural areas. These strata constituted the majority of the 
Algerian Moslem population and perhaps the most exploited in the colonial 
agrarian-based economy. Their great involvement in the guerrilla movement 
was dictated by their precarious social condition and their desire to 
fight for regaining their land which they regarded as their basic source 
of income and perhaps of their existence. But the agrarian question in 
their revolt did not resemble that of the Vietnamese peasantry in the 
sense that the Algerian rural masses lacked consciousness on their own 
and did not stress specific demands related to their own needs and 
aspirations. Moreover their contribution to the struggle against
1E l-Mou d j a h i d , (3), Summer 1956.
^National Charter, 1976, p.9.
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colonial domination did not exalt a religious revolt or a form of jihad 
as defined in terms of religious fanaticism as much as a revolt of the 
oppressed as described by Frantz Fanon.
Unlike the peasantry, the Algerian working class was relatively 
limited perhaps because of the low level of industrialization of the 
country and its lack of modern skills. Most of the urban working strata 
were labourers or involved in small craft activities. In their majority 
they were of peasant descent and supported the war of liberation as a 
response to the frustrations proper to a kind of plebian strata. Like 
the fellahs, they were attached to basic Arabo-Islamic values and were 
the primary source of ALN recruitment. In the course of the war, they 
came to form the main corpus of the revol utionary army as freedom 
fighters (Mujahidin) or as the maquisards in distinction with the 
politician militants of the FLN. In contrast, segments of the Algerian 
upper and middle classes did not support the revolution from the start 
not only because they were suspicious of the ability of the FLN-ALN 
guerrillas to fight French colonial troops, but also because of their 
distrust to violence, preferring instead a form of political activities 
based on rising the national consciousness of the indigenous population 
around the teaching of religious precepts (like the Ulama) or through the 
search for emancipation and assimilation like the Muslim 'evolue's'. 
Indeed, it was only in mid-1956 that the association of the Ulama and 
other political parties such as UDMA and PCA declared their support to 
the national cause, perhaps after realizing that "the revolution has gone 
to the streets", to use the terms of Larbi Ben M'Hidi one of its 
historical chiefs. Therefore, many members of the old parties and of 
the liberal professions joined the FLN on an individual basis as
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stipulated by the FLN leaders. However, being educated most of these 
segments of the upper and middle classes served in the political 
apparatuses of the national liberation front and many were able to take 
over important positions in its leadership after the structuration of the 
FLN—ALN organization.
b. Attempts to structure the framework of the revolution and their 
impact on the FLN leadership
It was at the Summam River Valley in August 1956 that the first 
attempts were made to provide the FLN with organized bodies, structures 
and political framework. These efforts aimed at unifying actions to 
sustain a war against the French colonial troops and at making the FLN 
the spearhead of the war of liberation. On the organizational level, 
Algeria was divided into six military departments according to geographi­
cal considerations. Each department or wilaya came under the control of 
personalities among the nine historic chiefs, while the general 
commandment of the FLN was placed under Krim's authority and another 
chief Boudiaf was charged to coordinate between the 'interior' and the 
'exterior'. The latter referred to the three remaining historic chiefs: 
Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella and Khider who had, outside of Algeria, especially 
in Egypt, attempted to gather international support and aid for the 
nascent revolution.
The Summam congress represented for the FLN a decisive step in its 
strategies and the decisions it took concerned intimately the leadership 
question, an issue that had serious implications not only on the FLN 
intra-elite relationships but also on the nature of the political 
leadership of independent Algeria. Three decisions were taken at this 
congress: 1) the primacy of the interior over the exterior; 2) the 
primacy of the political over the military; 3) collegial leadership.
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These decisions reflected the balance of power that existed at that time 
as the congress gathering only representatives of the 'interior' set up 
the FLN first political directorate, the national council of the Algerian 
revolution (CNRA) formed out of 17 members. The delegates elected also 
a five member decision-making body (CEE) supposedly the FLN's executive 
organ under the de facto leadership of Abbane Ramdane, a rising political 
figure within the FLN. However, provisions for a directorate and a better 
organizational frame for the revolution did not prevent conflicts among 
the FLN leaders. The formation of the CNRA was made according to a 
co-optation system based on the following selective criteria:the leader 
and the deputies of each military zone, plus two or three members of the 
old parties: MTLD, UDMA and Ulama were chosen with alternates for each 
full member. The criteria of selection angered many of the longest 
standing militants who found themselves evicted from the CNRA and the CEE 
to the benefit of newcomers many of whom did not initially support the 
principle of an armed insurrection like Ferhat Abbas, A1 Madani or others 
regarded as moderate such as Benkhedda or Lamine Debaghine.
The principle of the supremacy of the 'interior' over the 'exterior' 
aggravated these conflicts as no member of the 'delegation exterieure' 
was appointed to the CEE and raised the primordial conflict over 
leadership between Ben Bella and Abbane Ramdane. In Cairo, the former 
attempted to impose himself as the sole leader of the revolution and 
consequently was very critical of the Summam congress decisions, while 
the latter, a skilful strategist and probably the political genius behind 
the congress proceedings, was not willing to relinquish his newly- 
acquired authority. To Ben Bella, the congress brought the revolution " 
a bureaucratic apparatus and red tape that gradually divorced it from the 
realities and the masses since it elevated to leadership and high positions
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in the managerial organs, political personalities who, after November the 
first did not hesitate to disavow our action. Confusion, contradiction, 
the absence of firm principles thus set in at the head of the FLN. Our 
capture a few months later enabled leftist and conservative politicians 
to lead a revolution for which they were not prepared."'
The exigencies of the war, combined with the intensification of 
French repression originated events that in return produced great
consequences on the FLN and permitted the emergence of new forces
striving for its leadership. As the war went on, the wilayat officers 
acquired autonomy and increased their demands as ambitions inevitably 
grew in the absence of the delegation of the exterior and the CEE 
leadership who had to flee to either Morocco or Tunisia because of the 
growing insecurity in Algeria especially after the beginning of the 
dismantling of the FLN urban guerrilla strongholds by the French
paratroopers during the battle of Algiers.
In such a context, the second principle set up by the Summam
congress referring to the supremacy of the political over the military 
was doomed to a complete impotence and did not resist the facts. The 
CNRA second meeting took place in Cairo in October in 1957 and brought 
marked changes with regard to the FLN's leadership as it elected a second 
CEE comprising 9 members and reflecting the rise of high officers among 
the wilaya guerrillas: the colonels: Ben Tobbal (wilaya II) ,Boussouf 
(IV), Mahmoud Cherif (III), Ouamrane (IV). In addition to Krim,
politicians were retained: the liberal Abbas and the ex-centr alist 
Debaghine, while Mehri an ailing member of the PPA-MTLD was included.
'intervie# to M. Merle in 
Gallimard, 1965), p p . 113-114.
Ahmed Ben Bella (Paris
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The emergence of these officers not only undermined the authority of 
Abbane - who firmly opposed the membership composition of this second CEE 
- but also led to the creation of a "commandement des operations 
militaires” (COM) aimed at coordinating the FLN's military operations. 
Two branches of the COM were established: one at Oujda in Morocco with 
authority over the forces of the ALN and the other at Ghardimaou in 
Tunisia endowed with the control of troops in Eastern Algeria and along 
the Tunisian frontier. The commandment of the oujda COM branch was given 
to a rapidly rising young officer. Colonel Boumedienne, the deputy 
commander and a protegee of Cl. Boussouf the powerful head of wilaya V 
(Oran region), while the Tunisian branch was directed by Cl. Mohammedi 
said. Later, the two branches were unified with the setting up of the ALN 
General Staff (EMG) with Headquarters in Tunisia near the Algerian 
border.
With France attempting to put an end to the armed insurrection 
through extensive military operation, the setting up of the line Morice 
(electrified wires on the Algerian-Tunisian border), psychological 
campaigns and anti-FLN propaganda as well as harrassment of the ALN 
maquisards became harsher and efforts to coordinate actions between the 
'interior' and 'exterior' became increasingly difficult. The result was 
a sharp decline of arm supplies to the maquisards, a fact that intensi­
fied the hostility of the military chiefs of the interior toward the 
FLN's political leadership. Moreover, the transfer of the CEE
headquarters to Tunis increased the fragmentation of authority within the 
FLN direction. "Being abandoned, deprived of arms, the wilayat, pointed 
out Ben Bella, suffered from a deterioration that could have been 
prevented. They closed on themselves as they had no links in the
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exterior and sometimes with one another. They lived autarkically in
regions they started to look upon as fiefs and where some commandants 
ended up acquiring feudal or gang leaders' attitude."1 Such a situation 
gave birth to the cultivation of personal links, regional and ethnical 
affinities by some wilaya high officers. Conversely at the same time, 
the ALN troops stationed at the borders came to form a decisive political 
force with regard to the shaping of the FLN policies.
c . The empowering of the "army of the exterior"
The external army acquired better military training, new equipment, 
arms and recruits while its strength was also preserved by the fact that 
it was tremendously difficult for its members to cross mine fields on the 
frontiers to join the ALN fighters inside Algeria. Being kept away from 
the battlefield, they became increasingly involved in the struggle for 
leadership. It was in these circumstances that Boumedienne came to 
cultivate strong ambitions for leadership but lacking the authority and 
prestige of other guerrilla officers and FLN politicians, he was more 
concerned with strengthening his position and gathering support from 
others. As he lacked revolutionary legitimacy, he started building up 
his power carefully and with patience in the prospective of a post­
independence power scramble. Boumedienne came from a modest family of 
wheat farmers near Guelma in the constantinois but had great ambitions. 
He attended a Medersa in this town until he was 14 and in 1952 he left 
the country to avoid being drafted into the French army for service in 
the war in Indochina. At Cairo, he attended the prestigious Al-Azhar 
university and received military training at Hilwan at the time of the 
emergence of Nasser. He joined the maquis in 195 5 (at the age of 2 3)
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and was sent to Wilaya V where he substituted his real name Mohamed 
Boukharouba for Houari Boumedienne; 'Houari' was a very popular name in 
Western Algeria and Boumedienne was the name of a holy man in Tlemcen, a 
big city in this region. As Cl. Boussouf became more involved in the 
CEE affairs, he emerged as the real commander of this military region and 
at his Oujda headquarters he surrounded himself with loyal officers who 
in the course of the war came to form the nucleus of the ALN General 
Staff (EMG)• His closest aides included Kaid Ahmed (major Slimane),
Bouteflika, Medeghri , Tayebi Larbi and Cherif Belkacem, forming what will 
be later referred to as the 'group of oujda'in relation to friendship 
built up at the COM commandment established near this Moroccan town. 
Their alignment did not result from the fact that they originally came 
from parts of Western Algeria and nor were they able to construct popular 
following. Their main features were the common training received at the 
Oujda-based General Staff Command post-west under the direction of Cl. 
Boumedienne. Unlike many of the FLN politicians, they were young
elements with no pre-war political experience except Kaid Ahmed who was 
for a while a member of Ferhat Abbas's UDMA and in contrast to most of 
the officers of the 'interior', they came from relatively well-off social 
backgrounds and were able to acquire a relatively high level of
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education. Like Boumedienne they bore modernist values and radical
conceptions being opposed to both the old elite which they accused of 
political moderation and the 'maquisards' of whom they reproached the 
populist rhetoric, narrowness of mind and rudimentary methods of 
guerrilla welfare.
In the course of the war the ALN General Staff was strengthened by 
young Algerians who deserted the French army bringing with them military 
expertise and experience. Boumedienne invoked these criteria to justify 
their integration into the ALN which was resented by the maquisards on 
the grounds that many of these officers joined the war of liberation 
quite late and despite the opposition of the maquisards, some of these 
new recruits were permitted to retain their rank gained in the French 
army, a matter that facilitated their rapid rise in the ALN's hierarchy.
In addition to its alliance with these professional officers, the 
General Staff western branch benefited from the support of a certain 
number of students whose educational skills were to be needed in attempts 
to modernize the army. Following the May 6, 1956 appeal of the UGEMA, the 
Algerian Muslim students founded in 1955, thousands of Algerian 
university and school students went on strike and many joined the UGEMA 
activist groups and the FLN federation in France or the administrative
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apparatuses of the EMG organs based in Morocco and Tunisia. The 
students participated in raising funds abroad to support the revolution, 
particularly in France as well as in gathering international support for 
the Algerian cause from students' unions throughout the world gaining 
therefore an appreciable experience in the field of political persuasion 
and negotiation. When the provisional government of the Algerian
republic was created, many of them came to serve in its specialized 
organs where skills were adequately needed. Being young, well-educated 
and with practically no pre-war political credit they came to identify 
more with the nucleus of the General Staff than with the maquisards or 
the old guard of the FLN, therefore many of them came to cultivate links 
with the Boumedienne oujda-led group. The latter's power and potential 
was perhaps also regarded as the real source of political advancement and 
protection, especially with regard to the evolution of the Algerian war. 
The context of negotiations between the GPRA and the French government 
provided the students with a valuable opportunity to assert their 
increasing importance in Algerian affairs. It was, therefore, evident 
that it was from this strata that was to emerge the technocratic elite 
needed to fill the managerial posts in future Algerian state. Socially 
most of these technocrats came from segments of the petty bourgeoisie. 
This category given its great heterogeneity was far from constituting a 
class having its aggregate and well-articulated interests, but simply 
that the functions which the petty bourgeous elements or their parents 
once occupied distinguished them from the old traditional bourgeoisie 
(land and trade) and from peasants with regard to income and level of 
education. In contrast to Morocco and Tunisia, the technical skills of
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the Algerian technocrats did not come from a professional experience 
acquired within the colonial state's administration but from education 
achieved in many cases in France.
Provided with professional officers and a technical cadre, organized 
around a coherent nucleus and well-endowed with military equipment, the 
EMG embarked upon strengthening the cohesion of the army of the 
'exterior' and its politicization. Centres for training political
commissaires and administrative personnel were created at the ALN's rear 
bases in Morocco and Tunisia in preparation for the transfer of power 
from colonial rule.
With the evolution of the war of liberation, new developments on the 
international scene helped the Algerian cause. The inscription of the 
Algerian problem on the UN agenda made the FLN intensify its efforts to 
internationalize the war and gain support from the international 
community. The resounding success achieved by Nasser's Egypt after the 
Suez affair and the access of some colonies to independence, also served 
as an impetus for the FLN to believe in the success of its own struggle. 
These prospects led its leadership to create in September 1958 the 
provisional government of the Algerian revolution (GPRA), a new body 
gathering representatives of all tendencies including well-known 
politicians even moderates, in order to be better accepted by the French 
government in anticipation of eventual negotiations. The GPRA's aim was 
to "restore the Algerian state and represent it abroad".^ It also 
reflected the FLN's attempt to emphasize its determination not to accept
GPRA's declaration on September 26, 1958 (in Textes 
fondamentaux du FLN ( 1954-1962), Do ssiers documentaires, 
No . 24, Ministry of information and culture, January 1976).
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any solution rather than total independence in contradiction to De 
Gaulle's declaration of June 4, 1958 in which he promised equality of 
political rights to the indigenous population.
The rise to the GPRA leadership of the liberal and radical 
politicians irritated not only the ALN internal guerrilla fighters but 
also some elements stationed on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. 
Faced with increasing hostility, the GPRA led by the liberal Ferhat Abbas 
simply handed authority to the three most influential military men: the 
Colonels Krim, Boussouf and Bentobal a troika that held a de facto 
substantial power, especially after the death of Abbane Ramdane
regarded as a dangerous rival.
However, the crisis over leadership became sharper because of the 
frustrations of some military commanders as the wilayat came under heavy 
attacks from French colonial troops, especially with the coming to power 
of De Gaulle. Suffering most from these operations and from lack of arms, 
they felt demoralized and, therefore, attempted to unify and oppose the 
GPRA's attitude which they regarded as uncompromising with the French 
government's negotiation proposals. A meeting was held between the 
Commanders of these four wilayat: Amirouche (III); A1 Houes (VI); Hadj 
Lakhdar (I); Si M'Hamed (IV). But their aspirations were short-lived as 
the last three died in the battlefield shortly after. This failure 
undoubtedly marked the decline of the importance of the commanders of the 
ALN of the interior and the beginning of the extinction of wilayism. In 
this context, the strength of the external army increased and Boumedienne 
its most prominent leader, was appointed chief of the ALN General Staff 
which was set up in February 1960. Indeed the army's interference
became not only decisive but inevitable especially that the issue at
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stake concerned the shaping of the future of independent Algeria. The 
perspective of a negotiated solution for the war, boosted by De Gaulle's 
willingness to grant self-determination for the Algerian people had 
already sharpened the FLN internecine conflicts, since the disagreements 
concerned the political and economic orientation of the future Algerian 
state, to what extent it had to be dependent on France, the status of the 
French settlers, and the question of the Sahara. The apprehension of 
the General Staff were, however, partially relieved with the elimination 
of Ferhat Abbas from the GPRA's leadership and his replacement by a 
radical politician Benkhedda; and with the removal of two liberals 
Francis and Boumendjel from the GPRA negotiating team after the major 
reshuffle that took place in August 1961 following the failure of 
meetings with the French government at Melun in June 1961, Evian in May 
and July and then at Lugrin. But the approval by the GPRA of the Evian 
agreements in February 1962, paving the way to the independence of 
Algeria but closely linked to France, came under heavy criticisms from 
the members of the General Staff led by Boumedienne. Although it 
possessed the real power, the power of the gun, this group did not 
attempt to take over the GPRA's formal authority as perhaps such a move 
would have deepened intra-elite conflicts and weakened the FLN's 
bargaining position with the French government. And despite that
Boumedienne was conscious of his strength, he was nevertheless aware that 
some of the FLN leaders enjoyed more credibility and popularity. He 
then, was patient knowing that time was running in his favour. These 
considerations led him to ally with Ben Bella whose prestige never 
altered although he spent six years in France. Like the General Staff, 
Ben Bella firmly opposed the Evian agreements which he regarded as
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preserving French colonial interests in Algeria and like Boumedienne he 
bore anti-Kabyle feelings and supported a radical social change in 
Algeria. The alliance between the EMG and Ben Bella was aimed at
shaking the authority of the GPRA and was explained by Boumedienne in 
these terms: "We began contacts with the five historic chiefs detained in 
France ... we revealed to them the differences which placed us at 
loggerheads with the GPRA, so as to make the situation clear and 
unequivocal to all ... we (later) resisted the GPRA’s decision to oust us 
from the General Staff. This decision emanated from an authority which 
did not have the competence to take an initiative which the militants and 
the FLN rejected. It was then that Ben Bella came to inform us that he 
supported our position and that he sided with us against the GPRA•" ‘ In 
this position of strength, the General Staff made it clear that the 
latter's days were counted.
In an effort to heal the breach between conflicting factions and 
prepare the transfer of power, the National Council of the Revolution 
(CNRA) met in Tripoli in May 1962 where it formulated a programme for the 
future of Algeria in which the prominence of the state in political and 
economic affairs was asserted and the socialist orientation reaffirmed. 
However, major disagreements concerned the composition of the political 
bureau to assume the control of the FLN and the resulting outcome was a 
split into two broad factions: a coalition of groups which did not 
recognize the GPRA's legitimacy: the General Staff and the Wilayat close 
to the frontiers: Wilaya I (Aures), Wilaya V (Oran), Wilaya VI (Sahara).
The other coalition gathered the majority of the GPRA members and the
'interview to Revolution A f r i c a i n e , October 23, 1965 quoted
in Jackson, N.H.: The FLN in Algeria: party d evelopment in 
a revolutionäry society (Greenwood Press, Westport 1978), p.71
62
Wilayat XI (Constantine), III (Kabylia) , IV (Algiers region). These 
wilayat which had suffered most from the war forces were hostile to the 
General Staff and they came to regard it as a direct threat to their 
formally established fiefdoms.
On the eve of independence, the FLN was a mere forum for conflicting 
groups and clans striking for its leadership. The two blocs remained 
far apart as the GPRA and its allies established their headquarters at 
Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia while the forces hostile to the GPRA set up theirs 
at Tlemcen, the native region of Ben Bella and the fief of Boumedienne 
and his friends of the Oujda group.. Amid armed confrontation, negotia­
tions took place between the two blocs in August -1962 and among 
agreements reached were that the FLN bureau remained as it was suggested 
at the CNRA meeting in Tripoli and that elections for a national assembly 
be held on August 23. But fearing that the General Staff policy of 
modernizing the army would lead to the elimination of their own 
authority, the wilaya commanders sided with the GPRA in the Tizi Ouzou 
group and opposed these agreements. As a result, severe fighting
occurred between the two groups but the General Staff forces were better 
equipped than the maquisards whose human potential and energy had been 
exhausted after years of struggle with the French colonial troops. In 
the end, the Ben Bella-led group of Tlemcen supported by the General 
Staff entered Algiers on September 9, 1962. A week later, a national
assembly was elected and on September 29, Ben Bella was empowered to form
a government. It was clear thit the regime independent Algeria was to 
t
have would be strongly marked by the army's weight.
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C. THE POST-INDEPENDENCE DILEMMA
1. The lack of consensus-building
The colonial dialectic did not fail to have a lingering impact on 
the nature of politics in independent Algeria. The destruction of
Algeria's traditional structures resulted in the decline of the land 
aristocracy and segments of the traditional bourgeoisie. In this vein, 
the relatively limited role played by the Ulema in political mobilization 
attested for the weakness of this social strata and accounted for the 
largely secular character of the post-colonial Algerian state. Moreover 
impulses for economic liberalism and political pluralism in this state 
were hampered by the weakness of the Algerian bourgeoisie whose growth 
was seriously impaired by colonial capitalism. On the other hand, 
factionalism prevented the formation of a unified authority to enable the 
FLN act as a mobilizing channel during the war and as a modernizing force 
in independent Algeria. In this respect, lack of cohesion of the
wartime FLN leadership and the scramble for power impaired the party's 
efficiency and led to the neglect of the ideological and political 
formation of its militants and effective mobilization of the masses. 
They also plagued its political growth throughout the war, accounting 
therefore for its marginalization in independent Algeria and for its 
failure to turn into a mass-based revolutionary party. In practice, it 
proved far from achieving the task of creating an effective bureaucracy 
and more importantly the establishment of an effective party system 
capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics. '
^This task is the central scheme of political
institutionalization which Professor Huntington regards as 
the basis for political modernization. See Huntington,
P.S: Political order in changing societies (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1968)
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Unlike the Vietnamese Communist party for instance, the FLN failed 
to mobilize the masses around the objectives of a social revolution as 
its paramount aim had been to gain political independence and in contrast 
to the liberation movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique, it 
did not hold liberated zones where it could gain power base and exercise 
political and administrative control and therefore gain experience in the 
exercise of authority over its followers. Although large segments of the 
Algerian people and especially the rural masses participated in the war 
of liberation, neither the working class nor the peasantry were able to 
play a significant let alone a leading role in the FLN politics and until 
independence, the party remained a front gathering clans and factions. 
The lack of what Professor Rosenau calls 'integrated structure of 
national leadership'^ hampered the existence of a consensus-building, 
while the absence of a charismatic leader closed the way for the 
emergence of a nation builder as in the case of Tunisia's Bourguiba, able 
to stimulate and articulate a consensus of the identity and purposes of 
the new state.
If in appearance, Ben Bella was constitutionally designated Prime 
Minister, as he was empowered by the national assembly to form the 
country's first government on September 26, 1962 and was elected
president of the council of ministers three days later, there was no 
doubt that he owed his rise to power to the Army General Staff.^ Like 
the corps of officers and the technocratic strata, Ben Bella was
'Rosenau, N. Jamesi National leadership and foreign policy; 
a case study in the mobilization of public support 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964). 
^Did not Boumedienne declare that! "the choice of the armed 
forces to present Ben Bella to the presidency is not a 
sentimental choice. We wanted brother Ben Bella to take
this post because he is the man capable to assume its 
responsibilities"? - le Monde, September 9, 1963.
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committed to the idea of building a modern and strong state with a highly 
centralized authority.^ Then Ben Bella backed by the army, came into 
conflict with Abbas the president of the assembly and a group of deputies 
representing segments of the liberal bourgeoisie which favoured the 
establishment of a parliamentary regime with a multi-party system. And 
though Ben Bella and his allies shared the desire of the FLN Secretary 
General, Khider to set up a party system with socialistic orientations, 
they were firmly opposed to his attempt to transform the FLN into a mass 
party capable of controlling the activities of the state and confining 
the army to the barracks.
In April 1963, Ben Bella backed by the General Staff, bypassed the 
Party by charging the Assembly to draw a national charter that would 
serve as the basis for the country's first constitution. In doing so, 
he did not intend to entrust the parliament with the authority of 
enacting the constitution as most of the deputies were former maquisards 
and illiterate and also because the Assembly bureau headed by Ferhat 
Abbas included members hostile to the Ben Bella military coalition.^ 
In fact in April 1963, two projects were set outione by Ferhat Abbas and 
the other by a group of five deputies, supporting Ben Bella and his 
military allies. Only their project was submitted to the Assembly in 
August with Ben Bella's blessings. The constitution issued from this
project, adopted on August 28, 1963 and approved by National referendum
'The first task was to build the state' (interview to 1 e 
M o n d e , September 14, 1962J.
* On 1 y three out of its 10 members were supporters of Ben 
Bella and his military allies: Ben Allah, Cherif Belkacem 
and Menjli. After the composition of the
Assembly's bureau. Major Menjli a member of the General 
Staff, proposed another list filled mostly with officers of 
the General Staff Western branch clearly indicating the 
army's hostility to the Assembly's bureau (see le Monde 
September 27, 1962).
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on September 8, affirmed Algeria's commitment to socialism and to the 
principles of self-management and to anti-iyiperiali st ideals. The
assembly was deprived of executive powers in favour of the presidential 
ordinances. Among the most famous were the decrees of March 1963 
instituting self-management and nationalizing the properties left by the 
ex-French residents.
Refusing to endorse the role of the Assembly as a rubber stamp for 
the government's decisions and to espouse the regime's "marxist-leninist" 
tendencies, Ferhat Abbas resigned from the presidency on August 12. His 
departure and that of a group of liberal deputies left the way for Ben 
Bella to extend his control over the Assembly as he helped its vice- 
president Ben Allah one of his staunchest supporters to succeed Abbas. 
However, in a dictatorial regime, constitutional prerogatives are not of 
high significance as the Assembly in fact, was simply dissolved by Ben 
Bella on October 10, 1963 on the basis of immediate dangers jeopardising
the state's integrity and on article 59 which constitutionally gave him 
full powers.
Moreover, by a subtle manoeuvre, Ben Bella forced Khider to resign 
(on April 7, 1963) and personally took over the leadership of the party 
as well. By this move, the last attempts of the FLN to assume the tasks 
of nation-state building were virtually impaired since Khider was the 
most powerful figure within this party and one of the most fervent 
advocates of the submission of the state to the party direction.
While the Assembly was left in paralysis and the party in the shadow 
of the State power, the Algerian President strengthened his control over 
the government which was filled with trusted friends, leftist allies and 
the members of the original General-Staff. In the governments formed in
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September 1962 and September 1963, technocrats known for their leftist 
tendencies and who shared Ben Bella's staunch support of a state- 
controlled economy were appointed, while Boumedienne the patron of the 
army and his Oujda group aides were also present. The predominance of 
the alliance military-technocrats meant the elimination of the past 
political elite from official duties and its replacement by members of 
the young generation.
The support of Boumedienne and his clan to Ben Bella was assured as 
long as the latter did not interfere in the army's matters and as long as 
he respected the army as a political institution. In fact the 
President's reliance on the ANP became almost inevitable in his efforts 
to annihilate resistance to the central authority, especially in the 
context of increasing challenges and dissidences from those prevented 
from having a share in national-decision-making. The firmest opposition 
to Ben Bella's efforts to personalize power came from the ex-wilaya 
leaders determined to preserve their fiefdoms and oppose the policy of 
reconversion of the army which they regarded as a means to eliminate them 
from active politics and from territorial bases they gained during the 
war of liberation. Their reluctance to submit to the central power 
reflected the resistance of local authority to modernization carried out 
by the centre and to the establishment of new loyalties the state tends 
to develop with the periphery.
In September 1963, Mohand Ould Hadj, the ex-commander of the Wilaya 
III organized a maquis in his Kabylia stronghold where he had control 
over 15,000 ex-maquisards. He was soon joined by another Kabyle and 
historic chief Ait Ahmed who, after resigning from the National Assembly, 
constituted his own party, 'the party des forces socialistes' (FFS).
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Boudiaf, another historic chief, allied himself with the Kabyle 
insurgents and in July 1964, his own party 'the party de la Revolution 
socialiste* (PRS) merged with Ait Ahmed * s FFS into an opposition 
movement, the 'comité national pour la defense de la Revolution* (CNDR).
In the South on the edge of the Sahara, and in the regions of Oran 
and Constantine, similar partisan movements were activated by the 
ex-wilaya commanders, respectively by Colonel Chaabani and Majors Moussa 
(Ahmed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani) and Si Larbi. The Algerian-Moroccan
conflict of October 1963 brought a pause in the centre-periphery 
dissensions, as troops of Hadj and Chaabani came in aid of the ANP 
forces; but the pause proved short. Cl. Chaabani resigned from the 
FLN's political bureau and continued his defiance of the central 
authority, so did Ait Ahmed, being deprived of the support of Cl. Oui 
Hadj who had rallied Ben Bella's regime, and accepted a seat in the FLN 
political bureau. In the autumn 1964 these dissident movements were 
mastered by the ANP troops led by Colonel Boumedienne. Chaabani was then, 
arrested on July 8 and executed in September, Ait Ahmed was imprisoned on 
October 17 and Major Moussa on July 13. Major Si Larbi (Ben Redjem 
Larbi) gave up his insubordination to the authority of the General Staff 
and promptly retired from active politics.
The elimination of declared and potential opposition helped Ben 
Bella to consolidate his own position but made him depend on the army 
which had been acting as a cooperative ally. The eclipse of some 
ex-wilaya commanders and maquisards was also sought by Boumedienne who 
was left with a relatively easy task to carry out the modernization of 
the army and its transformation into a coherent and well-structured
force
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The increasing strength of Boumedienne and the de facto power of the 
ANP, led Ben Bella to attempt to reduce his reliance on the army and 
remove the potential rivalry and serious ambitions incarnated by his 
young defense minister. The prestige gained on the international level, 
in particular within the Panafricanist movement and the illusion of 
strength on the domestic level, boosted by the implementation of
self-management and the stress of a rhetoric had tempted Ben Bella to 
extend his control over defence matters, after succeeding in alienating 
the party, the national assembly and state administration.
Signs of Ben Bella's intention to concentrate more powers into his 
hands and lessen his dependence on the military by undermining the
cohesion of the General Staff and its nucleus the group of oujda, became 
tangible in late 1963 as dissensions between the President and the
military establishment slowly emerged. The issue in contention
concerned nation-state building tasks as Ben Bella seemed to opt for a 
form of self-management more or less similar to the Yugoslavian 
experience and to confine the army to the barracks, while the General 
Staff emphasized the historical role of nation-state building conferred 
upon the ANP by its revolutionary legitimacy. The military establishment 
also opposed Ben Bella's move towards a Marxist oriented model of
development stressing rather the Arabo-Islamie fondements of the Algerian 
society. Evidence of Ben Bella's attempt to sap the army's power was to 
consolidate his alliance with leftwing militants and intellectuals and by 
his rapprochement with the workers' union (UGTA) as he appointed Safi 
Boudii«o, a syndicalist and anti-military in charge of the labour ministry 
in the government formed on December 22, 1964. At the same time, he
attempted to undermine the cohesion of the Oujda group with a view to
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weakening the position of Boumedienne within the government. In May 
1964 he appointed Cl. Zbiri as Chief of Staff while Boumedienne was on a 
visit abroad and put Cl. Abid head of the seventh military region. Both 
were shawi and ex-maquisards and believed hostile to Boumedienne and his 
clan. Moreover, three of Boumedienne's aides saw their positions
undermined: Medeghri, the minister of interior, resigned on July 10, 1964 
in protest of Ben Bella's efforts to take direct control over the 
prefects, Cherif Belkacem was demoted to the education office and Kaid 
Ahmed ousted from the government in December 1964 after he was accused by 
Ben Bella of embezzlement and slapped in public. Meanwhile, news of Ben 
Bella's intention to dismiss Bouteflika and take over the foreign 
ministry constituted in the eyes of Boumedienne an ample evidence of the 
president's determination to sap the cohesion of his clan. But it was 
Ben Bella's decision to create popular militias of the ANP as a step in 
the process of confining the army into barracks that dramatized 
grievances between Boumedienne and Ben Bella. The former was ready to 
make concessions such as the firing of his close assistants Bouteflika, 
Medeghri and Kaid; to cede the direction of the General Staff to Zbiri, 
but he was not willing to relinquish his de facto control of the ANP to 
anyone else, as his strength stemmed mainly from the army, a strength 
that he had built up, patiently and thoroughly over years. When Ben 
Bella attempted to do so, he was promptly toppled on June 19, 1965 on the 
eve of the second meeting of the Afro-Asian movement scheduled to convene 
in the Algerian capital. Lately Mohamed-Cherif Messadia explained the
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reason of the coup in asserting that it "had, in fact, to stop the 
process that aimed at keeping the ANP in the barracks and isolate it from 
the popular masses."'
Ben Bella's thirst for power in the context of economic chaos, 
provided Boumedienne and the ANP top officers with a good reason to 
induce other officers and heads of military regions that were not 
especially friends to him. The coup carried out in a remarkably
bloodless fashion, was monitored by Boumedienne and professional officers 
especially Colonel Chabou and Major Hoffman responsible for the tank 
division that paved the way to a successful surrender of Ben Bella's 
residence.
The success of the coup alone assessed the cohesion of the 
Boumedienne group and the affirmation of the ANP as the leading force in 
Algerian politics. The removal of Ben Bella was presented by the new 
leader as a revolutionary readjustment or redemption that had to put an 
end to the president's cult of personality, ideological deviation, 
political confusion and adventurous policies. The stress was put on the 
faith to the ideals of the Algerian revolution and not on a change of the 
political and ideological options of the country.
2. The consolidation of the Boumedienne regime
The July 7, 1965 Ordinance announced that all political institutions 
created by the Ben Bella regime were suspensed and a council of 
revolution delegated a supreme authority was set up to conduct the 
country's policies. Boumedienne was designated chief of government. 
President of the Council of Ministers and in charge of the defence
'Quoted in Criscuolo, J: Armee et Nation d a n s l e s  discours 
du Colonel Boumedienne (These d'Etat, University Paul
Valery, Montpellier 1975), p.237
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ministry. The government was formally placed under the authority of the 
council of revolution. The heavy representation of the military in this 
council - as only two of its twenty-six members were civilians 
indicated the central role of the army in Algerian politics and its 
attempts to ensure order and security.^
The consolidation of the Boumedienne regime and the pursuit of the 
modernization of the country proved a hard and long process. Having 
seized power through a coup and removed a constitutionally elected 
president, the new regime gathered around the Oujda group felt the need 
of enhancing its legitimacy and increase popular support. To achieve 
this objective, it embarked upon ensuring the coherence of the ruling 
elite and wipe out political opposition that became active in protest 
against what was regarded as the right-wing and authoritarian
leadership of Colonel Boumedienne. In the process of consolidation, the 
organization of popular resistant ORP, a front gathering members of the 
outlawed PCA and Ben Bellist militants was dismantled in July 1966 and 
most of its leaders were arrested. Three members of the government Hadj 
Smain and Mahsas all ex-ministers of Ben Bella were dismissed in the same 
year because of their leftist tendencies and support of self-management
^The council of revolution comprised most of the high 
officers who had a certain influence within the military 
establishment. However, it was far from being homogenous
as it included two main groups: 1. Boumedienne and his
aides of the Oujda group: Bouteflika, Cherif Belkacem, 
Raid, Medeghri and Tayebi L a r b i ; a certain number of active 
officers close to Boumedienne: the commanders of the
military regions: Abid (I), Belhouchet (V), Abdelghani
(IV), Soufi (III) as well as Draia the Head of the police 
forces, Bencherif the Head of the Cherchell military
Academy and five former members of the wartime EMG: Colonel 
Mohammedi Said, Majors Boudjenane, Mendjli and Bensalem.
2) The group of former Wilaya cammanders: Zbiri (I), 
Boubnider (II), Mohand Ould Hadj (III), Khatib (IV) and 
Ben haddou (V ) .
73
against state's centralization preached by the new regime. Ali Yahya 
(agriculture) and Zerdani (labour) were also removed for the same reason 
and for their links with labour militants and ex—maquisard circles. By 
mid—1970, the Boumedienne regime succeeded, through the efforts of the 
FLN led by Kaid Ahmed, in bringing down attempts of militant students to 
revive their union (UNEA) which was weakened during Ben Bella's reign. 
It also succeeded in purging the workers' union rank and file of labour 
militancy and making the UGTA - under the leadership of Benikous, a 
moderate - adopt a supportive attitude to the regime.
Under Boumedienne, the government exercised in fact real executive 
powers, although it was formally made responsible before the Council of 
Revolution. However, this council - being reduced to 9 members from the 
original 26 following deaths, purges and retirements - remained the 
depository of supreme authority but did not act as a decision-making 
body. An indication of its de facto dislocation was the very rare
meetings of its members in the late 1960s. Until 1976, the year of the 
setting up of political institutions and the election of Boumedienne to 
the presidency of the Republic through universal suffrage, supreme 
executive power was assumed by Boumedienne through the council of 
Ministers where the initial nucleus of the General Staff and the group of 
civilian technocrats retained a large share of the government's 
prerogatives• The importance of the civilian technocrats increased with 
the strengthening of the state administrative organs and control over 
national economy, as the regime embarked upon an ambitious economic 
development programme and the building of a centralized state. In this 
vein, the attention of the military-technocratic strata concentrated upon 
these issues breaking away with the past period where ideological
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considerations prevailed. For the new regime, ideological discussions 
in Algeria "lead nowhere, what counts above all is economic independence 
and rapid development".^ The strength of the military-technocracy core 
combination reflected the remarkable political stability enjoyed by the 
country since the December 1967 abortive coup of Zbiri, and the relative 
coherence of the ruling elite. The government formed shortly after its 
coup (1965) was not changed until 1977 notwithstanding slight reshuffles 
in 1968 and 1970 and occasional but scarce ministerial appointments. The 
members of the Oujda group retained key posts: Bouteflika (foreign 
affairs), Medeghri (interior), Cherif Belkacem (finance) and Tayebi Larbi 
(agriculture). The technocrats were allocated important economic 
portfolios and constituted the largest ministerial group confirming the 
regime's search for technical expertise to achieve social and economic 
tasks. Most of them were intellectuals with high qualifications and 
were active members of the wartime student union (UGEMA)•
In the beginning of the 1970 decade, the regime broke its alliance 
with the feudal bourgeoisie with the launching of an agrarian revolution 
and with the merchant bourgeoisie after the establishment of the state
monopoly over foreign trade and the expansion of the public sector. The
regime's shift toward a harder socialistic line found, until the mid 
1970s, support from the workers' union, the landless peasants and 
militant students. It also benefited from the support of the unofficial 
PAGS, a resurrection of the PCA whose numerous members and militants were 
active within schools, universities, the FLN mass organizations and 
certain administrative organs and circles. However, until 1975, the
country witnessed a large consensus on the political formula as the flow
^Interview of Boumedienne to jeune-Afrique November 26,
1967 .
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of oil revenues due to huge increase in oil prices helped improve the 
standard of life of the lower classes, boost the national economy 
capabilities and permitted the regime to play an active role on the 
international level, especially in trying to line up the third world 
countries around demands for a new international economic order.
With the increase of domestic problems and decline of influence in 
the third world forums in the mid 1970s, the regime faced a quite serious 
crisis of legitimacy. Economic policy based on industrializing industries 
did not generate employment for the growing manpower and did not improve 
the agrarian sector. In addition, the housing crisis, bureaucratic
malpractices, rise of inflation and cost of life and the preoccupation of 
the regime with the problem of Western Sahara increased popular 
discontent. A series of large-scale strikes in the national companies 
was accompanied by political protest from members of liberal bourgeoisie 
and by riots at universities in reaction to the technocratic model of 
development that sharpened social disparities.1 All this contributed
to shake the legitimacy and the credibility of the regime whose coherence 
was relatively hampered by signs of disintegration affecting the
2homogeneity of the Oujda group.
In a visible attempt to enhance the legitimacy of his regime, 
Boumedienne announced in 1976 the setting up of political institutions, 
general elections as well as the determination to combat bureaucracy 
accused of much of the nation's ills. After a large debate over the
In 1976 , four members of the old guard of politicians: 
Ferhat Abbas, Benkhedda, Hocine Lahouel and Sheikh 
Khereddine issued a tract criticizing the regime's
policies. Bloody riots involving students from different 
ideological obediences occurred in Algiers campuses.
2Kaid Ahmed was ousted from the FLN leadership in December 
1972, Cherif Belkacem from the government in July 1975 and 
Medeghri died in mysterious circumstances in December 1974.
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government-sponsored national charter, a constitution was promulgated on 
November 22, 1976 in which the president was given extensive powers. 
Boumedienne, the FLN ■ s sole candidate for the presidency (article 103) 
was elected on December 10 for a six year period with 95.23 per cent of 
the turnout in support. In February 1977 were elected deputies for the 
people's national assembly. For the first time since the 1965 coup, 
Algeria was endowed with a constitution and a legislative organ and an 
elected president. The constitutional legitimacy the regime has been 
seeking was thus established, at least formally. Visibly boosted by this 
success, Boumedienne attempted to increase the concentration of powers 
into his hands just as Ben Bella did before him. In addition to being at 
the same time Head of State, head of the revolutionary council. President 
of the council of Ministers, the leader of the FLN, the minister of 
defense and supreme chief of the armed forces, Boumedienne took in 1977 
control over religious affairs, the police paramilitary forces, the civil 
services and administration.
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
1. The ANP as a political institution
The functioning of the Algerian political system owed much to the 
army which emerged as the principal force in post-colonial national 
politics, given its possession of the power of the gun and legitimacy 
conferred up on it by its predominant role in the war. In view of this 
context, the Algerian army stood as a part and parcel of the process of 
state formation and is therefore a political institution. The successful 
intervention of the army in putting an end to the summer 1962 crisis was 
an indication that the military establishment was the only national 
institution that could provide law and order in a politically disorgan-
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ized society. It also confirmed its intention to act as the guardian of 
the revolution and watchdog over national unity. On independence, the 
General Staff appeared as the only group in Algerian society that had 
sufficient organization, strength, discipline and highly motivated 
leadership to conduct the affairs of the state as well as the organ best 
equipped to resolve political and socio-economic chaos that characterized 
the period of Ben Bella's reign 1962-1965. Given this strength,the 
Algerian army began to play a major role in stimulating social change, 
expanding political infrastructure and develop political institutions, 
therefore emerging as the guardian of the institutionalized state. In the 
1976 national charter, the texts related to the army were placed well 
before those dealings with the party. The part concerning the army
represented by Chapter VI of the headline referring to the 'fundamental 
principles of the organization of the Algerian society', while the texts 
connected with the party were found under the first chapter of the second 
section related to 'power and its organization'. The nuance was clear, 
the army was regarded as one of the basic principles and components of 
the society, while the party was conceived as the means of power and of 
its organization. Moreover, the nature of the army remained in the 1976 
constitution the same as stated in the 1964 Algiers charter. The only 
difference between the two charters with regard to the army was that the 
1964 charter clearly stated that the army "is under the orders of the 
government” .
The process of modernization initiated by the army andthe need of 
expertise combined with the regime's search for political stability led 
to the virtual elimination of many of the ex-maquisards and members of 
the wartime political elite from the national decision-making machinery.
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A large number of these elements were dismissed from the ANP following 
the abortive coup of Tahar Zbiri in December 1967, the assassination 
attempt on Boumedienne' s life on April 25, 1968 and the conspiracy of
Krim Belkacem in early 1969. In all these plots a certain number of the 
former maquisards within the army were presumed to have taken part. The 
Wilayism spirit was regarded by Boumedienne as an obstacle to his 
modernization policies and was therefore considerably reduced by the 
elimination from the council of revolution of the ex-wilaya commanders: 
Mohammedi Said, Boubnider,, Ould Hadj and Khatib. The last three were 
also dismissed from the FLN's executive secretariat. In the Algerian 
leader's terms, these were people who "were not able to reconvert and 
grasp the sense of history. They have not understood that Algeria of 
1968 is very much different from that of 1962".1
Consequently, under Boumedienne1s tight control, the ANP was progres­
sively transformed from an army of peasants into a professional modern 
army. The nucleus of the ANP formed out of highly trained officers of 
the wartime General Staff, supported his attempts to modernize the army 
and the country's socio-economic structures. Therefore, the intrusion 
of the army in the state organs and administrative apparatuses increased 
as former officer* of the ANP were earmarked for ministerial posts, others 
occupied the functions of prefects (walis), or were affected at the head 
of the state-owned companies, administrative organs and local constituen­
cies, a fact attesting for the presence of the army at all sectors and 
all levels of the country's socio-economic life. Besides large supplies 
of sophisticated military hardware mainly from the Soviet Union, and the 
training of hundreds of the ANP officers in that country, the Algerian
'interview to P, Herreman (in le M o n d e , April 4, 1968).
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army was well endowed with civil engineering equipment, trucks, skilled 
working force in order to be able to better contribute to national 
economic development and emerge as an effective factor in its moderniza­
tion. The army has also its own enterprises, in particular the one 
specialized in public works (DNC-ANP) which employed more than 40,000 men 
making it in size and effectiveness comparable to the gigantic state- 
owned oil company, Sonatrach. The military conscription made compulsory 
in 1968 provided the army with potential reservist contingents and also 
with a quite important labour force employed in building roads, dams, 
schools, rural villages and highways, in particular the Transaharan 
highway running from Algiers to Mali and Niger.
When Boumedienne died on December 28, 1978 after a forty-day long
coma caused by a rare disease. an emergency congress of the FLN was held
to designate the candidate for the presidency. According to the
constitution, the president of the national assembly assumed the
presidency for a period not exceeding forty-five days until the congress 
met.' The meeting took place on January 27-31, 1979 fifteen years after 
its last gathering in April 1964. Out of 3290 delegates who attended the 
congress, 640 were representatives of the ANP and 537 were state 
technocrats and high civil servants, an indication of the preservation of 
the military-technocracy congruence. Behind the constitutional parody, 
the weight of the army was determinant in designating the FLN's sole 
candidate for the presidency. The candidate was chosen among the most 
influential high officers in particular, the heads of the military 
regions and commanders of operational units. The nomination of Colonel
'According to the constitution, the ANP's president is not 
entitled to run for the presidency of the Republic (Chapter 
III, a r t . 117).
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Chadli Bendjedid, the commander of the powerful military region of Oran 
had certainly obeyed the rules of the military hierarchy: he was the 
longest serving officer in the highest grade and in contrast to what was 
assumed, his nomination did not reflect the army's role as a broker or as 
a simple referee between two presumed potential candidates for the 
presidency: Bouteflika the foreign minister representing a group
favouring economic liberalisation and Yahiaoui, the former head of the 
FLN who represented those advocating a hard socialistic line, but it 
assessed the role of the military as a determining force. In contrast 
to these factionalist tendencies, the appointment of Colonel Chadli 
responded to the army's desire to present a new man with an apparently 
neutral attitude that was meant to transcend political cleavages or 
clashes of personalities existing between the army itself and within the 
ruling elite. His strong hold over the important military region of 
Oran, his absence of overt involvement in the past period's politics, his 
discreet posture and aloofness from any group or faction certainly helped 
him win the army's confidence, as the objective of the military 
establishment was to assume the role of watchdog over the revolution, 
safeguard the cohesion of its leadership, ensure domestic stability 
through keeping order and avoiding intra-elite conflicts. What was then 
seen as a remarkably peaceful succession and expression of the commitment 
to constitutional rules and principles of democratic centralism was in 
fact the articulation of the army's own interests.
The early stage of the Chadli's regime reflected the compromise 
between new and old forces, as the new government formed on March 8, 1979 
comprised no less than 11 technocrats who largely contributed in shaping 
the country's economic policy under the reign of Boumedienne, while the
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political bureau included all the barons of the past regime.^ However, 
only Benyahia, Bouteflika and Abdelghani were given ministerial 
portfolios- The former was even demoted to the formal post of adviser 
to the president, being replaced as foreign minister by Benyahia. The 
most significant changes had been the nomination to the important posts 
of planning (Brahimi) and energy (Nabi). The former, a Harvard graduate 
and a friend of Chadli as they fought together during the war in Wilaya X 
and the latter a notable long-time rival of Abdeslam. These new
ministers became the spearheads of the new economic policies the Chadli 
regime intend»to pursue.
However lacking the charisma and abilities of Boumedienne, the new 
Algerian president moved to strengthen his own position by attempting to 
remove potential rivals and strengthen the party in order to lessen his 
dependency on the army. At the March 1980 session of the central
committee, he obtained the revision of the FLN's status in the direction 
of reinforcing the prominence of the Secretary-General and in the sense 
that he was delegated powers to designate and not merely propose the 
members of the political bureau who in return were responsible before 
him, in contrast to the 1979 text which attributed the central committee 
prerogatives to elect the political bureau of the party. Chadli was 
given full powers by the FLN delegates, especially in the context of 
university unrest and Kabyle cultural protest, but also in view of 
eliminating potential rivalry within the party system.
The reshuffle of the political bureau following the fifth session of 
the central committee on June 30-July 2, 1981 saw the removal of Yahaoui
and Bouteflika while the demotion of Abdelghani was completed at the 1983 1
1Abdeslam, Bencherif, Draia, Tayebi Larbi and Yahaoui.
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party congress as he lost his post of Prime Minister to Abdelhamid 
Brahimi though retaining his seat in the political bureau. In addition, 
the easing out from the government ministers who were close to 
Boumedienne, permitted Chadli to strengthen his hold over the presiden­
tial executive organ. And under the impulse of the new Prime Minister, 
the regime's policies moved away from the rigidly socialistic line 
pursued by the past regime to a greater emphasis on the social needs of 
the people, decentralization and a more substantial association of 
private capital within policies of national economic development. The 
government formed in December 1983 was enlarged and many economic 
ministries were adjuncted sub-ministries in a visible attempt to adjust 
to technical responsibilities and permit the diffusion of power and 
political mobilization in order to absorb the recruitment of elements of 
the young generation of technocrats whose main virtue stems from 
expertise and no longer from revolutionary legitimacy.
To demarcate itself from the past regime and increase its own 
legitimacy, the new leadership embarked upon a clean up campaign against 
personalities and technocrats of the past period, accused of mis­
management, corruption and embezzlement. Bouteflika, Bencherif and
Tayebi Larbi were requested by the newly-created 'cour des comptes' to 
restitute large amounts of public funds they were accused of having 
appropriated. Other technocrats close to Abdeslam were also sued to 
discredit the former minister of national economy and energy as well as 
tarnish the economic policy carried out under Boumedienne.'
'such as Ait A1 Hocine the former General Director of the 
state oil company Sonatrach, Ghozali, the ex-minister of 
energy and petrochemicals and Keramane previously Head of 
the national electricity company.
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However, the most crucial test of president Chadli in his attempt to 
consolidate his own position was to reduce his dependence on the army and 
keep the military as a supportive force to his regime and political 
moderation. One important means to reduce this dependence has been the 
reinforcement of the structure of the FLN and the increase of its role in
the home polity. Under the impulse of Cherif-Messadia, a former ALN
officer and a long-time serving party official, the FLN has been
rejuvenated and became more active with regard to the tasks of political 
mobilization and participation, especially since 1983. Under its 
supervision, a certain number of mass organizations increased their 
activities while other associations with specific socio-cultural purposes 
were created. Moreover, the party's participation in preparing local, 
legislative and general elections increased and a greater number of its 
own officials were elected. The obligation that only its members were 
permitted to take up official functions in the state political and 
administrative organs!article 120), considerably increased the importance 
of the FLN at the expense of the PAGS, the semi-official leftwing party 
which had been relatively active during the Boumedienne era.
The party's presence in the government increased with the appoint­
ment of Goudjil (transport), Bouchama (sports) and Rouis (information), 
the latter being a personal friend of Chadli. And in a visible attempt 
to stress the prominence of the party in political life at least 
formally, no active military officer has won a seat as a full member in 
the political bureau designated in December 1984 with the exception of 
Colonel Belhouchet who assumed the charge of general inspector of the 
army, a post that meant to give him a formal occupation rather than real 
military responsibilities. Indeed, General-major Benloucif, the Chief of
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Staff and General Benyelles the Secretary-General of the defence ministry 
were nominated as alternate members only, just like Abdelhamid Brahimi 
the Prime Minister who represents in fact, the state technocracy. There 
is no doubt that the consolidation of the party resulted from the 
personal will of Chadli and so was the rise of Messadia a member of the 
FLN political bureau and the representative of the Central Committee's 
permanent secretariat.1
Moreover, in his efforts to consolidate his position by strengthen­
ing his control over the army, Chadli used the technique of reorganizing 
the military structure and manoeuvred to neutralize resistance within the 
ANP to his own power, through purges and by putting his own men in charge 
of the most sensitive military duties. Prominent officers such as the 
Lieutenant-Colonels Kasdi Merbah and Selim Saadi were promoted out of 
their strongholds. However, in practice Chadli's task of keeping control 
over the military establishment was rendered difficult by the consolida­
tion of military feudalities after the death of Boumedienne. Several 
heads of military regions gained increased strength in their respective 
military fiefdoms and were able to benefit from loyalties of some local 
personalities and administrators. In view of this context, Chadli's 
first moves were to take control over the national high security council 
to supervise military affairs and reinstated a General Staff (that had 
been suppressed by Boumedienne) in an attempt to break up factionalism 
within the army and permit a larger diffusion of central power within the 
military establishment. He also nominated a deputy to the heads of
'a presidential instruction N o . 30 of September 15. 1982
called for a greater drive of the party in all sectors of 
the economic and political life.
^However in March 1982, General Abbas Ghozaiel, a Chadli's 
loyal was put in charge of the high security council.
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each of the military regions in order to keep an eye on their commanders 
and remove some of their military responsiilities in favour of these new 
ad joints.
Furthermore, as ambitions grew. President Chadli seemed eager to 
hold on to his office and adopt the policy of divide and rule. The 
institution of the rank of General in 1984 permitted the creation of a 
well-defined military hierarchy for the first time in the history of 
contemporary Algeria. If the establishment of this hierarchy responded 
to military order and rules it did not, however, reflect a strict respect 
of the military ranking system. By awarding Colonel Benloucif the rank 
of "General-major" the highest grade and appointing him Chief of Staff, 
Chadli aimed more at endowing the army with a clear structure to allow a 
diffusion of power than at concentrating authority in the hands of the 
highest-ranking officer. The idea of the diffusion of power within the 
ANP became clearer when Belhouchet was appointed to the formal post of 
general inspector of the armed forces and later two other generals 
Abderrahim and Nezzar were designated as deputies to the Chief of Staff, 
while Benyelles was also promoted general and put in charge of the 
Secretariat-General of the Defence Ministry, which made of him the de 
facto army's strong man. The clash of personalities between Benloucif 
and Benyelles is reportedly constant and their nomination both as 
alternate members of the political bureau in December 1983, regardless of 
their difference in ranking, increased speculation over Chadli's desire 
to cultivate paradox and antagonism to be better able to play off one
against the other
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This policy proved necessary to strengthen the unity of the
army by transcending regional affinities perhaps inevitable
as in most developing countries. Undoubtedly, political st
abilty of the regime assesses the ability of the Algerian*
army to play down subjective feelings so as to preserve its 
role of the guardian of the institutionalized state.
Moreover, the reorganization of the military regions in 
November 1984 saw the promotion of officers of the second generation to 
lead other regions: Benmaalem (Oran), Betchine (Ouargla), Abid
(Tammanrasset) , Khellil (Constantine), Zeroual (Bechar). Like Benloucif 
the chief of staff and Benyelles the Secretary General of the ministry of 
defence, most of them are in their late 30s or 40s and have been the 
product of the modernization of the Algerian army carried out after the 
country's independence. This reorganization responded to the aspira­
tions of the young officers eager to assume high responsibilities in 
military duties and circles, especially in the context of renewed tension 
with Morocco following the latter's alliance with Libya and the increase 
of domestic civilian opposition and discontent. This opposition whether 
centered around Ben Bella after his release from prison in 1981 and
self-exile, or around Muslim fundamentalists, did not aim at the
rejection of Chadli's rule as much as it asserted the emergence of 
centrifugal forces resulting from the contradictions of the economic
policies of the past period, and striving for a greater share in the
national income and decision-making. If the Ben Bella-led movement 
concentrated on the authoritarian aspects of the present regime as it 
claimed, and the group of prominent women on the emancipation of the 
Algerian woman; the fundamentalists appeared critical of the embezzlement 
and westernization of the state technocracy while Berber militants
protested against massive arabization. The diversity of these protests 
indicates the greatly marked process of différenciation that Algerian 
society is currently witnessing. There is much evidence that the regime 
of President Chadli constitutes a transitory period leading towards a new 
order different from the socialists* hardline and technocratic model of 
development carried out during Boumedienne*s time. In this context, there 
has been a strident clash between various groups and clans within 
governmental and military circles. If the main apparent cleavage exists
between those who favour, an economic liberali zation and a moderate
foreign policy and those who advocate the extension of the public*s
sector and a more radical orientation in external policies, there is a 
certainty that the issue will be settled not along these ideological and 
political divisions but essentially through conflict of personalities. 
Up to the present time. President Chadli is playing a role of broker 
between the two factions and although he favours a less rigid socialist 
line and a more emphasis on the social needs of the people, he has 
nevertheless been cautious not to speed up economic liberalism and 
political pluralism. The better economic capabilities of the country and 
the relatively weaker weight of its bourgeoisie have so far permitted 
Algeria to avoid embarking upon the open door policy pursued by Egypt 
after the death of Nasser, for instance. The multiplicity of groups and 
clans with a relatively equal strength also explained Chadli's awareness 
of doing a Sadat and accelerate Deboumediennization. His centrist
position remains at the moment his main force to keep equidistant from 
both sides and act as a referee. His re-election in December 1984 for a 
second presidential mandate may stand as an indication of the relative
success of this strategy
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On the external level, Chadli's middle-way approach reflects the 
policy of a broker between East and West, and North and South, and the 
somehow moderate and less ideologically tempered foreign policy. In
this view it appears that the centrist approach to domestic problems that 
has been followed by Chadli constituted a ferment for the equally 
centrist attitude adopted on the foreign level as it resulted from the 
compromise existing between the fractions encompassing the President.
2 * prominence of the state's executive powers-
a • the reinforcement of presidentialism
The constitutional structure established since independence reserves 
a prominent place to the state's executive powers and emphasizes the 
decisive importance of the president with regard to the national 
decision-making process. This does not imply that foreign policy
decisions, in particular, are taken in a constitutional vacuum, but it 
nevertheless shows that the momentum and the effectiveness of Algeria's 
institutional structure depends upon presidential direction and control.
Given the historical context of independent Algeria, the Algerian 
ruling elites regarded the strengthening of the state's organs and the 
extension of their role in the socio-economic and political life as a 
crucial means to consolidate their own position. The assertion of the 
army as a political institution was also seen by the military as most 
effective within the state structure, in the sense that only a political 
constitutionalization, even formal and centralized around the state as 
the supreme authority, would confer the military establishment with a 
legal status which would help conceal the de facto prominence of the army 
in the country's political process.
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While the intention of the military has been to act as the guardian 
of the institutionalized state to protect their own interests/ the 
technocracy regarded the reinforcement of the state executive powers as 
the basis for their political advancement and social privileges. The 
bureaucracy has, therefore, increased by leaps and bounds with the 
expansion of the state's administrative and economic activities. As 
past political elite was eliminated, the party being left in lethargy and 
the parliament in paralysis, the congruence between military and 
managerial elites was maximized around the consolidation of the state's 
powers which meant the strengthening of institutions of the government.
The prominence of the state and the centralization of powers in the 
presidential office were clearly reflected in the two constitutions 
Algeria has known, the first in September 1963 and the other in 1976. 
Both provided the Head of the state with large executive powers as they 
made him supreme chief of all armed forces and responsible for national 
defence (art.43, art.111 al. 4 and 5 respectively) and the only
authorized body to call state emergency and take exceptional measures in 
case of dangers against the state (art.59, art.119 and 120). The
president is also empowered to appoint all the members of the government 
(art.47, art.113), all civilian and military functions (art.54, art.11 al 
12), to establish martial law, declare and sign peace (art.44, art. 119). 
The president also defines, conducts and implements domestic and foreign 
policies (art.48, art.111 al 6), negotiates and ratifies international
treaties and conventions (art.42, art.11 al.1), appoints and dismisses 
Ambassadors (art*41, art. 11 al.6)« However, it should be noted that the 
1976 constitution endowed the President of the Republic with larger 
executive powers than the 1963 constitution. In the terms of the
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former, the Head of state incarnates the state at home and abroad
(art.111 al•1) , represents the guarantor of the constitution (art. 11 
al. 3) and unlike in the 1963 constitution he could nominate and dismiss 
Ambassadors without propositions from the ministry of foreign affairs, 
negotiate and ratify international treaties without consulting the 
National assembly and appoint members of the government as he chooses
without two-thirds having to be chosen among deputies. More important, 
the 1976 constitution permitted him to call a national referendum 
(art.111 al.14), dispose of a legislative veto (art.55). He could also 
exercise legislative power during the Assembly vacations (art.113), while 
constituencies were permitted to formulate a demand for the government to 
issue projects of law, therefore bypassing the parliamentary preroga­
tives •
Constitutionally, the Head of state is empowered in the 1976 
constitution to control everything while being under no control unlike in 
the 1963 constitution where the assembly could by a vote of no confidence 
on the basis of absolute majority force the president to resign. The 
larger executive powers conferred upon the president by the 1976 
constitution reflected in fact the personal power of Boumedienne while
during the early time of Ben Bella, the assembly was full of powerful
civilian and military personalities who did not support the President's 
policies. The relative importance given to the assembly at that time 
resulted from a balance of power which was not entirely favourable to Ben 
Bella•
After his election in February 1979, President Chadli did not 
introduce major changes into the constitution promulgated in 1976 by his 
predecessor. The only amendments passed were to reduce the presidential
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mandate from 6 to 5 years and the obligation made for the president to 
nominate a Prime Minister to assist him.^ This does not mean a
reduction of the president's executive powers conferred upon him by the 
constitution as the Premier is made responsible before the president and 
not given substantial authority. According to the art.115 al. 15 of the 
constitution, the president may delegate some of his powers to the Prime 
Minister but not those regulating the nomination and the dismissal of a 
vice-president, members of the government; or those of calling a 
referendum, anticipated .legislative elections and dissolving the 
assembly. The premier also cannot assume command of the armed forces, 
decree state emergency, sign treaties of armistice and peace. Neither 
can he preside over meetings of state and party organs or define and 
execute domestic and foreign policies. In fact, the authority of the 
President remained intact as the revision of the constitution did not for 
instance impose the nomination of a vice-president although the 
constitution stated the possibility of appointing one or more vice- 
presidents .
b. the National assembly and the FLN as state's appendages
The first elections to set up a new parliament took place fifteen 
years later (February 1977) through which were designated 261 deputies 
for a five year period. Since then, the national assembly, though 
proclaimed the legislative organ, has seen its legislative powers 
limited. If it could enact laws with regard to personal status, penal and 
commercial law, economic and Social fields, vote the state's budget.
|Liiw of July 7 , 1979 relative to constitutional revision,
‘ in the March 5, 1982 elections the number of seats was
increased to 281
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define the national education policy, it could by no means interfere in 
military and foreign affairs, though the parliament could discuss matters 
related to the country's external policies.
In practice, the assembly remained subordinated to the state's 
executive powers and as a rubber stamp for the government decisions, as 
it was filled with deputies proposed by the FLN direction under the 
direct control of the presidential office. It should be noted that 
deputies are considered to represent a national rather than a local 
constituency. The majority of deputies are relatively young (averaging 
40 years) with little wartime experience, with no substantial regional 
following or local loyalties and many of them (a third) served previously 
in the state's organs and apparatuses: former ministers, diplomats, high 
civil servants and managers of state-owned companies. The intrusion of 
the state into the parliamentary membership left little room for 
militants of the party or mass organizations denoting the bureau­
cratization of the Assembly and its submission to the state's authority.1 
The president of the Assembly (since 1977) is Rabah Bitat, the only 
historic chief to remain in power. He has a limited political credo and 
is regarded as a state functionary having served as a minister for a long 
period of time 1965-1977.
Just as the Assembly was deprived of executive powers, the FLN never 
assumed a leading role in political mobilization and control and despite 
the grandiloquence of the rhetoric about the predominance of the party 
over the state as inscribed in the 1963 and 1976 constitutions, the FLN
Only 22 out of 120 candidates serving in the FLN 
administration were elected in 1977. Moreover, the number 
of representatives of working class and peasantry is 
n e g l i g i b l e .
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has become in fact a mere institutional appendage to the presidency.^ 
Declared attempts to revitalise it failed to make it emerge from the 
lethargy and inertia as to become the real 'parti-derigeant' .2
After the June 1965 coup and on the eve of appointing a secretariat 
executive of the FLN, Boumedienne publicly asserted the prominence of the 
state over the party. "The FLN, he declared, will be a dynamic
avant-garde revolutionary party, functioning according to the rules of 
democratic centralism and consisting of tested militants. Its tasks will 
be in conformity with the Tripoli programme but not that of ADMINISTERING 
or SUBSTITUTING itself for the state".2 As a result of conflicts
between the members of the executive secretariat, this organ was 
dissolved on December 12, 1967 and Kaid Ahmed a member of the Oujda group 
and a President's aide was put in charge of the party and responsible for 
its reorganization. However, Boumedienne did not intend to relinquish 
his leadership over the FLN as Kaid proved to have a mind of his own and
as indication of his authority over the FLN, he chaired himself the
important session of this party on December 22, 1970. After the
dismissal of Kaid on December 22, 1972, the party remained in
Boumedienne's hands, although in practice the administration of the party 
was assumed by Cherif Messadia, a senior party official with modest 
political credentials at that time. After the setting up of political 
institutions in 1976 and in the context of reinforcing his own position.
^The 1963 constitution empowered the FLN to "establish the 
nation's policies and control the activity of the National 
assembly and of the government". The 1964 charter 
confirmed the party prominence over the state (art.24) and 
in the 1976 constitution, the FLN is supposed to orientate 
the country's general policy (art.98).
^Directives related to its organization were issued on March 
26, 1966; December 10, 1967) January 24, 1968) October 24, 
1968 and February 11-13, 1970.
Speech, July 7, 1965. (emphasis added)
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Boumedienne appointed on November 14, 1977, Salah Yahaoui as coordinator
of the party. A former ANP officer, Yahaoui had been close to the 
president with whom he shared hardline socialist convictions.
Until the death of Boumedienne in December 1978, the FLN's 
activities were relatively limited. Tne party was practically absent 
from the state's administrative apparatuses and was bypassed by the army 
and by local constituency organs in directing the operations relative to 
the applications of the agrarian revolution that was launched in 1971. 
Another aspect of external -influence within the party, was the obligation 
made for the Muhafada - a party instance at the wilaya level - to include 
also in its bureau the wali (prefect) and the commander of the military 
region, both regarded as the representatives of the institutionalized 
state. ^ Moreover, in an attempt to overcome the inertia of the party 
and also widen the scope of the regime's legitimacy, Boumedienne appealed 
to students and military conscripts to volunteer in campaigning for the 
success of the Agrarian revolution by explaining its content to the 
peasants and helping them in their daily work and administrative affairs.
The application of the 'gestion socialiste des entreprises' (the 
workers' management charter) carried out by the UGTA under the FLN 
guidance did not touch all the ministries and national companies as 
originally intended. Invoking reasons of economic efficiency and the 
principle that politics and business do not mix, the ministry of industry 
and energy led by Abdeslam was able to stop the intrusion of this new 
charter in the state oil company Sonatrach in particular. The army also 
remained outside the FLN control. The ANP has its own magazine
^Decision taken at the March 29, 1981 sixth ordinary session
of the FLN's central committee.
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Al-Djeich (the army) which emphasized the role of the military establish­
ment in the socio-economic development of the country and as the guardian 
of the revolution and the institutionalized state.
c • the limits of local government
Another aspect of executive centralization is reflected in the
increase of the role of the state in local government. The administrative
system inherited from the colonial period instituted a pyramidal
structure of bodies as the country was administratively sub-divided into
13 Wilayat (departments), 100 arrondissements (districts) and 1590
communes having at their head a wali (prefect) a sub-prefect and a Mayor
respectively.^ In independent Algeria, the object of the administrative
organization aimed at deconcentrating the central power and increase
popular participation in decisions affecting these regions. However, the
state administration remained highly centralized and its control over
these constituencies nearly omnipotent. Both the prefect and the
sub-prefect, the main decision-makers in their constituencies were
state-appointed and depended on their 'Ministère de tutelle' the home
office. The communes supposedly the basic unit of the administrative
system and which Ben Bella compressed to 1150 for the purpose of
effectiveness, were placed under the control of organs known as the 
/ ✓ /'delegations spéciales' appointed by the president instead of being 
elected as he initially promised perhaps in order not to provide 
landlords, religious and traditional chiefs with the possibility to 
resist let alone challenge the state's authority.
^The number of Wilayat was increased to 31 in July 1974 
(ordinance no.74-09 of July 2, 1974) and to 48 in December 
1984 (Law of February 4, 1984). By 1978 the number of the 
communes was reduced to 691.
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The lack of a well-articulated administrative process remained until 
1967-1969 when the codes of the commune and the wilaya were enacted and 
municipal elections held in an attempt to redefine the role of the 
administrative units and their socio-economic functions as well as make 
local government focus on political and economic development and provide 
a two-way channel of access from the central authority to the people.1
The efforts to decentralize the bureaucratic structure remained 
formal as the subnational territorial entities may be delegated authority 
from the central government but they have no inherent authority of their 
own. Because the Algerian state is unitary, decentralization cannot be 
made to express some autonomy as decentralization is only "a technique 
for increasing the active participation of the Wilayat and of the masses 
in the revolutionary power.' The wilaya endowed with political, economic 
and socio-cultural prerogatives and operating as an intermediary between 
the commune and central authority remained, as in the past, headed by a 
state-appointed wali being the only depository of the state authority 
whose unicity therefore, rules out the confusion of responsibilities 
(article 150 of the code of the wilaya). The wali is assisted by an 
elected advisory body or council whose powers are in reality very 
limited. Economic projects interesting the constituencies for instance.
'The communal Charter was promulgated on October 28, 1966
and the communal code on January 1, 1967. The charter of
the Wilaya was issued on March 26, 1969 (ordinance 68-38). 
For other texts the ordinance No.67-24 of January 1, 1974 
related to the communal code modified by the Law No.79-05 
of June 23, 1979. See also decrees 81-37 to 81-398
published in the official journal of the Algerian Republic 
N o . 51 of December 21, 1981. Elections for APC (communes)
took place on March 1-3, 1967 and APW (wilaya assemblies) on
25-5, 1969 renewed in July 2, 1974, December 14, 1979 and
December 1984.2 'Interview of Boumedienne to Revolution Afrlcaine (July 2,
1 9 7 0 ) .
had to be planned and their realisation controlled by a national economic 
and social council (CNES) a government-appointed body composed of 170 
representatives from various ministries, financial institutions, managers 
of the state-owned companies and from the party organs, created on 
November 6, 1968.
The constitutional and administrative structure did not permit a 
free political activity, producing on the contrary a tight centralized 
governmental executive unwilling to give up its powers and prerogatives.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
A foreign policy of any country cannot be seriously analyzed without 
understanding the process of its formulation, making and conduct. In 
this process, the study of idiosyncratic or individual factors is 
indispensable, because foreign policy is neither a mere description of 
the external manifestations of a state nor a simple output of the entire 
national unit.
In contrast to constitutional states characterized by relatively 
permanent institutions, well articulated bureaucracies and pressure 
groups, the decision-making in Algeria, like in many new states, has been 
virtually personal or at least restricted to a small group centred around 
the president. The constitutional structure in this country proved,
when existed, too formal to permit a dynamic interraction between 
institutions and personalities. This suggests the minor role played by 
both the parliament and the party in the decision-making process and 
assesses that responsibility has come to rest in the office of the 
President. As a result, the institutional organs were merely confined 
to the role of more or less influencing the policies without having the 
power of making a formal decision. Moreover, in a context marked by 
authoritarianism where impermanently rooted institutions have been 
subordinated to relatively permanent personalities, and given the absence 
of mass political mobilization, influence of public opinion or group 
interests on the foreign policy decisions has been minimal. However, this 
does not imply that the president-led ruling elite was entirely immune 
from domestic constraints and pressures, but simply that foreign policy
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in Algeria underlines the feature of a strong state executive and the 
tendency to make policy within a small circle operating in secrecy or 
semi-secrecy.
In this circle of what has been commonly labelled as the foreign 
community, the President had to contend with rivalries between the few 
members of the ruling elite consisting essentially of a small coalition 
between officers and civilian technocrats. And it has been amid these 
rivalries that the evolution of Algerian foreign policy should also be 
understood.
A. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY 
1. Structure and organization
The foreign ministry in Algeria was not an institution born with the 
country's independence in 1962, but its formal creation dates back to the 
outbreak of the war of liberation. The FLN declaration of November 1, 
1954 made the internationalization of the Algerian conflict one of its 
main external objectives.'
The first manifestation of the wartime diplomacy was then, the 
setting up of a 'delegation of the exterior' entrusted with the task of 
gathering international support for the Algerian cause and its first 
success was the participation - though as an observer - of an FLN 
delegation in the first gathering of the third world countries at Bandung 
on January 24, 1955.^ At this conference, the Algerian delegates Ait
Ahmed and M'Hamed Yazid gained pledges of moral and financial support to 
the Algerian cause, mainly from the Arab countries. The strength of the
'see Textes fundamentaux du F L N , p.5.
^The external delegation was formed out of three historical 
chiefs of the Algerian revolutions Benbella, Ait-Ahmed and 
his brother in law Khider.
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socialist bloc and the emergence of the non-aligned movement gave an 
opportunity for mustering support for its struggle, in the sense of 
putting pressure on France to grant the Algerian people independence. 
The creation of the provisional government (GPRA) in September 1958 gave 
birth to a foreign ministry led by a radical politician, Dr Lamine 
Debaghine and diplomatic missions were sent to numerous countries which 
had supported the FLN cause. Moreover, the FLN actions on the external 
level were enhanced by the creation of an information bureau in New York, 
jointly directed by two highly skilful diplomats, Abdelkader Chanderli 
and M'Hamed Yazid. This bureau edited 'Free Algeria', a magazine which 
aimed at gaining the support of non-aligned countries and of other 
countries at the United Nations for the Algerian war of liberation, 
especially after the inclusion of the Algerian question on the UN agenda 
and the commencing of negotiations between the FLN and the French 
government•
Following changes in the GPRA leadership made in January 1960, 
Colonel Krim Belkacem, one of the most prestigious guerilla leaders, was 
put in charge of the foreign office. Krim's team included young and 
competent diplomats most of whom benefited from the already acquired 
diplomatic experience of the GPRA's Minister of Information, M'Hamed 
Yazid who will eventually become a prominent figure in independent 
Algeria's diplomacy. Under Krim Belkacem, the foreign ministry
comprised four sections according to geographical divisions: Europe- 
America, the socialist countries, Africa-Asia, and the Arab world and 
constituted the principal nucleus of sovereign Algeria's corps diplom­
atique. After the reshuffle of the GPRA in August 1961, Krim was
replaced by Dahlab, a radical politician and one of the most skilled and
entrepreneurial members of the FLN delegation which negotiated the final 
agreements at Evian. This change resulted perhaps from the pressures of 
the FLN1s general staff and some of the Arabic-speaking maquisards who 
suspected Krim of showing a moderate attitude at the negotiations with 
the French government.
Until 1963, the foreign ministry remained in the form of a general 
secretariat of external affairs and not in a properly articulated 
structure. With the nomination of Bouteflika in September 1963, this 
organ was progressively turned into an established unit organized into 
one general directorate and two additional directorates, one of which 
dealt exclusively with the French affairs, a matter that indicated the 
importance Algeria attached to relations with her former metropole - 
Table 11:1. The General Directorate and the other directions covered 
all aspects of Algeria's relations with geographically determined 
countries. In practice, this organization appeared quite rigid and
there were problems of coordination between the different divisions.
A reform took place in March 1977 unaccompanied by a public 
government statement to explain the reasons for the reorganization - 
Table 11:2. Apparently, it aimed at improving the effectiveness of the 
ministry in the context of Algeria's greater involvement in international 
affairs, increase of the economic capabilities and extension of the 
diplomatic network. The main changes were the transformation of the old 
specialised directorate into 12 integrated directions, each headed by a 
Direction General and comprising directions, sub-directions and bureaus. 
These Directions could be classified into three categories: 1) functional 
directions: dealing with economic, political and cultural relations, 2)
10 1
geographic directions: Arab countries, Africa, Asia Latin-America
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Eastern Europe, Western Europe, 3) technical directions: related to 
protocol, press, consular affairs and general administration. The most 
important change consisted in abolishing the French directorate by 
placing French affairs in the sub—direction EEC of the direction Western 
Europe and North-America. The assumption that the reform was only
structural and organizational, or that it merely responded to necessary 
adjustments to a new context marked by the country's external commitments 
prove too simplistic to explain the relative tardiness of the reform. 
For the same reason is invalid the argument that the abolition of the 
French directorate resulted from Algeria's determination to assess the 
reduction of economic dependence on her former metropole and avoid giving 
a special character to her relations with the latter as it was the 
practice during De Gaulle's era.
It seems however that the new structure reflects clearly two sets of 
considerations. Politically, it aimed at allowing the entry of new 
elements into the ministry as a result of political mobilisation 
initiated by Boumedienne to replace the old guard and at reducing the 
grip of Bouteflika over it. Structurally, it attempted to ease the 
heavy-centralized structure of the ministry so as to permit an increase 
of the participation of diplomatic personnel in the execution of some 
aspects of Algeria's external affairs as the implementation of foreign 
objectives needed more and more expertise and staff.
Algeria had diplomatic representation abroad well before her 
independence with the wartime FLN having permanent missions in several 
countries, mainly the Arab ones and those of the socialist world as well 
as in Ghana, and Guinea. The structure of these representations in
independent Algeria varies from one country of accreditation to another.
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given the importance of Algeria's interests in the host country and to 
some extent its size. Larger embassies are usually organized in a way 
that reflects the compartmentalization of routine work, being divided 
into these main sections: chancery, accounts, consular and judicial 
affairs, information and culture and military. The mission is headed by 
an Ambassador assisted by one or more advisers. In countries such as
USA, GB, France and the USSR, the missions also include an important
cultural section to deal with the affairs of the Algerian govern-
ment-sponsored students, but its head is designated by and is responsible 
to the ministry of higher education. In smaller missions such as those in 
sub-Sahara Africa, the pattern of organization is comparatively simpler 
with regard to the number of diplomatic staff and means due to the 
limitation of Algeria's affairs in these countries.
A variety of criteria has been used to justify the opening of 
diplomatic missions:
Fundamental considerations: proclaiming itself an Arab country and 
belonging to the Arab community and destiny, it was normal for Algeria to 
have diplomatic relations with primarily brother Arab countries of the 
Maghreb and the Middle East.
Ideological affinities: on the basis of anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism 
and anti-imperialism, as is the case with former colonies and the 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Communist China, North Korea, Cuba 
and Vietnam. Political reasons: consideration of non-alignment (such as 
Yugoslavia and India) and importance of some third world countries in 
international affairs (Brazil, Iran and Mexico) and energy such as
Indonesia, or Venezuela
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Economic considerations; in spite of a rhetoric resolutely anti­
imperialist Algeria has developed close economic relations with the 
Western world , the EEC Community, Japan, USA and Canada. Her economic 
policy depended heavily on sophisticated technology, expertise and 
markets available in these countries.
Prestige: an Embassy certainly reflects the importance or the status of a 
country abroad. The existence of a large diplomatic network abroad, 
illustrates to some extent the concern of prestige felt by the Algerian 
leaders. Indeed, Algeria's representation abroad covers nearly eighty 
countries and her presence in third world countries and in Africa in 
particular appeared to be quite impressive. The opening of a series of 
Embassies overseas in the early 1970s was dictated by Algeria's desire to 
lead the third world coalition around the demands for a NIEO.
In many cases, there was a combination of all these categories of 
considerations mentioned above, which played in Algeria's decision to 
open Embassies for instance in Syria or Nasser's Egypt. However it 
still remains difficult to single out the most important criterion that 
justifies the opening of diplomatic representation abroad. But in some 
cases, the reasons for justification are quite simple. For instance it 
was for ideological considerations that Algeria opened an Embassy in 
Addis Ababa, after the downfall of Selassie and the take-over of 
Mengistu, regarded as a progressive leader. In the case of Kenya, it 
seems that political consideration was the most prominent criterion, 
since President Moi was regarded by the Algerian leadership as more 
liberal and open-minded than his predecessor Kenyatta. Needless to say, 
the opening of diplomatic representation involves a great deal of
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finance, diplomatic cadre, technical and administrative facilities. It 
seems that in the case of Algeria, a huge effort has been made thanks 
perhaps to the flows of oil revenues.
2. Recruitment and political influence in the civil service
Unlike in many countries, including some from the third world, the
Algerian diplomatic service has not a good deal of generational and
familial continuity, perhaps because the history of the Algerian
diplomacy is too short to generate such a continuity. Indeed, the
foreign ministry like many other governmental institutions and agencies
originally recruited from the young generation of the Algerian militants
that were at various degrees involved in the colonial struggle,
especially within the FLN or its mass organization such as the student
, /unions (UGEMA), general workers' union UGTA and the Federation de France 
of the FLN (FF.FLN). The analysis of the senior personnel at the
Ministry of external affairs, reveals the heavy reliance on this source 
of recruitment until the late 1960s with the start of a professional 
career and the entrance determined by examination and promotions.
A theoretical study of a corps diplomatique, focusing especially on 
senior diplomats (Ambassadors and heads of directions) might not provide 
insights on the decision-making, orientation and conduct of a country's 
foreign policy even though the analysis is sustained by data on social 
background, values and behaviour of these senior diplomats. If,
theoretically, the analysis might be attractive and might offer valuable 
explanation, it still remains not fully convincing when testing it 
empirically. The problem one may face is related to the question of how 
powerful, how influential might an Ambassador be with regard to foreign 
policy-making and vis-a-vis others in the ministry and elsewhere.
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Generally, the diplomat’s job is not "to make policy, (this policy) 
belongs to the politician and the statesman. The tasks of the diplomat 
is its execution. He transmits details of that policy to foreign
governments, he negotiates agreements that seek to advance and embody 
it."1 However, it seems that in Algeria as in other developing
countries, the role of some Ambassadors has not been limited to executing 
the country's foreign policy only. The fact that about fifteen people 
with a long experience in the diplomatic service were appointed ministers 
and vice-ministers shows the importance of this organ in the state-
dominated national decision-making. The number is considerable with 
regard to the scarcity of governmental reshuffles and the numeric
smallness of the ministerial staff since independence. Schematically, the 
corps diplomatique comprises four categories of Ambassadors and senior 
diplomats. However, such a categorisation must not be taken as rigid 
since the criteria used for this purpose are chiefly suggestive and
subject to future investigation. Precise data on Algeria's Ambassadors 
are still elusive and aggregating data about Ambassadors that would point 
to relate them with group interests is extremely difficult.
The first category refers to the typical militant Ambassador which 
includes people born between 1922 and 1930, had been involved in 
nationalist activities before the outbreak of the Algerian armed 
insurrection, came from relatively privileged segments of Muslim Algerian 
population, a possibility that permitted them to attend high schools 
which in turn intensified their political socialisation. Such a
1E . Clark: Corps diplomatique (London, Allen Lane, 1973), 
p . 4 1 .
‘Kafi was a son of a Mufti (a Moslem judge), Yazid's father 
served in the French army. Al-Madani came from a
relatively well-off family with a traditional background.
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category would include: A1 Madani, Benhabyles, Kafi, Messa oudi, Mezhoudi, 
Hadj Yala and M'Hamed Yazid to cite the most influential among them. 
Their distinguished character is that they were members of the PPA-MTLD 
and quite heavily involved in wartime politics. For instance, Kafi and 
Oussedick were high officers of the ALN, Yala a politico-military 
official at Khenchela (Wilaya I), Mezhoudi and Madani belonged to the 
Ulama association. They were also among the first to serve as FLN's 
representatives abroad: Kafi in Cairo (1961-1962), Benhabyles in Damascus 
and Tokyo, Yazid at the United Nations. Their early nationalist
activities might explain their more marked anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism militancy, and their involvement in the FLN's diplomacy 
accounts for their higher prestige and experience. They could be
regarded more as politicians and ideologues than as mere executive 
diplomats. Oussedick and Yazid for instance are considered as close to 
national liberation movements and progressive third world countries, 
while Mezhoudi and Aissa Messaoudi could be regarded as close to the 
panarabist core. At Algeria's independence it was logical that they 
were earmarked for important functions inside the ministry or for 
important diplomatic posts abroad, especially to socialist countries of 
Europe and to some leading third world countries. For instance,
Benhabyles became successively head of Eastern Europe division at the 
foreign ministry and Ambassador to Japan (1964-1967), Tunisia (1967- 
1970), assistant Secretary-General (1974-1977) before being the 
Secretary-General of the government (1979-1981). Kafi served as
Ambassador to Lebanon, Libya and Syria; Oussedick had been successively
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in posts in Bulgaria, USSR, India and Italy; Yala was in charge of 
Eastern-Europe division in 1963, before representing Algeria in Conakry 
and then in Pekin.
This group had also been a source for ministerial and high civil 
service recruitment, a fact that shows their importance and position. 
Benhabyles became Minister of Justice in 1977, Lacheraf of education, 
Yala served successively as Minister of Commerce, finance and currently 
he is in charge of the home office.
2. In contrast to the 'militants', the 'technocrat' diplomats were 
younger (born between 1930 and 1934), came from relatively better-off
urbanized families and had been lately involved in nationalist activi­
ties, mainly in student unions (UGEMA).1 This category includes
diplomats such as Ait-Chaalal, Bedjaoui, Boulahrouf, Brahimi, Malek, 
Kellou, Houhou, Taleb-Chaib, Sahnoun and Yaker. Their common feature is 
that they were intellectuals, mainly immersed in student politics and 
most of them joined the GPRA's central direction or its specialized 
bodies where they were probably more useful than in the maquis.^ In 
addition, they were regarded with suspicion by the uneducated maquisards, 
a matter that aggravated the differences between these two segments 
during the war of liberation and even after. Rahal was director of
Cabinet in the GPRA's general affairs ministry (1961-1963), Houhou in its 
central direction and Malek was the editor of the FLN's organ El-
Moudjahid (1957-1961). Some of them participated in the GPRA's
negotiations with the French government at Evian such as Boulahrouf and
1Malek and Kellou were born in 1931, Brahimi and Houhou in
1934. Malek's father was a lawyer and Ait Chaalal's was a 
wealthy landowner from the Constantine region.
^Ait-Chaalal was president of the UGEMA (1957-1962), Kellou 
its deputy-president in charge of foreign affairs, Houhou 
was another deputy-president.
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Malek while Bedjaoui served as a legal adviser to the GPRA during these 
negotiations. It is not surprising to find that all served as Ambassa­
dors to Paris at one time or another: Malek (1965-1970), Bedjaoui (19 
-1979), Houhou (1981-1983).
The technocrats' distinctive feature is that they were technically 
better qualified than the 'militants' and perhaps because of their higher 
education level and nationalist activities abroad, they held more 
modernist valuesJ And because of their competence, they contributed 
largely in shaping Algeria's external economic relations, especially in 
the context of Algeria's participation in the North-South debate. They 
were also close to the state technocrats and particularly those in the 
ministries of economy, planning and finance, with whom they share the 
same social background, political socialization (UGEMA) and professional 
experience (GPRA or the Executif provisoire). These considerations 
helped build friendship and affinities, thus consolidating the technocrat 
trend and its influence vis-a-vis the ideologists and militant diplomats.
Because of their expertise a certain number of the technocratic 
personnel were accredited to countries with which Algeria has important 
economic relations or political relations linked with issues of 
North-South dialogue: for instance Malek had been successively in post to 
Belgrade (1963-1965), France (1965-1970), Moscow (1970-1977), Washington 
(1979-1982) and London (1982-1984); Kellou had been in posts in the UK, 
West Germany and Argentina; Houhou in Cairo, Canada and France; 1
1Many of them were French Universities graduates: Chaalal 
and Khene obtained Ph.D degrees, Kellou, Hamdani were 
graduates in Law, Malek in Letters, Houhou in Economics, 
Taleb-Chaib attended Paris faculty of medecine and Lausanne 
faculty of Political Science, Rahal graduated from Bordeaux 
University and Brahimi from the Political Institutes at 
Algiers and Paris.
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Ait-Chaalal in Brussels, Moscow and Washington. They had also been 
elected to preside over international conferences devoted to the 
North-South issues. Ait-Chaalal was the co-chairman of the commission 
for development of the 1975 Paris Conference, Khene served as Secretary- 
General of Opec organization (1973-1974) and then as UNIDO's executive 
director, Jezairy chaired the plenary committee of North-South dialogue, 
Yaker was a member of the Brandt committee, and Sahnoun was deputy 
Secretary-General of the OAU and the Arab league respectively.
Like the group of the militants, some technocrat diplomats held at 
one time or another ministerial portfolios: Bedjaoui (justice 1964-1970); 
Houhou (sports and youth 1977-1982 and health since 1983); Yaker 
(commerce 1969-1977) and Khene (public works 1966-1970).
- The third category is formed by the 'career diplomats'. Data and 
information are not enough to describe this category with accuracy 
although brief accounts gathered on the foreign ministry personnel may 
provide good insights into the status, values and objectives of the 
members of this group. The emergence of the second generation of the 
'career' diplomats may have started with the application of a recruitment 
policy carried out in the later 1960s as a result of two major demands: 
the expansion of Algeria's diplomatic network and the increasing emphasis 
on the economic issues in Algerian foreign policy since 1970. Like many 
of the technocrats of the first generation in the foreign service, they 
were needed to staff the central administration and diplomatic represen­
tations abroad. This policy responded to the fact that the foreign 
ministry did not wish to go outside its ranks to appoint economic 
counsellors from other agencies, especially in the context of the 
elevation of internationally-oriented technocrats of the ministry of
industry and energy to key posts in the national decision-making. The
Foreign Ministry instead, preferred to increase the capabilities and 
skills of its career diplomats by giving them experience in such 
positions and by broadening the base from which it recruits students, 
though through harsh examination. This proved necessary in the context 
of a rivalry with other ministries, especially the ministry of industry 
and energy as we shall see later.
The major source for recruiting the qualified cadre has been since 
the late 1960s, the diplomatic section of the national school of 
administration (ENA) which provides more than half of the foreign 
ministry recruits each year. The high qualifications of the recipients 
belonging to the diplomatic section is assessed by the very selective 
procedures to enter the ENA in the first place and by the fact that the 
access to its diplomatic section rests on academic merit. The entry 
procedures to the national school of administrative gave therefore a 
decided advantage to candidates from the urban and middle classes as 
there had been a strong assumption that candidates are chosen following 
criteria of personal connections and relations.
Next to the diplomatic section stands the 'external test' which - 
established since 1971 - requires that applicants obtain a university
degree in law, economics or politics before taking the entrance 
examination. Alike the first source of recruitment through the ENA the 
external test has been very selective and involved in some cases personal 
connections as well.
The career diplomats tend to identify perhaps more than others with 
their diplomatic function. In this respect, they share some similari­
ties with the administrators of the Middle East described by Bill and
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Leiden as they "are younger, more likely to support and be ideologically 
committed to development goals and have been more professional and more 
aware of modern administrative science."1 They are also little known to 
the Algerian public and unlike the militants or the technocrats they have 
practically never been earmarked for ministerial portfolios with the 
exception of the appointment as Vice-Ministers of some of them in the 
December 1983 government which in fact marked their recent but expected 
rise in governmental positions. Nevertheless, they still have neither 
the prestige nor the past political and diplomatic experience of the 
members of the other two groups. They constitute rather a clientele for 
these groups, searching protection, promotion and political advancement 
and conceivably act chiefly as executive diplomats. Yet, loyalties have 
been built up mainly with the older generation of technocrats with whom 
they share some features, probably because like the technocratic 
diplomats, they did not effectively participate in guerrilla activities 
(because of their age); their only virtue stems from their higher level 
of education and probably from the amount and potency of their connec­
tions and ties. Many of the career diplomats came from parts of Western 
Algeria especially from the Tlemcen region near the Moroccan border. 
During Bouteflika's time, their importance in the Ministry's internal 
decision-making grew as they came from the same native region as the 
foreign minister himself or were able to win his confidence through the 
use of connections which had a better access to him. Like Bouteflika many
1B i11 , J and Leiden, C: The Middle East: politics and power 
quoted in 'political development and bureaucracy in L i b y a ' , 
edited by Omar J. Fatham et al. (Lexington Books, DC. 
Health Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977).
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of them came from families which lived in Morocco during the war and 
returned to Algeria after independence, after having completed some kind 
of post-graduation achieved in many cases in France.
This group includes Allouane, Gaouar, Gharbi, Kherbi and Kesri. This 
geographical trend has been reversed since 1979 after the take over of 
the foreign ministry by Benyahia who encouraged the ascension within the 
ministry hierarchy of career diplomats from Eastern Algeria, his native 
region.
- The fourth category refers to the 'outsider' diplomats who came 
from other ministries and agencies as well as from three main institu­
tions: the army, the party and the national assembly. The number of
these candidates never exceeded twenty per cent illustrating the
reluctance of the foreign ministry - especially under Bouteflika - to 
allow the infusion of outsiders into the diplomatic service. The
relatively limited number of the outsiders into this service resulted to 
a large extent from disgrace as well as from the policy of shuttling 
abroad potential opponents rather than for services rendered. The 
appointment in 1964 to Ambassadorial posts of some members of the wartime 
FLN elite such as Oussedick, Gaid, Akkouche and Dahlab and Tayebi and the 
technocrats Benyahia and Malek resulted from Ben Bella 's decision to 
shun them for opposing his policies. The assignment to diplomatic posts 
abroad of majors Benmahmoud, Fadhel, Guennez, Maoui, (all ex-ministers) 
followed the governmental reshuffle decided by Boumedienne in April 1977, 
while the diplomatic movements that took place in 1979, 1983 and 1984
aimed at the political oblivion of personalities that were powerful
during the Boumedienne era.
Despite the intrusion of outsiders into the foreign ministry (in fact 
relatively marginal), recent changes that affected its personnel policy 
indicate shifts to political moderation and emphasis on economic 
considerations away from revolutionary rhetoric and commitments. To the 
period stretching from 1962 to 1967 marked by improvisation and 
transition, succeeded an era (1968-1975) of relative consolidation of the 
administrative process within the Ministry and continuity of diplomatic 
personnel and stability. It is noteworthy to remember that only one 
Ambassador Laaraj Sekkiou resigned from his Ambassadorial post (in 
Pakistan) in protest at the coup against Ben Bella. Until 1977, the 
Ministry witnessed a relative inner equilibrium marked by high profes­
sional calibre of its leading personnel, a substantial breadth of 
diplomatic experience at home and abroad, the establishment of high 
standard and a more or less well sustained system of recruitment mainly 
of students to fill posts in the central administration as well as in the 
diplomatic representation abroad.
As political institutions consolidate and the state settles down, the 
move toward conservatism increases. This trend affected the diplomatic 
service as well because the foreign ministry has not been completely 
independent from the country's inner vortex of the struggle for power, 
especially as the mid-1970s witnessed a strong rivalry between 
Boumedienne and Bouteflika and lately with the increase of personal 
ambitions of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Algeria's foreign minister since 1982. 
The moderate approach to international issue pursued by Chadli and Taleb 
Ibrahimi resulted in the elimination from diplomatic offices of the last 
veterans, mainly the members belonging to the category of militant 
diplomats such as M'Hamed Yazid, Lacheraf, Mubarak A1 Mill, Bounekraf or
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others belonging to the category of technocratic diplomats known for 
their leftist orientations such as Reda Malek and Boulahrouf in 
particular. The nomination of Abdelhamid Mehri as Ambassador to Paris 
in 1984 stands as a good example of this new emphasis on political 
moderation, as Mehri an FLN veteran is well known for his conservative 
arabic background and distrust of leftist ideology.
B. THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: THE CORE OF THE 
PROCESS
1. The prominence of the Presidential Office
For the reasons proper to the historical context, the Algerian 
presidents emerged as the guarantors of the institutionalized state and 
the guardians of the Algerian revolution which exalted a socialistic way 
of development and the attachment to Arabo-Islamic values. Whether 
supported by the army like Ben Bella or emerging from the military 
establishment like Boumedienne and Chadli , they enjoyed a great deal of 
authority as reflected by their more or less pronounced inclination to 
the personalisation of power.
a) The mechanisms of ensuring Presidential prominence
To mark their predominance over the foreign decision-making, the 
Algerian presidents had attempted to take over the foreign ministry 
itself (like Ben Bella ) or created parallel structures such as personal 
advisers as did Boumedienne and Chadli. In addition, the subservience 
of the government to the presidential office facilitated their hold over 
the foreign decision-making process. From Ben Bella to Chadli, the
governments were filled with trusted friends, allies and supporters 
indicating the inexistence of fundamental disagreements on the broad 
outlines of the country's policies in general and foreign policy orienta-
tions in particular. This situation was made possible by the relatively 
stable ministerial coalition, Algeria has known since independence. 
Prominent figures who had a share in the national decision-making had a 
long tenure in office and survived the three regimes. For 8 most
important ministerial portfolio there had been only 33 holders since 1962 
- Table 11:3. This assumes the quite remarkable ministerial stability 
and restrictiveness of the ministerial personnel, especially if we bear 
in mind that 8 ministers lasted only one year in office and 6 others for 
two years. At the end, this observation leaves us with only 19
ministers having occupied the 9 ministries for much of the time 
stretching from September 1962 to September 1985, and in average only 2 
holders per ministry for the entire period.
To highlight the length of this tenure, it is worth mentioning that 
Taleb-Brahimi served 20 years as a minister, Benyahia and Bouteflika for 
16 years, Medeghri, Abdeslam for 12 years, Cherif Belkacem and Abdelghani 
for 11 years, while Messaoudene, Yala and Yaker occupied ministerial 
posts for 8 years. This relative stability at the level of the
ministerial council enabled the presidents to act with a greater 
independence especially with regard to major foreign policy issues. Such 
an ascendancy was also facilitated by the fact that no major disagree­
ments existed between Ministers notwithstanding the 1964-1965 year, the 
first two years of the Boumedienne rule and the early stage of President 
Chadli's rule, and with regard to foreign policy issues, dissonances have 
been even less pronounced. These particular years were revealing signs of 
a change of regimes like in June 1965 or the consolidation of the new 
regime as in 1966-1967 with Boumedienne and in 1979-1981 with Chadli. The 
indication was that rivalries between persons and groups seemed more
crucial than their divergences over the country's fundamental domestic 
and foreign policies. From Ben Bella to Chadli, the socialistic line 
carried out at home and the anti-imperialist stance pursued abroad has 
not been seriously altered. in the shadow of these rivalries, the major 
discrepancies rested on the ways and means to achieve these policies. To 
the romantic and populist socialism of Ben Bella , contrasted the harsh 
and dour brand of the socialism of Boumedienne, while with Chadli, the 
concentration of the government has been on rectifying the mistakes of 
the past regime rather than on repudiating the socialist model of 
development altogether.
Besides ministerial stability, another factor that facilitated the 
predominance of the presidency over foreign-policy making has been the 
marked specialisation in Algerian cabinets, a matter which has in turn, 
weakened the ability of the council of ministers as a body capable of 
having a determinant impact on the formulation of foreign policy. Since 
independence, this specialisation appeared operational with Boumedienne 
holding the Defence portfolio, Bouteflika, the foreign ministry, Medeghri 
(Home Office) and for the national economy, Abdeslam and then A. Brahimi 
since 1979. These ministers turned their respective office into
fiefdoms and were able to control issues related to their specific areas 
and departments and their influence on the President was perhaps more 
individual than collective.
There is no doubt that ministers belonged to different groups and 
clans and represented the interests of their respective factions. Most 
notorious have been the Oujda group, the Abdeslam team within the 
ministerial council which represented the modernist and centralist 
faction of the state high technology under the Boumedienne rule, while
Taleb-Ibrahimi and Benyahia were regarded as expressing the interests of 
respectively the conservative and left-wing trends of the state 
technocracy.
In addition to the subservience of the cabinet to the presidency and 
the weakness of the ministerial council to act as the main decision­
making body, the councils of revolution during Boumedienne or the FLN's 
political bureau under Ben Bella or Chadli did not either act as 
decision-making bodies despite occasional meetings to issue declarations 
on foreign policy. The potency of these organs enabled then the
presidents to have a greater hold on the formulation of the country's 
external policies. Therefore, they made full use of the prestige of 
presidential receptions and visits, travelled quite exclusively, received 
innumerable heads of state in Algiers and hosted several international 
conferences•
b) The Presidential priorities
The Algerian presidents intervened in two main fields: defence and 
national security and had a personal involvement in handling the 
relations with the socialist countries and those of the third world.
With regard to national security, there was a strong rivalry between 
Ben Bella and Boumedienne then the defence minister, but the latter was 
able to make of the army his touchstone. An indication of Boumedienne' s 
strength was to decide later to counterbalance the Moroccan-Mauritanian 
take-over of the Western Sahara without the knowledge of many high 
officers and surely without the consent of his foreign minister 
Bouteflika. When the latter went to Rabat to seek peaceful settlement 
with King Hassan in July 1975, Boumedienne charged in October Bedjaoui, 
(Algeria's representaive to the United Nations) to defend the right of
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the Saharawi people for self-determination at the Hague Court of Justice, 
and launch a diplomatic campaign in support of the Polisario front 
against the Madrid agreement through which Spain handed its former colony 
to Morocco and Mauritania.^ To deprive his foreign minister of
negotiating with the Moroccan side, Boumedienne entrusted Taleb Brahimi 
then his personal adviser to assume contacts that took place in 1977 with 
Reda Guedira, the Moroccan King's confidant.
President Chadli's control over the military affairs was not easy at 
the beginning because of the diffusion of power that existed within the 
military establishment and the emergence of military fiefs with the death 
of Boumedienne in December 1978. However, evidence of the tightening of 
his hold over the army matters was given by the restruction of the ANP in 
late 1984 and by putting his own men at the head of military regions.
To signal his ascendance over the national defence with regard to the
tension with Morocco and Libya, President Chadli presided himself at the 
meetings which gathered the top officers to discuss matters of national 
security and in the aftermath of an incident between Algerian troops and 
Moroccan forces near the border he personally directed military 
manoeuvres carried out by the ANP perhaps in an attempt to stress his
command over the military and show its cohesion and organisation in the
context of renewed tension with Morocco. Like his predecessor, Chadli 
was reluctant to let matters concerning relations with this country slip 
from his hand. At the all important congress of the Polisario front held 
in 1983, the Algerian representative happened to be neither the foreign 
minister nor the head of the party but the minister of justice Boualem
^On December 10, 1975 an Algerian-sponsored resolution on
the question of the Western Sahara was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly.
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Baki a close friend of President Chadli . This is quite significant with 
regard to Baki's lack of political experience and unfamiliarity with 
state's affairs and handling of matters related to national security. 
Probably deceived by his foreign minister's soft approach which 
privileged diplomatic contacts with Morocco while the King seemed 
unwilling to make any concessions, Chadli moved to tighten his 'droit de 
regard' over intei Maghrebi relations. Therefore, he had several meetings 
with Qadhafi, Bourguiba and even held talks with Hassan in April 1983.
Shifts in the Presidential mark on the conduct of foreign policies
Despite the consistent reference to the principle of the foreign 
policy set out by the FLN during the war, the political orientation and 
the articulation of interests on the external level differed from one 
president to another. The style of leadership and personal preference of 
each of them had to some extent affected the decision-making process, 
although they shared the feature of imposing a relatively ideological but 
highly per sonalistic style of leadership as well as bore basic values 
forged from a common struggle against the colonial rule. Indeed, the 
Algerian presidents were the product of the war of liberation which 
largely shaped their perceptions and views of the outer world. It is 
then not striking to notice, when looking at the principles of the 
Algerian foreign policy, that these principles have not been altered, 
what has changed from one regime to another was undoubtedly a shift in 
emphasis on issues and priorities as well as in the style of conducting 
this policy. Their fundamental common characteristic rested on their
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commitments to a socialistic way of development and on their jacobinist 
tendencies as defined by the reinforcement of the state's role in all 
aspects of the country's life. These two aspects not only sprang from 
their modest social origin but also from the lack of local loyalties and 
absence of a regional power base. Their legitimacy derived more from 
their revolutionary past than from popular following and their power 
stemmed more from the army than from the party or democratically-elected 
bodies. Thus, their stress on nationalism in independent Algeria
resulted from their inability to identify with anything but the nation, 
and their emphasis on economic development was largely determined by the 
colonial legacy.
Differences in style and approach to international events were not 
based on cultural cleavages derived from either French or Arabic 
education, as all the three presidents emphasized Algeria's Arabo-Islamic 
ferment and common history and destiny with other Arab countries. In 
fact, the basically arabic education of Boumedienne did not prevent him 
from advocating a rapid modernisation of the country, a strict separation 
between state and religion as well as encouraging bilingualism that was 
preached by the westernized segments of the state technocracy, although 
he formally called for the massive arabization of the country.
Differences in style and ideological pigmentation, however, stem from 
the personality factor but were also determined by domestic and external 
constraints which relate to the obvious linkage between national and 
international environments. For instance, if Algeria had constantly
worked for the third world solidarity and supported the liberation 
movements against colonialism especially in Africa, the content of this 
policy and the form of aid and the fashion with which it was carried out
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differed considerably from one president to another. While Ben Bella 
exalted a revolutionary rhetoric and appeared quite passionately 
committed to Panafricanism, Boumedienne emphasized instead a messianic 
but methodic and rational approach with regard to the third world issues. 
Indeed, the former's enthusiasm and revolutionäry romanticism contrasted 
with the latter's austere, enigmatic and visionary attitude. In
opposition to both of them, Chadli opted for a discreet and moderate 
attitude, being himself a quiet reserved and timid person and with less 
pronounced ambitions. In Ben Bella 's desire to cultivate charisma and 
revolutionary euphoria as well as in his attempt to play an important 
role in international affairs, the personality factor was not negligible, 
as he liked to be at the centre of attention and enjoyed spectacular 
actions and the related popular acclaim.
The relevance of domestic constraints resided in the fact that Ben 
Bella's involvement in foreign affairs resulted partially from his 
regime's internal problems. Being restrained at home by a vigorous 
opposition on the one hand and by his dependency on the army on the 
other, he thus became immersed in external affairs not only in order to 
divert the attention from these problems to foreign issues - that 
appealed to the Algerian people at that time, such as the systematic 
critique of neo-colonialism and imperialism, -but also in an attempt to 
enhance his own legitimacy at home. In these circumstances, foreign 
policy constituted the main field where he had a relatively free hand, 
therefore he intended to capitalize from this exercise as much as 
possible. After the death of his foreign minister Khemisti in May 1963, 
he took over the office until September and played a personal role in the 
conduct of the country's external policies. In 1964, he spent 74 days
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abroad dedicated as many days to entertain leaders mainly from the 
communist and African countries and the next year he deployed intensive 
efforts to prepare the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled to take 
place in Algiers.1
In his engrossment in the Panafricanist movement in particular and 
third world in general, the external constraints intervened in the form 
of four considerations:
- France did not obstruct Ben Bella 's actions with regard to these 
issues, as De Gaulle - aware of the considerable prestige the Algerian 
leader enjoyed among the non-Western world - dreamt of making Algeria 
France's bridge to the third world in an attempt to counterbalance the 
hegemony of the super-powers.
- Because the Maghreb was entangled in a cold war era, Ben Bella was less 
enthusiastic about cultivating close ties with his neighbours than in 
gaining international prestige.
- the Black continent in particular represented an important field for 
Ben Bella 's concern of anti-colonialism since there were still colonies 
in Africa and consequently active national liberation movements.
- Nasser's hegemony over the Middle East policies did leave a little room 
of manoeuvre for the Algerian leader, conversely it left him with a 
relatively free hand to play a greater order in African affairs and 
attempt to challenge the Egyptian President's ascendancy in third world 
politics. The relative neglect of Middle Eastern issues by Ben Bella 
was indicated by the scarce meetings he had with Arab leaders. The only 
Arab country he visited was Egypt (in May 1963) and the only Arab leader
'ottaway, D. & M: The politics of a socialist revolution 
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1972), p . 147.
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he received in Algiers was Nasser in April the same year. And with the 
exception of the two Arab summits held in Cairo in January and September
1964, it was Boumedienne who represented Algeria in the next Arab summits 
that took place in the Egyptian capital in early January and late May
1965. However, the relative neglect of the Arab issues did not mean that 
Ben Bella left Boumedienne with a free hand to shape Algerian Arab 
policy as his handling of Arab affairs was made through his personal 
adviser Cherif Abderahmane. Once in power, Boumedienne1s approach to 
international events markedly contrasted with Ben Bella 's and followed 
two distinctive phases: 1. From 1965 to 1969, his concentration rested 
on domestic affairs so as to achieve the urgent tasks of building a 
strong state, laying foundations for economic take off and maintaining 
domestic political stability and cohesion of leadership. This demarche 
markedly differed from that of Ben Bella since Boumedienne appeared more 
pragmatist than ideologist and perhaps more rational as he seems to have 
learnt from his predecessor's experience that popularity and charisma are 
not enough to remain in power and that there is no effective involvement 
in world affairs without strengthening the country's capabilities 
first.^ The Algerian president then, was more preoccupied with 
reinforcing the cohesion of his leadership and army than playing an 
active role on the international level. Until 1970, the issue of Arab 
affairs seemed to occupy his attention showing an intransigence with 
regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and being opposed to Nasser's 
"defeatist'' attitude. This intransigence stemmed from Algeria's own 
experience of the war and aimed also at enhancing the legitimacy of
1Did not Boumedienne assert in 1969 that Algeria has "her 
own problems and her leadership has no ambitions to play a 
role in the international scene"? (Speech of December 21,
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Boumedienne's regime at home. Equally important was that by following 
this firm attitude, the Algerian leader found another good opportunity to
disentangle himself from active involvement in Arab affairs in order to
concentrate on domestic issues . To those who accused Algeria of
neglecting the Arab issues in particular (Qadhafi among others), he
replied that "they failed to prove their abilities in the development 
field. Indeed making speeches is an easy thing but difficult is the 
task of economic building, basis of a genuine progress."^
The concentration on domestic issues necessitated the reinforcement 
of stability in North-Africa and thus the maintaining of a kind of 
detente in the Maghreb despite ideological options of the existing 
regimes in this region* The result was the several meetings between 
Boumedienne and other Maghrebi leaders, the signature of treaties of 
friendship and good neighbourliness with Tunisia, Libya and Morocco in 
the years 1969-1970, as well as by a boost of Maghrebi cooperation. 
This evidently asserted the intimate linkage between domestic issues and 
regional environment, especially in the context of limited economic 
capabilities of the country.
During this period, as the government was still basically inward­
looking and being concerned above all with development and national 
security linked with the regional environment, the handling of the 
foreign ministry was the responsibility of Bouteflika. The Algerian 
president was probably still lacking negotiation skills and diplomatic 
experience and was therefore concerned with improving his own power and 
stature. 1
11 b i d .
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The second stage referred to the early 1970s which witnessed an 
increase of Algeria's economic capabilities highlighted by the resounding 
success of the nationalization of the French oil interests in February 
1971 and the rise of the Opec organization with changes which occurred in 
international energetic market, thus enabling the oil producing countries 
to enhance their foreign revenues and increase their economic bargaining 
with the West. Attempts to align the third world countries over the 
issues of the NIEO were ultimately linked with Algeria's search for a 
better access to Western technology and capital as well as obtain 
markets. Having strengthened his position at home and being encouraged 
by Algeria's economic progress and the strength of Opec, Boumedienne 
moved to play a more active role in the country's foreign policy. The 
prestige he gained from the 1971 oil nationalization, from hosting the 
non-alignment summit in Algiers in 1973, reconciling Iraq and Iran in 
1975 and contributing to the Arab-African rapprochement -considerably 
increased Boumedienne's confidence in his own abilities in the diplomatic 
domain. It was perhaps these ambitions to make Algeria a spearhead of 
the third world, that led the Algerian president to intervene further in 
the orientation and the conduct of the Algerian foreign policy and 
consequently take over of some of the prerogatives reserved to 
Bouteflika. An indication of his attempt to have a greater control over
the administration of the foreign policy and turn it into an executive 
organ was his decision in 1971 to put as its Secretary-General, Bessaiah 
in replacement of Rahal a close friend of Bouteflika who had held this 
post since 1965. The nomination of Amimour as his personal advisor on 
foreign policy matters had also deepened the gap between Boumedienne and 
his foreign minister. This is not to suggest that the president
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attempted to wreck completely the prerogatives of his foreign minister 
but just to allow himself a more active role in the execution of the 
country's foreign policy, perhaps in order to enhance his international 
stature, thus satisfying his personal ambitions.
With Chadli, the presidential impact on the formulation and 
implementation of the country's external objectives followed an ascendant 
line, from a period of reservation to an era of a greater assertion. 
The argument that the President’s approach to external issues stems from 
a combination of the personality factor as well as from domestic and 
foreign constraints finds a full justification in the case of Chadli's 
presidency. Like Boumedienne his main concern rested on ensuring the 
regime's position and ensuring the national security and domestic 
stability and until 1983, his involvement in the conduct of foreign 
policy has been quiet and less personali Stic. His visits to the
Middle East in March 1980, in Black Africa in April 1981, Moscow in June 
aimed at reaffirming a certain continuity in the orientation of Algeria's 
external policy as well as providing himself with diplomatic experience 
he obviously lacked. Throughout this period, the conduct of Algerian 
foreign policy has been diffuse and its orientation somehow incoherent, 
thus reflecting the strife of divergent forces to have a hold on its 
formulation and implementation according to their own objectives and 
interests.
If the political bureau did not constitute a real decision-making 
body, its membership reflects a great deal of factionalism and the 
existence of competing ideas with regard to foreign policy issues. On 
the basis of political and ideological alignments three main groups could
be distinguished:
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- a radical group committed to a hard socialistic line and to the
continuity of a militant foreign policy stance which favoured the 
cultivation of close links with progressive regimes and socialist 
countries, thus being firmly anti-imperialist and resolutely hostile to 
liberal regimes (such as Tunisia) or conservative (Morocco and Saudi- 
Arabia) . This group would include Yahaoui, the former head of the party 
and a strong rival to Chadli; Benyahia the foreign minister until 1982, 
and Kasdi Merbah, the former head of military security and currently 
minister of agriculture. It probably drew support from the radi­
cally-oriented officers within the army and some high civilian techno­
crats who favoured a centralized and a socialist way of development. Both 
Benyahia and Yahaoui in particular were believed to be close to Muslim 
progressive forces and sympathetic to Assad and Qadhafi regimes;
- a moderate group which emphasized economic pragmatism and an 
ideologically tempered foreign policy, thus favouring an increase of the 
role of the private sector in Algerian economy and a soft attitude toward 
moderate and conservative countries in general and Morocco and Tunisia in 
particular, as well as a greater economic cooperation with the Western 
world, especially France and the USA. Its main figures were perhaps 
Taleb-Ibrahimi the current foreign minister; Abdelhamid Brahimi, 
currently the Prime Minister in charge of the national economy; Benlouclf 
the chief of staff; Benyelles the Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Defence; Abdelghani, currently the state secretary and .
Yala at the present time Minister of Interior. These personalities were 
generally believed to have personal links with well-off families, big
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entrepreneur s and businessmen as well as some ties with France and 
Tunisia (Taleb-Ibrahimi, Abdelghani and Yala) and the USA (Brahimi and 
Benlouci f).
Between these two rival groups, stood the presidential group which 
advocated a change but at a slower rate without however renouncing the 
basic principles of the Algerian revolution. In addition to Chadli, it 
comprised personalities with relatively limited political credo: Colonel 
Belhouchet, the ANP' s general inspector, Benhammouda, the finance 
minister, Messadia, responsible for the FLN's permanent secretariat and 
two of Chadli's close friends: Baki (justice) and Rouis (information). 
Given his lack of authority at the beginning. President Chadli seemed to 
oscillate between the moderates and the radicals as he tried, perhaps 
with difficulty, to conciliate between continuity and change in the 
country's foreign policy. In the competition between these two groups, 
he attempted to play the role of a broker and adopt a centrist attitude, 
but it seemed that pressure from both sides substantially increased. 
The visits he made to a certain number of Arab countries in March 1980, 
black Africa in April 1981 and Moscow in June were counterbal anced by 
trips to Belgium, Italy and France (a stop-over) late that year. And 
the visit to Washington in April 1985 was immediately followed by visits 
to Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and Senegal as a result of pressure from the 
radical group to underline non-alignment as the driving force of Algerian 
foreign policy. However, Chadli seemed to have moved from the pursuit 
of a centrist attitude to the function of final arbiter as he tightened 
his control over the military affairs and consolidated his position after 
the wrecking of his rivals Yahaoui and Bouteflika and the demotion of 
Abdelghani, the prime minister. In these conditions his handling of the
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country's foreign policy inevitably grew, especially as the regime's 
attention concentrated on the country's territorial security and 
integrity with the growing tension with Morocco. His meetings with 
Hassan in April 1983 and other Maghrebi leaders attested to his greater 
control over these issues. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that under 
the pressure from the radical group, Chadli hardened his attitude 
vis-a-vis Morocco thus contradicting the approach of Taleb-Ibrahimi and 
the moderate group which favoured diplomatic negotiations with this 
country. These pressures seemed to have succeeded as the unexpected 
alliance between Libya and Morocco as well as the secret visit of 
Mitterand to Rabat in September 1984, were regarded as a direct blow to 
Taleb Ibrahimi's strategy which President Chadli had initially endorsed. 
However, this move did not mean a submission to this group but to the 
acuity of the matters related to the country's territorial security. 
These reasons were perhaps at the heart of his visit to the USA in April 
1985 an unprecedented event in Algerian diplomacy, although issues such 
as reviving the economic cooperation with this country, the gas contract 
and diversification of Algerian foreign relations seemed to have been the 
other reasons for this visit.
2• The Foreign Minister; role and attributions
In two decades of independence, Algeria had only four foreign 
ministers. This shows the relative record of durability if we bear in 
mind that two of them died after only a short term in office. Khemisti 
was Ben Bella 's first minister of external affairs from September 1962 
to April 1963, the date of his death. Bouteflika succeeded him in
December and retained hold over the ministry until March 1979 when the
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new president Chadli replaced him by Benyahia. Taleb-Ibrahimi took over 
shortly after the latter's death in an air crash in May 1982 while 
carrying a mission of good offices to help settle the Iraq-Iran war.
The successive four ministers share some features proper to the 
post-independent Algerian elite - 1) youth: all of them were born in the 
1930s and two, Khemisti and Bouteflika, became foreign ministers while in 
their mid-twenties; 2) social background; with the exception of 
Taleb-Ibrahimi, all came from modest urbanized families; 3) political 
socialization: all were involved in student politics during the war. 
Benyahia and Taleb-Ibrahimi had been presidents of the UGEMA in 1955 and 
1957 respectively, Khemisti was one of its cosmopolitan leaders while 
Bouteflika quit secondary school in 1956 when the UGEMA called for a 
general strike, to join the maquis in Wilaya V.; 4) wartime experience; 
they were all immersed in political and administrative affairs before 
becoming ministers - Taleb served a five year sentence for nationalist
activities in France (1957-62), Khemisti was directeur de Cabinet of 
\ / ^Fares, the President of the 'executif provisoire', Benyahia was the 
Secretary-General of the GPRA and Bouteflika a member of the General- 
Staff and a close aid of Colonel Boumedienne.
According to presidential decrees, the attributions of the foreign 
ministry are quite limited as the Minister was supposed to be under the 
high authority of the president of the Republic, charged to carry out 
diplomatic responsibilities and thus assigned only an executive role. 
But to limit the analysis to the basic assumption that the foreign 
ministry has been primarily involved in diplomatic transactions and the 
day-to-day implementation of decisions reached by the President is 
certainly fallacious. However, one possibility beyond this simplistic
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argument may be the analysis of the role of the foreign minister in some 
of the country's external issues, as this exercise may help provide 
useful insights into the study of the foreign-decision making. The
period in which Khemisti served as foreign minister (7 months) was too 
short to permit an accurate view on his role in the shaping of Algerian 
foreign policy, but it was believed that no major disagreements existed 
between him and Ben Bella , although the latter had an upper hand on the 
execution of this policy.^
With Bouteflika the foreign ministry was his own preserve as he ran 
it as a tight ship, where decisions flowed from above and where there was 
relatively little flexibility at the working level. This style of 
management was illustrated by the fact that many of the meetings with 
foreign diplomats took place not in the ministry offices but at the villa 
"Dar Ali Cherif” turned into a kind of personal residence, away from 
official circles. The main reason for this prominence in the conduct of 
Algerian foreign policy, especially in the second half of the 1960s, was 
perhaps the division of labour that existed between Boumedienne and 
Bouteflika. This tacit agreement reflected the professional specializa­
tion within the Oujda group and constituted probably an element 
explaining the relative coherence of the ruling group until the early 
1970s. Throughout this period, the close relationship he bore with his 
president, helped the dapper Bouteflika become Algeria's main figure on 
the international scene. His image Inspired youth and enthusiasm while
Khemisti was an orphan nursed by Benbella's mother. He 
accompanied Benbella when he moved to Cairo in 1 952 and 
then went to France to further his studies.
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his actions altered revolutionary romanticism with a great deal of 
pragmatism. He once said that Algeria's foreign policy was "a policy of 
means rather than of ideas".
Among the major issues the foreign ministry had been preoccupied with 
had been Algeria's relations with France and economic policy-making. 
The former remained the chief focus of the country's foreign policy until 
1971 when Algeria started to diversify its diplomatic relations, trade 
exchanges and to participate actively in world affairs. Against this 
background, Bouteflika attempted to contribute in the shaping of the 
relations with France and beyond national interests linked to this issue, 
he was probably tempted to forge his own credibility and prestige in 
order to increase his stature at home and on the foreign level. The 
context of privileged relations between the two countries might have 
provided him with the required incentive to achieve this aim, especially 
as the foreign ministry had the necessary instrument specializing in 
these relations, i.e. the department of French affairs, well endowed with 
technical cadre and expertise at the time when other state economic 
organs were still in the stage of building up.
Bouteflika's ambitions would be better understood in the latent 
conflict between him and president Ben Bella over the conduct of Algerian 
French policy. The designation of Laraj Sekkiou, a former militant of 
the FLN federation de France and a President supporter, - as assistant to 
the Algerian Ambassador in Paris Rahal a technocrat diplomat close to 
Bouteflika - highlighted this rivalry. And as Bella intended to benefit 
from the good relationship between Algeria and France, Rahal was replaced 
by Boualem Moussaoui, a former FLN militant who participated in the 
battle of Algiers, an indication of Ben Bella's emphasis on revolutionary
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ideals in the manifestation of Algerian policy toward France. It
remained, however, difficult to locate differences between Ben Bella and 
Bouteflika with regard to the attitude vis-a-vis France in the particular 
context of rivalry of persons existing between the two men, highlighted 
by the hostility between Ben Bella and the Boumedienne group in which 
Bouteflika was also an influential member. But one valid assumption may 
be that reasons of ambitions and prestige were at stake between the 
president and his foreign minister. The former's meeting with De Gaulle 
in March 1964 perhaps increased the credibility of the Algerian president 
in the eyes of the French leaders.
After the coup of June 1965, Bouteflika regained hold over the 
conduct of Algerian policy toward France and attempted to change the 
status of dependence of his country on its former metropole into a new 
model based on new relations between developed and developing countries 
void of neo-colonialism content, without, however, renouncing to forge 
out of these relations a good partnership and understanding. This new 
emphasis explained the nomination as Ambassador to Paris of Redha Malek - 
a highly qualified technocrat with leftwing convictions and long 
diplomatic experience- who had participated in the Evian negotiations. 
The signature of the all-important oil agreement in 1965 revised some of 
the clauses of the Evian agreements in favour of Algeria and constituted 
perhaps a substantial success for Bouteflika's own strategy. As
political relations between Algeria and France strengthened during De 
Gaulle's reign, personal relations were built up between the two sides. 
There was no doubt that mutual appreciation and friendly relationships 
were established between the Algerian foreign minister and the French 
Ambassador in Algiers, George Gorse a Gaullist and fervent advocate of
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French-Algerian relationship as well as with Couve de Murville the 
foreign minister and Jean de Brogile the Secretary for Algerian affairs. 
Bouteflika's basic French culture and admiration for the Gaullist 
opposition to the hegemonism of the super-powers, certainly contributed 
in making the foreign minister a key link in the Algerian-French 
relations. It is quite significant that other basically-economically 
oriented organs, especially that of the ministry of national economy were 
kept in the important but restricted role of subordinate authorities in 
the foreign-decision making process. After Bouteflika in June 1967, the 
only Algerian minister to pay an official visit to France was that of his 
close friend of the 'oujda group', Medeghri, the interior minister in 
February 1968. Like Bouteflika, Medeghri shared the desire to preserve 
the status of privileged relations with France thus favouring a less 
pronounced process of nationalization of French interests in Algeria in 
contrast to the national economy ministry led by Abdeslam. The latter's 
economic policy meant not only a radical change in Algerian-French 
economic relationship but also an increasing interference of the economic 
ministry in shaping these relations, a matter that led to the growing 
rivalry of personalities between Bouteflika and Abdeslam. The balance 
of policy-making power as well as the content of policy became to change 
as not only the full range of the economic agencies and state-owned 
companies began to participate in the concentrated effort of national 
development but also because the relative success of economic policy 
carried out by Abdeslam and his technocratic team helped to convince 
Boumedienne of the necessity of a radical drive in the country's economic 
policies that implied inevitable consequences for the Algerian-French 
relations. Moreover as more and more aspects of Algeria's international
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relations came to centre on technical and technological considerations, 
the role of the foreign ministry with regard to these relations and in 
economic policy making became threatened by the emergence of internation- 
ally-oriented technocrats in other ministries and agencies. The 
technocratic team's search for capital and highly sophisticated 
technology meant a diversification of Algeria's economic relations and 
the reduction of her dependence on France in favour of other countries 
such as West Germany, Italy and the USA in particular.
When negotiations started in January 1971 between Algiers and Paris 
to revise previous economic agreements in particular the oil issue, the 
head of the Algerian delegation was no longer Abdeslam but Bouteflika, 
regaining the prominent place in these negotiations for him and for his 
aides and experts in the Department of French relations, notably Jamal 
Houhou, its Director and his assistant Rachid Haddad, two eminent 
'technocratic' diplomats within the Ministry.1 At the height of these 
negotiations the coordination between the foreign ministry and the 
economy ministry was operative notwithstanding their competition behind 
the scenes. While Bouteflika declared that negotiations between France 
and Algeria were global and would not be affected by negotiations taking 
place at Teheran between Opec countries and the Cartel of Western 
concessionary companies, Abdeslam stressed Algeria's attempt to work 
closely with other Opec members, Libya in particular as well as Algeria's 
firmness toward foreign oil companies operating in Algeria. The
1The delegation that participated in these negotiations with 
the French led by Ortoli, the industry minister, included 
Bouteflika, Houhou and two representatives of the ministry 
of economy and energy: Ghozali, the General Director of the 
state oil company Sonatrach and Ait Alhocine, the adviser of 
Abde slam.
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difference in approach as well as in content to the revision of Algeria's 
relations with France appeared quite clear and did not mean a mere 
tactical plan to confuse the French negotiators.
The role played by Abdeslam in the nationalization of the French oil 
companies announced by Boumedienne on February 24, 1971 was highlighted
by frequent meetings with Boumedienne and in particular those that took 
place on February 4 and 24 after Abdeslam came back from Tripoli. There 
he attended a ministerial meeting of Opec which assured the support of 
this organization to Algeria in her battle against the French companies.1 
Highly significant was that the last official meeting between Boumedienne 
and Bouteflika took place on February 2 some time before the decisions of 
nationalization•
In an attempt to regain his influence on the conduct of Algerian 
policy toward France and mend fences with Paris over the question of 
indemnisation of the French companies affected by the nationalization, it 
was Bouteflika who engaged in negotiations with the French government's
2special envoy Herve Alphand. However, with the deterioration of
French-Algerian relations since 1971 and intensification of Algeria's 
economic cooperation with other countries, the role of the foreign 
ministry in these relations in particular and in economic decision-policy
^The meeting took place on February 23 gathering the oil 
ministers of Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Saudi-A r a b i a . 
Before his departure, Abdeslam gave a long and exclusive 
interview to E l -Mo u d j a h i d , an indication of his prominent 
role in the process leading to the take-over of French oil
interests in Algeria.2 On the ceremonial level of these two meetings, two aspects 
are worth mentioning: 1) the meetings took place at
Bouteflika's private residence, 2) in the absence of 
representatives from the ministry of energy; the other 
participants being diplomats of the foreign ministry: 
Bedjaoui, the Ambassador to Paris, Houhou and Haddad, the 
head and deputy head of the Department of French Affairs, 
and Djoudi, the adviser to Bouteflika's Cabinet.
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in general was more and more taking executive form. Moreover with the 
ascendancy of Boumedienne in the conduct of foreign policy, Bouteflika's 
prestige became eroded. The main disagreements between the two men did 
not concern the fundamental orientations of the country's foreign policy 
but arose from rivalries in ambitions and with regard to domestic issues. 
Indeed, Bouteflika objected to his president's leftward turn of mid-1970s 
and the dislocation of the Oujda group with the mysterious death of 
Bouteflika's close friend Medeghri and the departure of Kaid and Cherif 
Belkacem.1
News that Bouteflika was to run for the post of the United Nations 
Secretary General in 1974, and Boumedienne's offer to appoint him 
Vice-President (a honorific post) in the government formed in 1977, 
fuelled rumours that Boumedienne wanted in fact to shunt him away from 
directing Algeria's foreign policy. The relative eclipse of Bouteflika 
resulted from the concentration of Algeria leadership on two main issues 
which were not in the range of the foreign minister's powers and 
capabilities: 1) the Western Saharan conflict whose incidences on
Algerian national security became the major concern of Boumedienne and 
his touchstone, the army; 2) Algeria's contribution to North-South 
debates which fell in the hands of the ministry of economy and energy and 
a nucleus of diplomats possessing a high expertise required for the 
sophisticated formulation of strategies, projects and resolutions. As a 
result Bouteflika's role was limited to political aspects of Algeria's
^There were rumours that Bouteflika bore personal grievance 
against Boumedienne who was believed to have been 
responsible for M e d e g h r i 's death. For differences of
conceptions over domestic issues see speech of Bouteflika 
to students on April 28, 19764 and B o u m e d i e n n e 1s replies
in his speeches in Constantine in June 8, and Tlemcen (July 
11) reaffirming a hard socialist approach.
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non-alignment strategy, especially in strengthening the solidarity of the 
third world coalition in which he was one of the most popular and 
effective activists.
In contrast to Bouteflika, Benyahia his successor, appeared 
phlegmatic with a face marked by austere expression but his piercing eyes 
expressed intelligence and perspicacity. He was considered a hard worker 
and indefatigable with his discretion sharply contrasting with Bouteflika's 
jovial temperament and public exposure. Indeed, a long diplomatic and 
ministerial tenure helped Benyahia acquire negotiation skills and develop 
a deep knowledge of international politics, a matter that made him 
probably the most successful tactical and strategist foreign minister 
Algeria has ever had and perhaps the most versatile minister ever.1 He 
was reported to have declared to his confidants "I am here to serve my 
country, wherever and whenever I am placed". His relative independence 
from clannish affiliations made him probably the best choice for 
executing presidential directives in the context of a transitional period 
marked by a great diffusion of power.
With Benyahia, the regaining of the foreign ministry's prerogative 
over the conduct of Algerian-French policy and contribution to shaping 
the country's external economy was due to: 1) his deep knowledge of all 
aspects of French-Algerian relations and personal relationships with many 
technocrats inside the foreign ministry and in other governmental
 ^He was successively Ambassador to London (1962-1963); 
Moscow (1964-1965); Minister of information (1966-1970); 
higher education (1971-1977); finance (1977-79).
2To Simon Malley, Chief Editor of A f rique-As i e ,
1980, p .19.
May 2 4
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organs; 2) the deterioration of Algerian-American economic relations in 
the light of the Western Sahara conflict and the stiffness of Soviet 
attitude toward Algeria because of Chadli's moderate policies, permitted 
a rapprochement with France which had also been initiated by Giscard 
D'Estaing in late 1978 and greatly activated by Mitterand's rise to 
power• The signature of a global agreement with France in September 
1980 and the gas deal in February 1982, relatively advantageous to 
Algerian interests, was perhaps also due to Benyahia's personal 
contribution and imprint in the substantial improvement in Algerian- 
French relations. In the context of post-Boumedienne transitional era 
marked by the progressive displacement of powerful personalities of the 
past regime, Benyahia supported President Chadli's pragmatist and 
middleway approach to politics which aimed at keeping a balance between 
the radically-oriented forces and those favouring economic liberalism and 
a more ideologically tempered foreign policy. With regard to foreign 
issues, this strategy was reflected by the role of broker played by 
Algeria and its most resounding success had been the settlement of the 
Iran-US hostage issue in January 1981, in which Benyahia and his close 
aides from the diplomatic service played an active part.'* Another 12
1Among the members of the delegation he led when carrying a 
mission of good offices between Iraq and Iran in June 1982 
were 14 high technocrats from various ministries considered 
as his close c o l 1a b o r a t o r s .2 The nomination of Muhammad Sahnoun a friend of long standing 
as Ambassador to Paris confirms this assumption.
^Redha Malek and Abdelkrim Ghraieb then Ambassadors to 
Washington and Teheran respectively. Mostefai a Director 
of Algerian central bank also played a substantial part in 
these negotiations, particularly in issues related to 
financial transactions.
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feature of this role of broker was the intensive mediation efforts 
conducted between Iran and Iraq and which may have made substantial 
progress toward peace had he not died while embarking upon his mission.
Nevertheless, if the role of broker suited Algeria's diplomacy under 
Benyahia, the balance he tried to keep between ideology and pragmatism 
proved quite difficult as he may have felt torn between increasingly 
endorsing Chadli's drive toward political moderation and his own leftist 
and militant inclinations. Thus, to follow his own perceptions would 
have perhaps cost him his post, while the espousal of a moderate line
would have di scredited him in the eyes of the numerous supporters he
seemed to have among the state-technocracy. the army, notably the
radically-oriented officers. This uncertainty was expressed by the
sliding of Algerian support to Iran without, however, publicly showing a 
hostile attitude to Iraq, as well as by disapproving of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan without participating in votes condemning the 
USSR. Moreover, the clash between moderation and militancy was revealed 
by the difference of emphasis between Benyahia and his president. The 
domaine where the former's imprint was perhaps personal and stemming from 
his own convictions had certainly been the forging of friendly relation­
ships with progressive countries of the third world, especially in 
Africa. But this tendency was somehow altered by Chadli who encouraged 
an overture towards other unaligned countries without necessarily taking 
in this view Benyahia's penchant towards the progressive ones. The 
role of broker seemed to have been the President's primary choice and the 
cultivation of good relations with moderate African countries for 
instance expressed his prominence over issues related to Algeria's stand 
on the Western Sahara which in turn has a substantial impact on her
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territorial integrity and security. Thus, given these considerations 
Benyahia's preferences had been greatly obstructed. For instance, the 
progressive disengagement of Algeria from the Arab front of steadfastness 
and rejection may have not been approved by the foreign minister who 
certainly would have preferred an alignment with Arab progressive regimes 
and revolutionary forces. And if his diplomatic skills and experience 
were not disputed, it remained that Benyahia's militancy displeased the 
moderate segments of the military and civilian technocrats as well as the 
conservative and traditionalist groups among Algerian political elite. 
In the context of a revival of Islamic fundamentalism and the strengthen­
ing of the private sector, a radically-oriented foreign policy had little 
chance to survive.
Benyahia's sudden death, perhaps ironically, permitted Taleb-Ibrahimi 
to take over the foreign ministry, an office he eyed for a long time and 
allowed the conservative elements in the Algerian leadership to reorient 
the country's foreign policy in the sense of strengthening relations with 
Arab conservative countries, diversifying trade relations in order to 
alter the striking paradox of being ideologically close to the East and 
economically depending on the West. The de-emphasis on ideology in the 
manifestations of Algerian foreign policy reflected the diplomatic 
readjustment operated by Taleb-Ibrahimi in the context of renewed 
tensions with Morocco and of hostility with Libya in the early 1980s. 
Moreover, Soviet ambiguous attitude over the Western Sahara might have 
helped Taleb to incite President Chadli to strengthen relations with 
moderate countries even the USA so as to enable Algeria to maximise her 
national security and territorial integrity. In parallel, a greater
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attempt to diversify trade relations was made to permit Algeria to win 
support from a larger number of countries for her policies, particularly 
on the regional level.
Taleb-Ibrahimi offers an image of gallantry and wide education as he 
is a better intellectual than a politician. In comparison to his 
predecessors, his culture has a more arabic pigmentation and under his 
impulse, Algerian foreign policy has been less ideologically tempered. 
This moderation was, perhaps, due to his traditional middle-class family 
origin and relations with moderate circles in Algeria and elsewhere. 
His mark on the conduct of the country's external objective certainly 
responded to Chadli's desire to break with Boumedienne's messianic 
attitude and impose a more moderate substance in Algerian regional policy 
based on the policy of 'bon voisinage' (good neighbourliness) with other 
Maghrebi countries and the cultivation of close relations with other 
conservative states mainly in the Arab world.
Since he took over the foreign ministry, Taleb-Ibrahimi displayed 
intensive efforts to help find a political solution to the Western 
Sahara, a conflict of which he knows every aspect given his several 
secret negotiations with the Moroccan side ever since 1977. His
personal relations with certain members of the Royal family and diplomats 
certainly helped him to constitute perhaps the most valuable interlocutor 
for King Hassan within the Algerian leadership and probably also the most 
fervent advocate of an understanding and a working relationship among 
Maghrebi countries. Yet, he seemed to have difficulties not only to
induce King Hassan to accept a form of autonomy for the Saharawi people
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but also in alleviating hostile feelings the Algerian radical officers 
bore vis-a-vis the Moroccan ruler. The latter's alliance with Qadhafi 
constituted a harsh blow for Taleb-Ibrahimi who has indeed a little 
sympathy for the Libyan leader, while the move of the radical officers to 
increasingly support the war waged by the Polisario front seemed to have 
sealed the fate of his moderate attitude and perhaps personally hurt 
him.
In connection with his conceptions of a Maghrebi detente, the foreign 
minister also attempted to strengthen relations with the moderate Arab 
countries of the Middle East and favoured the moderate Arab peace plan 
for the conflict with Israel which was adopted at the Fez Arab summit in 
1982 without the approval of Syria and a certain number of Palestinian 
leaders• \ imprint on Algeria's Arab policy was reflected by his 
success in imposing moderate people to fill the Ambassadorial posts in 
the Arab world. The main examples had been to send Haddam to Ryadh and 
Ait Chaalal to Tunis. If the former, an ex-minister of religious
affairs shares the foreign minister's sympathy for conservative Arab 
regimes, the choice of the latter, a primarily technocratic diplomat and 
of a traditional bourgeois background meant an emphasis on the economic 
relations with Tunisia in order to provide a basis for the 'entente 
cordiale' established between the two countries in recent years.
However, it seems that Taleb's room for manoeuvre increasingly 
narrows in the context of a great political debate within Algeria and of 
the shifting of alliances on the regional level. It appeared that given 
his basic intellectual background and moderate convictions, he may find 
it also difficult to sustain a diplomatic game under heavy pressures and 
which may involve unexpected upheavals.
145
C. Favoured Interests
1. The military: the primacy of national security matters
Although foreign policy is generally of less importance to the 
military than are essentially domestic political questions, foreign 
policy makers cannot overlook the view of the military on foreign-policy 
issues. Under Ben Bella, the army did not in the normal course of 
affairs interfere heavily in foreign policy issues, but was primarily 
concerned with political order, armaments and the policy toward 
neighbouring countries, especially the aspects connected with national 
security and territorial integrity. With Boumedienne and Chadli, the 
basic goals and limits of foreign policy were set in a fundamental sense 
by the military, while to a marked degree military influence was made 
effective directly through the president.
During Ben Bella's period, marked by incessant factional turmoil and 
improvisation, the military establishment, centered around the 
Boumedienne-led nucleus of the General-Staff, acted essentially as a 
group interest in a constant but latent mutual suspicion with the 
presidency although apparently playing a supportive role to Ben Bella's 
regime. Throughout Ben Bella's time, the main concerns of the army 
rested on domestic issue, particularly at making the ANP a viable 
political institution, strengthening its cohesion, enhancing its 
capabilities and wiping out the persistent military dissidence repre­
sented by the ex-wilaya commanders.
The first most notable reaction of the Boumedienne-led General-Staff 
was to resist territorial claims raised by Morocco and Tunisia. Shortly 
after the ceasefire concluded with France in March 1962, troops of the
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ALN moved to occupy the disputed areas without the knowledge of the GPRA 
leadership itself. With the tension of these territorial conflicts, 
highlighted by the armed clash between Algeria and Morocco in October 
1963, the Algerian army under the direction of Boumedienne seemed 
determined to make of this issue its ' chasse gardee' in opposition to Ben 
Bella's increasing interference in military affairs. Disagreements 
between the two sides were fuelled by Ben Bella's criticism of his 
Defense Minister of having violated the cease-fire agreed upon by Algeria 
with Morocco, while Boumedienne in fact, refused to accept the defeat of 
his army as he seemed tempted to continue the war to obtain a military 
victory in order to deprive his president of a reconciliation with King 
Hassan that would have given much publicity to Ben Bella's own efforts to 
settle the conflict with Morocco. However, amid feelings of frustra­
tion, Boumedienne seemed eager to retain a 'droit de regard* over the 
negotiations which took place between the two countries as one of the two 
members of the Algerian delegation was his close aide, Major Slimane 
(Kaid Ahmed).^
The other contention of the army during Ben Bella's rule had been to 
press for the withdrawal of the French armed forces from Algeria earlier 
than scheduled in the Evian agreements and for the reduction of the 
dependence of the Algerian army on French military supplies. To Ben 
Bella's efforts to cultivate a personal relationship with De Gaulle and 
preserve the privileged relations between the two countries but based on 
a spirit void of neo-colonialism, contrasted the ANP's call for the 
lessening of dependency links with the former metropole, especially on 
the military field as the military interest in the transfer of technology
^The other was M'Hamed lazid a senior 'militant' diplomat.
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grew with the increasing strength of the ANP's direction for military 
fabrication (DFM). The search for diversification of sources of
supplies led Boumedienne to have contacts with the Soviet leaders, 
gaining therefore a substantial share in Algerian-Soviet friendship which 
was articulated around the close ties established by Ben Bella and 
Khrushchev. The Algerian defense ministry made then two trips to Moscow 
to increase military cooperation with the Soviets, one on September 
27-October 5, 1963 shortly before the outbreak of hostilities with
Morocco and the other on April 23-May 11, 1965. The length of his two
visits may have also permitted him to enhance his own position in the 
eyes of the Soviet leaders. The last visit, made shortly before the 
coup against Ben Bella might have aimed this objective as well as making 
of the Soviet Union an ally in the perspective of revising the economic 
agreements with France. Therefore it was not surprising that
Boumedienne1s first official visit abroad was to Moscow in December 1965 
only six months after Ben Bella's downfall. Since then most of Algeria's 
military hardware came from the USSR while military supplies from France 
were limited to supplying National Gendarmerie.
During Boumedienne's tenure, the nature of decision-making within the 
Defence Ministry and the manner in which its decisions influence foreign 
policy matters through the council of revolution and the council of 
ministers remained practically unclear to outside observers. However the 
most important link appears to be Boumedienne who apparently succeeded in 
making the army the backbone of his regime. Obviously his confidence in 
the army's support substantially increased after the removal of hostile 
ex-maqui sards and provided him with the freedom to manoeuvre as the 
military dimension of political power in Algeria has been manifested in
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the prominence of military men in the decision-making apparatuses. But 
if the military clearly constituted the government's power base during 
Boumedienne's administration, it did not, however, exercise a direct 
control over decisions related to foreign policy matters since there 
seems to be a strong assumption that the army's role in the normal course 
of affairs has not been that of vetoing, providing authority for or 
revising foreign policy decisions but was confined to the level of 
supporting the broad links of the government strategy. This relative 
symbiosis did not suggest that the army's opinion especially with regard 
to national security matters had been absent or minimal but simply that 
the formal communication between the military and foreign policy matters 
in general, seemed to have been Boumedienne who certainly had a fairly 
acute view of the military perceptions with regard to external issues.
Deference of the military in Boumedienne's foreign policy was 
apparent in 1974 when he received support for his firm stand on the 
Western Sahara that involved a sustained cold war with Morocco. Since 
then the intensive mobilization of the army and the semi-state of alert 
imposed within the military sectors situated near the Moroccan borders 
stood as an indication of a consensus of the army's top officers with 
regard to Boumedienne's decision, notwithstanding discontent within the 
lower-ranking military staff and young generation of officers as well as 
conscripts. The most noticeable fact of the military establishment- 
Boumedienne congruence was reflected by the latter's surrounding by top 
officers many of whom were the President*s close aides and belonged to the 
category of professional soldiers. The most important of these officers 
were Colonels Chabou; chef de Cabinet of Boumedienne; Abdelghani (Head of 
the fourth, then fifth military region and then home minister); Yahaoui
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(Head of the third military region and then of Cherchell Academy);1 
Zerguini (Commander of the fourth and then third military regions); and 
the Majors: Bensalem, Boudjenane and Hajeres, respectively a member of 
the Etat-major quartier-general, Head of the Cherchell academy, and 
Director of the ANP's political commissariat.
Colonel Chabou, an ardent supporter of modernization was believed to 
have been Boumedienne1s technical genius with regard to military and 
national security affairs. He was often charged to conduct missions 
abroad concerning these issues and on other questions involving military 
expertise. He was for instance sent to the Middle East in September 
1970 to hold discussions with President Bakr of Iraq, Atassi of Syria and 
Arafat the PLO leader in an effort to take all measures to implement the 
cease-fire reached earlier at Cairo between Hussein of Jordan and Arafat.
After his accidental death in 1971, Chabou's successors in these matters 
were perhaps two other professional officers Colonel Zerguini and 
Abdelghani, the former being a close aide to Boumedienne. Zerguini
supervised the delicate operation of delimitation of the frontiers 
between Iraq and Iran following the agreement reached between the Chah 
and Saddam Hussein in Algiers in 1975 under Boumedienne auspices. 
Colonel Yahaoui a socialist hardliner and close to the Panarab baathist 
ideology was supposed to have influenced Boumedienne mainly on Arab 
affairs. He was perhaps the impulse behind the cultivation of close 
ties with Presidents Assad of Syria and Qadhafi and a strong opponent of 
the state technocracy's drive to tie Algeria's economy with the Western 
world. Conversely, Majors Bensalem, Boudjenane and Hadjeres had stressed 
a more moderate attitude, being concerned with the assertion of the
1Yahaoui was basically an e x -maquisard, but had an
appreciable level of education though in Arabic.
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country's Arabo-Muslim identity, and the exaltation of the basic 
principles of the Algerian revolution. As the relations with the 
Polisario leaders became Boumedienne's personal concern, the organization 
of this movement and its intelligence were assured by Colonel Hoffman, 
extremely loyal to Boumedienne and a highly trained officer.
At the beginning of Chadli's reign, deference of the military in foreign 
policy remained centered on domestic issues and on matters related to 
the country's security and integrity. This deference was far from being 
coherent and unified as tergiversations, uncertain strategies within 
governmental and military circles perhaps proper to a transitional period 
came to mark the first years of the Chadli regime. With the lack of 
inner stability, authority within the army was not centralized and 
uniform, and amid rivalries of clans, the interference of the military in 
foreign policy issues was indeed diffuse and sometimes incoherent.
The most striking manifestation of these divergences had been the 
complicity of some Algerian officers and state high officials in the 
Gafsa plot in May 1980, certainly without the knowledge of President 
Chadli. This group which included Kasdi Merbah, the former head of 
military security, Benyahia the foreign minister, Yahaoui then the FLN's 
strongman, was supposed to have supported terrorist activities of a 
Libyan-backed band of Tunisian opponents. The embarrassment of Chadli and 
other army officers was evidently clear as the Algerian president 
personally - and later with the help of General Major Benloucif and of 
Taleb-Ibrahimi, a notorious anti-Qadhafi - worked to mend fences with the 
Tunisian government. Another example confirming this lack of consensus 
on the strategy to be pursued with regard to regional affairs, had been 
the go-ahead given to the Polisario Front by Yahaoui probably supported
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by the radical officers within the ANP and by the Libyan leader, to 
attacks on the Southern Moroccan town of Tan-Tan in January 1980. 
However, as the presidential of’fice proved weak to control affairs 
related with military and territorial security, the most important move 
of the army was to make Lieutenant-Colonel Belkheir Secretary-General to 
the presidency in replacement of a civilian technocrat Benhabyles, 
probably in an attempt to keep a close eye on the president. Neverthe­
less, this move neither asserted the homogeneity of the military estab­
lishment, nor a convergent attitude to foreign policy issues.
Broadly, two large groups could be distinguished. A first group of 
radical officers includes military men who participated in the war of 
liberation and are to be committed to the tasks of preserving the basic 
values of the Algerian revolution as well as to intransigent nationalism 
and rhetoric. They are also opposed to the promotion to higher posts
in the military hierarchy of younger officers, who in many cases had 
little or no pre-independence experience, since they have been primarily 
the product of the modernization of the army pursued since 1962. In 
contrast to the group of radically-oriented officers, the members of the 
younger generation have been trained abroad, are more open to modern 
techniques, values and Western culture and advocate a less rigid
socialistic line .
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They are generally fervent supporters of nuclear programmes and of 
lessening the dependence of the ANP on Soviet military supplies through a 
rapid and ample diversification of armaments. Seemingly they are
concerned with establishing a detente in the Maghrib and a more balanced 
attitude between East and West. These considerations may explain their 
approval of Chadli's visit to the USA in April 1985, a visit believed as 
inopportune by the officers with radical orientations. It was then not 
surprising to see that while Chadli was in Washington, a radical officer 
General Nezzar went to Moscow in an attempt to reassure the Soviets of 
Algeria's attachment to the policy of non-alignment and preserve the 
Soviet source of supply of spare parts and military hardware in case of 
US reluctance to sell Algeria the needed sophisticated armaments. 
However, President Chadli seemed to have been induced to endorse this 
policy of diversification of arm supplies as well as the search for US 
military technology in an attempt to counter Morocco's increasing 
military capabilities and face Libya's belicose attitude to Algeria.
This categorization remains suggestive as the main divisions within 
the military establishment lie primarily on regional basis. There is a 
strong assumption that President Chadli faces pressures from the clan of 
the East and the one of the West, centered around the strong rivalry 
existing between General-Major Benloucif, the chief of staff from Annaba, 
(Chadli's native town) and Benyelles, the Secretary-General of the 
Defence ministry who comes from Tlemcen. With regard to foreign issues 
regional affiliation may have also been the basis for regional alignment 
since Benloucif has been greatly involved in Algerian-Tunisian rapproche­
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ment while relations with Morocco have been the major concern of General 
Belkheir, the Secretary-General of the presidency, believed to be close
to the moderate group of politicians. Rumours also had it that 
Taleb-Ibrahimi, the foreign minister may be sympathetic to the group of 
the West as he was brought up in Tlemcen and showing a soft approach 
which privileged diplomatic traditions with Morocco.
Probably deceived by the moderate approach of Taleb-Ibrahimi and 
Belkheir toward Morocco as well as by the intensive alignment with 
Tunisia at the expense of an alliance with Libya (while Hassan seemed 
unwilling to make any concessions) and in the view of the recent Tripoli- 
Rabat axis and France's lack of confidence in Algeria, the radically- 
oriented officers moved to press Chadli to reaffirm Algeria's stand over 
the Sahara issue and disavow his foreign minister. The latter's
initiative to favour a form of autonomy for the Saharawi people was 
promptly rejected by the segments of the military who saw the continuity 
of the struggle against the Moroccan troops as the main means to wreck 
Hassan's expansionist policies. An indication of Taleb-Ibrahimi's
relative eclipse with regard to this issue had been his absence from the
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meeting that took place in February 1985 between President Chadli and
Muhammad Abdul Aziz, the President of the Saharawi Republic (RASD) and
Bachir Mustafa Sayaad, responsible of the Permanent Secretariat of
Polisario's political bureau. The army's view seemed to have prevailed as 
the recent Polisario's attacks on Moroccan targets was believed to have 
been endorsed by the radical officers and the FLN which have been anxious 
to prevent a change in the configuration in favour of Morocco and not let 
Hassan increase pressure on Algeria through deterence and diplomatic 
manoeuvres such as those he successfully conducted with Libya and France 
in late 1984. If the military attention will continue to concentrate on 
the state's security and the country's territorial integrity, its 
interference in these issues will be more fragmented and heterogeneous, 
perhaps because the Algerian army does no longer represent a monolithic 
group interest as coherently articulated as during Boumedienne' s era. 
Over the years, it has probably evolved into a microcosm of the political 
spectrum which exists in Algerian society as a whole today.
2. The State technocracy: The conciliation between
business and ideology
Given the decline of the middle classes during the colonial era and 
in the absence of an effective mass party and well-articulated and 
coherent ruling elite, the technocracy came to the fore and became to 
play an important political role in the new Algerian state. This
stratum was believed to have originated with the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution (Harbi); reinforced its position in the post-independent 
political structure through the industrialization policy and presence in 
administrative and public enterprises (Cubertafond) and as a result, this 
technocracy came to constitute a dominate class (Yefsah), which although
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nationalist "rejects in deeds if not in words the political and economic 
guidelines of the revolution" (Bouzidi).1 The assumption of these
writers is that the technocracy collectively appropriates the surplus 
through the control it exercises over the state administrative appara­
tuses and through the dominant role it plays in organizing the economy 
and distributing the national income. It remains, however, difficult to 
state that the technocracy constitutes a class let alone a dominant one, 
because it lacks a real control over the means of production as to be 
able to appropriate the surplus and also because of the relative 
coordination between the various branches and levels of the economic 
sectors- Furthermore, this lack of homogeneity has been aggravated by 
two sets of factors: factionalism which had in fact marked the entire 
Algerian political elite in modern times and the administrative nomadism 
through which civil servants rarely remained in the same office for a 
substantial period of time. Factionalism certainly underlines the
primary clanish character of the Algerian technocracy as many technocrats 
owed their positions and privileges to rival groups and clans existing
1M. H a r b i : aux origines du FLN (Paris, editions Jeune- 
Afrique, 1980); Cubertafond, C: La république A l ge r i enne 
démocratique et populaire (Paris, PUF, 1979), p-129; 
Yefsah, A: Le processus m i l i t a i r e ? Sami-Nair, K. Algérie 
1954-1962: forces politiques et blocs au povoir (in les 
Temps M o d e r n e s , July-August 1982, p p . 11-33; Bouzidi, M: 
Algeria's policy toward France ; similar assumptions had 
been also advanced by H. Lazrag: the emergence of classes 
i n A l g e r i a ? Balta, P and C. Rulleau: 'L'AlgeVie des 
Algériens, wingt ans après (Paris, editions ouvrières, 
1981); Dersa: L 1Algérie en débat (Paris, cedetim, Maspero, 
1981); Ammour and al. La voie Algérienne (Paris, Maspero, 
1974 ); Clegg, I: Workers' se 1 f-management in Algeria New 
York, Monthly Review Press, 1972? Jacquemot and Raffinot: 
le capitalisme d'Etat Algérien (Paris, Maspero, 1978 ).
ror the refutation of the technocracy as a class see the 
valuable article of Roberts, H: the Algerian bureaucracy 
(in the Review of African political economy, (24), December 
1982, p p .39-59) p .42.
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within the ruling elite or in the military establishment, and thus 
constituted a clientele for the powerful members of the Algerian 
leadership.
Schematically the technocracy comprises three main groups: 1. the 
"political" technocrats whose legitimacy stemmed from their revolutionary 
past or political socialisation made through the wartime Algerian student 
association (UGEMA), mainly; 2. the members of the state administration, 
party and workers' union who have administrative expertise, acquired in 
many cases within the French colonial bureaucratic system. They came to 
fill the lower ranks in these apparatuses and constituted the ideological 
support for the technocratic project and model of development; 3. the 
"technical" technocrats who also possess the know-how necessary for the 
industrialisation of the country. This category represents essentially 
the power base of the political technocracy. Working in the economic 
ministries and state agencies they acted primarily as the executors of 
the policies formulated by the political technocrats.
With Boumedienne, the share of the technocracy in the national 
decision-making substantially increased as the state tended to become the 
major entrepreneui— employer after the sweeping away of the self­
management experience initiated by the Ben Bella regime (and the 
exclusion of the wartime politicians, ex-maquisards and leftwing 
ministers from the state apparatuses). Indeed, the technocracy's skills 
contributed in the establishment of the regime's legitimacy through 
sounding economic success, especially as Boumedienne seemed anxious to 
demarcate substantially from the rhetoric socialism and romantic
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revolutionärism of his predecessor, thus being concerned with building 
the state institutions and laying foundations for the country's economic 
take off.
Perhaps the most important group of the political technocrats and 
technical bureaucrats had been the team of Belaid Abdeslam who served as 
minister of industry and energy from 1965 to 1979 and is believed to have 
been the chief architect of Algeria's economic development. In the late 
1960s, the Boumedienne regime effectively consolidated his position at 
home while the state technocracy embarked upon a process of rapid 
industrialisation and attempted to accommodate to the new changes in the 
international market which became favourable to the oil producing 
countries. In those crucial years of 1969-1970, the balance of power 
within the Algerian leadership changed reinforcing the position of 
Abdeslam and the state oil company Sonatrach the cornerstone of the 
country's parastatal system which was run by technocrats close to 
Abdeslam such as Ait Al Hocine, Liassine and Ghozali. The year 1970 saw 
the promotion to ministerial posts of highly qualified technocrats 
believed close to Abdeslam: Khodja (planning); Yaker (commerce). 
Boumedienne seemed to have aligned himself with the policies of his 
minister of industry as he also appointed Mahroug his personal adviser 
for economic affairs as minister of finance in replacement for Cherif 
Belkacem a member of the Oujda group, a fact that showed the relative 
decline of wartime politicians.
Beyond geographical alignment, and like the technocratic diplomats, 
many elements of the Abdeslam team militated in the wartime UGEMA, served 
in the GPRA's specialized bodies and graduated from French universities.^
^Like Abdeslam, all of Ait Al Hocine, Liassine, Mahroug
and Yaker were of Kabyle origin, while Ghozali and Khodja
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The model of development as carried out by the Abdeslam team did not 
fail to have a certain impact not only on the formulation of the 
country's external relations, but also on its orientation and execution. 
This model based on accelerated industrialisation led to the integration 
of Algerian economy into the internationalist capitalist market since the 
implementation of the industrialising industries necessitated massive 
imports of technology and capital available mostly in the Western world.
As the implementation of the domestic economic programme required 
more and more sophisticated technology and massive capital, the move 
toward a political moderation became almost necessary. The Abdeslam 
team, then, began to emphasize economic pragmatism and induce Bouraedienne 
to ease relations with the Western world countries. In defence of this 
pragmatism, the Algerian president referred to the huge gas deal 
contracted with the US firm El Paso in 1969 as purely commercial because 
as he said "we have a surplus of gas we want to sell to the USA and which 
the Americans need...There is nothing strange in such an agreement 
concluded between a socialist developing country and the world's biggest 
capitalist state. Algeria's attitude toward the just causes is clear 
and our country does not need lessons from anybody on these issues 
whether they concern the liberation movements in Latin-America, Africa or 
the case of the Vietnamese people.. .There is neither military base nor
came from the Tlemcen region. Abdeslam had been in charge 
of the GPRA's department of economic affairs and Mahroug 
his director of Cabinet. The latter obtained an MSc in
economics in Paris and Liassine attended a polytechnic 
there, while Abdeslam, Ghozali and Khodja graduated in 
economics at the University of Grenoble and had been 
influenced by two French economists at the same university: 
Perroux and De Bernis. The latter's theory largely
inspired the conceptions of Algeria's economic development 
policy. De Bernis also worked as a technical adviser to 
the Algerian Ministry of industry and energy during 
Abdeslam's tenure.
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influence of the US in our country and there will never be. Soviet 
Union for instance which is regarded as the leading socialist state in 
the world buys gas from Iran where the Cartel's major companies are 
operating and sells it again to Western Europe."
The stress is put on the separation between ideology and economic 
interests. In dealing with the Western world on economic affairs,
Algeria it is argued did not abandon her militant line whether at home or 
on the foreign level. Thus, the apparent paradox existing between her 
radical policies and the structure of her trade patterns is not as 
striking as it may seem. It merely crystallises her economic pragmatism 
regarded by the technocratic group as necessary to lessen the country's 
heavy economic dependence on France, increase its capabilities and 
enhance its status in the international scene. And as the rise of oil 
and gas production in early 1970s proved necessary for increasing export 
earnings, the technocrats started looking for Western expertise and 
finance as well as for foreign markets. Thus, Algeria's cooperation 
rapidly developed with the USA and West Germany despite the absence of 
diplomatic relations. But Abdeslam and his team resisted pressures from 
the radical members of the ruling elite to give up Algerian neutrality 
over the German question as they were wary about establishing diplomatic 
relations with Berlin in order to avoid upsetting Bonn with which they 
set up important economic links despite that relations were cut off in 
1954 because of West Germany's support to Israel. Algeria finally 
recognized East Germany in May 1970 and resumed diplomatic ties with Bonn 
in December 1971, but it was only in 1973 that she accredited an 
Ambassador to this capital perhaps in an attempt to conceal the existence 
of a huge trade with West Germany. In similar vein, the US economic
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involvement in Algeria started to increase because the technocratic team 
felt that the country needed US technology and market to compensate for 
France's defection. The signature in 1969 of the huge gas contract with 
the US company El Paso constituted a personal triumph for Abdeslam and 
his assistants and perhaps also the keynote in the relaxation of 
Algerian-American political relations after an era of mutual suspicion 
and distrust, highlighted by the absence of diplomatic ties which 
resulted from Algeria's protest at America's support to Israel during the 
June 1967 conflict.1 Until this rapprochement, Algeria's trade with the 
USA had been insignificant as economic links between the two countries 
were limited to humanitarian aid granted by Washington and relatively
small sales of wheat.
1 The new approach to the USA as initiated by the technocratic group 
meant the reduction of the support to the American black panther
movement, and to the hijackings carried out by Palestinian and other 
2leftwing movements. The visit the US State Secretary for African
Affairs, Newsom, made to Algiers in 1972, the first ever paid by a US
high official reflected the conception of Abdeslam that ideology and 
business do not mix.
'In this A1gerian-American rapproche m e n t , Bruno Etienne a 
French analyst of Algerian politics, suggested the combined 
influence of Driss Jazairy a top technocratic diplomat and 
Wilhelm Eagleton the US charge d'affaires in Algiers as 
both were believed to have attended the same course at one 
of the Oxford schools. See B. Etienne in 'chronique 
diplomatique' in Ann uaire de l'Afrique du N o r d , (II) 1971, 
p. 367 .
^These considerations led Algiers to hand back to Washington 
the ransom the members of the Black Panther movement 
obtained from the US government when they hijacked a plane 
to Algiers in 1972.
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Encouraged by Boumedienne and being better qualified than the 
politicians, the technocrats became more useful in Arab and North-South 
forums where economic problems especially the energy issues tended to be 
predominant. In the early 1970s, they pushed forward for a moderate 
attitude in the manifestations of Algerian foreign policy particularly 
with regard to the Arab world, being aware that such a strategy would 
strengthen Arab solidarity which would in turn serve its broader 
ambitions, i.e. the implementation of a new international economic order 
more favourable to raw material producing countries, among them Algeria. 
It seemed that Abdeslam succeeded in inducing his president to improve 
relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East which had been 
strained because of Algeria's firm stand with regard to the Palestinian 
question, the support to the Guerrilla movements in Oman and Yemen as 
well as the showing of a favourable attitude to the independence of the 
United Arab Emirates. Therefore under the impulse of the technocratic 
group, Algeria known for revolutionary radicalism in Arab affairs, 
started to give up her blessings perhaps reluctantly to an Arab policy 
that included a peace conference for the Middle East conflict of October 
1973 at which the states in conflict would be sitting at the negotiation 
table in Geneva. Moreover, shortly after the ceasefire, Algeria held an 
Arab conference which was regarded by the Arab radicals and militant 
Palestinians as the summit of capitulation, on the basis that it preached 
the preservation of an Arab consensus and moderate demands. As a 
result, Algiers received visits by Kissinger, the US State Secretary in 
December 1973 and October 1974, thus clearly breaking away with the 
intransigent attitude the Algerian leadership had shown in the aftermath 
of the previous Arab-Israeli war. And when requesting Western Europe to
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contribute in bringing about a settlement for this conflict, Abdeslam in 
line with other Arab moderate states, declared "we are only asking for 
the application of the United Nations 242 resolution"•  ^ This statement 
was indeed striking when confronted with the previous declarations of 
Algerian leaders who rejected this resolution on the basis that it 
ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people.
The pursuit of economic pragmatism, however, did not constitute a 
vital issue when Algeria's security and territorial integrity was 
threatened. Indeed, Boumedienne's attempt to challenge Morocco's take 
over of the Western Sahara steadily undermined the efforts of the 
technocratic group to maintain a detente in the Maghreb which would have 
not only helped a better concentration on domestic economic development 
but also increased Algeria's trade with her neighbouring countries.^ 
This move inevitably shattered the desire of the technocratic group to 
embark upon the exploitation of the mineral-rich Gasa Djebilet mines with 
Morocco and the supply of natural gas to Western Europe through pipelines 
to be built through the Moroccan and Tunisian territories. This
obstacle perhaps forced Abdeslam to give a go ahead to a drastic increase 
of the production of liquified natural gas which proved later, quite 
disastrous for the country's economy. Moreover, the deterioration of 
the trade relations with the US marked notably by the cancellation of the 
gas deal in 1977, was a direct result of the shift of the US support to
1 *Quoted in Moussi , A: "les relations Algero-Egyptiennes"
(DEA thesis, Political Studies, Paris II University,
1 9 8 1 ) ,  p . 9 8 .
^Mahroug, the Minister of finance was ousted in 
following his opposition to a drastic increase of
™  i 1 i .. J  V, „  V. »  —  i —  *- 1   i. i. U  j - ______ ____ -  i.   
1976 
t het ii n r n  
military budget on the basis that this request was too late 
and too voluminous to permit a good functioning of the 
State's financial regulations in accordance with the 
already scheduled programmes.
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Morocco. With the failure of the North-South debates and the growing 
domestic problems, the state technocracy became the target of popular 
discontent and criticism from other groups within the ruling elite. The 
dislocation of the powerful ministry of industry and energy into three 
sub-ministries during the reshuffle of the government in April 1977, 
constituted perhaps an attempt from Boumedienne to remedy Algeria's 
economic problems and wreck Abdeslam's technocratic fiefdom.
The rise to power of Chadli and the emergence of moderate segments 
within the political elite meant also the virtual elimination of Abdeslam 
and his assistants from the decision-making process as they had been held 
responsible for Algeria's economic problems. If such a faith marked the 
demotion of the state technocracy from a prominent position in the home 
policy to the status of a mere scapegoat, it also led to the confinement 
of this technocracy to the role of an executive organ with regard to 
important decisions which remain in the hands of the presidency and the 
military in final analysis.
Under Chadli the spearhead of Algeria's new economic policy and the 
leading figure of the state technocracy has been Brahimi Abdelhamid who 
was elevated in December 1984 to the post of Prime Minister with an upper 
hand over the country's economic affairs. The other influential members 
of the new powerful group within the state technocracy were believed to 
be Belkacem Nabi, the minister of hydrocarbons, Oubouzar (planning) and
Abdeslam's close assistants Ait Al Hocine, Keramane and 
Ghozali had been charged by the State's cour des comptes of 
mismanagement, misuse of public funds and for the low price 
by which Algeria's gas had been sold to the US company El 
Paso. Ghozali was even jailed for sometime# before
becoming Ambassador to Brussels in 1984. A native of
Tlemcen, he owed this nomination to the Tlemcen group led 
by Benyelles, the Secretary General of the ministry of 
defense and to the support of T a 1eb-1brahimi , the current 
foreign minister believed close to this group.
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Khellef (commerce) . ^ Both Brahimi and Nabi are older than most of 
Abdeslam's assistants and had a substantial pre-war political experience 
(within the MTLD), a matter that perhaps explained their political 
moderation and greater emphasis on economic pragmatism as they may have 
been influenced by the older generation of Algerian nationalists. 
Brahimi, a friend of long standing of President Chadli, was believed to 
be with Nabi a firm opponent of Abdeslam's highly centralized economy and 
of the extension of the role of the state in the country's economy. 
They generally, shared Chadli's encouragement to the private sector and a 
greater diversification of trade relations and a close economic 
cooperation with France and Tunisia in contrast to Boumedienne. And 
with the support of the Tlemcen group as well as of Taleb-Ibrahimi and 
Yala the Home Minister, Brahimi was believed to have contributed in the 
improvement of economic relations with France since 1982 and in the 
recent overture towards the USA.
Despite the opposition of the group of the radical officers and some 
militants of the FLN, the drive toward economic liberalization remain, 
beyond rivalries of persons and clans, an acute issue in Algerian 
politics today.
D. Favoured Interests *1
1• The party: the symbol of revolutionary ideals
As in domestic life, the party's share in the foreign-decision making 
remained quite limited until recently and its role in the formulation of 
the country's foreign policy expressed mostly the attachment to the basic
1Nabi comes from Tlemcen and the two others from Kabilya, 
thus confirming the prominence of these two regions as 
chief suppliers of state technocrats.
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principles of the Algerian revolution. This emphasis reflected the 
anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist feelings born by most of the FLN 
militants who actively participated in the struggle for independence. 
Many of the FLN officials and activists had been shunted off to the party 
following their elimination from the state decision-making organs as a 
result of their removal from the army with the policy of modernization 
carried out by Boumedienne and his group of professional soldiers. Like 
the members of the lower ranks of the FLN, most officials had been 
maquisards and urban guerrilla fighters but in contrast they have a 
certain level of education though to a lower level than the civilian 
technocrats' standard. And in many cases this education was in arabic.
Given their wartime experience, the FLN strata bore populist feelings 
which emphasized a socialistic rhetoric with Arabs-Islamic pigmentation 
and anti-colonialist ferment. They were more inclined to strengthen 
links with the Panarabist core and national liberation movements than 
with Western countries which they regarded as the principal support for 
imperialism and colonialism, an image forged during their own struggle 
against France. Moreover, lacking scientific knowledge and education 
they were less able to understand the politics of economic pragmatism 
preached by the state technocracy. And if they were grateful to this 
stratum for Algeria's economic growth and improvement of the standard of 
life of the Algerian people they were nevertheless critical of the 
Western ideas of the state technocracy and of the close economic ties of 
Algeria with the Western capitalist countries, which limited the links 
with Arab states. The main preoccupation of the FLN rank and file had 
been without doubt the struggle for Palestinian liberation and for the 
Arab cause in general. Since Algeria's independence, the FLN had not only
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provided support for the Palestinian movements but also expressed its 
solidarity with the Middle East Arab States in their confrontation with 
Israel. Despite its general atrophy with regard to political mobiliza­
tion, the FLN had occasionally been active in organizing conferences and 
manifestations to express solidarity with "brother” Arabs and 
Palestinians and fellow militants of national liberation movements in 
Lusophone and Southern Africa as well as Vietnam, especially during Ben 
Bella's time when anti-colonial struggle was one of the main issues of 
foreign policy. At that time, the FLN comprized a great number of
ex-guerrilla fighters and prestigious leaders of the Algerian revolution 
such as Mohamed Khider, then the FLN general-secretary.
During the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
party was active in channeling popular solidarity with the Arab cause and 
the mobilization of youth so as to increase the number of volunteers to 
be sent to the Middle East front. It also displayed some efforts in 
organizing popular manifestations in protest to Nasser's acceptance of 
the cease-fire in June 1967, to Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977 or to 
Jordan's clash with the PLO in 1969-1970. Since 1974, the FLN's 
attention concentrated on the Western Sahara issue, providing moral 
support to the Polisario front in line with Algeria's solidarity with the 
right of the Saharawi people for self-determination. Besides, the FLN was 
provided with the task of preserving and developing relations and 
solidarity with socialist and progressive countries throughout the world.
Being the symbol of the nation-state and the guarantor of the basic 
principles of the Algerian revolution, the FLN had also been used to 
enhance the legitimacy of the ruling elites through the exaltation of 
issues which appealed to most segments of the Algerian society:
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anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. In the case of the Western
Sahara, it served as a vehicle to gain support for the Algerian 
government's stand in this conflict and in the case of establishing 
relations with other parties, the FLN had been used to enhance the image 
of the Algerian leadership within the third world coalition, gather 
support for Algeria's strategy for a new international economic order as 
well as dissipate the doubts of other progressive parties on Algeria's 
socialist line. By way of example it is noteworthy to mention that
after the coup against Ben Bella, it was a delegation of the FLN led by 
well-known former maquisards who went touring Africa to stress the new 
regime's commitment to the cause of African liberation and economic 
emancipation.
To be able better to implement these functions of symbolism and 
propaganda, the FLN was provided with a commission for external 
relations. Originally, the presidential office set up a department of 
international studies led by Mohamed Ksouri a Panarabist militant and in 
1969 it created within the FLN a department of liberation movements led 
by Jalloul Malaika a former ALN officer. In 1977 a bettei— organized
commission for external was set up and held by a former ANP officer 
Colonel Hoffman considered as extremely loyal to Boumedienne.' The 
commission was subdivided into two departments: one of relations with 
parties and international organizations. The latter's included a
sub-commission for liberation movements led by Major Saddock Kitouni, 
regarded as close to liberation movements in Africa.
'Hoffman was replaced by Bouhara also a former ANP officer 
and minister at the head of the commission in 1983
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The party's mass organization such as the women's association (UNFA), 
youth (UNJA) and the workers' union (UGTA) have also sections of external 
relations related to their specific domains in accordance with the 
regime's political and ideological options.
The confinement of the party to the role of complementing actions and 
policies carried out by the presidential office and the foreign ministry 
both of which had been chiefly involved in state-to-state relations, led 
to a discontent within the party in general and the commission for 
external relations in particular. According to a member of this
commission, there has been at the theoretical level, no capitalization 
and recording of the experiences of Algerian foreign policy, since this 
policy has been based on general principles rooted in the past revolu­
tion, a matter that has led to a circumstantial attitude void of 
ideological elaboration.1 To remedy this situation, he argued, the
foundation of the country's foreign policy should go beyond its general 
principles and try to find out channels stemming from the principle of 
non-alignment which he regarded as Algeria's "seule issue possible". 
The implicit assumption was that the FLN commission for external 
relations should assume this role with regard to the new requirements and 
mutations in the international system.
These opinions, presumably, are widespread within this commission as 
their members might feel that their role should not be limited to the 
role of a rubber stamp for decisions taken by the presidential office. 
Conceivably these demands reflect the desire of the FLN to have a share 
in the national-decision making in general, being encouraged by Chadli's 
attempts to make the party better able to play the role of counterweight
i n t e r v i e w  with Ogab, head of the division 
the parties of Western Europe".
relations with
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to the army and state technocracy. As a result of this strategy, the 
party has since 1981 increased its role in mass mobilization and in 
foreign policy making. The nomination of party officials to diplomatic 
posts overseas, had certainly permitted the FLN a decisive intrusion 
within the foreign ministry and a substantial role in the execution of 
some aspects of the country's external policies. Indeed in contrast to 
cases of demotion, the infusion of the members of the FLN into the 
diplomatic service resulted from the rise in the party rank, reflecting 
the more active role played by the FLN in national politics since the 
death of Boumedienne.
The place for accreditation shows the party's stress and ideological 
considerations through maintaining close links with progressive 
countries, mainly of the Arab world. For instance, Hachemaoui, Kara, Ali 
Ammar have been given posts in Lebanon, Hungary and Libya respectively. 
Having a basically Arab cultural background their promotion might have 
served to cool down the increasing discontent among the arabic-educated 
students and other militants of the FLN. This promotion might have also 
been used to show that the party can permit as well, an effective access 
of the militants to high posts and thus enhance its abilities to lure 
many young cadre and technocrats to activate within the party. 
Undoubtedly the lethargic state, demagogic rhetoric and inefficiency into 
which the FLN had fallen, had kept away these social strata from joining 
it. Intense efforts displayed by Messadia, the FLN strongman, since 1981 
to increase the party's role in political mobilization perhaps aimed also 
at strengthening the role of the FLN in home polity and enhancing his own
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position within the leadership, so as to provide himself with a certain 
autonomy vis-a-vis the President and thus acquire a larger room of 
manoeuvre.
The desire of Chadli to revitalize the FLN in an attempt to
counterbalance the weights of both the army and the state technocracy
combined with Messadia's own political experience and skills had
certainly allowed the latter to assert himself in shaping the country's 
policies. With regard to external issues, the direct way of influencing 
the President, has been the participation of Messadia in meetings that 
took place between Chadli and foreign heads of state as well as his 
increasing involvement in conducting missions of negotiations, mediation 
and persuasion. With the support of the radically oriented-officers of 
the army, he was able to induce Chadli to opt for a firm attitude 
vis-a-vis Morocco and strengthen links with the progressive Arab regimes, 
especially Syria and Libya, and attempt to revive the Arab front of 
steadfastness in opposition to the moderate line pursued by Taleb- 
Ibrahimi with the implicit approval of President Chadli. ^
Furthermore, it is probable that behind the anti-French campaign, 
launched by the FLN since mid-1985 under the cover of the party's 
attachment to the basic values of the Algerian revolution, aimed at 
making Chadli turn from a close relationship with France which has been 
advocated by Taleb-Ibrahimi and Abdelhamid Brahimi, the Prime Minister.2
1 The substantial credibility enjoyed by Messadia in the 
eyes of Arab progressive forces may be highlighted by his 
trip to Damascus in May 1984 in an attempt to heal the 
breach between Assad and the PLO leader, Arafat. And
amid negotiations for a Maghrebi summit that took place in 
early 1985 it was Messadia who was charged to explain 
Algeria's position to Qadhafi (January 16).
2 The most vehement manifestations of this anti-French 
diatribe may be found in the FLN ' s own magazine 
Revolution Africaine. For a subtle attack on French
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It is perhaps difficult to ascertain that much of the FLN's standpoints 
on external issues reflect the perceptions of the party's rank and file, 
since the personal alignment of Messadia with the core of the radically- 
oriented ANP officers and his direct access to the president attest the 
basic clanish character of Algerian politics and the highly personalized 
feature of the country's leadership. The game of shifting alliances as 
it has been practised by Messadia, may politically constitute a risk for 
the party leadership. The task of explaining and gaining support for
Chadli's visit to the USA made in April 1985 for instance, represented in 
fact a dilemma for Messadia and the permanent secretariat of the FLN's 
Central Committee since the choice between profiting from Chadli's 
willingness to strengthen the party and the risk of jeopardising this 
support by opposing the president's move toward political moderation may 
prove difficult to make. This dilemma in fact reflects not only the 
weakness of the party to engage as a viable political institution with 
its specific identity and objectives, but also its divisions into rival 
factions and clans at a time of an open conflict over the future 
orientations of Algerian policies both at home and abroad.
attitude toward Algerian 
Messadia to L' Actualité7 
Algériens en Europe. (July
m i g r a n t s , 
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2. Public Opinion: a marginal role
Despite the complexity of its nature, the concept of public opinion 
has been viewed by political scientists as an important element in the 
process of foreign policy and as pictured in Western conceptualization, 
it was believed to exercise indirect influence on the decision-makers. 
Whether taken simply as a collection of opinions on specific foreign 
policy issues expressed by individuals or groups outside the executive 
power or as a factual and active force, public opinion remains hard to 
define with accuracy even in a participatory democracy in which public 
interests and values would find a tangible expression in the policy 
arena. In developing countries in general and in authoritarian regimes 
in particular, public opinion was assumed to be amorphous, apathetic and 
with no impact on the formulation of foreign policy. This assumption 
was easily established given the secretive character and highly 
centralized foreign decision making in these states and the complicated 
nature of relationship between society and government.
If one admits that public opinion may be linked with mass opinion, 
national character of a people may be conceived as the basic ingredient 
to help us speculate intelligently about the influence of the cultural 
environment of the national unit on the decision-makers. Mass culture 
then, may be apprehended in terms of psycho-cultural characteristies and 
of patterns of thought of a given nation. But to determine the national 
character of any nation is admittedly difficult because in the present 
state of knowledge, all generalizations about national character are 
hypothetical in nature.^ 1
1 A l m o n d , G . A : The American people and foreign policy (New 
York, Praeger Publishers, 1963).
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In this vein, many concepts related to psychological attitudes are 
derived from individual cases and thus do not lend themselves very easily 
to a serious analysis of the national character. Some interpretations 
of the Algerian character may be valuable to understand some basic traits 
underlying the conditions of patterns of thought and mood of the 
Algerians, but unfortunately they may not be highly pertinent to assert 
the capacity of these individuals to understand foreign policy issues, 
let alone their ability to respond to these issues. Infact,
characteristies supposed to be specific to the Algerian people such as 
suspicion (Vatin and Leca), 'complexed mentality' (Quandt), 'political 
apathy' (Moore) and "assabiya" (Hermassi) are too vague to describe the 
national values, empirical beliefs and expressive symbols and too 
individualistic to permit a correlation between the national mood and the 
degree of responsiveness to foreign policy issues.1
However, even if this correlation is assumed, the impact of mass 
opinion on the decision-makers remains hard to assess because of the
absence of plebiscites or referendums to collect individual opinions on 
specific foreign policy issues. Equally public opinion did not prove 
being even a latent political force given the absence of manifesting 
opposition or anger to foreign policy decisions in the form of strikes or 
riots.
With regard to foreign policy issues, this apathy may not be
fortuitous given the omnipresence of the state in all sectors of the
social life. Thus, individual responsibility became somehow diluted in
'vatin, J-C and Leca, J; L'Alqe'rie p o l i t i q u e : institutions 
(Paris, fondation nationals des Sciences politiques, 1977); 
Moore, C.H: North-Africa (Boston, Little Brown, 1970);
Hermassi, E: Political____ leadership in North-Afrlca
(California, Berkeley, 1972) and Quandt, B.W: Revolution and 
political leadership.
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the vagueness of public property which is itself regarded as an abstract 
unit, somehow transcending society. Expressive reliance on the *Etat de 
providence' (nanny state) implied a certain apathy to politics in
general. However, this apathy does not necessarily mean lack of
politicization as it may not be exaggerated to assert that Algerians in 
general are much versed in discussing political issues, especially those 
related to international issues. It simply attests a lack of public 
participation in the foreign decision-making in particular given the 
highly centralized feature of the state's executive powers. Understood 
in these terms, political apathy may explain the disregard of politics 
and politicians as rendered in the pejorative expression of boulitique, 
that is to say a function above the reach of commonsense connected 
sometimes with negative notions such as brain-washing, propaganda or pure 
speculation•
Absence of popular responsiveness toward foreign policy issues and 
impact on the decision-making derive also to a large extent from 
deep-rooted nationalistic themes and values exalted by the ruling elite 
and which appeal to large segments of the Algerian people, for instance 
Arabism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in general. These 
connotations have been greatly emphasized by the Algerian leaders since 
they yield them also political legitimacy. In this vein, public opinion 
has been easily mobilized to muster support for the decisions to support 
liberation movements throughout the world, especially the Palestinian 
re sistance•
To limit the analysis to this convergence or consensus on the 
principles defended by Algerian foreign policy may be misleading since it 
could be easily argued that there exists a nuanced outlook held by mass
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opinion over the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. And to dwell 
on these differences may be highly subjective and analytically superflu­
ous, as the assumptions one could put forward may remain biased and 
personal•
One useful way to transcend these difficulties, may be to deal more 
specifically with the foreign policy attitudes and perceptions of the 
articulate sections of the population. Most significant have been the 
various opposition movements - all outlawed - which expressed opinions on 
foreign policy different from those held by the ruling elites. The
progressive parties such as the FFS of Ait Ahmed, the PPS of Boudiaf and 
the MDNR of Mahsas have been critical of Algeria's economic co-operation 
with the USA and of her involvement in the Western Saharan conflict. 
However, being sympathetic to the Moroccan cause they lost substantial 
credibility, in addition to their limited political impact in Algeria. 
The pro-Soviet "socialist avant-garde party" was tolerated when it gave 
'positive' support to the Boumedienne regime and seemed to have made his 
views known to the President through a certain number of sympathisers of 
this party within segments of the state technocracy, mainly. However, 
with the death of Benyahia presumed close to this party and with the rise 
of the moderates under the impulse of Chadli and Taleb-Ibrahimi as well 
as the greater drive of the FLN in the home polity in recent years, the 
weight of the PAGS has considerably diminished. And many of its
militants and sympathisers have been removed from the state's bureau­
cratic apparatuses and responsibilities within the mass organizations, 
especially the student unions.
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The fundamentalist movements are naturally believed to appeal for a 
greater drive toward Arabism and Islamism. But while the "jihad islami" 
of Sheikh Mountadhiri seem to have contacts with pro-Iranian shi'it 
forces in the Middle East, the "Muslim Brethren" (FM) led by Mustapha 
Bouali would favour more contacts with Arab conservative circles. On its 
part the "Mouvement pour la democratic en Algerie" headed by Ben Bella 
appears more tolerant than the other two organizations, but it is 
believed to have substantial support from some Arab countries, Libya in 
particular• Among its main objection to the orientation of the Algerian 
foreign policy has been the opposition to Algeria's support for the 
Saharawi cause calling instead for a solution of the Saharan conflict in 
a Maghrebi context but that would favour the Moroccan stand. ^
Besides these underground parties and movements, segments of the 
private bourgeoisie have expressed their views on some important foreign 
policy issues. Centred around figures of the old political guard such 
as Far hat Abbas and Ben Khedda, this non-partisan opposition advocated 
mainly economic liberalisation and a Maghrebi unity founded on a united 
parliament functioning on terms close to Western political liberalism.2
Finally, the "mouvement culturel berbere" which gathers support 
mainly from youth in Kabylia and Berber speaking circles of the Algerian 
worker community in France, has been critical of the 'cultural oppres­
sion' exercised by the regime and called for cultural pluralism and less 
Arabism. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to see the response of the ruling 
elites to these diverse challenges with regard to the formulation and 
conduct of foreign policy. To assume that the political moderation and
^See interview of Ben Bella to the review edited by the MDN, 
Al Baad i1 , December 1985.
2 Fe r hat Abbas: La resolution confisguee (Paris,
1984).
Garnie r
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the strengthening of relations with conservative countries as carried out 
by the Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi aimed simply at calming down 
pressures from the fundamentalists, may be oversimplifying the manifesta­
tions of social and economic unrest and of the battles between political 
factions, in recent years.
More than the party and the national assembly, public opinion in 
Algeria is too disarticulated, too weak politically to make a substantial 
impact on the foreign decision making process. This process has not been 
made through clearly defined institutional, bureaucratic and party 
channels, but tightly held at the top. Indeed, the foreign policy 
community in Algeria had been centred around the President and restricted 
to a relatively small circle of groups representing different interests, 
essentially within the military establishment as a political institution 
and the state-technocracy as the engineer of socio-economic change.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ASSERTION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY VIS-A-VIS FRANCE 
For the Algerian nationalists, the attainment of political
independence did not constitute an end to their struggle of asserting the 
existence of their people as both a nation and a state.
Estranged in their own country during the colonial times by being 
denied their own identity and deprived of their sovereignty, they came to 
believe that the recovery of political independence could provide them 
with the necessary basis not only to feel their nationhood but also 
consolidate it vis-a-vis other nation-state units, particularly vis-a-vis 
France, With the latter, the conflict has been continuous not only in 
the efforts to wipe out the economic aspects of colonial legacy and 
dependence but also at achieving a cultural decolonization of Algeria
mentality so as to create a new Algerian man from which cultural 
alienation, inhibitions of the 'indigenat spirit* will be definitely
exorcised. Decolonization in terms of economic independence and 
affirmation of Algerian identity has been regarded as vital for the 
survival of the post-colonial state and for its access to the community 
of sovereign nations. But in practice the process proved long and hard.
Until the late 1960s, Algeria in the absence of effective economic 
capabilities was forced to accommodate to the special relationship with 
her former metropole which was imposed upon her by the colonial 
dialectics and peculiar circumstances of the transfer of power. But
since 1971, Algeria was able to break these special relations by reducing 
her economic dependence on France and asserting her political independ­
ence and distinct identity. However, lingering aspects of the colonial
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legacy have neither permitted a total rupture nor a normal state-to-state 
relationship, as highlighted by the ups and downs that came to mark 
Algeria's links with France since then.
A. THE RESTRICTIVE CONTENT OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1• The Evian agreements: the preservation of French interests in
Algeria
Having been itself a long process of intricate events and tragedies, 
the Algerian war ended in a complex political context that bred harsh 
implications for both sides. While General De Gaulle was pushing
forward his policy for the birth of an 'independent Algeria but closely 
linked to France', the FLN leadership was divided over the precise 
content of this independence. The signature by the GPRA of the Evian 
agreements on March 19, 1962, codifying the transfer of power and the 
framework for economic cooperation between France and Algeria was not 
approved by some FLN members, although it was endorsed by the National 
Council of the Revolution (CNRA) at its Tripoli meeting in February 1962.
The referendum for independence submitted to the Algerian people put 
forward a unique question: "voulez-vous que l 'Algérie devenue un état 
indépendant, coopère avec la France dans les conditions définies par la 
déclaration du 19 Mars 19627" Thus, the Algerian voters had little
choice with regard to the solution worked out by the French government 
and the GPRA at Evian. The approval for independence (by 99.72 per
cent) inevitably included the acceptance of a close cooperation with 
France, and if certain radical leaders of the FLN did not accept the
content of this cooperation, they could hardly reject the referendum's 
formula of the independence of Algeria.
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The Evian agreements granted Algeria a formal liberty in the choice 
of her domestic policies, in practice however, they substantially 
restrained the adoption of radical measures which the wartime FLN had 
endorsed in its various political declarations, particularly the 1956 
Summam platform and the 1962 Tripoli charter.
The new state's sovereignty appeared limited by three sets of 
provisions outlined in these agreements: the presence of the French 
residents, the maintaining of French military bases in Algeria, and the 
continuation of France's monopoly over the latter's energy resources.
The status of the French citizens: the agreements asserted their rights 
to share in equality the protection and privileges granted to all 
Algerians over a transitory period of three years at the end of which 
they could opt for the Algerian citizenship or retain their French 
nationality. Meanwhile, they were promised protection for their
properties (as no dispossesion could be taken without fair compensation), 
permitted to circulate freely between the two countries and transfer 
assets to France with no restriction. Their religious beliefs were to 
be respected and so were to be their political rights and access to jobs 
in Algeria without discrimination.
Through these agreements, the French government aimed at establish­
ing a secular state within a multiconfessional society in Algeria while 
at the same time granting a privileged status to the European minority 
and submitting the domestic legal authority of this new Algerian state to 
international jurisdiction in case of expropriation of French interests
in Algeria
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The constitution of a privileged minority formed by remaining French 
citizens was foreseen by the authors of the Tripoli programme, and many 
FLN leaders regarded their presence as a constraint against the 
implementation of socialism and social justice in independent Algeria. 
The submission to international jurisdiction in case of expropriation was 
also felt as a serious infringement Algeria’s hard-won sovereignty.
The maintaining of military bases: the Evian agreements allowed the 
French a period of twelve months to reduce their armed forces to 80,000, 
and a further twenty-four months to repatriate the rest. Moreover, the 
agreements granted the former metropole, the lease of a naval base 
situated at Marsa Al Kebir near Oran for fifteen years as well as the 
lease of other military installations for unspecified period. This 
included military bases at Reggane, In Ekker, Colomb-Bechar, Hammam-guir? 
airports at In Amguel, Bone (Annaba), Boufarik and Bousfer and radar 
installations at Reghaia, and Bou zizi. For a country that won its 
independence through a seven year long bloody war, these military clauses 
limited further its national sovereignty.
The control of energy resources: on the economic level, the agreements 
ensured the maintainance of French interests in Algeria in accordance 
with France's global economic strategy as aimed through the implementa­
tion of the Constantine plan, a five year economic and social development 
programme for Algeria promulgated by De Gaulle in 1959, in an attempt to 
shape the course of the Algerian war. Beyond political considerations, 
the objective was to create in Algeria an industrial infrastructure that 
would complement France's own industries in the context of restructuring 
its national economy. Light industries were to be encouraged to absorb 
the abundant work forces, develop small-scale craft industries and
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increase domestic consumption. In addition, agrarian production was to 
be increased to meet the needs of France and other members of the EEC and 
export-oriented heavy industries to be set up through the realisation of 
huge projects such as a plant refinery at Algiers and a metallurgical 
complex at Annaba. The plan did not aim at the real economic development 
of new Algeria, but at developing through the systematic exploitation of 
cheap labour certain products whose final procession would be achieved in 
the former métropole.' It inevitably had a distorting impact on 
Algeria's economic patterns by conditioning the orientation of her 
economic development even a few years after the political independence of 
the country and by neglecting the necessity of reforming the agrarian 
sector. This plan constituted mainly a means for the French industrial­
ists to achieve capital accumulation through the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons, a sector that became increasingly important in the French 
economic strategy after 1956.
Undoubtedly, the preservation of French oil interests in Algeria had 
been the most crucial element in the economic association set out by the 
Evian agreements guaranteeing the continuation for a six year period of 
the privileges French oil companies had enjoyed prior to Algerian 
independence in the form of large concessions and preferential treatment 
for new exploration. Under the terms of these agreements, the French 
state-owned oil companies Elf-Erap and the CFP were holding the 
predominant French interests in exploration, production and marketing of 
oil in Algeria and accounting for ninety per cent of the latter's 
production, while the new Algerian state was offered only a small share 
in the Arzew gas refinery (Camel) and 40.5 per cent of shares in the SN
'plan de C o n s t a n t i n e , General report, 1959-1963, June 1960.
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Repal Company which controlled 50 per cent of the oilfields of Hassi- 
Messaoud, Algeria's most important oil reserves. Moreover, non-French oil 
companies were prevented from obtaining concessions from the new Algerian 
state except on the basis of association with French companies. But the 
most severe restriction imposed on the Algerian state was the intei—  
diction to nationalize French oil assets without French consent. This 
measure and the deprivation of the right to take over land owned by 
French residents, thus preventing the implementation of an agrarian 
revolution whose principle was set out by the FLN Tripoli charter, were 
regarded by the Algerians as a serious infringement of their right of 
control over their country's natural resources, a matter that later on 
became the most important issue of contention between the two sides.
Last but not least, the Evian agreements tied the economic 
development of Algeria to France's financial assistance. Although the 
French government neither restricted Algeria's right to obtain loans or 
bilateral assistance from other countries nor restrained her plans of 
investments, it nevertheless succeeded through the form of aid allocated 
in directing investments to sectors where French interests were 
predominant. By integrating Algeria into the French monetary zone,
Paris virtually limited the new state's control over its financial 
transactions and monetary operations, as it could not, for instance, 
proceed to the devaluation of its currency unilaterally or control the 
financial transactions of the French companies working in Algeria. 
Under the terms of the Evian agreements, these companies enjoyed free 
trade, free transfer of capital and non-discriminatory fiscal taxation.
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As a result, independent Algeria's budget, the financing of the country's 
economic projects and its balance of payments depended largely on French 
financial inducements*
2• A necessary accommodation - to privileged relations
In its infant stage, the Algerian state burdened with many loads, 
most of which it inherited from the past colonial period, could hardly 
afford to emulate the Guinean example of rupture with France and resist 
De Gaulle's offer of cooperation and privileged relations. The accommo­
dation to his designs was justified by the Algerian leaders as 
necessary but temporary given the lack of power capabilities for which 
they made French colonialism chiefly responsible* Thus, they merely 
regarded French aid as a moral obligation to help them extirpate the 
burden of underdevelopment inherited from the ancien regime. On
November 20, 1962, shortly after the independence, Ben Bella made an 
urgent call for foreign assistance, especially from France, to tackle the 
country's economic problems. Soon afterwards, the foreign minister
Khemisti and later Boumaza, the minister of economy, led delegations to 
Paris to obtain more financial aid1 and in July 1965, Algeria signed an 
important economic convention with France known as the oil agreement 
through which the French agreed to participate in her development, while 
retaining substantial advantages, mainly in the energy sector. Both Ben 
Bella and Boumedienne in the early years of his office adopted a quite 
moderate attitude towards French interests in Algeria. Apart from the 
seizure of the vacant properties left by the former French residents in
1Khemisti did not get the 1.5 billion Francs of aid he 
requested, but obtained from Paris, assurance that French 
aid for the year 1963 will be equivalent to the amount 
envisaged in the Constantine plan, i.e. 1 billion of 
French Francs. (Annee pol i t i q u e , 1962 p.32).
Algeria, Ben Bella's achievements in taking over French interests were 
limited to obtaining shares in some French companies working in Algeria.1 
And until the nationalization of French oil assets in February 1971 
marking the end of the privileged relations between Algiers and Paris, 
the measures taken against French interests such as the banking and 
insurance network in 1965 and the mining industry in May 1966, were not 
sufficient to shake France's economic grip on Algeria. In addition, the 
two Algerian leaders were circumspect in criticizing Gaullist foreign 
policy despite their customary diatribe against all manifestations of 
Western imperialism. They, for instance, remained silent on the
existence of French nuclear experiments in the Algerian desert confines 
and on French military supplies to the Algerian army, while denouncing 
the installations of foreign bases in many third world countries.^ It 
was only after popular protest and discontent about the explosion of a 
French bomb at the In Ikker testing ground on March 18, 1963 that Ben
Bella engaged in negotiations with the French government to speed up the 
withdrawal from Algeria of the 100,000 French troops except those 
stationed at Mers el Kebir and in the Sahara, earlier than scheduled. 
Since then, no nuclear testing occurred in Algeria thus alleviating a 
heavy burden on Algeria's efforts to express a non-aligned foreign 
policy.^ 12
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1For instance, increasing shares of the state in SN Repal 
from 40.5 to 56 per cent and taking 20 per cent in the 
Algiers refinery, 40 in Caral Renault, 30 in the 
S aba b-Be r 1 i e t and 25 per cent in the 'Union industrielle 
Afr i cai ne ' •
2 Ben Bella also refrained from criticizing De Gaulle's 
initiative of sending in February 1964 paratroopers to 
Gabon to help reinstate Leon M'Ba who had been toppled from 
power by a military junta.
JSee Ottaway, D and M: Algeria: the politics of a socialist 
revoluti o n , p.147 footnote 7.
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To conceal the country's economic dependence on france, the Algerian 
leaders emphasized the reciprocity of interests in their cooperation with 
the latter and the independent line they pursued on the foreign level. 
Signing the 1965 oil agreement, Bouteflika presented it as a great 
achievement between the two sides as it introduced "an original 
conception of relations between Algeria and France on the basis of 
equality and reciprocity of interests and respect of each other’s 
sovereignty, thus breaking away from the neo-colonial spirit of the Evian 
agreements".^
The meeting between Ben Bella and De Gaulle in March 1964 - although 
unofficial and brief - attested the particular character of the 
Algerian-French relationship. The success of these talks concerning 
economic issues and accelerated timetable of the withdrawal of some of 
the French troops from Algeria was helpful to the image of France and 
Algeria in the third world. This apparent Algerian-French understanding 
was spurred by De Gaulle's desire to make Algeria the keystone of his 
relations with the third world and as a means to reinforce his country's 
position in the East-West struggles. The statement made before the 
French Assembly by Jean De Broglie the secretary of state for Algerian 
affairs highlights this Gaullist conception of forging from the 
French-Algerian relations a new leadership role for France in the third 
world, so as to re-establish French influence in the international fora. 
"Algeria - he declared - has taken the lead in the assembly of poor 
nations pitted against the rich nations... Certainly while maintaining its 
cooperation with Algeria, France defends certain interests and strives to 
counterbalance the tendency of this country to slide toward Communism.
^Quoted in La politique petroliere de 1 'Algeria, edited by
Sonatrach (Algiers, July 1972, volume I 1965-1967), p.13.
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But Algeria is also, and above all, the narrow door through which we 
penetrate the third world. A quarrel between France and a North-African
state is only bilateral. A falling out with Algeria would jeopardise
France's efforts throughout the third world...It is Algeria that opened 
up for us the road to the Middle East and whose support is useful to us 
in Latin-America."^
The French president's non-interference in Algeria's domestic 
affairs, his willingness to deal with this country no matter what 
political regime she chose were apparently not questioned by the Algerian 
leaders. There is little doubt that De Gaulle did not give or express 
support to the Kabyle rebellion in 1963, and the expulsion of the 
dissident Khider, a former Secretary-General of the FLN from France in 
November 1964 was a further evidence of French neutrality vis-a-vis 
Algerian internal affairs. Receiving the new Algerian Ambassador to Paris 
Reda Malek, shortly after the coup against Ben Bella, the French 
president assured him of "French Republic's greatest sympathy for the
oAlgerian Republic."
The Algerians seemed, however, convinced that the maintaining of 
this positive attitude towards their preferences had been possible mainly 
because of De Gaulle's own will. The opposition of the French Senate 
and other political parties and groupings to his initiatives concerning 
French-Algerian cooperation confirmed their beliefs that many segments of 
the French 'classe politique' especially those linked with the ex-Pieds 
Noirs lobby bore anti-Algerian feelings. Given these apprehensions, the 
Algerians felt it necessary to assert their political and economic
1 964
poli tique 1964 p. 326 and Le Monde November 7
independence with regard to their former métropole. Thus they set out a 
long-term strategy aimed at gradually taking over French economic 
interests in Algeria, particularly after De Gaulle's departure in 1969.
B . THE PRACTICE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY-DOMINANCE RELATIONSHIP 
1• Wine and emigration: the lingering aspects of colonial legacy
In their bargaining with the French, the Algerians felt the burden 
of some aspects of the colonial legacy on their choices and policies. 
Emigration and wine constituted among the most painful examples of this 
heritage on the material level while French cultural presence in Algeria 
had a sometimes traumatic and frustrating effect on the minds of many 
Algerians. These sequels reflected the typical dichotomy that existed 
in the colonial - post-colonial continuum. They were brought by the 
French settlers, contributed to their wealth, to the métropole's economic 
expansion, its cultural 'rayoneraent' and were responsible for many of 
Algeria's socio-economic ills and problems. 
a) The wine issue
In the Algerian analysis, wine constituted a crop alien to the 
Algerian population as wine consumption was contrary to Muslim precepts.1 
On independence, a large portion of the country's best land about 350,000 
hectares was covered with vineyards, constituting the main source of 
export earnings. From being the symbol of colonial settlement, wine 
became the bread and butter of the Algerian economy, while at the same 
time conjuring up memories of past domination. And it was in their
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Algeria's memorandum on raw materials, p.21
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economic bargaining with the French government that the Algerian leaders 
felt the pain of this aspect of colonial legacy, as they realized they 
had inherited a poisoned gift.
From September 1962 to July 1963, France bought 11 million 
hectolitres of Algerian wine and in an agreement signed on January 18, 
1964, it agreed to buy large quantities over a five year period but with 
an annual decrease of half a million hectolitres in order to reduce 
imports from the 1962 level of 15 million hectolitres to 7 in 1968, the 
year the contract was to end. But the deal was soon undermined with 
French annual imports falling below the ratios fixed, dropping for 
instance from 8.1 million hectolitres in 1966 to 3.1 the next year. In 
early 1967, Paris decided to cut off imports of Algerian wine as a result 
of its farmers' pressures; and although it was agreed in October 1969 to 
buy 5 million hectolitres, because that year vintage in France was 
particularly bad, it unilaterally cancelled further imports of Algerian 
wine a year later. The effect on Algeria was that the second most 
important source of foreign currency was cut off, as wine was worth FF 
485 million in 1966.
The closure of access to French markets for the Algerian wine forced 
the Algerian government to undertake a gradual uprooting of vineyards, 
which proved costly for the country's economy because it affected the 
incomes of thousands of people working in the wine industry and the land 
which, exhausted as it was, had to lie fallow for many years before it 
could be cultivated again. The substitution of vine by other crops has
not yet been fully completed as it proved extremely difficult to 
extirpate viticulture in Algeria without provoking substantial problems 
for the country's economic structure and balance. Uprooting had touched
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about 220,000 hectares of vineyards, representing about 30 per cent of 
the total vineyard surface.1 As the substitution of vine by other crops 
proved hypothetical because of geological, climatic and technical 
reasons, viticulture could not but be pursued despite a drop in profits 
resulting from a decline in exports, and although a large portion of the 
grape harvest had been transformed into juice and dried raisins, earnings 
remained slim because these two items were not widely consumed in 
Algeria. Against this background, the government resisted repeated 
pressures from the fundamentalist segments to stop completely the sale of 
alcohol in Algeria which is a lucrative business despite the relatively 
small number of its consumers.
In this intricate context, the Algerians claimed they had made 
painful sacrifices to diminish dependence on wine exports by drastically 
reducing production from 15 million hectolitres in 1962 to a mere 
2,838,000 in 1980 to match the fall in exports to France from 14,4 
million hectolitres to 2,266,000 respectively. The closure of the
French market for the Algerian wine resulted in a huge financial loss for 
the Algerian economy because it proved difficult to find new buyers to 
compensate for France's defection. The Soviet Union bought 5 million 
hectolitres in 1967, but for half the price France paid; West Germany 
yielded to Italian pressure and ceased to import Algerian wine. Ivory 
Coast has been only a small consumer.
As it appeared, the wine issue illustrated the dependency-dominance 
situation, Algeria had been facing since her independence. This
reliance on France was in fact twofold: when France continued importing 
Algerian wine, this implied a dependence on French markets, whereas when
1El-Moudjahid , January 20 , 1985 .
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France ceased buying this wine, Algeria experienced serious financial 
problems. In both cases, the wine involved substantial costs for
Algeria in the sense that the maintenance of the wine industry did not 
bring sizeable profits over the years because of the ageing of the 
working force and of the vineyards, the lack of expertise and the rapid 
decline in French imports of wine from Algeria. One policy to remedy 
the closure of French markets had been the substitution of vine by other 
crops but so far the alternatives as experienced proved too costly and 
sometimes ineffective, 
b) Emigration
In the official discourse, emigration like wine has been regarded as 
a direct consequence of French colonialism and to some extent detrimental 
to Algerian sovereignty and national pride. The presence of a huge
number of emigrants in France, it was claimed, did not result from the 
economic policy Algeria had embarked upon since the independence but from 
the economic backwardness of the country's community for which French 
colonialism was chiefly responsible. The drain of Algerian workers to 
France since the beginning of the twentieth century had been conceived as 
a consequence of France's need of manpower for economic reconstruction, 
especially in the aftermath of the two world wars. From about 4,000 in 
1912, the number of Algerian workers in France rose to 100,000 in 1948 
and in the early 1960s, it reached 425,000 people contributing to the 
"efforts of France's economic redeployment". The flux of Algerian 
migrants since independence increased the number of Algerians living in 
France to 870,000 making them the largest group of the foreign community
in the mid-1970s
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Emigration certainly constituted a double-edged issue for Algeria, 
while it helped her to overcome partially unemployment and gain benefits 
from remittance of her migrants, it increased her dependence on the 
French labour market and eventually proved a constraint on her economic 
bargaining power with her partner, as Algerian emigrants tended to become 
the easy scapegoats when relations between the two countries deterio­
rated. In this sense, emigration remains Algeria's safety valve, but
also her Achille's heel.
On independence, severe unemployment and urgent need of capital led 
to a continuing reliance on the export of the labour force surplus. 
Migrants' transfers made up as much as 80 per cent of total incomes in 
many villages of the Kabylia and Aures regions and constituted a huge 
source of foreign earnings for the Algerian state, amounting to $200 
million a year in the 1960s.
To preserve emigration as a safety valve, the Ben Bella government 
established in 1962 the 'office national Algerien de main-d'oeuvre' 
(ONAMO), to monitor the channeling of migrants to France. There was 
thus, a clear desire to make emigration, an "essential element of the 
cooperation with France” as stated in the declaration of Boumaza, the 
minister of labour.^
In an agreement negotiated in 1964 between the new minister of 
labour Nekkache and French authorities, contingents of Algerian workers 
were fixed at 12,000 a year, far below Algeria's expectations of 50,000.^ 
In December 1965, Paris pressed for the restriction of the number of 
Algerian workers permitted to enter France, in retaliation for Algeria's
^Quoted in Annuaire de l'Afrique du N o r d , Paris, CNES, 1962, 
p .527.
^This target was agreed upon at the F L N 's Seminar on 
Emigration, (Secretariat e x e c u t l f , Algiers, August 1966 ).
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demands for better economic agreements. A joint committee on this issue 
was set up, and after difficult negotiations, Algiers finally conceded by 
accepting an annual quota of 35,000 to be allowed to work in France.1 The 
Algerians regarded this measure as a clear evidence of the discriminatory 
attitude of the French authorities toward the Algerian labour force and a 
further demonstration of French blackmail, arguing that the French fifth 
development plan envisaged the creation of jobs for 160,000 new 
immigrants. The free circulation of people between the two countries
and the privileged status of the Algerian immigration in France as 
contained in the provision of the Evian agreements virtually ended when 
the French government decided in 1968 to grant visas for Algerian 
immigrants, valid for 10 years for those who had entered France before 
January 1, 1966 and five years for others. The 1971 nationalization of 
French oil interest in Algeria further complicated the issue of 
emigration as after a meeting of the joint committee in Paris on December 
13-23 that year, the French obtained the compression of the Algerian 
worker contingents to 25,000 annually over the next two years. Visibly 
disappointed, the Algerians embarked upon lengthy negotiations with the 
French in an attempt to reverse this decision, but in vain, despite 
efforts made by Bouteflika on his official visit to Paris on June 3, 
1973. To counter French inflexibility, Boumedienne announced the
suspension of Algerian emigration to France on August 9. At first
glance this decision appeared bold and quite hazardous, but it reflected 
more than anything else his pride and arrogance and desire to assert 
Algeria's sovereignty. The Algerian president did not seem unaware of
1Proces-verba1 signed between R. Haddad, Director, French
affairs department and Gilbert de Chambrun, Director,
administrative and consular affairs at the Quai d'Orsay.
^Politique p e t r o l i e r e , (4), p.32.
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the consequences of his decision when he stated that: "everything is 
negotiable except the dignity of Algerians", but what seemed more 
important in his eyes was to stress the determination of the Algerian 
government not to give in to French pressures whatever the costs. The 
increase of Algeria's economic capabilities boosted by the rise in oil 
revenues, facilitated this position in the conception of a continuing 
struggle against French neo-colonialism and the affirmation of the 
independence of the Algerian state. Furthermore, Boumedienne1s decision 
was bound to increase the legitimacy of the leadership, the credibility 
of the state and to enhance the image of Algeria in the non-aligned fora.
Despite the decision of the Algerian government to stop emigration, 
the number of Algerians living in France steadily increased to more than 
900,000 in 1983 as a result of clandestine emigration which proved 
difficult to control for both sides. The high unemployment rate
resulting from an economic policy based on highly capital-intensive 
industries eventually impelled the Algerian authorities to request Paris 
to resume the emigration process.1 The failure of the economy to
generate employment and absorb massive repatriation forced the Algerians 
to adopt a flexible attitude with regard to illegal emigration. The 
abolition of the exit visa for Algerian tourists under Chadli government 
in 1979, probably intended as a measure to respect civil liberties, 
provided many youngsters with a good opportunity to remain in France at 
the end of their three month stay allowed by the French administration. 
By 1980, as many as 120,000 Algerians were believed to have used this 
procedure•
1This request was presumably made by Bouteflika when he was 
received by President Pompidou in Paris in January 1974.
Although repatriation of emigrants has been a constant slogan in the 
declaration of Algerian officials and the themes of many conferences 
organized by the FLN, little has been done to proceed to their integra­
tion into the Algerian economy.1 Only 14,000 out of 60,000 Algerian 
skilled workers, the Algerian authorities announced in March 1975, had 
been reinserted over a period of three years.^ And although some
measures had been taken since 1977, such as duty free importation on a 
number of items or access to housing through saving accounts in hard 
currency, a relatively modest number of Algerian migrants returned home. 
And so far, the Algerian state, burdened by a booming demography, rising 
unemployment and housing shortages, has been unable to provide structures 
for a large-scale repatriation.
Conversely, economic recession and domestic pressures led the French 
government to envisage forcing gradual departure of Algerian immigrants 
and Stoleru, the state secretary for immigration was despatched to 
Algiers in October 1978 for negotiations, as the visas delivered to 
Algerian migrants in December 1968 were about to expire. Algeria's 
request to extend these visas for another 10 year period was rejected by 
the French government which in December proposed instead an extension of 
one year. At the end of 1979, the French foreign minister J-F Poncet, 
made a trip to Algiers to obtain a quota of 100,000 departures a year. 
The Chadli government firmly rejected these demands, stressing the
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'The National Council on emigration issued recommendations 
on reinsertion in 1969 and 1972, while a seminar on 
emigration took place in Summer 1973 and meetings organized 
by the labour ministry in 1973, all suggested repatriement 
(see Amicale des Algériens en Europe! Nouvelles 
perspectives pour L'émigration Algérienne, Eighth General 
Assembly of Cadres, Nancy 12-13 February, 1977).
^Harbi, M: les emmigre’s Maghrébins entre le Passe et le 
Present (in les temps M o d e r n e s , (452-4), 1984. pp. 1697-1707
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principle of the free will of the Algerian migrants to return home,- but 
under pressure, it agreed to a ratio of 30,000 departures annually. In 
return, they obtained a one year extension for the visas that expired 
between January 1 and September 1980. However, the improvement of 
Algerian-French relations in the late 1970s resulted in a global 
agreement signed in Paris in September 1980 between the Algerian foreign 
minister Benyahia, and Poncet, which apparently pleased the Algerians. 
Not only did they obtain the extension of the visas for Algerian emigres, 
but also the suppression of the departure quotas. Under the terms of this 
agreement, Paris agreed to renew the visas of 400,000 Algerian workers 
settled in France before July 1, 1962 for a 10 year period according to
the 1968 accord on emigration, while the visas of roughly 270,000 others 
which expired between October 1, 1980 and October 31, 1983 were to be
extended for three years and three months. The French also agreed to 
facilitate the reintegration of some Algerian immigrants into the 
Algerian economy through financial inducements and technical training. 
In opting for an intermediate and provisional solution, Giscard's 
government attempted to use the renewal of these visas as leverage on 
Algiers in the perspective of future negotiations concerning gas imports 
and the release from Algeria of the assets belonging to French entei—  
prises and industrialists.
Although the 1981 change of government in France improved the 
relations between Algiers and Paris in general, emigration still 
constituted an issue of contention between them. Indeed, despite the 
Mitterrand government's decision to regularize the situation of hundreds 
of thousands of Algerian squatters who had entered France before January 
1981 and its favourable attitude to the Algerian immigrant community.
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suspicion and tension mounted between Algiers and Paris, 1 following the 
announcement in Summer 1982 by the French to impose entrance visas on 
Algerian tourists (as well as on Moroccans and Tunisians). Many
Algerians were victims of racial discrimination by French customs 
officers, and as many as 16,000 were refused entry without reason and in 
a sometimes humiliating fashion. For the Algerians, this decision to 
impose visas was not taken to fight terrorism, as the French claimed, but 
resulted from "a psychosis created by the French authorities which 
stemmed from economic recession and high unemployment in France."^ 
Despite strong reservations, the Algerian authorities agreed to work 
together with the French customs to regulate visits by Algerians to 
France in order to curb illegal immigration.^ Their good will was a 
response to assurances by the French premier Mauroy that no measure 
against Algerian immigrants would be taken without consulting the 
Algerian government. Since then, a pause on the emigration issue was 
observed by Paris, which seems to have pleased the Algerians.^
Being used as a commodity, the Algerian emigrants have also been the 
scapegoats, when relations between the two countries deteriorated. They 
constituted an easy target for racist violence in France, when a crusade 
against Algeria and her immigrants was carried out by the French right
For this favourable attitude see the interview of Autin, 
the French Secretary of State for the migrants in 
Afrique-Asie , December 7, 1981 pp. 25-27 .
^Declaration of M'Hamed Yazid, Director of the Arab league 
bureau in Paris, quoted in Algerie-Actualite', December 
16-22, 1982 pp.2-3.
^Two officials from the French Foreign Ministry and home 
office met in Algiers on December 22 with Khediri, the head 
of the Algerian police security.
’ in his reply to the speech given by Mitterand during his 
visit to Paris in November 1983, Chadli paid a warm tribute 
to French policy toward the Algerian migrants. For speech 
see La semaine de I'emigration , November 1 7 , 1983 and
El-Moud j a hid , November 11, 1983 .
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wing press and ex-Pied-Noir organizations on the aftermath of the 
Algerian-French conflict over the oil issue in the early 1970s. 
Algerians were stereotyped as inferior, uncivilized and responsible for 
many of France's ills, but the diatribe was more virulent. For
instance, le Meridional, a newspaper edited in Southern France wrote: "we 
have had enough of Algerian thieves, Algerian thugs, Algerian broggarts, 
Algerian trouble-makers, Algerian syphilisties, Algerian rapists, 
Algerian pimps, Algerian lunatics, Algerian killers."^
Racism was accompanied by the assassination of several Algerian 
workers in France and these killings have continued although at a 
sporadic and slower rate than during the two years following the 1971 oil 
nationalization•
Although emigration served as a safety valve for Algerian labour 
problems, relations between the Algerian authorities and Algerian 
migrants in France were strained as a result of the complex role of 
Banker this community was supposed to play. The Algerian state's
attempts in Summer 1982 to extract more foreign revenues from the latter 
as a result of diminished remittances due to the existence of a 
flourishing black market, were met by the Algerian emigres with 
reticence, anger and discontent. Opponents of the Chadli regime took the 
opportunity to rally dissident emigres, and in Summer 1983, violence 
broke out between the militants of the official 'Amicale des Algeriens en 
Europe' and members of the opposition at a meeting held in Lyons and
Quoted in M. Bennoune: the Maghribi workers in France (in 
Race and C l a s s , (17) 1975 pp.41-56) pp.54-5.
“ i n a d d i t i o n t o  Algerian citizens, 150 Frenchmen belonging 
to Renault company and working in Algeria stood trial in 
Algiers in June 1980, being accused of illicit currency 
dealings and 8 French technicians have been imprisoned 
since the end of 1979 on similar charges ( 1 e Monde , June
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attended by Ben Bella who publicly expressed his hostility to the 
Algerian regime. Renewed contacts between officials from the Algerian 
government and the Algerian 'Amicale' helped ease the tension within the 
Algerian community in France.' But whatever the efforts of the Algerian 
government, the Algerian emigrant circles in France will remain a source 
of trouble because of the precarious living conditions of many of its 
working members and because of their peculiar status in the host country.
Algerian problems with regard to the emigration issue have been 
seriously aggravated by the case of the Harkis, and children born in 
France of Algerian parents. The Harkis are Algerian Moslems who fought 
aside the French during the Algerian war and on the eve of independence, 
about 200,000 were believed to have fled their fatherland in fear of 
reprisals and have since been living in Southern France in poor 
conditions. The Algerian authorities refuse them entry to Algeria
except on a case-case basis, invoking the difficulty of guaranteeing 
their security as these Harkis may face acts of revenge in their native 
city, village or tribe. However, it seems that the real reason was not 
mere rancour but the fact that these Harkis collaborated with the 
colonial enemy. These conceptions seemed present in the thought of 
President Chadli when, asked by a French journalist on the issue of the 
Harkis, declared "they had chosen their side. It was the verdict of 
history. Anyway, you, as a Frenchman, how would you regard those who 
collaborated with the (Nazi German) occupants?1'^
'in that summer, the visit to France of Khediri, the Head of 
the police forces was followed by that of Messadia, the 
•responsible' for the Permanent Secretariat of the FLN's
central committee.
2 Interview to Charles Saint-Prost of Paris-Match, quoted in 
Revolution Africaine, December 4-10, 1981.
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The refusal to let the Harkis and their children enter Algeria had 
given rise to many protests from the Harkis organi zations and their 
French sponsors in France. The most notable incident occurred in Summer 
1975 when 4 Algerian workers were held hostages by Harkis at Saint
Maurice L'Ardoise and an official of the Amicale kidnapped near 
Villeneuve-sur Lot by a group of Harkis in retaliation for the refusal of 
the Algerian authorities to let a French-born son of a Harki return to 
France after a short holiday in Algeria.1 The firmness of the Algerian 
government and the French jurisdiction had discouraged many of the 
shrewdest Harkis going back to their fatherland even for a short stay.
However, it was only after a series of protests in France that the
Algerians agreed to lift the ban on the entry of their children to 
Algeria.
More complex and more arduous to solve has been the problem of these 
children or others of Algerian parents born in France before January 1,
1963. They form what is commonly known as 'the second generation' of 
Algerian emigres in France and represent more a human dimension than a 
mere issue of contention between Algerian and French jurisdiction. They 
not only suffer from the ambiguity of their legal status, but also from 
their acculturation, being as they are, torn between their Algerian-
Muslim inheritance and their French culture and citizenship. A young 
Algerian living in France emphasized this analogy as he stated: "My 
brother born in France after January 1, 1963 is French we are told; my
1 The child Borzani Kadaoui was finally released by the 
Algerian authorities on August 8.
^Particularly by the 'Association of the Repatriated and 
spoliated Frenchmen of overseas' (Recours), as two of its 
leaders Jacques Roseau and Guy Forzy met with the Algerian 
Ambassador to Paris Mohamed Sahnoun on April 1980 (Le
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other brothers, my sisters and myself born in France before December 31, 
1962 we are told: we are Algerians! How to understand and accept that 
in a same family some children are Algerians and others French? What is 
more striking is that all my brothers and I have been called up by the 
Algerian consulate to undertake our military service in Algeria."' A 
period of time as short as a few minutes seemed to be the crux of the 
problems as the children born in France from Algerian parents have been 
considered as French until their majority by the French legislation on 
the basis of their birthplace while the Algerian authorities regarded 
them as Algerians by virtue of their Algerian descent. More than
300,000 youngsters were born in France after this date and have been more 
or less victims of this intricate situation. The option for either
nationality has, in many ways, proved hard and frustrating: to remain 
French citizens would not alleviate some discriminatory attitudes against 
them in France because of their complexion and patronymic names. An 
option for Algerian citizenship, on the other hand, meant a more or less 
early return to Algeria and their integration there was difficult because 
of their acculturation, as many had never been to Algeria and could 
hardly speak either Kabyle or Arabic. Staying in France has not been 
easier either as 5,000 had been expelled from France in 1980 because of
'Quoted in El-Moud j a h i d , November 29, 198 1 .
*The problem of language has been only partially solved by 
the efforts of the Algerian government to send teachers to 
France to help Algerian school attendants improve their 
Arabic. 374 teachers were believed to have contributed in 
these efforts and as many as 35,000 of these pupils and
20,000 other Algerians in France were assumed to have 
received a partial education in Arabic language. See:
Aggoun, Y: enseignement de la langue Arabe en France: 
Preserver l'identlte culturelle et preparer le retour 
(El-Moud j ah i d , December 17 , 1984 , p.13) and A b b a d , A:
enseignement de la langue Arabe en France: réponse a 
Al-Chaab (in La Semaine de 1 'emigration (122), 15 May
1985, p p . 13- 1 4 . )
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failing to find a job or having committed unlawful acts.^ However, most 
of the Algerian emigres of the second generation had to make this painful 
choice of opting for either nationality when they were called up for 
military service by the French authorities as well as the Algerians. 
Only in October 1983, was this problem solved when, during the visit of 
Pierre Mauroy to Algiers, it was decided that the military service done 
in either country will be recognized by the other.
Like wine, emigration had been a crucial aspect of Algeria's 
dependence on France but in contrast, it had been a continuous phenome­
non, as Algeria still relies heavily on the French market for its labour 
surplus through the maintenance of a huge community of workers in France 
and through clandestine emigration which became important in the early 
1980s and whatever the evolution of the Algerian-French relationship may 
be, emigration will remain as one of the bases of this entente and at the 
same time as one of the sources of disputes between the two countries.
2. French cooperation: a curious aid^
The model of cooperation France established with Algeria soon came 
under heavy criticisms from the Algerian government with a stress on what 
her leaders regarded as French neo-colonial practice violating the spirit 
of a mutually beneficial economic cooperation, increasing rather 
Algeria’s economic dependence on her former metropole. This dependence 
was ranging from financial and trade dependence to the lingering aspects 1
1A young Algerian protesting against these measures 
underwent a hunger strike in Lyons in April 1981, joined by 
two French clergymen.
^Title from la politique petroliere, (4), p.22.
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of the colonial predicament characterized by wine and emigration issues.1 
As far as French public aid was concerned, the Algerians were disap­
pointed at its reduction in volume from one year to another falling from 
FF 667 million in 1965 to 400 in 1970. Since 1971, Algeria obtained 
credits only from French private organisms and banks and many of these 
loans had to be reimbursed in short term and at a high interest rates.
Another example of malpractice put forward was that out of DA 4,8 
billion of aid France committed to pay Algeria over 3 years as part of 
reparation for the war damages, the Algerian treasury received only 0,4 
billion Algerian Dinars.^
In addition to this slump in financial aid French cultural and 
technical cooperation was declining. In contrast to the Evian
agreements and the 1966 convention, the number of French conscripts and 
their qualifications, it was argued, was far below the level expected. 
The relatively limited number of teachers and technical cadres provided 
by France proved to some extent detrimental to the Algerian educational 
programme as the country faced the gigantic task of reducing the 
percentage of illiteracy estimated at 90 per cent on independence. At 
that time, only 18,000 out of 50,000 French teachers remained in Algiers 
and after the 1966 agreement, Algeria received only 5,000 additional
cadres most of which were teachers supplied in the frame of la
/co-operation technique. This number was thought to be extremely minimal
1As extensively underlined by the Algerian media and 
official documents published by the state oil company 
Sonatrach in July 1972: 'La politique petrollere de
1 1 Al gerie ' 4 volumes; the Memorandum on Petroleum, raw
materials and D e v e l o p m e n t , submitted by Algeria on the 
occasion of the special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, April 1974 and the economic bulletin 
issued by the Algerian Ministry of Commerce N.34 1981.
 ^L a politique pe'troliere, (2), p.12.
since it represented only 10 per cent of the total Algerian teachers of 
French and insufficient with regard to the 1,835,000 school attendants 
receiving their teaching in French in Algeria in 1969. 1 Since 1971, the 
French technical and cultural contribution has met only a third of 
Algerian needs in technical and cultural staff annually averaging 4,000 
teachers at schools, universities and technical institutes. The
reduction of the number of French teachers was due to France's substitu­
tion of the policy of simply filling up the teaching posts available at 
schools and institutes by la cooperation de formation which aimed at 
helping Algeria to train her own educators, teachers and technicians. 
This procedure did not fully satisfy the Algerians on the basis that 
although this policy of formation would help them Algerianize the staff 
in the long term, the immediate problem was the great need of teachers in 
French. Until the present, the number of French teachers working in 
Algeria has fluctuated around the average of 3,500. For a country where 
French language - a vivid aspect of the colonial legacy - is still widely 
used despite the process of Arabization, French cultural assistance 
remained with regard to the criteria of both volume and quality far below 
Algeria's urgent needs. Yet again, France's geographical redeployment 
had been regarded as having negative effects on this particular aspect of 
the Algerian-French cooperation.
Besides the reduction of the number of French coopérants and 
conscripts, another complaint concerned French financial contribution in 
the Algerian cultural programme. This contribution was seen as extremely 
insignificant as it amounted to only 13 billion of old Francs, a sum 
believed to be derisory in comparison with the 250 billion the Algerian 1
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1 La politique P é t r o l i è r e , (4) p.15 and p.43.
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government allocated for education in 1970-1971 and to the fact that 40 
per cent of this contribution was earmarked for covering 30 per cent of 
the salaries received by the French coopérants in Algeria, the rest being 
paid by the Algerian state. The burden on the latter appears quite
heavy as these coopérants were allowed to transfer freely to France up to 
70 per cent of their earnings.1
Another aspect of disequilibrium in the relationship between the two 
countries had been Algeria's trade dependence on her former colony. In 
Algerian official economic analysis, this form of dependence could be 
seen on two levels: 1) the prominent place of France in Algeria's global 
foreign trade and 2) the deficit in Algeria's trade balance in her 
exchanges with her partner. Until 1968, France's share in Algerian
foreign trade oscillated between 80 per cent and 60 per cent, although 
steadily declining from one year to another. Despite that it abruptly 
declined during the 1970-1971 oil crisis and reaching 17.4 per cent in 
1979 as a result of the diversification of trade relations pursued by the 
two countries, France's position in Algerian foreign trade remained 
important both in volume and value. To shed light on this prominence, 
the Algerians stressed that the volume of exchanges between the two sides 
reached in 1963, 5713 millions of DA had not been surpassed only until 
1974 when it amounted to DA 7917 millions.2 See Tables 11:1 and III: 2
The dependence of the country's budget on wine and hydrocarbons 
export earnings constituted in the eyes of Algerians a sequel of the 
economic policy carried out by the French in Algeria during colonial 
times. If wine constituted her main export to France from 1962 to 1965, 
oil and gas made up 53,3 per cent of her total exports to France for the
1La politique p é t r o l i è r e , (4), p.43.
b u l l e t i n  é’c o n o m l q u e , p.6.
period 1966-1971 and reaching an annual average of 92 per cent for the 
decade 1974-1983. Another aspect of Algeria's trade dependence on
France had been her heavy reliance on French outlets and technology. 
From 1962 to 1966, the French companies had been responsible for the 
realization of half of all industrial projects undertaken in Algeria and 
until the late 1970s they contributed in the implementation of a quarter 
of the latter's total industrial ventures.1 Until 1975, France had been 
Algeria's first industrial partner and it had been her first client until
1979. In 1977, Algeria represented 17 per cent of France's total
exchanges with the third world and accounted for the two thirds of the 
contracts France realized in the whole Maghreb2 and in the period 
1975-1977, Algeria was France's second most important client with 7,1 per 
cent of total French foreign trade exchanges. In many industrial
sectors, Algeria ranked high in France's total exports buying for 
instance 50 per cent of French mechanical products, 9,8 per cent of 
steel-made goods and 14 per cent of chemical items. And for 1975-1977 
period, she was France's second best client for industrial mechanical 
exports with 7,1 per cent and her fifth in 1980 with 5,04.3
Since 197 1, Algeria has experienced a grave deficit in her trade 
with France. While her imports from the latter increased in volume, her 
exports represented a relatively insignificant share in percentage in 
France's total imports. In 1969 for instance, Algeria's exports to her 
former metropole which constituted 54 per cent of her total exports, 
represented not more than 3 per cent of France's total imports for the 
same year. See Table 111:3.
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Bulletin e c o n o m i q u e , p.23.
Nouveau Journal, (Paris), September 26, 1981.
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The Algerians contended that this disequilibrium -resulting from the 
deliberate reduction of imports from Algeria (decided by the French 
government in accordance with its diversification policy and geographical 
redeployment it launched in the late 1960s) - constituted a great
prejudice against Algeria's trade balance. As a result France's imports 
from Algeria fell from DA 2918 million in 1963 to 991 in that crucial 
year of 1971 and although France's imports from Algeria steadily 
increased since 1971 to reach 4,810 million Dinars in 1979, this rise was 
due mainly to the increase of oil price. On the other hand, France's 
exports to the North-African country though gradually decreasing in value 
from 1963 (DA 2795 million) to 1973 (2844), followed an ascendancy line 
since then, reaching 6015 in 1979. Algeria's trade deficit with her 
former metropole was estimated at DA 4,3 billion for the 1968-1979 
period, representing from 1973 to 1979 72,2 per cent of the global 
deficit of Algeria's total foreign trade balance for the same period with 
maximum levels of 83 per cent in 1973 and 80 in 1977. For that year, it 
reached a record level in volume estimated at F 4,9 billion.1 Imbalance 
in trade between the two countries was well assessed by Yaker the 
Algerian ministry of commerce as he stressed that "from January to 
November 1975, Algerian imports from France rose to 7.4 billion Francs. 
The value of our exports in the other direction was 2.8 billion. So the 
deficit has risen to 4.6 billion. This is an unacceptable situation. 
Our deficit with France is exactly the equal to the total deficit in our 
commercial balance. By contrast, it adds up to more than 80 per cent of 
the total surplus registered by France in 1975."1 2
1E u r o p e - o u t r e m e r , August 1981, p.43.
2Quoted in Africa Contemporary R e c o r d , 1975-1976, p.310.
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Against this background, trade deficit became a serious issue of 
contention between the two countries, particularly in the mid-1970s, 
where their relations were heavily strained following France's attitude 
over the Western Sahara. Under repeated Algerian criticism, Ornano the 
French trade minister made a visit to Algiers on June 25, 1975 but no
solution to Algeria's increasing trade deficit was formulated. As 
reprisals, Algeria held up negotiations with the French authorities over 
a $42 billion commercial deal and the exchange of 5,500 Renault trucks 
for 3,3 million barrels of Algerian oil.1 And in January 1977,
President Boumedienne urged all the Algerian Ministries and companies to 
stop as far as they could ordering imports from France. Consequently, 
many contracts ware suddenly frozen and inevitably imports from France 
fell from F 8,8 billion in 1977 to 6,9 the next year, representing a 21 
per cent drop. However, since the bolstering of Alger ian-French
relations with the election of President Mitterrand in 1981, Algeria's 
trade balance with France rapidly improved and it was France which 
suffered a deficit that amounted to F 3,8 billion in the first half of 
1982 because of the decline of its exports to Algeria and the rise in 
value of its imports from this country due to the high price Paris agreed 
to pay for the Algerian gas following the huge contract it signed with 
the Algerian oil company in 1982,3 as we shall see later.
^Africa R e p o r t , July-August 1975.
^ 1e M o n d e , January 25, 1979.
3For figures see le Monde , September 5-6 , 1982 .
209
C. THE ROUTE TO ECONOMIC AUTONOMY
1• The nationalization of French residents' properties
When the French hostility fled Algeria, they left behind a 
substantial number of properties estimated at 200,000, ranging from farms 
and estates to small enterprises, factories, shops and flats. Declared 
biens vacants (vacant properties) and put under the protection of the 
Algerian state by a decree issued by the provisional executive on 
September 9, 1962, many of these properties were taken over by Algerian
individuals. However, the Algerian state reserved for itself rights on 
the most important and valuable portion of these 'biens vacants' . 
Officially the take-over was justified by the failure of the colons to 
return to Algeria and resume their rights to ownership, but the real 
reason was that many of these properties were occupied by natives who 
considered their gain as a reward for their deprivation and fight against 
colonial rule. Thus many farms abandoned by the colons came under the 
control of former guerilla fighters and hunger-stricken landless 
peasants. In this popular euphoria, the Ben Bella government could not 
but endorse this take-over of French properties in an apparent attempt to 
rally popular support by deciding in March 1963 to institutionalize and 
give legal sanctions to the workers' self-management committees set up on 
the land deserted by the French settlers. In this process, about
1,200,000 hectares of land declared vacant were transferred to self- 
managed sector.
The Algerian state extended its control over French private capital, 
and by the late 1960s most of the French private companies operating in 
the non-oil sector had been nationalized, notably in the mining industry 
(May 1966) and the water works in early 1978. This take-over was not
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accompanied by indemnification, and the Algerians justified this 
procedure by referring to the exclusive right of the state to nationalize 
and the repayment for the war damages* In many cases, assets belonging to 
French individuals or firms had been since then frozen in Algerian banks, 
and many of the French residents were not allowed to repatriate their 
earnings. Furthermore, a decree issued on July 13, 1964 required all
foreigners when leaving Algeria to prove that they had honoured their 
tax-obligations.
On the basis of compensation for war damages, the Algerian 
authorities were adamant in their determination not to grant indemnifi­
cation, and as early as December 1962, they opposed the meeting of an 
Algerian-French commission set up to discuss compensation for the first 
properties taken over shortly after the French settlers had fled the 
country, and later they resisted requests from Paris to indemnify the 
owners of the 5,000 farms taken over in October 1963. Under repeated 
pressure from the Pied-Noir Lobby in France, the French government 
finally demanded that Algiers respect the clauses of the Evian agreements 
which stipulated fair compensation for nationalized properties. It even 
threatened to reduce financial assistance if expropriation of French 
properties was not accompanied by indemnification, and as retaliation for 
Algeria's nationalization of 17 French companies in June 1968, it 
considerably reduced wine imports. The Pied-Noir lobby and groups
nostalgic of French Algeria contributed to the deterioration of the 
relations between Paris and Algiers which occasionally occurred.
In spite of laws and promises to grant indemnities estimated at 50 
billion Francs ($10 million) the French leaders, especially De Gaulle 
were quite reluctant to cede to Pied-Noir pressures because they wanted
to avoid a controversy with Algiers over the indemnification issue, in 
order not to jeopardise the privileged relations France had been enjoying 
with its former colony. As a result of the French government's inertia 
and Algeria's refusal to pay compensation, underground organizations 
formed by former OAS terrorists or others sympathetic to the Pied-Noir 
cause, carried out a number of violent actions against Algerian targets, 
especially in the aftermath of the 1971 Algerian-French conflict over 
oil. From August to September 1972, four Algerian immigrant workers
were assassinated and twelve were wounded; in the following year, fifty 
others were believed to have been victims of these reprisals. 
Responsibility for bombings of the Algerian consulate in Marseilles was 
claimed by an organization called Charles Martell, and bombs were placed 
at the offices of El-Moudjahid in Algiers in January 1975 and the 
Algerian tourism bureau in Paris in February 1976. An underground armed 
group, les 'soldats de l'opposition Algérienne' claimed responsibility 
for these blasts. Algiers accused Colonel Foucault, a senior officer 
belonging to the French secret service SDCE of complicity with the 
bombers of the El-Moudjahid offices whom they duly arrested on January 3, 
1976.
If the Algerians were firm in rejecting demands from Paris to grant 
indemnities for the nationalized French properties, they nonetheless 
showed their willingness to permit French residents in Algeria to 
transfer their assets to France, when the French government manifested 
its will to boost the French-Algerian relations. The decision taken in 
November 1974 to allow resident foreigners to repatriate their earnings 
reflected Algeria's positive response to the Pompidou government which 
despite the oil conflict in 1971 was determined to preserve good
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relations between the two countries. But the process of repatriation 
was called off in retaliation for Giscard's hostility to the Algerian 
regime. The renewal of Algerian-French under standing after the election 
of President Mitterrand explained the decision of Algiers (inter­
ministerial decision of October 26, 1983) to permit French enterprises
and industrialists to transfer this money estimated at F 70 million from 
Algerian banks to French accounts. They were also allowed to sell out 
freely their properties, a matter which had been denied to them since 
1962.1 Four days after receiving Guy Frozier, the President of the
Association of the former French residents in Algeria (Recours), the 
Algerian government gave assurances to the French Premier Mauroy when he 
visited Algiers in October 1983, that the ministry of finance would 
proceed with the transfer without delay.
2• The control over energy resources
The desire for a revision of the clauses of the Evian agreements 
that governed the exploitation of oil in Algeria was expressed by the 
Algerian leaders on many occasions, and if nationalization of French oil 
interests remained a long-term objective, active participation in the 
exploitation of their own resources was envisaged for the short-term 
objective. In her early post-independent stage, Algeria could not
afford an aggressive policy leading to the eradication of French economic 
privileges in the country. The lack of economic capabilities and
domestic problems that characterized Ben Bella's period not only 
prevented such a move but also aggravated Algeria's dependence on French 
financial aid, technology and markets. To ameliorate a detrimental
1 An inter-Ministerial decision 13-12 of 1982 had restricted
French residents to sell their properties only to the
Algerian state.
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situation resulting from the predominant French interests in the oil 
sector throughout exploration, production and marketing, the Algerians 
made no secret of their attempt to increase the state's control over 
their oil resources. The short-term objective, however, was to
transform the oil state company Sonatrach from a mere tax-collector into 
an active operator in the hydrocarbon sector in order to promote 
effectively national economic development.
The opportunity to implement these goals came in 1964, when the 
Algerian government's decision to participate in the construction of the 
country's third pipeline scheduled in the economic clauses of the Evian 
agreements was rejected by the French oil companies. The determination 
of these companies to build and operate this 500 mile gas-pipeline 
linking Haoud al Hamra to Arzew, on their own, ran counter to the 
Algerian government's demand of a 50 per cent share in its ownership. 
With the French refusal to offer more than 10, eventually 2 0 per cent, 
the Algerians decided unilaterally to build the pipeline without the 
participation of the French companies. With loans from British banks 
($50.4 million) and the Kuwaiti development fund (19.6), the construction 
of the 22 million tonnes -annual capacity - conducted by a British 
company, the CJB group, was completed on March 19, 1966. The Algerian
government gave its inauguration a historical dimension during an 
ostentatious ceremony which was attended by Boumedienne, a number of high 
officials from the government, the army and the party as well as 
representatives from friendly countries. In his speech, the Algerian 
President stressed the ability of the state to fulfil its duties in the 
framework of its sovereignty, declaring that: "practically inexistent in 
the process of petroleum industry yesterday, but present today and even
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prominent, the state has regained the place it deserves and thanks to 
that, it can better than ever play the role it was assigned in the domain 
of transportation. Our conviction is that the state is better placed to 
organize this service... for the best interests of the national economy 
and the supreme interest of the nation."' For the Algerians, the
control over the tr ansportation of gas was a decisive step towards 
dominating oil and gas process, as it gave them authority in the sphere 
of transportation, a key sector in the processes of hydrocarbon industry, 
and increased their bargaining position vis-a-vis the French oil 
companies.
After harsh negotiations, they succeeded in obtaining an economic 
agreement regarded as favourable to the state's interests. Signed on 
July 21, 1965, this contract, known as the 'oil agreement' and valid for 
fifteen years, provided the Algerian state with a better fiscal arrange­
ment, including an increase in the posted price of oil believed to be 
higher than the world market price; a greater control over oil exploita­
tion; and more financial flows from French public sources to help 
implement the country's economic projects. The agreement set up a 
joint-Algerian-French company, Ascoop, in which Sonatrach and ERAP were 
to be equal partners in the exploration and the exploitation of oil and 
gas fields. The French companies committed themselves to pay for 80 per 
cent of these efforts, and Sonatrach obtained the right to share equal 
profits derived from new discoveries. The agreements obliged these
companies to reinvest in Algeria half of their profits extracted from the 
exploitation of Algerian oil. Besides the oil deal, France agreed to 
buy 3,5 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Algeria. Also important
'speech at Haoud al Hamra in El-Moud j ahid March 21, 1966
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was France's commitment to help promote Algeria's industrialization 
through an aid programme: FF 2 billion grant to be paid over 5 years, 
with half of this sum consisting of medium-term loans and the rest 
representing soft loans provided by the French treasury, four fifths of 
which were to be repaid over a twenty year period at an interest rate of 
3 per cent. Moreover, Algeria received FF 200 million in donations,
and in December 1966, she obtained the cancellation of her pre-independ­
ence debts that amounted to $1.2 billion. The Algerians were satisfied 
that the July set of agreements permitted them to gain a partial control 
over the petroleum industry and over oil revenues, although realizing 
that it neither put an end to French oil interests in their country nor 
did it eradicate their reliance on the oil concession system.2 Not only 
did Gaullist France secure its oil and gas supplies through the 
maintenance of oil concessions and a preferential posted price (paid in 
Francs and at advantageous freight costs) , it also ensured its prominent 
position in the Algerian economy and the pursuit of an independent energy 
policy vis-a-vis other world powers.
Since the 1965 agreement, conflicts between Sonatrach and the French 
oil companies occurred on several occasions as in the process of 
extending control over the oil industry, the Algerian state resented what 
it regarded as neo-colonial behaviour and patronizing attitude practiced 
by these companies and which it could not bear without feeling its 
economic sovereignty being threatened. When Sonatrach decided to set up
Bulletin e c o n o m i q u e , p .2 0.
In a speech on the occasion of the signature of the oil 
agreement. Bouteflika pointed out that: "a genuine
development policy cannot be possible as long as efforts 
remain limited to the exploration and extraction of the 
country's resources in the sole perspective of exporting 
them in their raw state." In politique p é t r o l i è r e , (1),
p . 1 1 .
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an ammonia and fertilizers plant, for instance, the French national 
office of industries and Azote (ONIA) and SN Repal proposed to build it, 
but on conditions which the Algerians considered unacceptable, particu­
larly the engagement not to commission foreign companies for the 
construction of other fertilizer plants without the prior consent of the 
French authorities* Another restriction was that ONIA refused to build 
a plant with a production capacity exceeding 400 tonnes a day. For the 
Algerians, this restriction reflected the French determination to limit 
the production to Algeria's domestic needs in order to keep her out of a 
possible competition in the international market. To assert its
sovereignty with regard to economic decisions, the Algerian state company 
issued a notice to tender in September 1965, and after long negotiations, 
the French technipensa was given the contract in July 1965 to build a 
fertilizer plant at Arzew with a capacity of 1,000 tonnes daily of liquid 
ammonia, on terms the Algerians regarded as advantageous, notably 
technical training for Algerian youngsters.
Despite its negative experience with ONIA, Sonatrach accepted in 
April 1966 an offer from the French state-owned company 'Petrole 
d 'Acquitaine' (SNPA) to build at Arzew a gas refinery with a production 
capacity of 6 billion cubic metres a year, one ammonia plant (1 million 
tonnes a year) and polyethylene (15,000 tonnes annually). But after 
feasibility studies that were jointly conducted, SNPA unilaterally 
withdrew from the realisation of these projects because of the 
Algerians's intention to acquire the majority of shares in the capital of 
the joint company and in the marketing of the finished products.^
(4) , p. 254 .
2 TbiH. p 256— 7
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Moreover, conflict arising from the determination of Sonatrach to 
extend its control over the petroleum industry on the one hand and the 
reluctance of the French oil companies to relinquish the advantages they 
had previously acquired on the other, became sharp within the Algerian- 
French company Ascoop set up following the July 1965 oil agreement. The 
major complaint the Algerians made concerned the relatively low amount of 
money the French partner invested in the oil prospection in Algeria, a 
practice they regarded as contrary to this agreement. From 1965 to 1968, 
they claimed, the French oil companies invested only 20 billions of old 
Francs, while collecting 380 billion in benefits from the exploitation of 
Algerian oil resources.^ According to Ghozali the director of Sonatrach, 
cooperation "does not consist only of maximising profits and reducing the 
amount of investment to the minimum required by the agreement. It must 
take into consideration the prior interest of the partner, that is, the 
rapid development of its oil domain."^ This reaction apparently came 
after efforts by the French government to reduce dependency on Algerian 
oil through diversification of its oil supplies and its investments to 
finance prospection programmes of French companies in other oil-rich 
countries such as Iraq and Libya.
Because of the reluctance of the French oil companies to expand the 
programmes of exploration to find more oil, the Algerians began to 
underline their demands for a higher posted price in order to fulfil 
their objectives of national development. They also argued that
prospecting would increase oil production which would in turn enhance 
their foreign earnings. Therefore, they repeatedly called upon the
^Politique pétrolière (I ) , p .2 0.
2Quoted in A. M u r c i e r s le pétrole entre 1'Algérie et la
France: (in le Monde March 21, 1969).
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French to enter into negotiations on the basis of the article 12 of the 
1965 oil agreement. Due to start on January 1, 1969, these negotiations 
were delayed until November because of France's domestic problems and the 
departure of De Gaulle. Throughout the lengthy negotiations, the
Algerian delegation led by Belaid Abdeslam and then Bouteflika employed 
great skill and expertise, trying the make CFP and ERAP accept an 
increase in the posted price of oil from $2.08 to 2.65 a barrel and then 
to a level in line with Opec price of $2.85. The French promptly
rejected these demands proposing rather an increase of 8 cents per barrel 
on condition that the Algerians accepted to freeze the posted price for a 
period of 5 years J  Seemingly, the Algerians were not prepared to
accept the French proposals, and because of the reluctance of CFP and 
ERAP to accept their demands, the French government called off these 
negotiations on June 3, 1970. In retaliation, Abdeslam announced
obligation for the French companies to place 90 per cent of their
investments profits in Algeria instead of 50 per cent previously and to 
pay $2.85 for a barrel.
As the rift between the two sides grew wider, tension mounted 
between the two governments. In Algiers, officials and the media
repeatedly emphasized what became known as the 'oil battle' with France. 
From the demand for a rise in the oil price, the Algerians moved to
request an increase in their control over the overall process of oil 
exploitation. In a speech delivered at Skikda on July 16, 1970,
President Boumedienne expressed in a metaphorical style, the symbolic 
role the oil battle represented in the affirmation of the state's control 
over the national resources. "Certain groups, he declared, have been
^Politique potroliere , (4), p. 327 .
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unable to understand that Algeria is today an independent country. They 
persist in believing that oil questions are not a matter of complete and 
total sovereignty but a sort of co-sovereignty. We say to them: No, oil 
is ours, as is the gas, since they are well and truly found in Algeria. 
We were opposed in the recent past to the colonialists who tried to
separate the Sahara from the Tell. If we were able to analyze Algerian 
oil, we should discover that the blood of our martyrs is one of its
constituents, because the possession of this wealth was paid for with our 
blood. Moreover, foreign capital which was invested in the exploitation 
of our oil has for the most part been recovered and remunerated."1
Negotiations between the two sides were broken off because of 
France's refusal to accept the increase in the posted price of oil from 
$2.08 to 2.85 a barrel and because of its conviction that time was
playing in its favour, believing that its former colony would no longer 
be able to sustain a confrontation given its evident lack of economic 
capabilities. Thus France deliberately ignored Algeria's determination 
to gain control over her energy resources, by overlooking the increasing 
solidarity within Opec, and by believing that lack of capital and 
technicians as well as absence of foreign buyers for its oil would
discourage the Nor th-Af rican country in taking the crucial step to 
nationalize French oil assets. Moreover, the French seemed to believe 
strongly in the Libyan alternative to put pressure on Algiers and on the 
threat to expel some of the Algerian immigrants as reprisals, a fact they 
assumed would certainly have had disastrous effects on Algeria's fragile
Q u o t e d  in W. Knapp: North-West Africa: a political and 
economic survey (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), 
p. 1 33.
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economy. Conversely, the Algerians' determination was spurred by the 
desire of the Opec state members to get more concessions from the oil 
companies and also by Libyan support.
With the emergence of Libya as a new colossus in North-Africa, its 
growing importance in the Opec bargaining coalition and with Qadhafi's 
aspirations to revive Nasser's panarabic dreams, the Algerians could not 
but opt for a more radical policy at home and a more determined attitude 
against French interests in particular. The context -characterized by 
France's domestic problems, Pompidou's illness, his preoccupation with 
European affairs, the slight decline of French influence in Africa, and 
by the availability of Soviet assistance and American technology and 
financial inducements - gave the Algerians the necessary impetus to push 
forward their demands on the French oil companies.
The Algerian intr ansi gence grew in intensity on the return of 
Abdeslam from the Opec Tripoli meeting which saw the rise of the posted 
price of market crude oil rise from $1.8 to $2.8 and the tax-rate from 
the level of 50 up to a flat 60 per cent. On January 12, 1971, the
Algerian government decided to impose an embargo on some oil shipments to 
France in an attempt to resume negotiations between the two sides. 
After days of haggling, the French agreed to reopen these negotiations 
which then took place in Paris in January 29, between Bouteflika and 
Xavier-Ortoli the minister of industry, but in vain as the French 
adamantly refused the Algerian demands. On February 8, the Algerian 
foreign minister made another call to resume negotiations, but with 
French refusal to accede to these demands, Boumedienne announced the 
partial nationalization of French oil interests in Algeria on February
24
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The decisions and the date were given a symbolic value and on the 
foreign level, the Algerians emphasized their precursory role with regard 
to the efforts of the Opec countries to abolish the regime of oil 
concessions and extend the control of the national governments over the 
process of oil production and marketing.
In the ordinances of February 24, 1971, the Algerian government
unilaterally decided to take over a 55 per cent share in the French oil 
companies and nationalize the gas industry entirely from production to 
marketing.^ At the end of this process, Sonatrach had increased its 
share in the total volume of crude oil extracted in Algeria from 30 to 77 
per cent.
The presidential decrees of April 24 confirmed the imposition of a 
reference price level to be applied for the years 1969 and 1970 as fixed 
by the Algerian government in July 1970. They also set the posted price 
at $2.70 FOB (Free on Board) Bedjaia for the period from January 1 to 
March 19, 1971, while the posted prices applicable for the period
starting from March 20, 1971 to December 31 should conform to the
dispositions of the Opec prices of the Tripoli agreement reached on April 
12, taking into account adjustments to be made for better geographic 
location and quality of the Algerian oil in comparison with the Libyan 
oil. The Algerians stressed that these measures were not excessive, as 
the posted price they fixed included a rate for freight costs similar to 
that applied by Libya (25 cents). Given the fact that Algeria is 
geographically closer to France., the differential, they argued, should 
have been fixed between 20 to 22 cents instead of the 15 they asked for.^
Ordinances of February 24, 1971 (Jora 25-2-1971 Nos 71-8,
7 1 - 9 , 7 1 - 1 0 , 7 1 - 1 1 ) .2 In 'les hyd r o c a r b u r e s 1, Ministry of Information and 
Culture, Algiers July 1971, p p . 50-51.
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And providing these reasons, they rejected the proposition sent by the 
French government which stated that it did not dispute the principle of 
Algeria's right to nationalize provided the primary compensation to which 
the Algerians had committed themselves in the Evian agreements and the 
1965 oil convention, was paid.1 The Algerian government offered $100 
million as indemnification to the French oil companies affected by the 
nationalizations, an amount rejected by the French as derisory since it 
represented only about a seventh of their own estimates. The refusal of 
Algiers to meet their demands could be explained by a need for capital to 
finance the ambitious development plan (1970-1973). Although compensation 
constituted a serious issue of contention between the two countries, as 
is highlighted by lengthy negotiations and several meetings in Algiers 
between Bouteflika and Herve Alphand, the French government envoy 
-neither side wanted a complete rupture. The moderation of the French
attitude became more tangible when Paris failed to alter Algeria's 
decisions through economic sanctions. In May 1971, CFP withdrew its oil 
technicians from Algeria and three weeks later, ELF-ERAP repatriated most 
of its staff there, while the French government decided in December to 
reduce the annual quota for Algerian migrants from 35,000 to 25,000 and 
threatened to restrict savings sent home by Algerian immigrant workers. 
Moreover, it attempted to launch an international economic boycott 
against the North-Africa state, requesting, for instance, the US to 
cancel its gas contracts with Algeria, signed in 1969-1970 which were 
awaiting approval from the US energy commission (CFP), as well as 
threatening to urge the World Bank to deny Algeria credits. France's 
efforts proved a failures on March 3, 1971, Sonatrach obtained $5 million
l a n d e d  by Premier Cha b a n -De1mas to Bedjaoui, the Algerian
Ambassador in Paris on March 9, 1971.
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loan it concluded with the 'US Bank Manufacturers Hanover Trust' in 
December 1970 and in March 25, it signed a loan agreement with 'Banque de 
Montreal' worth $10 million. Furthermore Sonatrach succeeded in signing 
contracts with other countries to sell her oil, notably with the USA and 
Brazil's oil company Petrobas concerning a deal of 45 million tons of 
crude oil over the next 4 years.
In an apparent move to secure its interests in Algeria in other 
fields, the French government manifested its desire to settle the oil 
issue in a new cooperation framework. The visit to Algiers of Jean de 
Broglie, the president of the National Assembly on July 7, 1971, was 
understood as evidence of France's nvDderation.
A settlement was reached between Sonatrach and CFP in June, which 
granted the latter $60.7 million payable in 7 years on the condition that 
it paid its tax-arrears of $25 million between August and December 1971. 
Following an agreement signed on December 12, ELF-ERAP the French 
state-owned company handed over a part of its capital to Sonatrach 
because the debts it owed to the Algerian treasury were higher than the 
amount of compensation agreed upon and fixed at 183,5 million Algerian 
Dinars by the Ordinances of February 24 and April 12, 1971.^
The result of this process meant the end of the regime of French oil 
concessions in Algeria, making CFP and ERAP companies holding minority 
interests, with Sonatrach being the majority partner. Since the
February 1971 nationalization, the two French companies accounted for 
only 7 and 6 million tonnes of oil production respectively in comparison 
with the 35 million tonnes they were responsible for in the past. Their 
fate as the most important oil companies operating in Algeria was sealed
^Politique p e t r o l i è r e , (4), p.591.
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when ELF-ERAP stopped producing oil in Algeria in 1975, while CFP 
obtained a new contract concerning investment and production valid for 5 
years in the new framework of association with Sonatrach through which it 
received between 6 to 10 million tonnes of crude oil annually subject to 
compulsory investment to be undertaken in Algeria. In July 1977, the 
Algerian oil company signed another contract with CFP for the sale of 14 
million tonnes of condensat for a 10 year period. In this context, 
contracts with the two French oil companies had lost their 'charactere 
special' as CFP and ERAP were dealt with as any other foreign company 
operating in Algeria under a new framework where Sonatrach's weight and 
power of decision began to predominate. with the affirmation of the 
state’s sovereignty in the economic field, the privileged status of the 
Algerian-French relationship became to wither away almost irreversibly.
D. PARTNERSHIP AND RIVALRY AND THE LOOSENING OF THE 
"CHARACTERE SPECIAL" OF RELATIONS
1• The search for equality in status and in partnership
If the early years of independence constituted for Algeria a
situation imposed on her as a result of the colonial past, the access to
control over the natural resources, in the context of changing conditions
favourable to oil producing countries, represented a gateway not to the
international community to which she formally belongs since being
independent, but to a certain international status, to a certain identity
in the gathering of nations or what the Algerians like to call 'concert
des nations souveraines'. Having assessed the state's control over
French interests in Algeria, the Algerians believed they have succeeded
in asserting their status as a sovereign and independent state with
regard to their former metropole. The access to this particular type of
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sovereignty consisted in their eyes, a permanent and hard exercise, as 
they were conditioned by the challenge to assert their maturity, to 
legitimate their policies and prove the rightness of their choices 
vis-a-vis those who not long ago, considered them as inferior, uncivil­
ized, apathetic and as 'indigenes' as they were stereotyped in the French 
colonial discourse.
In their relations with France, the Algerians seemed perturbed by 
these images and it was perhaps for this reason that they were anxious to 
avoid being victims of what some French politicians would consider as an 
'indigenous state-nation'. These subjective but deep-rooted feelings 
had been constant in their dealings with their former metropole and 
partly determined the peculiar character of the Algerian-French 
relations. It was difficult to think that these relations could be
banal, they were as Boumedienne put it "necessary bad or excep­
tional".^ This statement reflects, indeed, the cyclical form of
Algerian-French relations, alternating between periods of Algerian-French 
understanding and periods of denouncing French imperialism and patroniz­
ing attitudes. The difference of objectives remains significant and 
constitutes the crux of their troubled relationship. The Algerians 
believed that relations with France should be based on the respect of 
mutual interests and that their country should be regarded as independent 
and sovereign and not as a pawn in French global designs. The conflict 
has been and still remains the problem of equality not only on the level 
of power capabilities, but also of equality of status: that the French 
side should recognize and deal with Algeria as an independent state with 
its own experience, specific interests and with its Arabo-Islamic 1
1Annee p o l i t i q u e , 1975.
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ferment, socialist orientation and non-aligned conceptions# For the 
Algerians, this search for equality in status has been crucial for the 
assertion of their own identity and personality, and also for the 
recognition of sacrifices made to obtain their political sovereignty# 
From the feelings of being assisted and a junior partner to the access to 
the status of a sovereign state, the process proved complex and arduous, 
but the Algerians seemed willing to live up to this challenge. In their 
eyes, this process has beyond the simplistic legal or formal level, a 
sacred value for it helps them exorcise any latent inferiority complex 
the French think they may still have.
The assertion of the self vis-a-vis the other (La reconnaissance de 
soi par 1'autre) has been greatly exacerbated by the Algerian state in 
its dealings with the French government. This deep motivation which 
-reflecting a pathetic but insatiable struggle for political independence 
and cultural decolonization of the mentality of Algerians, many of whom 
were victims of French cultural alienation - remained essential for the 
Algerian leaders' state-to-state practice. Attempts to recover archives 
and documents on Algerian history retained in France aimed also at 
assisting this search for the self and cultural identity, as these 
archives were regarded as "the concrete mark of Algerian history".1 The 
refusal of the French government to hand them back to Algerians was 
merely viewed as "an attempt to deny the existence of Algeria before 
1962". Another important aspect of Algeria's attempts to ensure her
independence vis-a-vis France had been the complete withdrawal of the 
French troops from Algeria by December 1967. The recovery of military
^Declaration of Mohamed Benyahia to El-Houd j a h i d ,
30 , 1 98 1 .
2 i bid .
November
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bases formerly occupied by France, especially the Mers el Kebir naval 
base, did not mean for the Algerians a mere — although decisive —means to 
protect their country's sovereignty and security but represented a vital 
step in their efforts to master their own destiny- Having assessed 
their control over their natural resources and national security matters, 
the Algerians could then move to establish a new type of relationship 
with France with a greater self-confidence and strength.
It was amid these conceptions that the maintenance of a cooperation 
with France on the basis of mutual interests and the need of this country 
for her own use that made Algeria adopt a conciliatory attitude with the 
French government which seemed to have accepted the realities of the next 
context resulting from the February 1971 oil nationalizations- France 
announced on April 13 the end of privileged relations with Algeria, 
although remaining determined "to pursue the application of the technical 
cooperation agreement of April 8, 1966 modified on August 22, 1970 as
well as the immigration agreement of December 27, 1968 of which it does
not rule the extension if necessary. Finally, France declares herself 
willing to continue to participate in the framework of international 
cooperation in the economic development of Algeria. The decisions thus 
taken by the French government are inspired by the two countries' 
long-term interests and by their relations as sovereign states."1
The Algerians seemed pleased with the new course of the Algerian- 
French relationship which ensured them sovereignty over their national 
resources and reinforced their political independence, as much as the 
French side had been looking for the diversification of its energy
'communique issued by the Quai d'Orsay. See also speech of 
Premier Chaban-D e 1mas to the French National Assembly in 
April 20. (French Embassy in London, Bulletin mensuel 
d'informations series 13, No.4, April 1971.)
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supplies in the framework of its economic and geographic redeployment, 
and rayonment. In a speech at a luncheon given in honour of Bouteflika 
on July 9, 1973 in his first visit to Paris after the oil conflict,
Michel Jobert the French Foreign Minister asserted that "Algeria has now 
found her place in the concert of nations••.you are independent, your 
independence is questioned by no one."1 The response of the Algerian 
government reflected similar conceptions, stressing links of interdepend­
ence existing between Algiers and Paris. According to a statement
issued on April 20 1971, Algeria's constant concern has been "the search 
for real and final solutions to the sequels of the past in order to 
redefine with France a new type of cooperation largely open over the 
future...Since independence, Algeria has subscribed to a policy of 
cooperation based on the respect of sovereignty, on equality and 
reciprocity of exchanges. Such a policy was directed against any
attempts to perpetuate neo-colonial domination over (Algeria)'s national 
resources...The objective appreciation of relations between Algeria and 
France indicates the existence of many complex interests whose interfei—  
ence and weight would serve as a support and main guarantor for this 
cooperation...As far as she is concerned, Algeria has... adopted a 
strategy that would preserve the harmonious development of her relations 
with France."2
The development of these relations proved in fact important for 
Algeria, as despite her efforts to diversify her foreign trade patterns, 
she has relied on France's market for her energy exports and labour 
surplus as well as French technological outlets and expertise. Equally, 
the better quality of Algeria's oil, its low freight costs, the
^Bulletin mensuel d' information,
2El-Moudjahid April 23, 1971.
series 15, N o .7 , July 1973 p.5
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increasing importance of gas in the French policy of diversification of 
energy supplies, and the importance of Algerian market for French goods 
enhanced Algeria's position in her former metropole's foreign trade.^ 
This economic interdependence remained constant despite the occasional 
conflicts and tensions that have characterized the French-Algerian 
relations since 1971 and constituted the main source of the convergence 
of interests between the two countries. The remark that Algiers and 
Paris were "condemned to live together" as Boumedienne emphasized, "if 
not cooperate", as Chadli realistically observed -became evident, despite 
political divergencies highlighted by conflicting attitudes over the 
Western Sahara as the French government made clear its determination to 
preserve France's position in Algeria's economic schemes, as was 
emphasized by Giscard's visit to Algeria in April 1974 and his overture 
in 1978 after a freeze in relations exacerbated by the conflict of 
ex-Spanish Sahara. Thus after a substantial decrease in the volume of 
Algerian-French trade in the second half of the mid-1970s, a considerable 
boost was given to the cooperation between the two countries, following 
the visit of Francois Poncet to Algiers and that of Benyahia to Paris in 
1979, and especially after the access to power of Mitterrand's socialist 
regime. In exchange for a series of contracts in favour of French
companies, worth 35 billion French Francs, the new French government 
agreed to increase its gas imports from Algeria following the signature 
on February 3, 1982 of a huge deal that involved a high price paid for
the Algerian gas and a financial aid accorded to this country averaging 1
1For the role of gas in France's diversification of its 
energy imports, see interview of Edmond Herve, the Minister 
delegate, responsible for energy to le Monde November 11,
1982 .
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350 million French Francs annually.^ Among the main contracts awarded by 
Algeria was that concerning the feasibility studies and construction of 
the first part of the Algiers underground by the Sofretu company. Other 
contracts concerned French participation in the realization of a certain 
number of small and medium-sized economic projects.
Algeria's desire to strengthen economic cooperation with France was 
met with the setting up of a joint committee on cooperation following the 
signature of an Algerian-French intej— governmental protocol on June 21 
1982 by Abdelhamid Brahimi the minister of planning and Claude Cheysson, 
the minister of external relations. Moreover, a committee for Algeria 
was created within the CNFP the French Employers Association whose 
leaders Ceyrac and Berliet visited this country on a few occasions. The 
intensification of Alger ian-French cooperation has been highlighted by 
numerous visits exchanged by nearly all the ministers of both sides and 
by the convergence of interests between Algiers and Paris beyond the 
economic fields as confirmed by five meetings held by Chadli and 
Mitterrand between 1981 and 1983.
For Algeria, France remains an important partner in three major 
domains: 1) the consolidation of political stability in the Maghreb, 2) 
the preservation of Algeria's place in European markets and 3) the 
efforts to remodel the world economic order.
1. By cultivating good relations with all the North-African 
countries and by remaining neutral over intej— Maghrebi disagreements, 
France could, in the eyes of Algerians, help strengthen the independence 
of the Maghreb and help protect it from East-West confrontation. Thus, 
Algeria called upon France to contribute in demilitarizing the Mediterra-
1399,85 million of FF in 1981, 360,54 in 1982 (Maghreb 
Se 1e c ti o n , November 11, 1981r pp.83 & 4.
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nean Sea by freeing it from naval presence of foreign powers, though 
reproving France's attempts to impose its own hegemony over the 
Mediterranean basin, and despite their political differences, Algeria 
regarded her former nvetropole as a possible and effective counterweight 
to supei— powers' interference in the Maghreb and to the destabilizing 
activities of Qadhafi. After being infuriated by the stand of Moscow
and Washington vis-a-vis the Western Sahara, it was to France that the 
Algerians turned.' Paris responded positively as it was also in its 
interests to counterbalance supei— powers rivalry in the Maghreb. Since 
the mid-1970s, Morocco has become courted by both the USSR and the USA: 
while Washington increased arms supplies to help Hassan secure his 
throne, Moscow increased economic cooperation to enhance Soviet image in 
Morocco to be better able to benefit from any revolutionäry perspectives 
in Morocco, since this country is potentially unstable. Soviet-American 
rivalry over the Sherifian Kingdom was regarded by France as a threat to 
its interests not only in this country but in the whole Maghreb.
These considerations explained Giscard's overtures to Algeria in 
1978 after a long period of tension and hostilities. The coup in
Mauritania the same year stood as an evidence of the improvement of 
relations between Algiers and Paris.^ If the overthrow of Ould Daddah 
was a deliberate attempt to annihilate any Moroccan territorial claims 
over Mauritania, since this country is regarded by France as a vital 
plank in its military strategy in North-West and West-Africa, it was also
'This desire was underlined in the telegram sent by 
Boumedienne to Giscard when flying over the French 
territory on his return home from Moscow where he received
medical treatment for his fatal illness.2 See his speech of February 9, 1978.
^This possibility was confirmed by Abdelaziz, 
Secretary-General of the Polisario Front ( le Monde April 
13, 1979).
232
a starting point for Algerian-Mauritanian rapprochement as the new 
leadership in Nouakchott scrapped the military treaty Ould Daddah had 
concluded with Morocco, resumed diplomatic relations with Algiers, signed 
a peace treaty with the Polisario front and has been pursuing an 
anti-Moroccan policy. However, this Algerian-French alignment did not, 
in French designs, aim at isolating Morocco or forcing it to relinquish 
its hold over the Western Sahara, but rather it was a form of leverage to 
prevent Rabat from sliding into the American sphere of influence and to 
preserve French economic interests in Morocco. Political stability in 
North-Africa that should result from the pacific settlement of the 
Western Sahara problem has been viewed by Paris as a necessary means to 
keep the Maghreb out of East-West entanglements, thus to reinforce French 
presence in this region. It was, therefore, against this background 
that Fr ance1s offer to help solve this problem should be understood. 
The refusal of Mitterrand's government to aid Morocco build a railway 
line linking the 'mainland' to the West Saharan-occupied territory, was 
also appreciated in Algiers as a concrete illustration of eventual 
convergence of interests with its former metropole.^
2. Given her relative maturity, Algeria hoped to make France her 
bridge to Europe as much as France attempted to make her its gateway to 
the third world (De Gaulle), a positive ally (Giscard) and an indispensa­
ble partner (Mitterrand). While France, regardless of differences
between these regimes, attempted to preserve a good image in the third 
world and enhance its position between East and West, Algeria badly
 ^El-Moud j a hid reported that during the visit of the Moroccan 
Premier Lamrani to Paris in April 1984, the French
government declined Morocco's demand for assistance in 
building a railway line between Rabat and El Ayoun in the 
occupied Western Sahara (El-Moud j ahid April 13-14 , 1984 ).
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needed Europe to avoid being entangled in the super powers' scramble for 
influence in Africa so as to consolidate her position of a non-aligned 
country* Moreover she needed Europe both as a source for her energy 
exports and as a supplier of technology and capital. In Algerian views, 
Europe may constitute the most stable partner with regard to these 
objectives because of this region's lack of energy resources and its 
geographic proximity. Thus, Algerians came to believe that it could 
play a substantial role in Europe's diversification of energy imports 
given its huge gas reserves. Neither the Soviet Union nor the US have 
been particularly in need of Algeria's oil and gas, being themselves 
among the biggest producers of energy in the world, and having their own 
clients. Furthermore, no country from the third world could constitute 
the required market for Algeria's exports or provide her with the 
technology she needs. Efforts of Algeria had, therefore, been directed 
at emphasizing economic interdependence with Europe: as a most stable 
source for the latter's energy needs, as a valuable market for its 
outlets and also as a valuable card in its bargaining with the USSR gas 
supplies. These reasons may explain the conclusion by Algeria of huge 
gas contracts with France, Belgium, Italy and Spain in 1981-82, while 
negotiations with the US to resume gas supplies have failed so far. In 
exchange for a higher price for their gas, the Algerians agreed to 
increase their country's economic cooperation with Western Europe. In 
their designs, this interdependence could help attenuate fears of 
recession in Europe, thus dissipating possible reprisals against their 
migrant workers there, particularly in France.
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Needing Western Europe both as a market and support, Algeria has 
been reluctant to break with France whom she hoped would become the 
dynamic nucleus for a Europe free from American domination and which 
would cultivate friendly relations with the Arab world in general and the 
third world in particular- These feelings were encouraged by the
Gaullist line of national independence which the different governments of 
the French fifth Republic attempted to follow at one time or another. 
From Pompidou to Mitterrand, French foreign policy had, at times, 
manifested a strong reluctance to endorse US external standpoints, thus 
coinciding with Algeria's own visions of world politics. France's good 
relations with the Arab world dictated by her own interests in this 
region -constituted another element in Algerian-French alignment, as the 
successive French governments followed more or less the traditional 
Gaullist sympathies for the Arab cause, despite Mitterrand's ambiguous 
standpoints on the Arab-Israeli conflict.1 The Algerians particularly 
appreciated the favourable attitude of both Pompidou and Giscard toward 
the Palestinian cause as highlighted by the meeting between the French 
foreign minister Sauvagnargues and Arafat the PLO leader in 1974, and the 
June 1980 EEC Venizia declaration on the Middle East favourable to the 
Arab stand, owing much to the efforts of President Giscard D'Estaing.^
'Algeria's main criticisms were directed against the 
inopportunity of Mitterand's visit to Israel in 1981 and to 
French approval of Camp David Agreement. Moreover the
decision of the EEC, especially that of France to send 
troops to supervise the application of the Egyptian- 1srae1i 
disengagement was regarded as contrary to the spirit of the 
Euro-Arab dialogue and as threat against security in the 
Mediterranean (El-Moud j ahi d November 11, 1981).
^The resolution stressed the necessity and urgency of a 
global solution to the Middle East conflict, of a just 
solution to the Palestinian problem and the recognition of 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It also 
called upon Israel to end its occupation of Arab
territories (E l - M o u d j a h l d , December 12, 1981).
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3. The policy of independence attempted by both countries seemed 
sometimes to serve as a basis for Algerian-French understanding: the 
opposition of Pompidou to Kissinger's international agency for energy, 
the efforts of Giscard to boost debates on North-South issues in the 
1974-1976 years and initiate a triangular cooperation gathering Europe, 
Africa and the Arab world as well as Mitterrand's support for Algeria's 
proposal of global negotiations made at Cuncun in 1981, his decision to 
increase French public assistance to the third world and critical 
attitude to the rise of interest rate in the USA -have all been regarded 
with high consideration by the Algerians in the context of the converg­
ence of interests with France.
This convergence remained constant despite periods of misunderstand­
ing distrust and hostility that prevented a possible long-standing 
alliance as the two sides believe they could be useful to one another. 
Being on opposite sides after independence, Algerians and French could 
hardly ignore one another especially as they know each other well, having 
once shared a common destiny in the dialectical dichotomy: colonist- 
colonised. Being representative of each sphere and having common
interests in the whole conception of North-South relationship they have 
been tempted to forge from their bilateral relations an example for the 
North-South configuration, but they have not been able to transcend their 
own differences to at least narrow the bridge between the imbalanced 
condominium and their divergent interests due to disparities in wealth, 
power and political options.
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2. Difficulty in transcending the divergence of interests
As paradoxical as it may appear, there has been a coexistence 
between the desire to pursue Algerian-French rivalry. This dialectical 
process may explain why the relations between the two countries
alternated between good and tense periods. Although the visits to 
Algiers by Presidents Giscard D'Estaing (in April 1974), Mitterrand in 
1981 and 1983 and the visit by Chadli to Paris in November 1983 were 
surrounded with the desire to give an impulse to Algerian-French
alignment, involving a great deal of emotions and passion peculiar to the 
special relations between a former metropole and its former colony, they 
were immediately followed by mutual distrust and hostility as the two 
sides diverged over issues regarded as crucial for their national
interests.
Despite Algeria's reliance on France's market and technology and 
despite inequality in power capabilities, the Algerians remained 
determined not only to pursue their socialistic policies at home but also 
a radical foreign stance. The implementation of these policies did not 
fail to have an impact on the whole conceptions of French-speaking 
countries in general and in the Maghreb in particular where France's
interests remain vital for its economic and cultural rayonment.
Claiming that the nature of their struggle for independence 
conferred upon them a special role in the third world, the Algerians 
effectively attempted to be at the forefront of the battle against what 
they called Western imperialism and neo-colonialism. These motivations 
constituted an impetus to their attempt to assert their country's 
political sovereignty and implement their foreign policy objectives in 
the process of assessing the state's identity and personality. In doing
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so, the Algerians were conscious of France's opposition and challenge. 
Their aspirations to the leadership in the Maghreb and expansion of their 
influence southwards of the Sahara inevitably led to a competition with 
France, exacerbating their mutual hostility from time to time.
From the outset, Algeria refused to participate in the French- 
African summits or endorse the concept of French-speaking gathering 'la 
Francophonie'. She also addressed strident criticisms to the model of 
economic and military assistance France set up with many of her former 
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. To Algeria's ambitions with regard to 
this region, corresponded France's determination to preserve its huge 
interests in its former empire, especially during Giscard's reign which 
saw the strengthening of French-African policy after its slight passivity 
under Pompidou.
Far from constituting the main source of friction between the two 
sides in the mid-1970s, the Western Sahara dispute merely crystallised 
their latent conflict over these areas which France wanted to keep quiet 
and Paris-oriented in face of Algeria's 'revolutionary elan'. Amid 
tensions accentuated by this issue, the French made clear that their 
African policy could not be dictated by Franco-Algerian cooperation as 
France wants to have political independence and will maintain it. 
French support for the Moroccan stand and declared hostility to the 
setting up of an independent state over the Western Sahara were deeply 
resented by the Algerians who accused the French of playing a 'double 
jeu', noting that while Giscard declared his hostility to the multiplic­
ity of micro-states, he firmly opposed the United Nations resolution
passed in October 1976, requesting France to cancel the referendum it
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planned to organize in Mayotte. The French stand over the Western Sahara 
led Algerians to accuse the French of becoming the "imperialist policeman 
in the region", participating "in an international plot directed against 
the Saharawi people and the Algerian revolution through the supplies of 
arms to Morocco and Mauritania" and "inciting Senegal, Tunisia and Zaire 
to increase their hostilities against Algeria".1 This virulent diatribe 
was accompanied by condemnation of France's intervention in Lebanon in 
1975 and in Zaire in April 1977 and by lobbying to gather support for 
condemning French policies toward Mayotte and South-Africa at the United 
Nations and non-aligned fora.^ This resolute anti-French attitude
increased with Algeria's failure to put pressure on Paris to endorse the 
rights of the Saharawi people for self-determination and prevent Morocco 
and Mauritania from consolidating their hold over the Western Sahara 
territory, a fact that would have serious incidences on Algeria's 
territorial security and position in the Maghreb.
The capture of six Frenchmen working in the phosphate mines in 
Mauritania gave the Algerians a good opportunity to play the go-between 
the French government and Polisario in an attempt to induce Paris to 
recognize the latter and put pressure on Morocco to alleviate risks of a 
generalized war in the Maghreb. But their claims that the French
1See speech of Boumedienne before the fifth congress of 
Algerian war veterans on May 24, 1978 (in Pi scours d u
President (8)# p.89). See also the FLN magazine
Resolution Africaine December 19, 1 975 and El-Moud j a hi d May
6 , 1 9 7 8 .2Algeria voted the UN 1976 resolution on Mayotte and was 
behind the 1976 non-alignment summit held in Colombo in 
1976 calling for economic sanctions against France, 
including oil, because of French favourable attitude to 
South-Africa (see Nouvel Ordre international et non- 
alignement Baudung-Baghdad 1955-1982, Recueil de documents, 
EMA, Paris 1982). For a critique of French African
policy see El-Moud j ahid Jul y  4-6 , 1974 and Revolution
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hostages were not retained in Algeria and that France should negotiate 
directly with the Saharawi movement were refuted by Paris which instead 
accused Algiers of being behind the Polisario's attacks.1 By refusing 
to intercede with the Polisario front following the request of the French 
government to release the French hostages, the Algerians succeeded in 
forcing Paris to engage direct negotiations with the Polisario front. 
These negotiations conducted by a high official from the Quai d'Orsay, 
proved to be in vain, as the French categorically rejected to endorse the 
rights of the Saharawis for self-determination or assume good offices 
between Polisario on the one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the 
other. Deceived by France’s favourable attitude to her neighbours, 
Algeria increased her campaign against the regime of Giscard D'Estaing, 
by showing fervent support for the leftist coalition formed by the French 
Communist and Socialist parties and by entertaining with their leaders a 
form of a government-to-government parley. Georges Marchais the PCF 
Secretary General was received in mid-September 1974 and Mitterrand then 
the leader of the PS in late 1976. On these occasions, Boumedienne 
publicly declared that the 'union de la gauche' should come to power in 
France, being encouraged by Mitterrand's near victory in the French 
presidential elections in 1974. To embarrass the regime of Giscard on 
the eve of French municipal elections, Boumedienne obtained from the 
Polisario front the release of the French hostages during the visit of 
Marchais to Algiers following that of Lionel Jospin the Secretary General
1I,ouis de Guiringand, the French Foreign Minister declared 
on May 1, 1977 that "we know very well where they (attacks)
came from: a neighbouring country where polisario has its 
bases (quoted in Africa Contemporary record 1977). 
z In a letter sent to Nimeiry the O A U 's president on August 
11, 1978, Giscard confirmed France's refusal to conduct such 
a m e d iation.
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of the PS who met the Polisario leaders in Algiers in November 1977. 
However, there was a possibility that the decision to release them came 
after Polisario columns had been heavily tracked down by French 'Jaguar* 
aircraft fighters. These French pressures or what it was called in 
Algiers 'la politique des jaguars' highlighted the marked differences in 
power capabilities existing between Algeria and her former metropole. 
Moreover, the defeat of the French leftist coalition in the general 
elections of 1978 contributed to enhance Giscard's position, thus 
undermining Boumedienne's policy of leverage.
The rapprochement between Algeria and France that developed in the 
late 197 0s and strengthened with the coming to power of Chadli and 
Mitterrand did not attenuate the conflict between Algiers and Paris 
resulting from divergences of interests and options. Despite the
declared neutrality of the French government on the Western Sahara issue, 
the Algerians still regard French attitude over this question as 
ambiguous and confusing since Mitterrand's government, while favouring a 
referendum with a possibility of dialogue between the interested parties, 
has not granted the Polisario front diplomatic recognition, despite the 
fact that the French socialist party favours this.^ Apparently, the 
Algerians were deceived that Paris was determined to see that the 
Franco-Algerian alignment does not offset French relations with Morocco 
where French interests remain important as it became evident to them that
Thi s standpoint was expressed by Mitterand in his speech 
given in honour of Chadii during the latter's visit to 
Paris in November 1983 (in La semaine de 1 'emigration 
November 1 7 , 1 983 pp.12 & 13). See in
contrast the statement made in Algiers by Jacques 
Huntzinger, the PS spokesman on international affairs that 
the PS favoured the right of the Saharawis for self- 
de ter mination and direct negotiations between Rabat and the 
Polisario (El-Moudjahid December 16, 1982).
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Mitterrand could not - despite what Cheysson called the 'coup de passion' 
between Paris and Algiers - privilege relations with Algeria at the 
expense of France's interests in Morocco- The joint French-Moroccan 
military manoeuvres conducted in November 1982 without the Algerians 
being informed, created a great deal of surprise and incomprehension 
within the Algerian governmental circles.^
The confirmation that French domestic concerns and interests in the 
Maghreb and French-speaking Africa were more important than maintaining a 
special relationship between Paris and Algiers came after the secret 
visit of Mitterrand to Rabat in August 1984 to request King Hassan to 
persuade Qadhafi to agree on a joint French—Libyan troops withdrawal from 
Chad- While domestic pressures and electoral purposes seemed to have 
prevailed in the French President's move, the demand made before the 
Moroccan King was an indication of Moroccan influence in African affairs 
that offered a better entree for France than Algeria, especially after 
the sudden but significant rapprochement between Tripoli and Rabat.2 
The Algerians felt Mitterrand's manoeuvre as an affront and outrage 
completely in contradiction with the warm relationship that developed 
between them and the French government highlighted by several meetings 
between Chadli and Mitterrand and sympathies to Algeria of many French
^The Algerian Embassador to Paris, Houhou expressed these 
feelings, stressing that his government, in contrast, has 
always been informed in advance by the US government of 
joint US-Moroccan military operations (El-Moudjahid, December 
16, 1982). For Algerian disapproval of these operations
see El-Moud j ahi d November 29, 1982 , p-1.
2Although acknowledging that the two countries share a 
similar attitude with regard to the Chad crisis. Premier 
Mauroy confirmed during his 24 hour visit to Algiers on 
September 9, 1983, that France was not asking Algeria to
mediate between Paris and Tripoli. However, it seems that 
Algerians attempted to convince the Libyans to reach an 
agreement with the French but in vain.
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minister s such as Mauroy, Cheysson, Roccard, Defferre, and other
influential members of the Sociali st party like Claude Estier for
instance. President Chadli, perhaps, felt Mitterrand ' s move as a
personal insult, as not long before, he had publicly referred to the
French leader as 'mon ami Francois".1 The latter's failure to reassure 
personally Chadli, confirms the fragility of Algerian-French working 
relationships. The Algerian hope to make France a reliable and stable
ally proved illusory, though the Algerians seem willing to maintain good 
relations with their former metropole for it possesses considerable 
utilitarian powers in the form of markets for their labour surplus and 
energy exports as well as a source for capital equipment and technologi­
cal expertise.
^Interview with le Fi g a r o , November 9, 1983 .
z It was Cheysson who went to Algiers in September 1984 to 
explain Mitterand's trip to Rabat.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND THE STATE'S 
SECURITY
The jacobinist tendencies of the Algerian leaders, as defined by a 
devotion to the building of a strong and a centralized state and by the 
rejection of any supra-national form of government, were regarded by 
their neighbours as stemming from selfishness, arrogance and hegemonistic 
temptations. This is a mere simplification of the process of nation­
state in Algeria. Indeed, given their historical experience, this
process appeared more crucial to the Algerians than to their neighbours, 
who in contrast had been able to preserve their identity, personality and 
state traditions during the protectorate, a form of colonization which 
was neither as deep nor as socially disturbing as in Algeria. Conse­
quently, the reaction to colonial dialectics was more violent in Algeria 
than elsewhere as the spirit of national consciousness was cemented in 
the heat of the guerrilla war, while the ideological ferment that emerged 
emphasized radical perceptions with regard to political and social 
change. In contrast, the preservation of traditional structures in 
Morocco and Libya and of the middle-classes in Tunisia accounted for the 
evolution of these nation-states on the basis of the political conserva­
tism of their respective regimes. The deep antagonism which resulted 
from differences in experiences stood then as the unequivocal obstacle 
for the failure to unify the Maghrebi nationalist movements during the 
colonial times as well as for the accentuation of nationalisms soon after 
the birth of independent Maghrebi states, thus making the idea of a 
Maghreb a far remote possibility.
Furthermore, the problem of frontiers resulting from the past 
colonial period, added to this differentiation in the sense that with the 
instinct of national preservation of the state's security and national
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integrity, Algeria like her neighbours, was not prepared to make any 
territorial concession that may undermine her own national basis. Against 
this background, territorial disputes as highlighted by the question of 
the Western Sahara could not be dissociated from ideological divergences. 
And if these dialectical dichotomies have accounted for the troubled 
relationships between Algeria and other Maghreb countries, they have, 
nevertheless, remained in the background even when the North African 
countries underwent periods of detente and economic co-operation.
A. ACCENTUATION OF ALGERIAN NATIONALISM 
1. Radicalization of national sentiments
During the colonial era, the first attempts envisaging a platform for 
unity between the North African nationalist movements with the exception 
of Libya which was then under British protectorate, occurred within 
Maghrebi student circles in France between the two world wars. In this 
period, the "association des Etudiants Musulmans Nord-Africains" (AEMNA), 
founded in 1927, was dominated by Moroccans and Tunisians because of the 
relatively low number of Algerians studying in the French metropole, just 
about 30 at that time. Its objectives, however, were more directed at 
strengthening cultural affiliations among Maghrebi students than on 
turning into a political forum for nationalistic activities. The two 
congresses held in Tunis in August 1931 and in Algiers a year later did 
not make much progress in this direction although the declarations 
adopted there hailed the unity of the Maghreb. Moreover, despite an 
agreement made between Messali's PPA and the Moroccan section of the 
AEMNA in June 1933, contacts between the North-African nationalists 
remained quite formal and limited. The split within the AEMNA which led
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to the creation of the 'Association des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens* in 
1933 did not help push forward nationalist demands on a unified basis and 
neither did the decision of the French government not to let the AEMNA 
convene its meeting scheduled to take place in Rabat in 1936. In this 
situation and with the old generation of Algerian nationalists believing 
that it could obtain political rights from the French administration on a 
peaceful basis, attempts to create a common front against colonial rule 
seemed inopportune. In the same vein, nationalist movements in Morocco 
and Tunisia gathered around the the old political guard also favoured a 
nationalistic-oriented line relying chiefly on their own potential and 
abilities. But as these legalistic demands failed, thé possibility of 
unifying efforts to combat French colonialism came under consideration by 
the nationalist movements in the three countries. Thus in January 1947 
a Bureau of the Arab Maghreb was created and a year later a committee for 
the liberation of the Maghreb was set up as well as a pact among the 
Algerian PPA-MTLD, Morocco's Istiqlal party and Tunisia's Neo-Destour. 
Another pact was signed on April 4, 1954 at the Arab league but it was 
followed by no concrete measure for a coordinated insurrection against 
French colonial rule. And while in Algeria, the young generation of 
nationalists resorted to use violence to gain independence, the political 
parties in Morocco and Tunisia remained committed to achieve that goal 
through other means. These divergences became crystallized with the FLN 
initiating a guerrilla war on November 1, 1954 while in the other two 
countries, the advocates of an armed struggle were overwhelmed by the 
partisans of a negotiated solution with the French government. Therefore, 
attempts to hasten the disintegration of French colonialism in the whole 
Maghreb irremediably failed. Despite that the FLN asserted in its
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political proclamation, Algeria's search for national independence in "a 
North African context" and despite the secret agreement signed in early 
1955 between the FLN's external delegation, Benyoucef the Secretary 
General of the Neo-Destour and A1 Fasi the leader of the Istiqlal party. 
Reasons inherent in the differences of colonial contexts and rivalries 
undermining the cohesion of their nationalist movements had led the 
Moroccan and Tunisian leaders to turn down the FLN's demand for a 
generalized war in the Maghreb.^ And when these leaders succeeded in 
making France grant independence for their countries in March 1956, the 
Algerians pointed out that it was their own insurrection that forced 
France to relinquish its hold over these territories to be better able to 
keep Algeria French. The demise of revolutionary spirit from the Moroccan 
and Tunisian regimes bitterly disappointed the FLN leadership and cast 
clouds on the likelihood of a drive for unity in the future as ideologi­
cal and political differences were implicitly outlined in the FLN Summan 
platform. "It is erroneous, it was stated, to believe that both Morocco 
and Tunisia will enjoy a true independence as long as Algeria remains 
under the colonial rule." However, having been granted independence 
these two countries believed they could be more useful to the Algerian 
cause and thus set to provide the FLN with moral and material support, 
granting shelter for thousands of Algerian refugees and bases for the ALN 
guerrillas. But for the Algerian leaders this was an expression of a 
simple solidarity and not of a total commitment to disentangle the whole
'in Tunisia there was a strong rivalry between Bourguiba and 
Salah Benyoussef an advocate of violence as a means to 
achieve independence, while in Morocco there was an
exacerbation of Berber particularism and a challenge to the 
legitimity of King Mohamed V represented by the French
backed A1 Glawi.2 Plateforal de la Soumam, August 1956 in Textes fondamentaux
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Maghreb from French presence and influence so as to work effectively for 
the unity of the Maghreb. The moderation shown by Morocco and Tunisia 
was dictated by their inability to fight the French troops and by their 
determination to safeguard their fragile internal cohesion.
It became thus unlikely that the two countries would risk their newly 
gained independence for the purpose of a war in Algeria which they 
believed could be settled through peaceful means. To the deep
discontent of the FLN leadership both Morocco and Tunisia favoured a 
political solution of the Algerian conflict which would take into account 
French stakes in Algeria. At their meeting in Rabat on November 11, 
1957 King Mohammed V and Bourguiba "urgently called the FLN and the 
French government to open negotiations leading to a joint solution aiming 
at the achievement of the sovereignty of the Algerian people in 
conformity with the principles of the United Nations and at safeguarding 
the legitimate interests of France and its settlers in Algeria."^ The 
FLN vehemently rejected the call for negotiation that would imply the 
abandoning of the guerrilla warfare and came to look with scorn on the 
Moroccan and Tunisian regimes. Relations with Tunisia became strained 
as Bourguiba attempted to induce the FLN leadership to adopt a moderate 
line and also move it away from the influence of Nasser.
Further disenchantment of the FLN came with the failure to push 
forward to co-ordination of policies and lay down foundations for a 
Maghreb unity after the hopes raised by the conference in Tangiers on 
April 20-30, 1958 of representatives from the FLN, the Destour and the
Istialal party. If the Algerian delegation led by Mehri was pleased 
with the recognition of the FLN as the legitimate representative of the 1
1Le Monde November 23, 1957 (emphasis added).
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Algerian people and if it welcomed proposals for the creation of a 
Maghrebi consultative assembly, it however, denounced the maintenance of 
French troops in Morocco and Tunisia being especially infuriated by the 
fact that the Tunisian government did not learn lessons from the bombing 
by the French of Sakiet Sidi Youcef in February 1958 in reprisals for 
Tunisia's support to the FLN guerrillas. For Mehri, the war in Algeria 
was not that of Algeria alone.^ This appeal was in vain as differences 
in political and ideological orientations further increased between the 
FLN and the regimes established in Rabat and Tunis. Both had embarked 
upon a liberal model of economic development and a foreign policy 
regarded by the FLN leaders as pro-Western and thus incompatible with 
their own options. The adoption by the FLN of a radical programme in 
Tripoli in April 1962 and the eclipse of the GPRA's authority in favour 
of the alliance between Ben Bella and the radical officers of the ALN 
General Staff left no doubt on the nature of state and society the FLN 
leadership wanted to establish in independent Algeria. In eliminating 
Ferhat Abbas and then Benkhedda from the leadership of the GPRA, the 
radical faction within the FLN definitely shattered the hopes of 
Bourguiba and King Hassan to see a moderate regime running new Algeria.
The nature of leadership as explained in terms of this historical 
perspective may help explain why ideology has been held responsible for 
differences existing between the Maghrebi states and rivalries that have 
erupted occasionally ever since. The Algerian leaders defended their 
position in strongly ideological terms opposing the rightness of their 
policies in the face of the reactionary regimes of Morocco and Tunisia. 
These perceptions were best outlined by Boumedienne when he emphatically 1
1El-Moud1ahld. April 16, 1958.
stated that "for many years, Algeria has been following a clear policy
based on the principles of co-existence, stability, good neighbourliness
and fraternity. Today we do not regret this because it is still valid
in its totality. I simply say that our policy today aims at the destiny
of peoples rather than of governments because in final analysis, it is
the peoples who will survive. We have pursued this policy of the
Maghreb of peoples for the simple reason that we are a revolution. If a
conflict exists in the region today (Western Sahara), its reason stems
from the huge revolutionary mutations which are happening in Algeria.
This is the reason of the conflict. This will remain vivid as long as
there will be a popular .revolution on the one hand and the exploitation
of the man by a man on the other.” Consequently radical perceptions
were made the basis for a united Maghreb "where the exploitation of a man
by a man will be banished, servitude of peasants ended and where foreign
Acapital will be nationalized." The difference existing between Algeria 
and Morocco was also echoed by King Hassan who pointed out that "many 
people believed that the problem between Algeria and Morocco concerns a 
small piece of North African soil." For him, the problem is much deeper since 
“Morocco is facing an ideological conflict in which Algeria is only a 
small part. Morocco is standing in the forefront of a struggle in a
world which wants to be free and democratic. I regret to say that the
“  2ideology which Algeria is following is the one which is attacking us.
It was not surprising that shortly after her independence, Algeria 
found herself entangled in a cold war with her neighbouring countries.
The manifestations of this type of war had been the accusation made by
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'speech, June 19, 1975 in Discours du president (6),
pp. 1 36-1 37 .
^Address to a delegation from the Chamber of Deputies, 
November 10, 1977 in Africa Currents (10), 1978, p.20.
250
Morocco and Tunisia of Algeria's attempts to export her revolution 
through the support of leftist opposition movements in these countries. 
In January 1963# Bourguiba held Ben Bella responsible for an assassinati­
on plot against him and for backing the subversive activities in Tunisia 
of the former followers of Salah Benyoussef. The result was the
severance of diplomatic relations between Algiers and Tunis# thus 
aggravating dissensions between them. On the other hand# King Hassan 
also accused the Algerian leader of attempting to overthrow the Monarchy 
by depicting him as the driving force behind the July 1963 plot. And 
although Algeria denied these allegations# both Rabat and Tunis suspected 
an alliance between Ben Bella and the Egyptian President Nasser which 
they believed was directed at spreading socialism throughout North 
Africa. The animosities between Egypt on the one hand and Morocco and 
Tunisia on the other were evident because of Nasser's declared hostility 
to Arab monarchies and liberal regimes. Not only the Egyptian leader 
declined the invitation made by Hassan to visit Morocco but went to 
Algiers where he received a much publicized welcome in April 1963.
Algeria's relations with Libya were also affected by ideological 
dissonances since Ben Bella invited opponents of King Idriss on the 
occasion of the celebration of the eighth anniversary of the Algerian 
revolution on November 1# 1963. However# these divergences were not
acute since Tripoli abstained from being involved in Maghrebi affairs and 
given Libya's weakness and the support it provided the FLN during the 
war# cordial relations with the Senoussi Royal family were established# 
as reflected by a treaty of friendship signed in February 1963 and the 
visit of Libya's Premier A1 Mountasser to Algiers in December 1964.
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This good relationship was also made possible because in contrast to 
Morocco and Tunisia, Libya did not make demands to alter the frontier 
with Algeria.
Beside ideology, the border issue has been the other fundamental 
factor in the dispute involving Algeria and her other neighbours.
2. The link between state and territory
The history of demarcating the border with Morocco goes back to 1844 
when agreements were reached between the French colonial administration 
and Morocco which was a sovereign kingdom at that time. See Map IV 1. 
Several other agreements consecrated the principle of keeping the 
boundary the same as -when Algeria was under the Turkish Regency. 
However, because the territorial separation between pre-colonial Algeria 
and the Moroccan kingdom was unclear, the delimitation of the frontiers 
proved difficult to establish. The treaty of Lalla Maghnia of March 18, 
1845 provided for a detailed delineation of only over a 150 kilometre 
line from the Medi terr anean coast to Teniet A1 Sassi in the Atlas 
Mountains, while the area stretching from the peak of Teniet A1 Sassi 
southwards to Figuig was not demarcated because of the infertility of the 
land. Beyond Figuig the delimitation of the border was believed 
superfluous since it was an uninhabitable desert. In 1912, the French 
established an administrative frontier known as the Varnier line between 
Teniet A1 Sassi and Tindonf. From there, the line veered westwards and 
subsequently lined southward to a point west of Igli, but beyond this the 
frontier remained undefined. 1
Brownlie, Ji African boundaries: a legal and diplomatic 
encyclopaedia (London and Berkeley, Hurst, 1979).
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The basic idea of Moroccan territorial claims was that sizeable parts 
of the 19th century Sherifian empire which France occupied in 1912 had 
been "purely and simply attached to the administrative zone of the 
Algerian south and south-west".^ On geographical scale. Moroccan
irredentism was made clearer by the map of greater Morocco issued in 
November 1955 by Allal A1 Fasi the leader of the Istiqlal party. See Map 
IV 2. According to this plan, Morocco's historic frontiers did not rest 
on geography or politics but on traditional Islamic concepts by which a 
territory is defined on the basis of allegiance of the community of
believers (umma) to the spiritual leadership (Dar al Islam). Conse­
quently, the present borders of Morocco should be extended to conform to 
the historical frontiers of the Sherifian kingdom and would then include 
the vallees of Saoura and Tindouf in Algeria; Mauritania; Timbuctu in 
Mali and the Western (Spanish) Sahara. The claims made by King Hassan 
corresponded to the limitations indicated in Fasi's map although it had 
not been acknowledged officially as such.
As with Morocco, the frontiers of Algeria with Tunisia, Libya, Niger 
and Mali had been demarcated in the time of French colonisation.
Tunisia's southernmost point was kilometre stone 222 as fixed by the
French administration. In 1957, President Bourguiba claimed rights over 
the uninhabited desert south of the line between Fort Saint (222) and Bir 
Romane and proposed an extension of his country's territory south from 
Bir Romane to about 30° N on the parallel near marker 233 south of
Ghadames. In his plans the prolongation of Tunisia's territory about 35 
kilometres west of marker 222 would give Tunisia a greater access to El 
Borma oilfield in the same area. As in the case of Morocco, the oil
'lldssan, King: the challenge (MacMillan, London, 1978,)
p . 87 .
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prospects and mineral deposits which the Sahara was believed to be well 
endowed with, had urged Algeria's neighbours to make claims so as to 
obtain a share in this promising wealth.
The Saharan borders in which Mali and Niger had been concerned were 
annexed by France on December 24, 1902 and were administered as units of 
the "territoires du Sud Algerien". In June 1905, the French authorities 
formally separated the territories from French West Africa and on June 
20, 1909 a line between Algeria and Niger on the one hand and with 
Mauritania on the other was defined by a convention known as the Niamey 
convention.
With Libya, the Franco-Turkish convention of May 19,1910 provided for 
the delimitation of the 35 kilometres long section frontier which 
stretched from Fort Saint mark 220 to southwest Ghadames (mark 233). 
The treaty of friendship signed by the French government and the Libyan 
kingdom in October 1955 confirmed this alignment and delineated the 
section between Ghadames and Ghat which was delimited with more details 
in the exchange of letters of December 26, 1956 between the French
government and the Libyan Prime Minister. However beyond Ghat, the line 
stretching southward to the Niger Tripoint still remained on terms which 
were not clearly dealt with in the exchange of notes of September 12, 
1919 between the French government and Italy which was then in control of 
Libya. Against the claims made by Morocco and Tunisia especially, the 
Algerian leaders had shown no disposition to question the delimitation of 
her frontiers on two distinct levels:
emotionally: the Algerians referred to the historical fact that 
Algeria existed as a distinct entity under Numidia and during the Turkish 
rule as a territorial ensemble geographically similar to the present
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state* Despite its unclear legal connotations, this argunent rests on 
subjective feelings given the lack of historical evidence and the 
inexistence of Algeria as a distinct nation-state unit for much of its 
pre-ottoman era. According to the Algerian leaders, the symbolic but 
sacred value of the principle of Algeria's territorial integrity and 
state security was inherent in the heavy price the Algerian people paid 
to revive its nation and restore its state in a historically determined 
territory. Combining rhetoric and firmness, Bouteflika declared: "It 
has been historically established that Algeria's present frontiers have 
been historically the blood of almost one and a half million martyrs. It 
also happened that the atrocities of the war were prolonged in Algeria 
because of the fundamental problem of the integrity of our territory. 
These are questions that no authority can tackle without bearing 
prejudice to the principle defining an independent and sovereign state." ^ 
As it appears the intimate link between the state and its boundaries is 
well established as it constituted the raison d'etre for independence and 
sovereignty and the framework for nation-state building. In their 
experience of an independent country, the Algerians came to realize that 
neither the consolidation of the state nor the cohesion of the nation 
could be ensured without the search for maximising national security and 
territorial integrity. For a leadership which was fighting for the 
revival of the Algerian nation and for restoring the Algerian state and
for a new country that had emerged to ensure these tasks, territorial
integrity became the fundamental pillar to embody both the nation and the 
state. These motivations had been in fact the crux of Algeria's existence
as such and not a mere selfishness or arrogance of having inherited a
1Quoted in Africa Research B u l l e t i n , January 1-31, 1967,
p .6 96 B .
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vast territory well endowed with natural resources and human potential 
for which she was accused by Morocco and Tunisia. It was out of the 
nation-state perceptions that Algerian nationalism, which had been built 
on ideological considerations, takes its material basis and form. On 
this ground one clearly understands why "frontiers are the razor's edge 
on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or 
death to nations ... just as the protection of the home is the most vital 
care of the private citizens, so the integrity of her border is the 
condition of the existence of the state. It was precisely this form
of existence that the Algerians came to defend with persistence and 
determination ever since they embarked upon the struggle for independ­
ence.
legally: the principle Algeria defended was the respect for the 
inviolability of the frontiers inherited from colonialism which was 
consecrated for Africa with the signing of the OAU charter in April 1953.
The implicit assumption was to keep the boundaries traced in colonial 
times in order not to create scrambles from reviving old territorial 
claims. In these views, the feeling was that attempts to remedy the 
haphazard demarcation of boundaries may lead to a multitude of conflicts 
which may jeopardise the newly gained independence of a number of African 
countries. Realism then prevailed over considerations as all the OAU 
member states subscribed to the inviolability of frontiers with the 
exceptions notably of Morocco which had made firm reserves on the basis 
of its territorial irredention and opposition to the 'uti posidetis' 
principle consecrated by the OAU.^ For the Algerians, the infringement
'lord Curzon of Kedleston: Frontiers, the Romanes lectures, 
Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1907), p.7.
For Moroccan legal conceptions, see Maazouzi, M: L'Algérie 
et les étapes successives de l'amputation du territoire
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of the principle would only have negative implications on other African 
states as well. As Bouteflika put it: "to wish to impose unilaterally 
the least revision of the Algerian-Moroccan border is without a doubt a 
precedent of an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future of many African 
states."^
On the basis of combing legal argument with concerns of nationhood, 
Algeria had always expressed her support for the inviolability of 
frontiers and thus to the state's territorial integrity in cases 
involving other countries. Therefore she expressed hostility to 
secessionist attempts such as those in Katanga or Biafra. In both 
cases, the Algerian leaders reaffirmed their support to the central 
governments and attacked African states which had recognized these 
secessionist movements lumping them with "imperialist plotters".’ 
Moreover, it was the hostility to territorial disintegration that 
explained Algeria's backing to Ethiopa's efforts to maintain its 
sovereignty over Eritrea and Ogaden regions as well her resentment to the 
separation of Bengladesh from Pakistan in 1971 or to the attempts of the 
Kurds to create their own country distinct from the rest of Irak.
Morocain (Dar El Kilab, Casablanca, 1976, 244p.), El Oauli,
A: "L'uti-posidetls ou le non-sens du principe de base de 
l'OUA pour le règlement des différends territoriaux" 
(colloque Association Morocaine d'Etudes et de Recherches 
internationales" in collaboration with the department of 
public law, Casablanca, April 19B4).
^Speech before the emergency conference of the OAU council 
of Ministers, Addis Abeba, November 15-25, 1963 quoted in
"De Bamako à A d d i s ", Ministry of national orientation, 
Algiers, March 1964.
Opening speech, fifth OAU Summit Conference, Algiers, 
September 13, 1968 , in Les Discours du Présidant, (2), pp. 155- 163 .
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Recent turmoils in India and Sri Lanka were also disapproved of by the 
Algerian leaders, accusing the Sikhs and the Tamil of putting the 
territorial integrity of these two countries at risk.^
When it came to preserving her own territorial integrity and state's 
security, Algeria's reaction was one of sheer intransigence and 
determination.
B. Preserving Algeria's status in the Maghreb 
1 • The defense of territorial integrity
The threats to Algeria's territorial integrity arose when during the 
war of liberation, France attempted to salvage her hold on the Sahara 
regardless of the political settlement of the Algerian question. This 
move came after the discovery of huge oil deposits in the Saharan desert, 
shortly after the beginning of the Algerian insurrection. Thus in order 
to secure this considerable wealth necessary for the energy independence 
of France, the French government tried to provide the Sahara with a 
status distinct from the rest of Algeria by creating on January 1957 the 
Ministry for the Sahara and the organization of the Saharan regions, 
OCRS.
The sudden riches of the Sahara lured the neighbouring countries and 
encouraged them to demand shares on the basis that France had in the past 
amputated their respective territories in favour of Algeria. Niger soon 
agreed to join the OCRS, thus helping France to internationalize the 
question of the Sahara.
*For these criticisms see "La provocation Sikh, 1 'escalade 
Tamoule" in E l - M o u d j a h i d , May 14, 1985
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As expected the FLN was adamant about preserving the total integrity 
of the Algerian territory and moved to seek international support in an 
effort to keep the Sahara under Algerian sovereignty and prevent it from 
being "a new Katanga".^ Several delegations were then sent to Rabat, 
Conakry, Bamako, Benghazi and Cairo to defend the principle of territo­
rial integrity. These attempts were quite successful as in 1961 all of 
Mali, Ghana and Senegal approved of the Algerian request while at their 
meeting held in Yaounde in March 1961, the bloc of moderate African 
states (the Brazzaville group) rejected France's plan to keep the Sahara 
under French sovereignty.
The diplomatic offensive launched by the FLN resulted from the 
decision of the French government to keep the issue of the Sahara 
separate from the rest of the Algerian question during the negotiations 
it had with the GPRA in July 1961. These negotiations broke down
following the insistence of the Algerian delegation that the Sahara is an 
integral part of Algeria and that it would not make any territorial 
concessions. The confrontation between the two sides was passionate and 
harsh as reflected by the clash between Saad Dahlab a member of the GPRA 
delegation and Louis Joxe France's chief negotiator. The argument
developed by the latter was that the Sahara was created artificially by 
France and that it never had any connection with Algeria whether 
historically or geographically. To counter any attempt at partition the 
FLN called a general strike in Algeria in early July and the violence 
that erupted highlighted the bitter rivalry between the Algerian 
nationalists and the French government. Amid this conflict. President 
Bourguiba urged the latter to accept a rectification in the delimitation
1El-Moudjahld, June 4, 1961.
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of the Sahara to give Tunisia a share in the areas where oil discoveries 
were made. And in the aftermath of Bizerte crisis of July 1961 Tunisian 
troops moved to seize posts situated in the Algerian territory. However 
Bourguiba's attempts to revive his claims were doomed to failure with De 
Gaulle's acceptance of Algerian territorial integrity in return for 
privileged relations between France and independent Algeria as agreed 
upon at the final round of negotiations at Evian in March 1962.
On its part, Morocco informed the GPRA of its territorial demands but 
in contrast to Tunisia, it accepted an agreement with Ferhat Abbas on 
July 6, 1961 through which it accepted the principle that the border
dispute will be peacefully settled after Algeria's independence. See 
Document IV 3. But shortly after this event, contingents of the ALN 
moved to regain posts which Moroccan and Tunisian troops had occupied in 
order to enhance their bargaining position. The Moroccans had in fact 
occupied the main posts on the Bechai— Tindouf axis on the basis that 
their inhabitants had paid allegiance to the Moroccan King although 
voting in favour of Algerian independence during the July 1962 refer­
endum. Moreover, King Hassan claimed that the Algerian troops killed 
all the members of a tribe in the Tindouf area who had expressed their 
Moroccanity, as well as 120 Moroccan nationals, despite the efforts of 
his envoys to Algiers to halt this fratricidal conflict.16 But for the 
Algerians, these incidents resulted from a manoeuvre to take over Tindouf 
while Algeria was facing a leadership crisis. Ben Bella then accused 
Morocco as well as Tunisia of trying to profit from his country's 
weaknesses so as to undermine the State foundations his regime was 
attempting to establish. Territorial claims made by these two countries
16 King Hassan: t he c h a l l e n q e , p .8 3
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were bitterly resented by the Ben Bella government in the sense that they 
contributed to diverting its attention frcxn crucial and acute domestic 
problems that followed the transfer of power from the colonial era. 
Therefore when Hassan came to Algiers in mid-March 1963 to remind of the 
agreement signed with the GPRA in 1961, Ben Bella was anxious to delay 
discussions over the border issue. He demanded from the Moroccan King
time to set up state institutions and strengthen his power at home before 
opening any negotiations. In doing so, the Algerian leader was in fact 
only trying to delay indefinitely these negotiations, being determined 
not to make any territorial concessions. This determination explained 
his adamant refusal to respond to the call made in April 1963 by 
Niger's President Diori suggesting that Algeria should convene a 
conference of all the Saharan countries to lay the bases for their joint 
exploitation of the desert resources in collaboration with France. 
Moreover, Ben Bella demanded in May the postponement of the meeting of 
the Casablanca group scheduled to take place in Algiers in a deliberate 
attempt to avoid another confrontation with Morocco over the border 
question. Morocco's insistence, however, did not stop and tensions 
between the two sides mounted when, in August 1963, Algiers expelled 
hundreds of Moroccans residing in Algeria while Rabat replied by sending 
home a certain number of Algerian merchants. A hostile public and press 
campaign against each other followed with Ben Bella accusing the King of 
supporting the Kabyle rebellion against his regime. In early October, 
the Algerian government ordered its troops to dislodge the Moroccan 
forces who had occupied the posts of Hassi Beida and Tinjoub. Bloody 
skirmishes occurred amid exchanges of hateful accusations and criticisms, 
before appeals to negotiations were made.
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Burdened by political dissidence at home and weakened by the lack of 
military capabilities of the Algerian army, Ben Bella favoured a 
negotiated solution to the border dispute but on the basis of the respect 
of the status-quo. His Foreign Minister met the Moroccan counterpart 
Guedira at Oujda on October 3 with the recommendation to reach an 
understanding with Morocco to avoid the continuation of the fratricidal 
clash between the two countries. At this conference Morocco agreed to 
withdraw its troops from the border, with the two sides accepting the 
normalization of relations-, the principle of a meeting between Ben Bella 
and Hassan in Algiers in the near future and the setting up of a joint 
commission to discuss the frontier problems. But when - this commission 
met at Oujda on October 15, the gap separating the positions of the two 
countries remained hard to bridge. Summoned by the Boumedienne-led 
General Staff, the Algerian delegates contended that a new frontier 
should be legalized in conformity with the map drawn during colonial 
times. Further negotiations took place at Marrakesh on October 17,
however without success, because the Algerians refused a ceasefire which
involved territorial concessions in favour of Morocco. Clashes between 
the troops of the two sides were resumed with greater severity and
tenacity.
To halt this conflict, the Emperor of Ethiopa and then the President 
of Mali offered their good offices proposing direct negotiations between 
the leaders of the two belligerent countries. After hesitating, Ben
Bella finally agreed to hold talks with King Hassan. The meeting which 
took place in Bamako on October 19-20 under the auspices of Haile 
Selassie and Modibo Keita, resulted in the acceptance by Algeria and 
Morocco of a series of recommendations, the most important being: an
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immediate ceasefire, a demilitarized zone between the two countries, and 
the convening of an emergency meeting of the OAU council of Ministers 
with the mission to set up a commission that would make proposals for 
settling the dispute. As scheduled the meeting was held in Addis Ababa
on November 15-18 and an ad hoc commission was set up with representa­
tives from three radical countries: Mali, Sudan and Tanganyka and three 
moderates: Ethiopa, Ivory-Coast and Senegal.
Apparently the commission succeeded in convincing Algeria and Morocco 
to end hostilities and attenuate the tension which resulted from their 
border disputes. Indeed in early December the two countries resumed 
diplomatic relations but Algeria postponed the exchange of Ambassadors 
demanding first the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Hassi-Beida and 
Tinjoub. After a series of negotiations, an agreement was reached on 
February 20, 1964 by which Algeria agreed to withdraw her troops from the 
Moroccan town Figuig in exchange for the return of the Royal forces to 
the positions they held before October 1, 1963. Moreover, the area around 
Figuig was to be demilitarized and a no-man's land was to be established 
along the common border with the help of the OAU ad hoc committee. On 
May 29 a joint commission set up at an Ambassadorial level met and 
announced that the two sides had agreed to resume free passage of persons 
across the common border, to let nationals of the two countries who had 
been expelled during the October 1963 hostilities return to their 
previous residences and to compensate those who had been victims of 
expulsion measures.
This new climate in Al gerian-Mor ocean relations was also possible 
with the desire of Ben Bella to ease tensions in the Maghreb in 
anticipation of the Afro-Asian conference Algiers was to host in
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mid-1965. Thus he accredited a new Ambassador to Rabat (Ferhat Hamida) 
and succeeded in bringing the Moroccan government to sign a trade and 
customs treaty on November 25 with the promise to exploit jointly the raw 
materials around the adjacent Saharan area under dispute. In emphasiz­
ing economic cooperation, the Algerian president was anxious to dispel 
Morocco's hostility to the territorial status quo as he was convinced 
what this country and Tunisia had in fact eyed most had been only a mere 
share in the Saharan wealth. In this context of detente, Ben Bella and 
Hassan met at Saida on May 12, 1965 being determined as they claimed to
maintain this new spirit and new relationships.
After Ben Bella's downfall in June 1965, both Morocco and Tunisia 
made pressing demands on the new Algerian regime to enter negotiations 
over the border issue. However, Boumedienne began to show a firmer 
attitude than his predecessor since he reaffirmed on many occasions the 
sacred character of Algeria's territorial integrity thus rejecting any 
attempts that aimed at altering the demarcation of Algeria's frontiers 
inherited from the colonial period. The nationalization of all iron-ore 
mines on May 8 1966 left no doubt over his determination to preserve
Algerian sovereignty over the territory claimed by Tunis or Rabat. And to 
protect the newly nationalized mines in the Tindouf area, the Algerian 
troops carried out imposing military manoeuvres around Merkala. 
Immediately after, the Moroccan government accused Algeria of occupying 
parts of the demilitarized zone in violation of the October 1963 
ceasefire agreements. Apparently the Algerians were not impressed with 
Hassan's declaration on May 18 that his country would not renounce its 
rights and promptly turned down his demands for revising their measures 
of nationalization, carried by Moroccan envoys to Algiers on May 20.
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However, the fact that Morocco denied rumours of a visit made to Rabat by 
Major Zerguini a close aide of Boumedienne attested the effect of 
Algeria's strength and intransigence on the Moroccan leadership. In 
fact the latter abstained from adopting an aggressive attitude, 
preferring instead a meeting of the OAU ad hoc commission to discuss the 
new developments in its border dispute with Algeria.
The commission met at Addis on May 30, but no progress was made as 
the Algerians refused to enter any negotiations involving their country's 
territorial integrity and security. And not surprisingly, they opposed 
a proposal made in August to attend a summit conference with Morocco and 
three members of the OAU ad hoc committee.
Nevertheless, the irredentist claims of Morocco and Tunisia remained 
unalterable. In early January 1967 unsuccessful negotiations took place 
between military delegations from Algeria and Tunisia and in March an 
acute tension with Morocco arose following severe criticisms made by King 
Hassan against Algeria. This new controversy -highlighting a sharp
rivalry between Algeria and Morocco with regard to supremacy on the 
regional level - came with Morocco's fears of an increase in Algeria's 
economic power and military capabilities as Hassan demanded a control by 
the United Nations of arms potentials in the Maghrebi countries.’ This 
initiative was deplored by the Foreign Minister Bouteflika, as the 
Algerians were anxious to strengthen their military potential in the face 
of Morocco's irrendentist claims.
To divert the attention ff-om this issue and avoid discussing the 
border problem, the Algerians carefully placed the confrontation with 
Rabat and Tunis on ideological ground opposing their socialist experience
'speech's excerpts quoted in Le Monde March 5, 1967.
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to the tyranny of feudal Morocco and reactionary Tunisia. They also 
attacked the relations existing between Rabat and Tunis and the USA and 
accused Washington of building bases in the neighbouring countries 
"directly menacing Algeria’s security” .1 The Algerians did not miss the 
occasion to depict the US as a crucial element in the plot fomented 
against the Algerian revolution since relations between Algiers and 
Washington were in a doldrum following the partial nationalization of 
American oil interests in Algeria and the failure to conclude a deal over 
wheat. The polarisation of the Maghreb around ideological divergences and 
border disputes was aggravated by the radical foreign policy Algeria 
followed in contradiction with the standpoints of her neighbours. 
Boumedienne attended the summit conference of the Heads of progressive 
African states in Cairo in April and Algiers hosted a meeting of African 
revolutionary parties in May. On his part King Hassan visited
Washington in February, Teheran and Ryaih in May.
These ideological cleavages led each Maghrebi country to express 
support to the opposition movement of the other. King Hassan publicly 
paid a tribute to Khider who was assassinated in Madrid perhaps under 
Boumedienne's orders and welcomed Rrim Belkacem, another opponent of the 
Algerian regime, in Casablanca in October 1967. President Bourguiba 
granted asylum to Colonel Tahar Zbiri after the latter's aborted coup 
against Boumedienne in December 1967. In reprisal, Algeria gave formal 
support to the Moroccan opposition and made allegations on the King's 
responsibility for the assassihation in France of the Moroccan leftwing 
militant Mehdi Ben Barka.
1.New York Time s , June 19, 1967 .
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There was no doubt that the Algerian regime bore the hostilities of 
the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes with a great deal of impatience and 
annoyance as it found itself unnecessarily diverted from carrying out the 
tasks of national economic development* The acuity of domestic issues 
were at that time the prevailing concern of the Boumedienne leaiership 
since its political legitimacy at home was yet to be established and the 
conflict with France over oil and gas resources had just begun.
2. The search for the settlement of the border disputes
By 1969, Boumedienne had succeeded in eliminating political forces 
hostile to his regime through purging the state apparatuses of Benbellist 
sympathisers and leftist technocrats as well as the army of ex- 
maquisards, many of whom disliked Morocco and Tunisia for their political 
conservatism. With the impulse of the technocratic team led by Abdeslam 
the Minister of economy, the Algerian leader moved to ease tension with 
Algeria's neighbours being convinced that an armed conflict with Morocco 
in particular would disrupt the country's ambitious economic development 
plan. Moreover as the oil conflict with France was crucial for the 
country's economic take-off, the technocratic group insisted on the 
preservation of national energies and the concentration of the government 
on the mobilization of the necessary resources. Abdeslam's argument was 
that an increase in Algeria's economic power would act as a capability in 
the country's dealings with its neighbours as economic supremacy would 
enhance its status in North Africa. Therefore, Boumedienne began to show 
a less hostile attitude to the .Moroccan and Tunisian regimes by adopting 
a global strategy that meant a halt in Algeria's support to the
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opposition movements in these countries and an increase of intra-Maghrebi 
economic cooperation to make a detente in the Maghreb effective and 
lasting.
This diplomatic overture led Bouteflika to visit Tripoli in February 
1969 and obtain the signature of a friendship treaty and in August he was 
able to conclude an agreement with the Libyans settling the frontier 
problem between the two countries. The official visit the Libyan Crown 
Prince Reda paid to Algiers in April was conceived by the Algerians as an 
evidence of their good will to ensure stability in the Maghreb and as an 
impetus for the further improvement of relations with Mauritania and 
Tunisia.^ With Mali, the visit of President Traore in late January 1970 
marked the consolidation of relationships between the two countries and 
their determination to take practical steps to demarcate the common 
boundary.
In contrast, this "offensive de charme" proved less easy with Tunisia 
because of the long time frontier dispute and hostilities between the two 
regimes. It was not until June 1, 1970 that the agreement signed in May 
1967 came to force as Bouteflika succeeded in inducing the Tunisians to 
accept a treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness valid for twenty 
years. Bourguiba in fact had hesitated to respond to Algerian offers of 
economic advantages in return for his abandonment of territorial claims 
but finally conceded to this formula because of his country's need for 
foreign revenues that would result from a share in Algeria's gas exports 
to Italy through the Tunisian territory. In addition, being squeezed 
between two powerful neighbours and threatened by the ambitions of 
Qadhafi who took power in Libya in 1969, little Tunisia had little choice
1Boumedienne speech in the address of Prince Reda, April 10,
1969 in 1e s Pi scour s , (2), pp. 307-308 .
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but engage in a rapprochement with Algeria while maintaining friendly 
relations with Libya as it lacked capabilities to play off Algiers 
against Tripoli especially when these two sides were coordinating their 
policies within the OPEC organization in spite of their rivalry for the 
leadership mantle in North Africa. Against this background Boumedienne 
and Bourguiba exchanged state visits in April and May 1972 to symbolize 
detente in the Maghreb.
Having resolved her problem with Tunisia the weaker side in 
comparison with other Maghrebi states, Algeria turned her attention to 
Morocco. The first step was to switch off support to the Moroccan
opponents of King Hassan, in contrast to Qaihafi who depicted the 
Monarchy as a target of Libya's revolutionary Panarabism. The second 
step was the contribution to the Moroccan-Mauritanian rapprochement which 
resulted in the official recognition of the independence of Mauritania by 
Morocco in 1969. The Algerian leadership regarded the latter's
abandoning of territorial claims over Mauritania as the triumph of 
realism on the basis of the respect of the OAU's principle of the 
inviolability of frontiers. But conversely, the Algerians were afraid 
that the settlement of the dispute between Rabat and Nouakchott would 
provide King Hassan with more incentives to concentrate his claims over 
parts of the Algerian territory and the Spanish Sahara.
To anticipate this possibility Boumedienne attempted to lure Hassan 
with the assurance of non-interference in Moroccan domestic affairs and 
with the benefits Morocco could muster through an economic cooperation 
with Algeria. In mid-January 1969, the two leaders met at Ifrane where 
they agreed on a treaty of peace, brotherhood, good neighbourliness and 
cooperation dictated by "the long-standing historical ties between the
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two countries and two peoples".^ On his side, Hassan proposed to drop 
his territorial claims in return for Algeria's endorsement of his claims 
over the Western Sahara. Apparently he wanted to push Boumedienne into 
a settlement that would favour the Moroccan stand probably because he 
expected to reach an agreement with the Spanish government with whom he 
was having contacts at high levels.^ But having seemingly failed in his 
bargain with Madrid, King Hassan had no better choice but to seek an 
understanding with Algeria with regard to the border dispute and over the 
Spanish Sahara. Evidently Boumedienne was not prepared to let Morocco 
outmanoeuvre Algeria on the issue of the decolonization of this territory 
and hurried to respond to Hassan's offer of dialogue. The two leaders 
met at Tlemcen on May 27and then at Nouadhibou in September along with 
the Mauritanian president Ould Daddah in an apparent friendly atmosphere.
But behind the euphoria of such encounters, mutual suspicion was not 
completely alleviated. Unlike Boumedienne, domestic pressures on Hassan 
were intense in the sense that he could neither force the issue through 
an armed conflict with Algeria or with Spain nor could he make more 
concessions without putting his own crown in jeopardy. In the context of 
discontent in the army, increase of partisanship activities against the 
palace, Hassan's room for manoeuvre seemed very limited. Boumedienne was 
aware of that and intended to benefit from the King's dilemma. Thus at 
the Tlemcen meeting of May 1970, an agreement favourable to Algeria was
^The treaty was signed .on January 15, 1969 at the Royal
palace of Ifrane between Bouteflika and his Moroccan
counterpart Ahmed El Iraqi (see United Nations Treaty, 
series 479139, vol. 703, 1969) p p . 332-6. See Document IV
4 .2Notably the visit of the Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo to 
Rabat, May 4-6, 1970 - for the joint communique of the 
Tlemcen meeting see Annuaire de l'Afrique du N o r d , 1970,
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reached as the two sides agreed to set up a mixed commission to demarcate 
the common frontier from Figuig to Tindouf it being understood that the 
definitive line would not alter the de facto border. Thus Algeria's 
control over the Gara-Djebilet mines was established although the two 
parties agreed to exploit jointly its mineral resources. This agreement 
was signed by the two leaders in Rabat on June 15, 1972 during the OAU
summit held in the Moroccan capital. Boumedienne was amply satisfied 
with this accord and did not miss the opportunity to use the framework of 
the Panafrican organization to stress the solemnity of the ratification 
of these conventions. And in return for Moroccan concessions, the
Algerian president promised to aid the King in forcing Spain to proceed 
to the decolonization of the Western Sahara. However Boumedienne's
optimism did not last since the ratification of this convention by the 
Moroccan parliament was delayed indefinitely because of mounting 
pressures from Moroccan military establishment and opposition parties 
generally hostile to Algeria. Indeed Hassan escaped an assassination 
attempt on August 16, 1972, less than a year after the aborted coup of 
Skhirat of June 1971. Boumedienne realized the implications of these 
pressures on Algerian-Morocean relations as he became aware that a change 
of the regime in Rabat might bring a more radical leadership which would 
be more intransigent over the border issue than King Hassan. Thus, 
Boumedienne was among the first to greet Hassan after he escaped the 
assassination attempt.
To ensure a good relationship with Morocco and a detente in the 
Maghreb, Algeria displayed intensive efforts to increase economic 
cooperation with her neighbours as the emphasis on economic issue would 
help transcend border problems and political differences. In Algerian
conceptions, intra-Maghrebi cooperation did not mean regional economic 
integration but merely developing economic links on bilateral basis and 
setting up joint projects. Just like the unity of the Maghreb, the 
principle of regional integration was rejected by the Algerians on the 
grounds of the incompatibility between their own political orientations 
and economic model of development and those of their neighbours. To 
sustain their arguments, they referred to the failure of early attempts 
to bring about an institutional framework for regional economic 
integration. In 1966 .the ministers of the four Maghrebi states
established a Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM) with headquarters 
in Tunis to work out a system of regional preference' and agreed on 
coordinating national policies on exports and industrialization. To be 
effective and operational the CPCM was provided with a centre for 
industrial stuiies endowed with financial and technical assistance from a 
United Nations development programme. However, beyond marked diffei—  
ences in the political orientations of the various regimes, economic 
integration proved difficult since each of them feared that such an 
integrative process would disrupt its own economic programme and 
undermine its teething industries. This economic nationalism explained 
the reluctance to work for the shifting of trade barriers, duplicate 
industries and for subordinating domestic projects to supranational 
designs. More than her neighbours, Algeria refused to subscribe to the 
CPCM's recommendations an customs tariffs on the basis of state control 
over foreign capital. Thus, she refused to associate with either
Moroccan or Tunisian industrial companies because their capital was 
largely dominated by foreign sources. In the conceptions of the
minister of economy Abdeslam, a Maghrebi product or an industrial good is
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Maghrebi when "at least half of its value comes from one of the three 
countries, should it concern the raw material itself or the additional 
value obtained after its transformation." 1
In the context of building a sound economic infrastructure and 
strengthening a nationally-oriented economic development, Algeria then 
did not accept the principle of regional integration because it might 
restrain her efforts to obtain foreign technology and assistance 
necessary for the implementation of capital intensive industries and to 
win markets for her hydrocarbons exports. Economic nationalism of the 
state technocracy seemed to have prevailed over unity ideals since this 
stratum believed that the country's economic potential would make Algeria 
the central power in the Maghreb and to achieve this objective Abdeslam's 
technocratic team relied upon the success of its economic experience and 
model which it conceived as a means to challenge liberal economic 
experiences carried out by Morocco and Tunisia.
Instead of regional integration, Algeria appealed for an increase in 
intra-Maghrebi trade on bilateral as well as multilateral basis and 
through the setting up of common economic projects which would enhance 
economic cooperation between the Maghreb countries without subordinating 
domestic economic sovereignty. Consequently the existence of the CPCM 
seemed fruitless as highlighted by the fact that its ministerial 
conference of July 20, 1970 which took place three years after the last
2ministerial session was itself delayed eight times.
^Quoted in A. Doucy and K. Monheim: 
Alqérlennes (paris. Fayard, 1971), p.258. 
Jeune Afrique ,August 11, 1970, p.24.
les revolutions
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The most important joint project Algeria proposed was back in October 
1964 concerning the construction of two gas pipelines, one to Sicilia 
through Tunisian territory and the other to France through Morocco and 
Spain. In return both of her neighbours were promised shares in the 
exported gas as well as financial inducements. However divergences and 
conflicts between Algeria and her partners as analysed earlier as well as 
tensions which occurred later severely impaired this project as only the 
pipeline to Sicilia was built and completed in 1983 after a long delay.
On bilateral basis Algeria's trade with her neighbours remained very 
low despite several agreements and despite the fact that by 1968, Algeria 
became Morocco's chief trading partner in Africa thanks to oil exports. 
With Tunisia nine economic conventions were signed in 1969 but were only 
partially implemented. Nevertheless, Algeria benefitted from the
disposal of 400 Tunisian teachers and technicians in 1970, while a joint 
project concerning the building of a cement plant near A1 Borma which was 
finally completed in late 1975.^ Most significant was Algeria helping 
Mauritania financially to create its own national currency (ouguiya), 
nationalize its steel company (Miferma) and revise its economic 
agreements with France. However the attempts to increase intra-Maghrebi 
cooperation after an era of detente in the Maghreb 1969-1973, were 
inevitably altered with conflicts between Algeria and her neighbours as 
crystallized by the Western Sahara conflict.
 ^E l - D j e i c h , August, 
1972, p p .8-10.
1975, p.14, also Jeune A f r i q u e , May 6
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C. The Lingering Impact of the Western Sahara conflict 
1 • Implications for Algeria's security and status
Until 1974, a Maghrebi consensus on the basis of the decolonization 
of the Western Sahara seemed to have been reached at the meetings between 
the leaders of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania at Nouadhibou on September 
14, 1970 and then at Agadir on July 23-24, 1973. But the consensus did 
not conceal the existence of disagreement over the future of this 
territory. Both Morocco and Mauritania attempted to bring the Spanish 
Sahara under their sovereignty on the basis of their historical claims 
while Algeria favoured the decolonization of this territory. Antagonism 
between the two sides sharpened and tension mounted when Boumedienne 
deliberately moved to undermine the efforts of King Hussain and Ould 
Daddah to acquire a hold over the Western Sahara. Critics of the
Algerian regime argued that Boumedienne attempted to use the question of 
the Sahara as a subtle means to emerge as the champion of the peoples' 
right for self-determination so as to divert the attention of Algerians 
from pressing economic problems which became acute after the euphoria of 
the oil revenues boom of 1973-74. It was also reported that the
Algerian president saw a good occasion to avenge the defeat of his army
during the 1963 conflict. However, these arguments were less important 
in comparison to what it was believed were Boumedienne's conceptions that 
the establishment of an independent Saharawi state, closely linked to
Algeria might provide the Algerians with a share in the Sahara's mineral 
resources and also with the long-desired corridor to the Atlantic.
Beyond those arguments lay the belief that Boumedienne' s design was 
contrary to the formal engagement the Algerian president made earlier 
through which he was supposed to have given his blessings to the
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partition of the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco providing 
that the latter abandoned his claims to Algeria's territory. In a speech 
in November 1977, Boumedienne dismissed all these allegations and 
particularly the assumption that he had concluded a bargain with King 
Hassan over the Western Sahara. He stated that "the Moroccan King 
pretends on every occasion that I have a commitment with him. The truth 
is that I never had mercantile intentions vis-a-vis a just cause based on 
sacred principles. I am a militant and not a corrupt politician."'
Officially the Algerian government made clear that he had no claim 
whatsoever on this territory and regarded its issue as exclusively 
relevant to the decolonization principle to which Algeria had always 
subscribed. And the support to the Polisario Front which was fighting 
for the independence of the Sahara, it was claimed, stemmed from 
Algeria's own experience of the war of liberation and from her adhesion 
to the people's right to self-determination as framed in the United 
Nations charter.
The consideration whether the Western Sahara problem was a real issue 
of decolonization and whether the Polisario front was a genuine national 
liberation movement were not of vital importance in the eyes of 
Boumedienne since what mattered most was perhaps to deny Morocco a source 
of power that might enable it to challenge Algeria's territorial 
integrity and status in the area. Against this background, the
diametrically opposed attitudes of Algeria and Morocco over the Western 
Sahara highlighted that their rivalry has not been ideological as much as 
a struggle for power and supremacy - be it economic or military. Thus
'important speech given on November 14, 1977 on the occasion
of nominating Colonel Yahaoui Head of the FLN, (in Le s
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Algeria's major concern has been the fear that Morocco having completed 
its take-over of the Saharan territory would revive its old claims over 
the Tindouf area, this time in a much better position than before. In 
this vein, the perceived danger was that the take-over of this territory 
would provide Morocco with a power configuration that would surpass 
Algeria's economic and military capabilities in the foreseeable future. 
The possibility proved likely when in the aftermath of the 1973-74 energy 
crisis, Morocco became the world's major exporter of phosphates as its 
annual production increased to 18 million tonnes and its exports rose 
from $150 million to more than $1 billion. It was perhaps evident in 
Boumedienne's conceptions that with the huge mineral resources of the 
Western Sahara, Morocco's economic prospects would become brighter than 
before and thus seriously challenge Algeria's well-established economic 
supremacy in the Maghreb.^
The preservation of Algeria's integrity and centrality in the Maghreb 
have been the reasons behind the support of her leadership to the 
decolonization of the Western Sahara ever since she became independent. 
Indeed, Bouteflika handed a memorandum on the decolonization of this 
territory before the meeting of the OAU's liberation committee held in 
Addis in 1963 and in November 1965, the Algerian delegate to the United
Nations Bouattoura considered the future of Spanish Sahara "of vital
2interest to Algeria and to the stability in North Africa.' There was
no doubt that in Algerian views, decolonization should in no case
^ i t h  the inclusion of the Sahara, Morocco would control 
nearly 75 per cent of current world reserves of phosphates. 
^Declaration to the XXIth session of the General Assembly 
December 14, 1966 (in La question du S a h a r a , Permanent 
Mission of Algeria to the United Nations New York), p.146; 
see also El-Moud j ah l d , November 7 , 1966 .
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"jeopardize the balance of power in this region."1 The implicit concern 
had been to prevent Morocco from gaining a substantial territorial 
advantage had Spain decided to proceed to the decolonization of her 
Saharan colony. Already in March 1967, the Algerian government attempted 
(through contacts between Bouttoura and the Spanish Ambassador to 
Algiers) to induce the Spanish government to proceed to a referendum vote 
in its Saharan territory. At the same time it sought and received 
support from Mauritania in this enterprise following the strengthening of 
relations between Algiers, and Nouakchott as President Ould Daddah was 
seeking Algeria's backing in his efforts to obtain the recognition of the 
independence of his country by Morocco. Obviously, the Algerians wished 
the issue to be settled in line with a referendum conducted under the 
auspices of the United Nations. Thus they gave a warm welcome to the 
initiative of its Secretary-Gener al when he visited Algiers, Rabat, 
Nouakchott and Madrid in 1975. In parallel, they maintained contacts 
with Morocco and Mauritania thus confirming Algeria's desire to keep 
dialogue and concentration going in the hope of seeing this issue solved 
through peaceful means. Therefore on July 2-4, 1975, Bouteflika made a 
trip to Rabat to ensure understanding with Morocco on the basis of the 
resolution endorsed by the two countries over the Western Sahara and on 
the principle of strengthening detente in the Maghreb. See Document IV 5. 
Despite these basic assumptions, the context of the talks between 
Bouteflika and King Hassan still remains unclear but many political 
observers believed that the Algerian Foreign Minister approved of the
'Declaration of Algeria's representative to the United
Nations A. Rahal before the meeting of the Security
Council, October 22, 1977 in 'Resolution sur le
Sahara occidental (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algiers)
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partition of the former Spanish colony between Morocco and Mauritania in 
return for the ratification by Morocco of a previous agreement by which 
it accepted the de facto delimitation of the common border.
However, in face of King Hassan’s desire to bring the whole of the 
Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, the Algerian president 
disapproved of the efforts of his foreign minister to ensure a compromise 
and a certain equilibrium with Morocco. In response to the discreet 
negotiations Hassan was conducting with the Spanish government, 
Boumedienne charged Bedjaoui his ambassador to Paris to defend the right 
of the Saharawi people for self-determination before the international 
court which both Morocco and Mauritania had asked to decide whether the 
Sahara had been a res nullius (belonging to no-one) at the time of 
Spain's colonization. Boumedienne certainly feared Hassan1 s option for 
outmanoeuvring Algeria on the diplomatic and legal front, although the 
Moroccan King Solemnly declared that he would respect the court's 
verdict. Thus, he moved to set contacts with other members of the 
Spanish government which favoured the principle of a referendum in the 
Sahara. It was then with Boumedienne's blessings that a secret meeting 
took place in Algiers on September 9 between the Polisario's Secretary- 
General Sayed A1 Ouali and Cortina Y Mauri the Spanish foreign minister 
who was in opposition to the Moroccan lobby led by Arrias Navarro the 
Prime Minister and Jose Solis, the President of the right-wing "movimiento 
nacional". Apparently, Boumedienne expected his
diplomatic game to succeed, especially after the boost given by the 
verdict the international court issued on October 16 which stated that 
although there had been legal ties of allegiance between same Western
Sahara tribes and Morocco and Mauritania, these ties did not amount to
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establishing their territorial sovereignty. But his tactics soon
received a blow when King Hassan announced on October 21, his intention 
to organize the 'Green March' a peaceful march into the Sahara to back up 
Morocco's claims. Indeed, when 350,000 excited marchers started their 
move, Boumedienne realized that the process of annexation of the Sahara 
by Morocco was underway. His immediate reaction was to declare that the 
march was in violation of international law as well as to summon Ould 
Daddah to come to Algiers (on October 25) in an attempt to prevent 
Mauritania from joining the Moroccan enterprise, but in vain. More 
important, he decided to expel about 35,000 Moroccans in reprisals and in 
an apparent effort to induce the Spanish government to put pressures on 
Morocco to give up attempts to take over the Western Sahara, he 
despatched to Madrid the Home Minister Abdeighani and Hoffman a high 
professional officer. This initiative came after Hassan had called off 
the Green March and in anticipation of the possibility that Morocco might 
reach unilateral agreement with Spain at the expense of Algeria. This 
fear became real when it was announced on November 14 that Spain agreed 
to relinquish its former Saharan territory to both Morocco and 
Mauritania, a move that was deeply resented by Boumedienne constituting 
perhaps an evidence of the failure of his own diplomatic strategy. See 
Document IV 6. But in order to deny King Hassan a resounding political 
victory, he declared that "under no circumstances will Algeria be 
prepared to endorse the 'fait accompli'"1 and refused to give a hearing 
to the Spanish envoy Guttierez Como who flew to Algiers to explain the 
Madrid agreement.
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2• The politics of the war of attrition
The underlying tactics if decided were to sustain a war of attrition 
which would wear Morocco out and force it to withdraw from the Western 
Sahara and accept the principle of a referendum supervised by the United 
Nations. This strategy assumed that Algeria could sustain this war better 
than Morocco given her greater military power and economic capabilities 
as well as her international prestige. And in contrast to Morocco, she 
could conceal this type of war behind the widely accepted principle of 
the people's right for self-determination which was consecrated by the 
United Nations and made by the non-aligned movement as one of its five 
fundamental theoretical pillars. Under this proclaimed principle, the 
Algerians were able to undergo a war by proxy by combining a constant and 
unflagging support to the fight waged by the Polisario front with 
intensive diplomatic lobbying to help ensure the right of the Saharawis 
to determine freely the future of their country.
Against Moroccan allegations that the Polisario front was a pure 
Algerian creation the Algerians presented it as a genuine national 
liberation movement with its own political direction, guerrilla forces 
and as the only legitimate representation of the Saharawi people as it 
was recognized as such by the Saharawi tribal assembly, the Yemaa on 
November 28, 1975.
From late 1975, Algeria offered shelter and assistance to what she 
evaluated as being 100,000 Saharawi refugees gathered in a camp near 
Tindouf and provided the Sahar.awi nationalist movement with offices in 
Algiers, radio broadcasting facilities and massive diplomatic and 
military support. It is practically impossible to evaluate this aid 
because of the relatively well-kept secrecy but there is little doubt
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that she had injected the Polisario front with substantial part of 
Soviet-built armaments, ample logistic aid and training for its 
guerrillas.
The risk of an all-out war with Morocco was reached when the troops 
of the two countries were engaged in bloody skirmishes at Amghala, 180 
miles inside the Western Sahara in January and February 1976. If these 
clashes did not bring the two countries on the brink of war, the realism 
shown by both Boumedienne and Hassan attested that neither of them could 
win had they embarked upon an armed conflict. This basic evidence led 
them to continue the policy of attrition since each side was convinced 
that not only it was backing a just cause but that time was running in 
its favour .
While supporting the guerrilla activities of the Polisario front 
against Moroccan positions in the Sahara and military as well as economic 
targets in Mauritania, the Algerians attempted to put pressure on the 
Spanish government to scrap the November 1975 Madrid agreement and carry 
out its duties of ex-colonial power by holding a referendum in its former 
territory. The leverage used on Madrid was the declared assistance 
given to the movement for the liberation of the Canary Islands, MPAIAC 
and the threats to halt energy exports to Spain. But neither of these 
means appeared to have changed the Spanish attitude as Algeria failed to 
obtain the recognition of the MPAIAC by the OAU while Saudi Arabia 
offered Spain to compensate for the defection of the Algerian source of 
oil supplies. This aggressive .attitude led to a freeze in Algeria's 
relations with Spain as the Spanish government decided to recall its
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Ambassador from Algiers in December 1977. As a result trade relations 
between the two countries deteriorated as highlighted by their conflict 
over the gas issue.
Tensions which involved Algeria with Morocco were not, however, 
confined to a bilateral level but were aggravated by Tunisia's alignment 
with the latter's position. When Tunisia declared its support for
Morocco, Boumedienne was convinced of the existence of a French-backed 
Moroccan-Tunisian axis directed at undermining the foundations of the 
Algerian regime. This certainly was the real reason behind the annoyance 
of the Algerian leader at the declarations made by the Tunisian 
government offering to mediate between them and the Moroccans. President 
Bourguiba in fact had neither recognized the RASD nor believed in the 
genuineness of the Algerian support to the Saharawi's right for 
self-determination. Given these accusations, hatred between Boumedienne 
and Bourguiba came to surface again as the distrust of the Algerian 
leader of the latter increased, when during a visit to Tunis on January 
15-16, 1978, Boumedienne failed to induce the Tunisian government to
condemn French intervention in the Sahara and to cancel the visit that 
the French Chief of Staff Guy Mery was to pay to Tunis.'
The Tunisian government was probably alarmed by the close relation­
ship Algeria enjoyed with Libya, especially as Qadhafl never dropped his 
attempts to destabilize Tunisia after the short-lived Libyan-Tuni si an 
fusion in 1974. In fact, Boumedienne, fearing a French-backed alliance 
between Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia directed against Algeria, moved 
to cultivate close links with Libya. Being isolated in the Arab world and 
at odds with the super-powers because of their positions favouring the
'see revelations made by Colonel Qadhafi to Jeune A f rigue,
May 2, 1982, pp.52-3.
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Moroccan side, the Algerian leadership inevitably turned to the Libyans. 
Under the impulse of the Panarabist group led by Colonel Yahaoui, the 
Algerian President met Qadhafi on several occasions and on 29 December 
1975 both agreed to sign a mutual defense treaty. Such an unexpected 
move denoted that the threats on Algeria's security were so strong that 
Boumedienne felt inclined to accept this treaty notwithstanding the 
mutual suspicion between Algeria and Libya and the moody nature and 
excessive ambitions of Colonel Qadhafi. But the Algerian President 
intended to use this pact as a means of deterrence capable of refraining 
hostilities that might ccme from what he regarded as the trilateral 
alliance Paris-Rabat-Tunis against the Algerian revolution. The
defensive purpose he attempted to make of this treaty was confirmed in 
the wake of the Libyan-Egyptlan conflict of Summer 1977. Boumedienne flew 
to Tripoli and Alexandria on July 24-26 more in an attempt to ensure a 
peace between the belligerent countries than on defending the Libyan 
cause as Qadhafi had expected. This dissonance did not fail to stir up 
the latent rivalry existing between the two leaders with regard to the 
leadership mantle of North Africa and to its future. The Libyans in fact 
did not encourage the establishment of an independent Saharawi state so 
as to prevent the fragmentation of the Arab Nation. The support they gave 
to the Saharawi movement aimed mainly at destabilizing the Moroccan 
regime and in contrast to Algiers, they attempted to incite the Saharawi 
to set up a federal state with Mauritania which would benefit from Libyan 
financial assistance and protection. And to push forward his unionist 
project, Qadhafi moved to strengthen the position of the pro-Libyan 
faction within the Saharawi movement and tried to lure the Mauritanian 
president whom he invited to visit Tripoli on April 13-14, 1978. The
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Algerians reacted angrily to these manoeuvres but carefully avoiding a 
controversy that might lead them to lose a valuable ally. Such tactics 
were necessary to maintain Libyan financial support to the Polisario 
front, a matter that had considerably helped to alleviate the heavy 
burden on Algeria.^ On his side, Qadhafi was aware that he could not 
sustain a revolutionary foreign policy nor a confrontation with France 
over the Chad issue without Algeria's support. This convergence of 
interests was reflected by Qadhafi's visit to Algiers on May 30-June 6, 
1978 and by the attempts of the two sides to coordinate their foreign 
policies. Both participated in the setting up of the Arab rejectionist 
front in opposition to President Sadat's separate peace agreement with 
Israel and both showed a hostile attitvxJe to the policies of Giscard's 
France in North Africa.
In her efforts to maintain an alliance with Libya on defensive terms 
and with the assurance to respect their territorial integrity and 
political orientations, Algeria succeeded in dissipating partly the fears 
of her other neighbouring countries Niger and Mali which had for some 
time suspected Algiers of endorsing Tripoli's attempts to spread radical 
influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given Boumedienne's commitment, 
Niger's President Kountche participated in the summit gathering 
Boumedienne and Qadhafi at Ouargla in April 1976 and at Tripoli in 
November, aimed at maintaining dialogue between the Saharan states and 
increasing their cooperation. The Malian leader Traore joined these 
efforts at the next summit conference held at Niamey in March 1977.
^ i b y a  granted Algeria $1 billion in December 1978 (see 
Valeurs a c t u e l l e s , (Paris), January 8, 1979).
2The joint communique stated the "total condemnation of 
neo-colonial military intervention in the Sahara, Shaba and 
Chad" in A f r i q u e - A s i e , June 20, 1975, p.21.
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Nevertheless, if Boumedienne succeeded in preventing the efforts of 
Morocco to turn Mali and Niger against the Algerian-Libyan alliance, the 
intensive efforts to gather international support for the Saharan cause 
as a means to alter the ’fait accompli' did not live up to the expecta­
tions of the Algerian leadership. After the reluctance of the Arab 
league to discuss the Western Sahara question and the hesitations of the 
United Nations to push Spain to proceed to the decolonization of its 
former colony, the Algerians attempted to get recognition of the 
Polisario front by the OAU since they believed they had better creden­
tials in African affairs than Morocco. However, by mid-1980, the
Polisario front was recognized by only 40 states and its self-proclaimed 
RASD was consistently refused admission into the OAU. ' At the meeting 
of the Heads of State convened in Mauritius in July 1976, the RASD 
received 29 votes against 9 and 16 abstentions while the special summit 
which they agreed to hold in Lusaka was indefinitely postponed because of 
pressures from Morocco and its moderate African supporters, Gabon, 
Ivory-Coast, Senegal and Zaire in particular. Moreover, thanks to this 
support Morocco was able to undermine the proceedings of the November 
1978 meeting of the ad hoc committee set up by the OAU at its summit 
conference held in Khartum in July with the mission to seek a solution 
compatible with the principle of self-determination.
With the failure of the policy to alter the 'fait accompli' whether 
militarily or diplomatically, discontent against Boumedienne' s policies 
increased. Bouteflika and a number of moderate ministers resented the 
relative diplomatic isolation of Algeria which resulted from her 
intransigence over the Saharan issue, while the Abdeslam-led technocratic
^23 of which were Africans.
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group seemed to disapprove of the substantial drain of Algerian financial 
potential especially. Moreover discontent among large segments of the 
Algerian people did not help Boumedienne sustain a firm attitude toward 
Morocco without showing at least a certain disposition to ease tensions 
through diplomatic contacts with Morocco. These considerations led the 
Algerian president to engage a dialogue with Morocco as he charged his 
adviser Taleb-Ibrahimi to conduct contacts with Moroccan personalities 
and officials. Negotiations were also carried out between the Polisario 
front and the Moroccan officials at Ifran in August and September 1977. A 
secret meeting between Bouteflika and Reda Guedira the King's adviser 
took place in Geneva on July 2, 1978 to make preparation for a summit
between Boumedienne and Hassan but the illness of the former and then his 
death in December impaired the possibility of such a meeting. However, 
had it taken place such an encounter would probably not have broken the 
deadlock over the Saharan problem since the Algerian president was 
willing to envisage any solution except one repudiating the right of the 
Saharawi people for self-determination.
After the death of Boumedienne, the Algerian leadership maintained a
firm support for the Polisario front, thus shattering Hassan's hopes that
a change of the regime in Algeria would bring a shift in this country's
stand over the Western Sahara. Morocco's overture to Algeria started
with King Hassan sending a delegation to attend Boumedienne's funeral and
a letter to Bouteflika to induce him to exercise power on President
Chadli. And in a speech on August 30, 1979 he depicted Libya as his
main enemy and called for a regional conference to discuss the Western
Sahara. These gestures were turned down as President Chadli came under
heavy pressures from the group of radicals within the military esta 
blishment and the f L N •
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to maintain the strategy of the war of attrition initiated by 
Boumedienne.  ^ In their perceptions, this strategy was bound to succeed 
if not put staunch pressures on the Moroccan King even at the risk of an 
escalation of tensions between the two countries, because of the 
combination of four considerations favouring Algeria: 1) economic 
hardships and social unrest in Morocco;2 2) the election to the OAU 
presidency of the Liberian leader William Tolbert believed more 
sympathetic to the Saharawi cause than his predecessors Omar Bongo of 
Gabon and Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan; 3) a shift in the Spanish attitude 
vis-a-vis the Saharan problem as Madrid moved to improve her relations 
with Algeria and establish contacts with the Polisario front so as to
^The delegation sent to Boumedienne ' s funeral was refused 
entry while the Algerians accepted Fqih Basri a former 
member of the UNFP and a well known opponent to King 
Hassan, living in exile in Beyrouth. In his reply to
Hassan's letter, Bouteflika reaffirmed Rabat's
responsibility for a series of terrorist bombings in
Western Algeria and in the despatch of arms to a group of 
Kabyle insurgents at Cap Sigli near Algiers (see
Bouteflika1s reply in L'Algerie et l'action i n t e rnationale, 
(Ministry of foreign affairs, February 1979).
^On the economic level, phosphates revenues amounted to only 
1.4 billion Moroccan Dirhams in 1979 compared with MD 2.1 in 
1978 (see Middle East Journal (57) July 1979). Under the 
headlines: "Morocco of struggles" and "Morocco: a desperate 
regime", the Algerian semi-official magazine made Morocco's 
military adventure in the Sahara responsible for riots in 
Casablanca in July 1981 and for the budget deficit of the
state. According to their estimates, Morocco's forces
had increased from 57,500 in 1971 to 120,000 in 1980 while 
military expenditure reached a $947 million in 1980, ten 
times more than the 1971 level ($95 million), see
Algerie-Actualit^s, July 29, 198 1 , p.10 and Rev ol u t 1 on
Af r i c a i n e , April 11-17, .1980, pp.40-45. Other sources
believed that Morocco's military expenditure constituted in 
1979, 45 per cent of the bud get investments (1 e Mond e ,
April 18, 1979) and the cost of the war running at 0500,000
a day (The G u a r d i a n , September 26, 1979), its debt service 
nearing 41 per cent in 1984 and its annual balance of 
payments deficit reaching $2 billion (Parker, B.B: 
appointment in Oujda in Foreign Affairs (3), 1985,
pp. 1 095-1 1 10 ).
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preserve its economic interests in Algeria. In September 1978, Javier 
Ruperez a representative of the Central Democratic Union UCD attended the 
Polisario's fourth congress at which he announced the support of his 
government for the right of the Saharawi people for sel f-determination 
and later the Spanish Prime Minister Suarez came to Algiers and met with 
Abdlaziz the leader of the Polisario front; 4) the rapprochement with 
France discussed in chapter III, was followed by a military coup in 
Mauritania in July 1978 fuelling rumours that France was behind this 
change of regime with Algeria's blessings and perhaps formal complicity. 
The departure of Ould Daddah left the Algerians with a good opportunity 
to encourage the new ruling committee in its attempts to demarcate itself 
from Morocco and settle its differences with the Polisario front. Being 
economically poor, and militarily weak, Mauritania could not resist their 
pressures or the repeated attacks of the Polisario guerrillas notably on 
the country's vital economic centres: the Zouerate iron-ore mines and the 
Zouerate-Noualhibou rail link. Consequently the Mauritanian military 
committee was brought to sign a peace treaty with the Saharawis under 
Algerian auspices on August 8, 1979 by which it accepted to relinquish
its Western saharan share of Tiris A1 Gharbia to the RASD, thus putting 
an end to the state of war between the two sides. See Document IV 7.
The jubilation of Algeria and the Polisario front was cut short when 
Morocco promptly moved its troops to take over the territory from which 
Mauritania had withdrawn. Shattered frustrations were felt by the 
Algerians and the Saharawis as they came to realize Morocco’s staunch 
determination to pursue its Saharan venture.' Nevertheless, they gained
'Benyahia, the Foreign Minister compared the Moroccan
take-over to the policy of Anshlus and Israeli annexation,
Le Monde , August 8 , 1979.
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some satisfaction from undermining the Moroccan-Mauritanian alliance by 
keeping Mauritania away from Moroccan influence. Later in March 1981, the 
first reaction of the Algerian government to the attempted coup in 
Nouakchott (backed by Morocco) was to airlift supplies of arms to help 
secure Ould Haidallah's regime and to send to the Mauritanian capital 
Taleb-Ibrahimi and Lt.Cl. Belkheir to express Algeria's support. However 
the immediate response to the Moroccan invasion of Tiris A1 Gharbia was 
the encouragement given to the Polisario front to continue its guerrilla 
activities inside the Moroccan territory in the occupied Sahara. Among 
the most important operations carried out by the Saharawi guerrillas had 
been the attacks on the Moroccan cities of Lebouirate in August 1979 and 
Smara in October as well as on the fortification of the Royal troops at 
the Ouarkziz in March 1980. Further attacks on Moroccan military 
positions in the Sahara were undertaken at Boukraa and Rais Lakhal in 
January 1981 and Guelta Zemmour in March.^
Fearing the ability of the Polisario to strike even inside the 
Moroccan territory, Hassan ordered an intensification of military 
operations against Saharawi guerrilla columns (operation Ohoud) and the 
building of a wall to protect the mineral-rich parts of the Western 
Sahara known as the 'useful triangle'. This wall stretches in a
southwesterly arc from the old Spanish Saharan-Moroccan frontier to Smara 
and Bou Craa and ends at the Atlantic coast settlement of Boujadour. 
Its installations ranged from observation and artillery posts and 
sandbanks, mine fields and barbed wire to radar devices and electric 1
1The battle of Lebouirate was one of the bloodiest clashes 
between Royal troops and the Polisario guerrillas. Morocco 
was reported to have lost 100 troops and 10 per cent of its 
armoured tanks, while the Saharawi victims lost 407 men 
(El-P af 8 , September 18 , 1979).
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censors. Moreover while Hassan backed the Aosorio a Saharawi movement
rival to the Polisario front to mount terrorist actions inside the
Algerian territory, King Hassan repeatedly threatened Algerians with the 
right of hot pursuit.' The risk of an all-out war was immediately
evoked by the Algerian leadership, warning that a conflict between the 
two sides may go beyond the limits of North-West Africa.^
Being forced to drop his threat of a direct confrontation with 
Algeria, King Hassan moved to outmanoeuvre Algeria on the diplomatic 
front in an attempt to obstruct the admission of the RASD in the OAU
which was nearly obtained at the OAU summit held in Freetown in July
1980. There 26 African states declared their support to the RASD 
entitling it to become a member state under the provision of the article 
28 of the OAU charter, but Morocco argued that since the 'Saharawi 
Republic' did not constitute an independent state, its admission required 
the interpretation of the charter and to do so the approval of a majority 
of two-thirds of the OAU member states was necessary. At the July 1981 
summit conference held in Nairobi, King Hassan made the unexpected 
announcement of a 'controlled' referendum but the idea was rejected by 
Algeria and the Polisario front as intending to be a mere plebiscite to 
rubber stamp Moroccan take-over of the Western Sahara.'* And under 
pressures from the Algerian delegates and the pro-SADR lobby, the OAU 
meeting agreed to replace the formula of a 'controlled' referendum by a 
referendum for self-determination and charged a 7 nation-committee to
'in September, Aosorio commandos ambushed one of the
ANP ' s columns, 25 miles of East Tindouf (The G u a r d i a n , 
September 8, 1979 and El Pafs , September 8, 1979 ). 
i n t e r v i e w  of President Chadli to A1 Watan Al Arabi in (1 e 
M o n d e , October 12, 1979).
3Algeri a presented a Memorandum with detailed conditions for 
re ferend u m .
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examine the Western issue on a global scale. ^ Algeria's success was 
that President Chadli was heard in his role of an "interested party" in 
the conflict at this committee's meeting in Nairobi on August 24-26, 
while King Hassan and Abdelaziz the Polisario leaders were called up as 
the two parties in conflict. And as Hassan failed to attend the next 
session of the committee on February 8-9, 1982 and mocked the OAU
conference as a 'picnic' party, Algeria went all out to secure SADR's 
application and seemed to have succeeded when the OAU's Secretary-General 
invited the Saharawi delegates to attend the council of ministers 
scheduled to take place in late February. However, the meeting was 
scrapped as Morocco led a 19 country walk-out in protest against the 
presence of a Saharawi delegation led by Ibrahim Hakim.2
Since then the question of the RASD's admission to the OAU has 
paralyzed the Panafrican organization and was partly responsible for the 
scrapping of the summit conference due to take place in Tripoli on August
5-3, 1982, although under Libyan pressures, Algeria had requested the
Saharawi not to attend it. And when a second attempt to convene the 
meeting in Tripoli did not succeed, the Algerians placed responsibility 
for this failure on Morocco and foreign interference in particular 
American . ■*
^Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania. 
^Cameroon, Republic of Central Africa, Comores, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory-Coast, 
Liberia, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Upper-Volta and Zaire.
^Declaration of the Foreign Ministry spokesman in 
E l -Moud j a h i d , November 30, 1982 for Hassan's manoeuvres,
see El-Moudjahid, December 1, 1982
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3. Diplomatic costs
In the eyes of the Algerian leadership, the Western Sahara conflict 
beyond the issue of decolonization had a direct threat on Algeria and its 
revolution. The multifarious support Hassan obtained from Arab
moderate countries and the strengthening of Morocco's military potential 
since 1977-78 thanks to US assistance and Saudi finance convinced 
Boumedienne of the existence of an alliance of right-wing forces against 
socialist Algeria as he declared in strong terms: "we are facing today a 
real plot to exterminate .the Saharawi people. France supplies arms, 
Morocco and Mauritania troops and a big Bank in the Middle East provides 
the financing. In fact this plot does not only aim the Western Sahara 
but also at undermining the Algerian revolution."1 All the Arab
countries except Libya and South-Yemen supported the Moroccan stand and 
successfully prevented the Arab league from discussing the Western Sahara 
question. At the United Nations, they voted in favour of the Moroccan- 
sponsored resolution while abstaining from voting a resolution backed by 
Algeria supporting the right of the Saharawi people for self-determinati- 
on. In order to alleviate mounting domestic pressures on Hassan and
help him counter Polisario's attacks, some Arab countries, Saudi Arabia 
in particular, attempted to mediate between Algeria and Morocco. 
Despite good offices of Crown Prince Fahd and the Foreign Minister Saud 
Al Faisal, the Saudis failed to make headway since Algeria insisted that
1Address to the fifth Congress of Mujahidin, Algiers, May 
24, 1978 in Le s d i scour s , (8), p.79.
^Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Tunisia and the Arab Emirates voted in favour of the 
pro-Moroccan resolution 3453B. Egypt abstained. They
all abstained from voting the pro-Algerian resolution 3458 
A/XXX of December 10, 1975 meeting (see Yearbook of United
N a t i o n s , vol.29 , 1975 , Office of Public Informatrion , New 
See Document IV:8.York), p . 1 8 3
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she had no claims over the Western Sahara and that only Morocco and the 
Polisario front were the conflicting parties. Resenting Ryadh's 
financial assistance which enabled Morocco to purchase arms for the USA, 
the Algerians moved to adopt an overt anti-Saudi attitude in Arab 
affairs.
In addition to the Saudi Kingdom, Egypt came openly to support 
Morocco as President Sadat declared that he was prepared to support King 
Hassan militarily to the end . ^ It was then reported that Egypt supplied 
Morocco with Soviet-built • Mig 17 jet-fighters and Sam 7 missiles which 
had eventually been used against the Polisario's guerrillas.^ 
Apparently, the Algerians saw the Egyptian move as a sign of collusion 
between Cairo and Rabat in the light of the Egyptian-Israeli rapproche­
ment, but it was also possible that the Egyptian support to Morocco 
resulted from apprehensions that Libya was to provide Algeria with a vast 
array of Soviet-built tanks and Mig 23s. Nevertheless, in reprisals for 
the pro-Moroccan attitude of moderate Arab countries and for Sadat's 
peace initiatives in the Middle East in summer 1977, the Algerians along 
with Syria, Libya, South-Yemen and the PLO, participated in the setting 
up of the Arab front of steadfastness and boycotted Egypt on both 
diplomatic and economic levels. If Algeria's alignment with this front 
was to conform to her constant line of supporting the Palestinians, it 
also meant breaking out from her relative isolation in the Arab world 
because of her stand over the Western Sahara and at counterbalancing the
 ^T he Guard i an , September 5 , 1979.
^Ibrahim Ghali, the Saharawi defense minister presented to 
the international Press some of these arms supposedly 
supplied by Egypt which the Polisario captured during the 
Lemgat battle of September 16, 1979. El-Moudjahid also
reported the confirmation of these deliveries by a Deputy 
from Smara who defected to Polisario (El-Moud j ahid , October 
15, 1979 and El-Pais October 16, 1979 and 27.9.79.)
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increasing weight of her neighbours in Arab politics. Tunis had become 
the Headquarters of the Arab League after its removal from Cairo and 
Morocco a key element in the Saudi—led bloc of Arab moderates and an
important factor in the American strategy in the Middle East and
North-West Africa.
At the same time, the adoption by Algeria of a radical stance in Arab 
affairs would permit her leaders to obtain support from the hawkish
states within the rejectionist front with regard to the Western Sahara 
conflict* Indeed, the members of this front had been the only Arab 
states to express their support to the struggle of the Saharawis. Thus it 
was not surprising to see that in order not to lose Syria's support,
Algeria showed a great deal of pragmatism during the 1976 Lebanese civil 
war in contradiction with her commitments to support the Palestinian 
cause in all circumstances* As a zealous outspoken advocate of the PLO, 
Algeria was indeed expected to condemn vigorously Syria's move on 
Palestinian forces, but she reacted with a surprising moderation as no 
official condemnation of Syria was issued* In fact the Algerians gave 
the impression of hesitating since their dilemma was how to avoid losing 
an ally i.e. Syria without damaging their credibility vis-a-vis the 
Palestinian movement* To conceal their dilemma, they attempted along 
with the Libyans to mediate between President Assad and Yasir Arafat, but 
the choice of a junior minister Benhammouda to conduct this mediation 
perhaps revealed not only the concern of the Algerian leaders not to 
engage their own prestige in case of failure of the mediation efforts but 
also to avoid a direct confrontation with Damascus which might have 
damaged Syrian support to Algeria over the Western Sahara.1
1Balta, P: L'Algerie et Le Liban (Revue Française d'études
politiques A f r i c a i n e s , 1976).
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Algeria's stand over this issue did not also fail to have a damaging 
impact on her relations with the supej— powers, thus highlighting the 
weight of matters of national security and regional problems on the 
orientation of the country's foreign policy.
Our concern here is to see the effect of the Western Sahara conflict 
on Algeria's relations with the USA, while the Soviet attitude over this 
conflict will be discussed with a more appropriate setting in the section 
D of Chapter V that deals specifically with the convergent-divergent 
dynamics that came to mark Algeria's relations with the USSR.
The US neutrality on its part, was reflected by the reluctance of the 
American government to sell offensive weapons to Morocco that might be
used against the Polisario front in an attempt not to offset the
important economic interests the USA had in Algeria, as long as the
conflict between Algiers and Rabat remained within the limits of
tolerable tension.'
However, as the war between Algerian-backed Polisario front and 
Moroccan troops went on, the Algerian leadership noticed a tangible shift 
in Washington's stand dictated by US interests in North Africa. In its 
eyes this shift appeared when Washington rejected Algeria's request for 
a higher price for gas and scrapped some of the huge gas contracts signed 
in late 1960s. But what the Algerians feared most was an increase in 
American military assistance to help Morocco neutralize the Polisario 
front and thus cut off Algeria's leverage upon this country. Such a 
possibility came out after the October 8, 1979 meeting gathering
President Carter, his adviser for national security Brzezinski, the State
'The US had turned down Morocco's $100 million request for 
military supplies. (Phillip,Pi le triangle des armes in 
L'economiste du t i e r s - M o n d e , (46), p.31.
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Secretary Vance and the Defense Minister Brown to discuss the eventuality 
of overt military aid to Morocco.' President Chadli made a strong
objection to this initiative when he received Ulrich Haynes the US 
Ambassador in Algiers two days later and probably threatened to help the 
Polisario front intensify its guerilla attacks on Moroccan territory if 
Washington decided to lift the ban on arms sales to Morocco. On October 
13, the US government cautioned Algeria that in this case it would sell a
vast array of arms to Morocco. In fact, three days later it decided to
2supply Morocco with a huge amount of sophisticated offensive weapons.
Although there was an assumption that the Carter administration came 
under heavy pressures from the Jewish lobby in Washington- after the visit 
of the influential Jewish Senator Jacob Javitz to Rabat in June 1979, the 
Algerians believed that the US decision stemmed from geo-strategic 
concerns linked with Algeria's position with regard to the Western 
Sahara. Thus despite the fact that Cyrus Vance flew to Rabat to urge
King Hassan to seek a negotiated solution and Brzezinski came to Algiers 
to dissipate Algerian worries, the Algerian leaders seemed convinced that 
Washington aimed at undermining Algeria's socialist revolution by 
securing the King's throne and by making Morocco an effective counter­
weight for the Algerian model of socialism in North Africa. These
apprehensions certainly reflected the implications resulting from 
geo-strategic concerns proper to US global designs in the sense that the 
US, fearing that Hassan might go the same way as the Shah or Somoza, 
moved to secure Morocco as the West's closest ally in North and North 
West Africa.^ Indeed, in addition to pursuing a liberal economic policy
'New York T i m e s , October 9, 1979.
2E1 Pais, October 13, 1979.3 - . - . I ,In ht s alarming call, Brzezinski pointed out that* "we face
two problems: one is the growth of Soviet military power
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at home and having close economic ties with the US and France, Morocco 
sent troops to Zaire to help Mobutu against Soviet-backed movement in the 
Sahara region and while visiting Washington in November 1978, King Hassan 
declared his willingness to challenge Soviet designs in Africa by 
offering to staff and organize a 20,000 mein Panafrican army to replace 
the Cuban troops stationed in Angola.“* Moreover Hassan played a 
substantial role in Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement as he secretly met 
with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Summer 1977 and permitted 1000 
Israeli citizens born in Morocco to return and live in his country.
After Hassan's visit to Washington in March 1980, the US government 
granted Morocco $235 million worth of military aid and in March 1981 the 
US announced that it would supply M60 tanks, 6 anti-guerrilla jet
The Algerians were alarmed by the volume of these deliveries to their 
neighbour and suspected an eventual agreement on strategic cooperation 
between the US and Morocco in the light of the successive visits of US 
officials to Rabat and of the accord signed between the US State 
Secretary Haig and the Moroccan foreign minister Boucetta through which
which has been sustained over the last 20 years and which 
unless we take matching steps would pose very serious 
problems for the US in the early 1980, the other is 
regional conflict, the fragmentation of the wobbly social 
and political structure's all the way from Iran down to 
South Africa." quoted in R. Legvoleedi the super-powers 
conflicts in the third world (Foreign A f f a i r s , Spring 1977, 
p p . 755-778) p.756.
"interview to the Washington Post quoted in R. Dev i s h : 
Hassan plays Washington (Africa Re por t January-February 
1979) pp.52-4 .
. . .  4 a .  K  . . I  » ____4 1 4 _  4 1  1 Q Q  1 «  A 1  . . 4
fighters Ovo Broco 24 helicopters Chinook CH47, 6 helicopters
Cobra like those which were used in Vietnam and 20 jet Northrop F5.^
Revolutlon___ A frlesine April 1-17, 1981 p.43 and
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Morocco agreed to grant Washington military bases in its territory.' 
Furthermore the Algerians were deeply concerned with the creation of a 
joint military commission between the US and Tunisia after the visit of 
the American Deputy Defense Secretary Francis West to Tunis in November. 
The belief in Algiers was that the establishment in South Tunisia of an 
US-directed communication network aimed also at controlling large parts 
of the Algerian territory.
These perceptions of threats against their country's national 
security made the group of radicals push President Chadli and his foreign 
minister Benyahia to revise economic agreements with the USA in favour of 
socialist France in particular. It may be also argued that Algeria's 
successful mediation to secure the release of the US hostages from Iran 
did not prove sufficient to induce Washington to aiopt a neutral attituie 
in Maghrebi affairs. The resurgence of US 'imperialism' on a global scale 
became evident in the eyes of the Algerian leaders as they concluled that 
US involvement in the West Mediterranean was linked with its strategic 
and economic interests in the Middle East. In this vein, US "aggres­
sion" against Algeria was merely understood as a part of the old cleavage 
between Western imperialism and revolutionary forces. The despatch by 
the US of Awacs aircraft to Saudi Arabia and the ail— clash with Libya in 
December 1981 as well as US military manoeuvres in Egypt, Sudan and Oman 
(Bright stars operation) constituted for the Algerians evidence of the US 
preparation to protect its economic interests in the Arab world, while 
the strengthening of Israeli airforce and the attempts to make Saudi 1
1El-Moud j ahid reported the visits of General James William, 
CIA Deputy Director, Admiral Inman, Deputy Director 
(intelligence) and a 5 member delegation led by Francis 
West, Deputy State Secretary in charge of international
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Arabia and Egypt the new policemen in the region aimed at preventing 
revolutionary uprising and contain Iranian influence.1 Therefore the 
intensification of US military manoeuvres in the Southern parts of the 
Mediterranean and the US—Moroccan collusion made the Algerian leadership 
declare that it would result in making of Africa a field for East-West 
confrontation.^ Thus not only Algeria expressed her solidarity with 
Libya in the aftermath of the airclash between the Libyan jet fighters 
and US air patrol, but also denounced US military strategy in the Middle 
East at the ministerial conference of the Arab steadfastness front held 
in Aden on November 18, 1981.
D. A Necessary Diplomatic Readjustment 
1. Changes in tactics
The elimination of the Boumediennist group of radicals from 
decisional making power and the emergence of the moderates with the 
accession of Taleb Ibrahimi to the foreign ministry after Benyahia's 
death in May 1982, permitted President Chadli to move away from 
Boumedienne's tactics of defeating King Hassan through a war of 
attrition. The new strategy initiated by Taleb Ibrahimi implied the 
necessity to work for a detente in the Maghreb instead of maintaining a 
constant tension with Morocco that was detrimental to Algeria's economy. 
The policy of "Algeria's first" meant also the improvement of relations 
with neighbouring countries and other powers on the basis of a greater 
economic pragmatism and a moderate foreign policy 1
1 El-Moud j a h i d , November 11, 1981.
^Political resolution, sixth session of the FLN Central
Committee in El-Moud j ahld December 25-26, 198 1.
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The adoption of such a strategy would alleviate economic and 
political hardships on the Algerian regime while maintaining pressures on 
Morocco although with less pronounced hostility and aggression- In the 
views of Taleb Ibrahimi, the support to the Saharawi right for self- 
determination could be continued without espousing the extremist and 
bellicosestand pursued by Boumedienne and still advocated by the group of 
radicals remaining in the government. Given his diplomatic skills, deep 
knowledge of regional politics, various contacts with Maghrebi governmen­
tal circles and his support from the moderate group within the Algerian 
leadership, Taleb Ibrahimi certainly made an impact on President Chadli's 
own perceptions of the implications of the Western Sahara on Algeria's 
territorial integrity and security. And as Chadli wanted to concentrate 
on domestic issues to establish his own power, the moderate approach of 
his foreign minister appeared quite operative and less costly than an 
extremist attitude which had in the past burdened Algeria financially and 
led to her relative isolation diplomatically.
President Chadli's endorsement and the support of the moderate 
officers of Western Algeria origin, were essential for the foreign 
minister to implement his strategy. However, if the demands of the group 
of radical officers were kept at bay, there was little doubt that these 
officers believed that he would fail to obtain a settlement of the 
Western Sahara because of Morocco's determination to keep this territory 
under its sovereignty. In these considerations they were determined to 
put pressure on President Chadli to adopt a hawkish line as soon as the 
Foreign Minister's strategy proved a failure. It was in this context of 
challenge that Taleb Ibrahimi embarked upon the policy of "le bon 
voisinage positif'1 which Chadli explained as referring to "non-interfer-
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ence in domestic affairs of other countries and of non-aggression as well 
as to a cooperation between neighbouring states." On this basis, the 
Algerian leadership vehemently rejected pressing demands for a unity with 
Libya made by Qadhafi when he unexpectedly visited Algiers in January 
1982. On this occasion, Chadli was adamant that any proposal for unity 
should not come from a simple agreement between governments but should 
respond to the aspirations of their respective peoples and must be based 
on the prior settlement of the border disputes and on a long process of 
economic measures to pave the way for this unity. Without these
conditions, Chadli insisted there would be no serious attempt to work for 
such a unity. But, while the Algerians prepared plans for economic 
cooperation during the meeting of representatives from the two govern­
ments in March 1932, the Libyans pressed for a political declaration to 
include the formal acceptance of unity between the two countries.^
The refusal to meet Libya's request led Algeria into a controversy 
with her neighbour and to sharp disagreements over regional and 
international issues, but most significant it increased hostility between 
President Chadli and Colonel Qadhafi as the latter was believed to have 
threatened the Algerian leader with an assassination plot and with 
reviving territorial claims. With the eclipse of Colonel Yahaoui, a
convinced panarabist close to President Qadhafi, relations between 
Algiers and Tripoli seriously deteriorated despite the mediation 
conducted by the South Yemeni President Ali Nasser when he visited
'For these economic measures see Revolution A l f r i c a i n e , 
March 9-15, 1983 and Keesings Contemporary Archives
September 3, 1982, p . 31632.
^Revelations by Omar Chenib former Ambassador of Libya to 
Jordan in P. Balta: Le style Qadhafi, 1 e Mond e , April 
22-23, 1984.
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Algiers and Tripoli in mid-March 1982. Moreover their relations
worsened after the take over of Algerian diplomacy by Taleb Ibrahimi 
whose political moderation was disliked by Qadhafi.
Libya's threats to destabilize their regime and those of the Saharan 
states constituted a serious concern for the Algerian leadership and for 
stability in North Africa. At the summit conference of the Saharan 
states held in Nouakchott in March 1982 which Qadhafi declined to attend, 
Chadli addressed a disguised warning to the Libyan leader as he declared 
that the peoples of this region needed stability.1 Eventually the 
increase of Libya's military potential and its growing subversive actions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa led to the strengthening of relations between 
Algeria and Mali, Niger and Senegal.
But most importantly, the potential danger Libya constituted for the 
Algerian regime contributed to her search for improved relations with
Morocco and Tunisia. The concert ation and dial ogue with Morocco in
par tic ul ar con formed to the policy of ' bon voisinage' and implied a
reduction in Polisario front's guerrilla activities in favour of
intensive diplomatic contacts and negotiations to permit headway in the 
settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. The basic formula proposed by 
President Chadli and his foreign minister was to set up a Maghrebi 
'ensemble' that would include a Saharawi entity. Paradoxically, the 
vagueness of this proposal far from breaking up dialogue with Morocco, 
did lead to renewed contacts between the two sides so as to reach a 
compromise since each of them seemed to believe that decisive steps to 
strengthen intra-Maghrebi cooperation might be taken as a prelude to a 
detente in the region and not necessarily as a platform for settling the
’Quoted in Revolution A f r i c a i n e , April 2-8, 1982.
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Saharan dispute. On this basis, secret contacts between Moroccan
officials and the Polisario front took place in Algiers,1 while President 
Chadli met King Hassan in February 1983 on an occasion described by the 
two sides as historic. It was historic because it was the first official 
meeting after a long period of discord and important because it 
constituted a hope to work for a Maghreb of peace and cooperation. A
new page in their relations seemed to have been turned when after a 
meeting in Algiers on March 30-April 3, the interior ministers of the two 
countries gathered in Rabat three weeks later to issue a declaration 
stating the determination of the two sides to eliminate "obstacles liable 
to oppose the ongoing normalization so as to contribute ■ to the building 
of a united and prosperous Maghreb."^ A number of measures were agreed 
upon such as free circulation of persons between the two countries, the 
resuming of air and rail transport and the development of bilateral
economic cooperation. Algeria made a positive gesture in accepting to 
indemnify the 35,000 Moroccans expelled from Algeria in 1975.
In parallel the Algerians responded favourably to Tunisia's desire to 
join efforts to strengthen detente and cooperation in the Maghreb.
President Chadli was warmly welcomed in Tunis on March 18, 1983 and a
treaty of fraternity and concord was signed between the two governments. 
This treaty, valid for twenty years, reaffirmed the principles of 'bon 
voisinage' as it reflected more the concerns of good neighbourliness and 
stability in the Maghreb than laying foundations for its unity. It
stipulated the preservation by ■ the two sides of peace and security; the
'confirmed by Polisario's Abdlaziz in an interview to 
El-Moud jahid, May 19, 1983 .
^Communique issued at the end of the visit of Hadj Yalla to 
Rabat, May 25-27, 1983 in Revolution A f r i c a i n e , June 3-9,
See Document IV;9.198 3
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abstention from force against one another, refusal to enter a political 
or military pact directed against the other's political independence, 
territorial integrity and security, and the commitment not to assist 
movements which might threaten the security and the territory of the 
other partner and its regime.'
This strategy of peace, stability and friendship combined with a 
determination to counter Libya's subversive actions on the one hand and 
Morocco's policy of paralyzing the OAU on the other, brought Algeria a 
considerable credit from her other neighbours as both Mali and Niger 
subscribed to the principle of intangibility of frontiers by signing with 
Algeria treaties officially demarcating the common borders in Summer 
1983. On both occasions Algeria stressed the symbolic value of these 
agreements and underlined the exemplary character of the friendly 
relationship existing between President Chadli and Presidents Kountche 
and Traore.
Under the pro-ALgerian leadership of Ould Haidallah, Mauritania also
endorsed these principles of peace, stability and coordination as it
tuL
adhered to the treaty of fraternity and concord in May 1983 and signed an 
accord accepting the official demarcation of the frontiers with Algeria 
on April 9, 1985. As in the past, the alignment of Mauritania with
Algeria resulted from its fears of Moroccan expansionism and from Libyan 
attempts to destabilize the regime of Ould Haidallah following the
'see text of the treaty in El - D j e i c h , April 1983 . 
Document IVs10.
See
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recognition of the Polisario front by Nouakchott in February 1984, thus 
turning down Qadhafi's plan of a federation between Mauritania and the 
Saharawi self-proclaimed republic, RASD. '
However, if Mali, Niger and Mauritania were expected to respect the 
principles of the treaty of fraternity and concord, it remained difficult 
to obtain the endorsement of Morocco and Libya without the settlement of 
the Western Sahara problem and the border disputes in general. When the 
Tunisian president came to Algiers on May 29-31, 1983 there was doubt
that a Maghrebi consensus could be reached on the basis of the treaty of 
friendship signed between Algeria and Tunisia as the visit indicated 
instead the division of the Maghreb along bilateral alignments. The 
refusal of Morocco to join this treaty shortly after the February 1983 
meeting between King Hassan and President Chadli was followed by the
defection of Libya to whom Algeria had refused adherence to the treaty 
unless Colonel Qadhafi dropped his claims over Algerian and Tunisian 
territories. In reaction, the Libyan leader threatened Algiers and
Tunis of using force if possible, to achieve the unity of the Maghreb.^ 
Seemingly, the shifting of alliances between the Maghrebi states 
responded chiefly to matters of national security and territorial 
integrity. While the Tunisians believed that a rapprochement with
Algeria would help them counterbalance Libya's threats, the Algerians 
conceived this rapprochement as a means to prevent an alliance of Tunisia 
with Morocco and to contain Libya's drive for leadership in North Africa. 
Consequently, ideological considerations did not matter when state
'According to 1e Monde , the Mauritanian governmental
newspaper Chaab published a series of documents
establishing Tripoli's attempts of destabilizing the 
Mauritanian regime, 1e M o n d e , April 28, 1984.
1e M o n d e , March 5, 1983.
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security and territorial integrity were at stake as Algeria moved to 
strengthen friendships with a liberal regime she had disapproved of in 
the past while Tunisia decided to endorse the right of the Saharawi 
people for self-determination, a principle she had firmly rejected not 
long ago. ' Eventually the new Algerian-Tunisian alliance resulted in the 
strengthening of economic cooperation through the approval of a huge 
number of projects, notably the opening of the Algerian-Italian gas 
pipeline via Tunisia which would provide this country with 5,25 million 
cbm of Algeria's gas exports annually and inducements expected to reach 
$21,4 million in 1986.^
This alignment did not help attenuate bipolarism in the Maghreb with 
the unexpected rapprochement between Morocco and Libya following the 
secret visit Colonel Qadhafi made to Rabat on June 30-July 3, 1983. In 
fact the Algerians were not surprised since they believed that as in the
past, Libya was tempted to lessen its diplomatic isolation in North
Africa and that Morocco was trying to divert the attention from the
Western Sahara issue as usual. But what annoyed them most was the
suspicion of a bargain between Rabat and Tripoli which might be detrimen­
tal to Algeria's own interests. In their belief, the secret visit paid 
by the French president Mitterrand to Rabat in April 1984 confirmed the 
existence of such a bargain on the basis of Morocco obtaining Libyan 
commitment to drop military assistance to the Polisario front in return 
for Morocco stopping its support to Hissene Habre and for mediating 
between Paris and Tripoli for the withirawal of French and Libyan troops 
from Chad .
'joint communique issued at the end of Bourguiba's visit to 
Algiers on May 29-31 1983.
^Inaugurated by the Presidents Chadli, Bourguiba and Pertini 
of Italy at Al Houria filling station on May 18, 1983.
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The possibility that an understanding between Morocco and Libya would 
only aggravate tensions in the Maghreb and accentuate the paralysis of 
the OAU over the Western Sahara question, made Algiers demand from the 
Moroccan government a more flexible attitude and distance itself from 
Libyan influence.1 With Moroccan refusal, the FLN political bureau met 
on April 10 and issued a declaration reiterating Algeria's support to the 
Polisario front without reserves and immediately after, the Saharawi 
guerrillas carried out fierce attacks against Moroccan troops at Zag and 
Ouled A1 Moulat and Grarat .where 350 Moroccans were reported to have been 
killed and 400 wounded.^ In the meantime, the Algerians promptly
assured Tunisia of their military support in anticipation of Qadhafi's 
threats. The Algerian Chief of Staff General Major Mustafa Benloucif met 
with his Tunisian counterpart in Algiers on April 10. Faced with the 
recrudescence of Algerian-backed Saharawi attacks and diplomatic setbacks 
within the OAU, King Hassan moved to stir up the latent conflict existing 
between Algeria and Libya. Given the growing animosities between Chadli 
and Qadhafi, this task looked easy. At their meeting at Oujda in 
mid-August, Hassan succeeded in making Qadhafi sign a treaty of 
'Arabo-African Union'. Promptly, the Algerian government disapproved of 
this treaty and turned down the proposal of subscribing to it, carried 
over by Qadhafi and Reda Guedira the King's adviser when they hurried to 
Algiers to calm down Algeria's anxiety.^ The Algerians were convinced 
that the Moroccan-Libyan pact was clearly directed against their 
country's security and its frieridship with Tunisia since it contradicted
'visit of Col. Belkheir the Secretary-General of the 
Presidency to Rabat on April 6-7, 1984.
 ^El-Moudj ahl d , May 2, 1984 .
'for proposals for a unity between Morocco and Algeria made 
by Rabat and their rejection by the Algerian government.
3 03
the spirit of the treaty of fraternity and concord signed between Chadli 
and Bourguiba in February 1983. In fact the article 12 of the Oujda 
pact stipulated that "any aggression against one of the member states 
would constitute a threat against the other." ^
The existence of two treaties highlighted in fact, an increase of 
bipolarism in the Maghreb on tactical considerations related to national 
security matters and not on ideological or political alignments, while 
the rules of this new game seemed to be based on a competition by which 
each side wanting to prove, the other wrong. In this play, Algeria moved 
to help the Polisario front intensify its military activities against 
Morocco less in order to show the determination of the Saharawi to
continue the war than to prove that Algeria could sustain support of the
2guerrillas even without Libya s financial and military assistance. 
Against this background, the Polisario front carried out attacks against 
Moroccan positions in the Sahara in July and against Smara section of the 
Wall in August as well as a series of military operations undertaken in 
the framework of an intensive offensive it launched on October 10 under 
the headline "offensive of the Great Maghreb." In this exercise of
showing off muscles, another means was the go-ahead given to a diplomatic 
offensive in the OAU gatherings since par adoxically, the Oujda treaty 
signed between Rabat and Tripoli seemed to actually serve better the 
interests of Algeria and the Saharawi cause than those of either Morocco 
or Libya. While the Qadhafi-Hassan alliance was regarded in African
Le Mond e , August 2, 1984 .
In an interview. King Hassan confirmed that Libyan 
assistance to the Polisario front had ceased for more than 
a year, 1 e Mond e , November 1 0 , 1984 . For the
Saharawi ability to carry on the war without Libya's aid 
see declaration made by the Polisario leader Mustafa 
S a y y a d , 1e Mond e , October 3 1 , 1984 .
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circles as bizarre, the shift of Algeria's African policy towards 
moderation was highly praised. Algeria, in fact, showed a deliberate 
anti-Qadhafi line as she strengthened her relations with moderate African 
states especially Senegal, Ivory-Coast, Kenya and successfully lobbyed to 
prevent the Libyan leader assuming the OAO Chairmanship in favour of 
Mengitsu of Ethiopa. And in contrast to Morocco's arrogant behaviour 
vis-a-vis the Panafrican organisation and to its attempts to cripple its 
proceedings, Algeria under the efforts of Taleb Ibrahimi largely 
contributed in salvaging the existence of the OAU by persuading the RASD 
to abstain from its meetings and by shifting support to Hissen Habre away 
from the Libyan backed faction of Goukouni Ouddei.^
These diplomatic efforts were rewarded by the official admission of 
the RASD into the OAU in its twentieth summit conference held at Addis 
Ababa in December 1984. And in parallel, Algeria and the Saharawi went 
on intensifying the war of attrition against the Moroccan Kingdom. With 
this position of strength, Algeria refused to attend any Maghrebi summit 
to discuss regional unity or the future of the Sahara the Saharawi
liberation movement despite intense efforts that took place between the
2Maghrebi governments from early December 1984 to February 1985. 
Morocco having apparently refused Algeria's plan of a form of federation 
with the RASD while Algeria was adamant that any solution of the Western
^The Chadian Foreign Minister Garara Lassou was received in 
Algiers in late August -1984 and in December 1985, Chadli 
had talks with Habre.2 President Chadli declared that Algeria was not prepared to 
construct the unity of the Maghreb on the dead body of the 
Saharawi people (Speech to the third national conference on 
development in El-Moud j ahid February 28, 1985); see
also comments of Taleb Ibrahimi quoted in Marches Tropicaux 
et Mediterraneens , February 1 , 1985, p.259 and March 8,
1985, p .564
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Sahara conflict should come from direct negotiations between Rabat and 
the Saharawi liberation movement as was recommended by the OAU meeting 
held at Addis Ababa on June 6-12, 1983.^
2. Reversing political alignments
From being aligned with Moscow with regard to foreign political 
issues and economically dependent on the Western outlets and markets, and 
from attempting to play a role of a broker between East and West and 
North and South, Algeria seemed to have moved towards a greater political 
moderation and embarked upon a policy of economic diversification with a 
greater emphasis than in the past. While relations with Moscow tended 
to be on the whole less warm than in Boumedienne' s time,' there have been 
more contacts with Washington to ease the political stalemate which had 
characterized Algerian-US relations in spite of close economic ties.
Asked to explain the significance of this new shift in the orienta­
tions of Algerian external policy, Taleb Ibrahimi stressed the predomi­
nance of purely nationalistic objectives as he declared that "our policy 
is first pro-Algerian, then pro-Algerian and lastly pro-Algerian. It is 
in this sense that one could talk of a reorientation of our diplomacy."
This policy of diplomatic readjustment was partly due to the 
preoccupation of Algeria with regional issues affecting national security 
matters. These concerns led Algeria to seek support for her policies 
from moderate countries after departing from the radicalism of 
Boumedienne. On the Arab level, Algerian moderation appeared in her
endorsement of the Arab consensus initiated by the Saudi-led group of
Arab conservative countries which preferred a political solution of the
>
Palestinian problem that included the recognition of the right of Israel
^See 'Victoire de l'Afrique' in El- Moud j ahid , June 14, 1983 .
See Document IV: 11.
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to exist as it was implicitly agreed upon at the Fez Arab Summit of 
September 1982. In the light of this Algerian-Saudi connivance, there 
was speculation that Algeria hosted the conference of the Palestinian 
National Congress in February 1983 against Syrian and Libyan opposition 
in connection with Saudi contribution in Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement 
of the same period. Algeria's move toward moderation increased her 
credibility in the eyes of the Saudis and other conserva-tive countries 
while her hostility to Libya's policies reinforced the determination of 
these states to encourage Algeria as a counterweight against Libyan 
subversion in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is in this context that 
the recent rapprochement with Egypt should be understood after years of 
freeze in their relations following Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977. 
Improving relations with Cairo would help Algeria put heavy pressures on 
Libya to slow down its subversive activities on the one hand and incite 
Cairo to try to temper Morocco's stiffness on the other. In any case, the 
Algerians were pleased with their abilities to induce the Arab moderates 
to rely more on them to maintain stability in North Africa than on the 
alliance between Morocco and Libya. The financial assistance received 
from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait since 1982 may be regarded as a reward for 
Algeria's moderate policies in North Africa and for the active role it 
played to induce Iran to end the war with Iraq. Besides this moderation 
on the regional level, the most important implications of Taleb 
Ibrahimi's diplomatic readjustment were a loosening of ties with the 
Soviet Onion and the improvement of relations with the USA.
With Libya getting most of Moscow's favours in North Africa and 
Morocco reaping the fruits of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
it became increasingly difficult for Algeria to maintain good relations
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with the Soviets without pursuing the Boumediennist line. However, with 
the accentuation of conflicts in the Maghreb, such an option proved in 
the end single-minded and quite impotent as it resulted for Boumedienne 
in heavy costs for Algeria on the economic level and a relative 
diplomatic isolation. Indeed, Algeria could no longer sustain the costly 
war of attrition along the same lines pursued by the past regime. To 
compensate for the dwindling of oil revenues, she was forced to adopt a 
moderate line to win the markets of the Western countries for her gas 
exports, while she was led to diversify her source of arms supplies to 
maximize state security and territorial integrity.
The reverse of political alignments was therefore thought much 
beneficial than a rigid alliance with Soviet Union and Libya. 
Consequently in the context of winning more support for her policies, 
relations with the Soviet Union had to lose in warmth, depth and utility.
And as national security concerns had been the basis of diplomatic 
readjustment, the Algerians set out to enhance the military capabilities 
of the country by searching for sophisticated armaments from everywhere, 
thus trying to break the heavy dependence on Soviet source. Amid these 
efforts, the most significant moves were the attempts not only to induce 
the US government to soften its attitude toward Algeria but also grant 
her weapons and military hardware. Direct official contacts were 
established with the US administration and among the first important ones 
were the visit of Colonel Benloucif, the Secretary-General of the defense 
ministry to Washington in Summer 1981 followed by that to Algiers of a US 
military delegation, the first ever made to independent Algeria.
313
The policy of detente in the Maghreb pursued by Taleb Ibrahimi did 
not fail to have a positive impact on Algerian-US relationships in the 
sense that Washington responded favourably to Algeria's move toward 
political moderation by adopting a balanced attitude between Algiers and 
Rabat, thus breaking away from the overt diplomatic and military support 
it had previously given to Rabat.^ After a period of aggressiveness^ the 
Reagan administration began to soothe its relations with Algeria and 
seemed to respect the seriousness of the Chadli regime and his moderate 
policies, particularly on the Maghreb and Arab levels. In May 1983, 
General Walters, the US roving Ambassador came to Algiers to request the 
Algerians to use their influence to help break the Lebanese stalemate and 
in September the US Deputy Secretary for political affairs Eagleburger 
expressed when visiting Algiers, his admiration for Chadli's role in the 
constructive developments in the Maghreb. Evidently the Algerians
welcomed this change in the US attitude, but seemed quite cautious not to 
slide into an overt optimism and not appear as turning away from their 
basic principles of positive non-alignment. This approach was
underlined when Vice-President Bush came to Algiers on September 13-14 in 
the first official visit ever made by a high member of the US government 
to independent Algeria. Prom the outset, it was stressed that the US 12
1 El-Moudjahid noticed this shift of attitude in statements
made in Rabat in early September 1983 by Mrs Kirkpatrick 
the US representative to the United Nations, as she 
affirmed that the US government was taking no position 
vis-a-vis the sovereignty over the Western Sahara but 
favoured a political settlement of the conflict on the 
basis of the resolution taken by the OAU summit held at 
Nairobi. In Algerian perceptions this position amounted
to US recognition of the right for the Saharawi people for 
self-determination and for direct negotiations between 
Morocco and the Polisario, El-Moud j ahid September, 2-3,
1983.2 Le Mond e , September 1 5, 1983 .
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Vice-President was the guest of the Algerian national Assembly therefore 
not engaging directly the Algerian government. Equally significant was 
the fact that a junior state official Djelloul Khatib was charged to 
reply to the speech made by M. Bush before the Algerian parliament. In 
his address, the US Vice—President regarded Algeria as a "serious 
spokesman for the causes of reason and equity" and although acknowledging 
that the two countries had different interests and objectives, he saw no 
"incompatibility between the interests of both Algeria and the USA in a 
world where nations are truly independent and prosperous." The implicit 
concern was obviously to try to dissipate Algeria's worries over US 
temptations for world hegemony: "we do not want, he added, to forge tha 
World according to our image and it is not our philosophy - we respect 
the independence of others even when their methods are different from 
ours."1 In his reply, Khatib insisted on the strengthening of
Algerian-US economic and cultural cooperation and avoided mentioning 
political issues. These matters were left with some discretion to the 
FLN's department of external relations to deal with in a deliberate 
attempt not to put too much emphasis on a rapprochement with the USA that 
might lead to misunderstanding of Algeria's real objectives. The
apparent concern was probably to minimize the impact of Bush's visit on 
the orientation of her foreign policy and stress the existence of 
disagreements with US policies, notably in the Middle East. Against
^ l - M o u d j a h i d , September 14, 1983.
2i bid .
^Meeting between Hoffman the Head of this Department and 
Haywood Rankin in charge of the Maghrebi affairs at the US 
department of state.
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this background, the Algerian leadership turned down a stop over at 
Algiers for talks, requested by the US State Secretary Schultz during his 
Maghrebi tour in early December 1983.
However, despite differences in political and ideological options as 
well as in power capabilities and influence, the two sides were brought 
to work for a viable understanding and cooperation in the light of the 
alliance between Morocco and Libya. In this context, the US tried to 
encourage Algeria to maintain political moderation and move away from 
Soviet influence as well as attempting to make of her a counterweight for 
Libya's ambitions in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. On their part, the 
Algerians aimed through the strengthening of relations with Washington 
more to spite Libya and Morocco than sort out long-standing differences 
with Washington. With this argument, Taleb Ibrahimi seemed to have 
succeeded in pushing forward his policy of a working relationship with 
the US against the suspicions raised by the group of radical officers and 
some high officials of 1LN. His meeting in Algiers in early January 
1984 with Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, Rumsfeld may have 
been the prelude for preparing the official visit of President Chadli to 
the USA, the first ever paid by an Algerian president to this country. 
The visit eventually took place in mid-April 1985 and resulted in a tacit 
accord on coordinating efforts to ensure stability in the Maghreb. But 
most important it resulted in the agreement by the US government to sell 
arms to Algeria as the Pentagon has put Algeria on the list of friendly 
countries susceptible to benefit from US credits and military supplies.^
^Until then, Algeria was only granted a licence for the sale 
of 6 Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft valued at $100 
million on the condition that they will not be passed on to 
the Polisario front (The Economist Intelligence Unit (2), 
1982, p .7 j le Monde, 18-12-1981.
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It was perhaps in this sense that one should understand the comment made 
by El-Moudjahid on the visit of Chadli to Washington when it simply 
stated that "the Algerian president has the abilities to be heard and to 
convince."^
The attachment to the country's fundamental options was emphatically 
stressed as immediately after. President Chadli paid a visit to Cuba, 
Mexico, Venezuela and Senegal. And it seems that the policy of diversifi­
cation of arras supplies as well of a balanced approach between East and 
West may be the most valuable means to assert a genuine non-aligned 
policy, thus underlying the faith in the basic principles of the 
'Algerian revolution' .
El-Moud j ahid (April 14, 1985 ) .
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ASSERTION OF THE STATE'S IDENTIFICATION
The accentuation of Algerian nationalism found its cultural 
expression in attempts of the Algerian leaders to assert national 
identity and personality. This cultural process expressed through the 
state, and exalted the cultural unity of the Algerian people and a 
national identity based on radical perceptions proper to the Algerian 
ruling elites.
In the process of nation-state building, cultural nationalism as it 
has been expressed by these elites was thought necessary to safeguard the 
hard-won political independence and strengthen the foundations of the 
newly-formed Algerian state. However, behind the coating of national 
ideology, the state's identity helps to bolster the legitimacy of the 
military-technocracy strata since the ideological values flowing from 
above serve also to justify the national economic model of development 
and the actions of the regime on the international level. In this
sense, ideology and bureaucratic sources of legitimacy complement each 
other and operate through two basic and interrelated features: radical
pragmatism at home and anti-imperialism on the foreign level.
Internally, the process of identification held been based on radical
perceptions of Arabism and Islam as ways of life and thought while
externally it was based on belonging to the third world communities and 
socialist bloc and directed against all manifestations of colonialism and 
imperialism.
If the reference to Arabo-Islamism serves to assert the identity of 
the state, socialism may be used as an instrument to consolidate the 
foundations of the states both at home and on the foreign level. The
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two notions are correlated in the sense of a strong affirmation of both 
Algerian identity and independence, a matter that helps understand the 
accentuation of Algerian nationalism on cultural terms. Indeed, though 
the Algerian leaders link their destiny with other third world countries 
in general and Arab brother peoples in particular, the feelings of 
belonging to these communities aimed at ensuring the emancipation of 
these peoples through a continuous fight against foreign domination. 
The paramount objective has been the search for wider solidarities while 
at the same time preserving the state's distinct identity and personal­
ity. However, if during her early stage the emphasis on identification 
and on revolutionary ideals had strong ideological connotations, economic 
concerns came to prevail eventually as the cleavage between ideology and 
technocracy tend to partially overlap with the rapid development of the 
huge bureaucracy of the welfare state and the perceived threats from 
abroad.
A. A technocratic vision of national ideology 
1. Radical and broader perceptions of Arabo-Islamism
As conceived by official ideology, both arabism and Islam have been 
thought necessary to assert the state's identity and thus act as symbols 
of unity and identity of the Algerian people. Because the state is 
Unitarian, its ideology and religion could not but be uniform. This 
interpretation implies a deliberate effort to transcend ethnic linkages 
such as those between Arabs and Berbers.
The reference to Islam has been quite easy given the great uniformity 
in Algerian Islam - as all Algerians (except the M'zabit Khariji) are 
sunni and of the malekite rite - in addition to the role Islam played in 
the past as a source of unity and resistance of the Algerian people to
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French colonialism. In contrast, the process of affirming the Arabism 
of Algeria posed a problem because of the complex historical process 
Algeria had undergone, a complexity highlighted by the occasional 
linguistic cleavages between Arabic and Berber speaking groups. As
explained in the first chapter, the Algerian ideologists overlooked these 
differences stressing instead the racial symbiosis of the Algerian people 
believed to be formed out of Arabs and Berbers. In this sense, the
reference to Arabism has no racial connotations but is connected with the 
key problem of cultural authenticity on terms of way of thought and moral 
values. Arabism, then, tends to play the symbolic role of personifying 
the nation. It is against this background that Bella's famous statement 
of "je suis Arabe, je suis Arabe, je suis Arabe," should be understood. 
As he explained, Arabism "means above all a philosophy and ethics. For 
we Algerians, who had fought racism, Arabism could be nothing but a way 
of life and thought. There is no future in this country without Arabism. 
This is the objective of our revolution."1
To lay the foundations for a commitment to Arabism, the use of Arabic 
language was gradually extended to schools and sections of the adminis­
trative and economic life. Not only was Arabisation meant to wean 
Algerians from an alien language and culture (French) but also at 
becoming a basis for national identification. Here again, the use of 
the Arabic language tends to transcend linguistic differences that exist 
in Algerian society for the purpose of national unity.
'speech, July 5, 1963 in Les discours du president Ben Bella 
(Ministry of national orientation, Algiers 1963 
pp. 116-117). See also his interview to Claude Estier in 
liber a t i o n , November 5, 1962.
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This is a clear rejection of demands made by certain Algerian 
intellectuals to make the Algerian dialect - a colloquial form of classic 
Arabic - or the Berber as national languages besides Arabic. In the 
official ideology, Arabic language was presented as neither a "dead 
language" as claimed Kateb Yacine, a well-known radical writer, nor as 
the languages of the masses in opposition to the conception that makes 
French a language and a culture of the elites.1 Boumedienne made it 
clear that "language should be attached to the materialistic development 
of the society as it is true that the decline of the arabic language 
occurred when the Arab Muslim civilization had known a period of 
stagnation and decay. The day Arabic becomes an instrument of labour and 
communications at the petrochemical plants at Skikda and the steel 
complex at A1 had jar, then our language will be the language of iron and 
steel."1 2 Once again, the link between identification and development is 
clearly ascertained.
Given the cultural impact of colonial legacy, bilingualism has been 
conceived as necessary, though only circumstantial, so as "to assume the 
transition from colonial teaching to a truly national one".3 This 
cultural pragmatism reflects in fact the logics of the technocratic way 
of development since most of the state technocracy involved in economic
1Kateb Yacine 1 s interview to La République (Oran) November 
7, 1972. Another radical writer A. Mazouni also defended
the popular languages against the prominence of Arabic. 
See his culture et enseignement en Algérie et au M a g h r e b , 
Paris, Maspero, 1969.
2Speech to the first national conference of Arabization in 
El-Moud j a h i d , May 16, 1975.
3 See A . Tale b Ibrahimni's article« une revolution culturelle 
globale (in Le Monde d i p l o m a t i q u e , January 1972) and book: 
De la decolonisation a la revolution c u l t u r e l l e , Algiers, 
Sned , 1 973. See also articles of M. Lacheraf, former
Minister of education in favour of bilingualism in 
, August 9-10-11, 1977.El- Moud j ahid
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decision-making have been educated in French and in many cases abroad* 
It is not surprising that this conception of using French only as an 
instrument of labour and technics has been critized by some Arabic­
speaking intellectuals and traditionalist segments on the basis that it 
is a form of cultural alienation since no language is neutral.^
More than a moral sanctuary and an effective instrument for deriving 
public support from large segments of traditionally devout and conserva­
tive Algerian people, the Islam preached by the ruling elites has been 
viewed as a militant inspired by the traditions of radical Islam in 
opposition to the inert, passive and reactionary Islam of the private 
bourgeoisie at home and . of some other Arab countries. ' However, this 
conception of Islam contains neither religious euphoria nor the type of 
radicalism expressed by the extremist visions of ’jihad', nor an 
expression of clerical institutions. In Algeria, the clergy partici­
pates in educational activities but does not constitute a substantial 
political weight in the regime’s power hierarchy since religious figures 
have been excluded from the core elite. Moreover, religious affairs 
have been, in fact, under the strict control of the state and the Immams 
considered as civil servants and by no means providing a major influence 
on matters of policy decisions.
The attachment to Arabo-Islamism does not limit itself to the 
feelings of belonging to Arab and Islamic communities and their destinies 
but attempts to go beyond the considerations of the old Arab nationalism 
or those of panarabism and pan-Islamism. These two notions underline a
*See notably, A. Rakibi's article "arabiser la pensee* in 
culture et personalite* Alge/ri e n n e s , edited by Jean Dejeux, 
Algiers, Sned , 1979 ); Mouloud Kasim: innaya wa assala
(identity and originality) (Algiers, A1 baath, 1975) and 
Cheriet, A: opinion sur la politique de 1 ' e n se i gn e me n t et 
de 1 ' arabisation, Algiers, Sned 1983
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new perspective: an Arabo-Islamism breeding radical socio-economic change 
and being primarily directed against all manifestations of Western 
domination throughout the world. In this vein, the primary concern has 
not been the search for Arab unity or panislamic ideal but merely to 
increase links of solidarity with Arab and Muslim peoples on the basis of 
a common struggle against imperialism. Such concerns were clearly
asserted by the 1976 national charter that Algeria "works tirelessly for
the Arab unity ... but this unity will not be the result of simple
agreements between governments and less the product of temporal 
situations ... It is the socio-economic transformations as well as the 
political choices of the -masses that should become the determinant factor 
for the implementation of this historical enterprise."' In practice,
the Algerian leaders do not favour any form of unity which would 
transcend their own nationalism, and have been reluctant to join some
other Arab countries in their attempts to establish projects for unity. 
In accordance with the anti-imperialistic conception of Ar abo-1 si ami sm, 
the Algerians attempted to transcend the confinement of these two notions 
to basic racial or religious linkages in international fora. In
practice, the Algerians sided with the group of Africans in the 
conferences devoted to Arab-African dialogue, and declined to adhere to 
the islamic pact proposed by the Saudi King in 1966 which aimed at 
assembling all the Muslim nations, on the grounds that such a pact would 
reinforce the position of the conservative Arab states against the 
progressive ones, among them Algeria. Anti-imperialistic perspective 
was also the reason for Algeria's rejection of joining any "Arab cruzade 
against Persian Iran". Thus, Algeria came to support the Iranian
'National Charter, 1976, p.110.
revolution which she regarded as fundamentally anti-imperialist and in 
doing so, she wished to reinforce the radical trend within the Islamic 
community in order to oppose what she saw as a racialist tendency and 
political conservatism in the Middle East in particular.
2. Non-alignment: an evolutionary content
In Algerian official ideology, imperialism is essentially linked with 
the Western capitalist world and is believed to have manifested itself 
through two fundamental means: a direct domination of the third world 
countries as it was the case with colonialism and the maintaining of the 
new nations in the state of underdevelopment and dependency through the 
regulations of the world system.
Like many new states, Algeria has been strongly motivated by the 
ideology of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism stemming from memories 
of colonialism and the long and sometimes bloody colonial struggle.
During the war, the FLN denounced the multifarious assistance France
received from the Western world as it observed that "Algerian people had 
to fight the American-led Atlantic coalition at all levels. Nato and 
the US in particular spurred France's finance in order to permit the 
French to continue the war."^
Conversely, the anti-colonialism of the USSR and the socialist bloc 
was viewed by the FLN as positively contributing to dismantling
colonialism in general, but Moscow's ambiguous approach to the Algerian 
war and the subsequent attitude of the Algerian communist party and its 
mentor the French communist party (PCF), raised the suspicion among the 
FLN leadership that the Soviets were following an opportunistic line. 
Moscow favoured the principle of self-determination for the Algerian
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El- Moud j a hid (15), January 1 , 1958 quoted in S. Chikh:
L'Alqerie en armes, Algiers, Opu, 1981.
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people, but refrained from overtly supporting or supplying the FLN with 
military equipment in a deliberate attempt not to alienate Gaullist 
France which was then adopting a foreign policy which did not coincide 
with the US standpoints. In fact, the USSR recognized the Algerian 
provisional government (GPRA) only shortly before Algeria's independence. 
It could be argued that this reluctance and ambivalent attitude toward 
the Algerian war also contributed to the sometimes cool relationship 
between independent Algeria and the Soviet Union. In opposition to the 
West and in distinction With the East, the Algerian state founded the 
outer manifestation of its identity in the non-aligned movement. This 
process followed two stages:
i. In her first post-independence era, Algeria, in the absence 
of a solid economic experience and lack of power capabilities, had 
exalted political consciousness as a means to preserve the identity and 
interests of her third world peers. Until the end of the 1960s, she 
expressed a non-aligned policy on essentially political terms with an 
emphasis on the necessity to hasten the end of colonialism. The struggle 
of liberation was then regarded as forming the "core of all the national 
liberation wars and a decisive step in shrinking the basis of colonial­
ism".' From one president to another the support to the national
liberation movements has been unremitted, because anti-colonialism has 
been an essential value in the process of the state's identification, 
since it stemmed from memories of the war the Algerians themselves 
experienced. And having - as Professor Irene Gendzier put it - "made 
the transition between resistance and a government in power, the
^Boumedienne's speech to the OAU summit conference held in
Algiers in September 1968 in Discours du president (2),
325
Algerians felt in position to know the advantages of each stage as well 
as the responsibility which each imposes and therefore were tempted to 
appear as a model for the national liberation movements."1
In a speech entirely devoted to the struggle against colonialism, 
given at the address of the OAU founding meeting held at Addis Abeba in 
May 1963, Ben Bella passionately declared that this
charter will remain a dead letter
unless we take concrete decisions, unless we lend 
unconditional support to the peoples of Angola, South 
Africa, Mozambique and others ... There has been talk 
of a development Bank. Why have we not talked of 
setting up a blood bank? A blood bank to help those 
who are fighting in Angola, Mozambique and South 
Africa ... Thus the day that Portugal attempts to 
undertake a further evil action, such as that against 
Senegal or the Congo, in Guinea or against any other 
African country, it will find the whole of Africa 
united opposing it. These peripheral countries must 
know that we owe a ransom to African unity. A
ransom had to be paid for Algeria's liberation. It 
is because Tunisian brothers died at Sakiet Sidi 
Youssef ... that Algeria is free ... Thus, African 
brothers agreed to die a little so that Algeria might 
became an independent state. So let us all agree to 
die a little or even completely, so that the peoples 
still under colonial domination may be free, and 
African unity may not be a vain word.
More than any other war of liberation, the struggle for Palestine has
been regarded by the Algerians as identical to their own. As the 1976
charter put it, the liberation of Palestine "is in our conscience and
preoccupation ... it is a problem that is identical with our liberation.
This is the reason why our commitment is without reserves and implies the
acceptance of all the sacrifices including the one of blood.
'Gendzier, I.L: Algeria and Palestine! warning or model? in 
The new Middle East (25), October 1970, p.14.
^Quoted in Anspr e n g e r , Fi die befrieungspolitik der 
Organization fùr Afrikanishe Enheit, 1963-1975 ( of the
Organization of African Unity), Munich, 1975, p.28.
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In the official discourse, the Palestinian problem has been conceived 
as a 'fait colonial' in the sense that the occupation of Palestine and 
the establishment of the state of Israel are depicted as colonial 
policies in which the Zionist diaspora backed by the Western power 
deprived the native Palestinians not only of their land through Jewish 
settlement and repression, but also of their identity as it was the case 
of the Algerian people during the French colonial rule. In this vein, 
the fight of the Palestinian people has been regarded as "a struggle for 
national identity and the suffering of the Palestinian people as similar 
to that of the Algerian people."’ To sustain their argument, the
Algerian leaders came to view Israel as a state whose foundations are 
based on "abject racism, religious fanaticism and territorial expansion­
ism".^ The link between Israel and imperialism is implied in the belief 
that this state played the role of 'US policeman' in the Middle East as 
it could not survive without the assistance provided by the Western 
world. Thus, in the eyes of the Algerians, the Arab struggle should not 
be directed only against Israel but also against imperialism as a whole. 
Here again, the notion of anti-imperialism prevails over considerations 
of racial or religious struggle against Israel as exalted by some other 
Arab countries.
From Ben Bella to Chadli, assistance to the national liberation 
movements in general and to the Palestinian resistance in particular, has 
been consistent and multiform, ranging from diplomatic to military
’i b i d .2---Speech on the occasion of the 
Al Atassi on February 2, 1970
p.562.
visit of the Syrian president 
in Discours du president (2) ,
support, though there has been a change in style from one leader to
another. This substantial aid has been admitted by Algerian leaders and
by several leaders of national liberation movements.1
ii. With the emergence of economic considerations, Algeria was 
inclined to go beyond the political content of non-alignment stressing 
the necessity of remodelling the international system regarded as working 
at the expense of the new and weak states. To maximise their own
security and search for a redistribution of the world's economic 
resources, the Algerians called for the alteration of the balance of 
power, thus preaching a new conception of non-alignment. In this
context, Algeria not only attempted to lead a joint alignment of the
third world states in contradistinction with both East and West but also 
hoped to see a loosening of bipolarism and hegemony of the supei— powers 
over the world's political and economic affairs. In the eyes of the
Algerians, the third world is left on its own: on the one hand there are 
the USA which they regard as the "world's policeman" armed with a "big 
stick" and on the other hand, the Soviet Union which has its own 
alliances. The former was held primarily responsible for major conflict
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1Boumedienne confirmed that thousands of guerrillas belonging 
to various national liberation movements had been trained 
in Algeria (see 1e Mond e , April 1 1-1 2, 1965 ). Sam
Nujoma, the leader of Namibia's national liberation 
movement declared that the Algerian revolution "has always 
been a source of important support for the liberation 
movements in Africa, Asia and Latin-America" (interview to 
El- Moud j a hid , December 30 , 1980 ); Samora Machel, the
Mozambican president revealed during Chadli's visit in 
April 1981, that "we broke out our revolution with
Algerian arms and it was with Algerian arms that Zimbabwe 
had continued its struggle for national liberation" (in 
Revolution A f r i c a i n e , April 16, 1981). And when visiting
Algiers in January 1983, Premier Mugabe confirmed that the 
"Zimbabwean people will never forget the great sacrifices, 
Algeria made to help them gain independence" (interview to 
El - Moud j a h i d , January 19 , 1933 ).
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in the world: Indo-China, Middle East, Africa as well as for the 
injustices of the international economic order. And although,
acknowledging the fact that the socialist bloc had played a great role in 
encouraging the stream of the struggle against colonialism and imperial­
ism, the Algerians were disappointed with the Soviet Union's preoccupa­
tion with a balance of power with the USA without taking into 
consideration the specific interests of the third world.
B. A militant attachment to Arab and Palestinian causes 
1• The politics of militancy and intransigence: Boumedienne vs Nasser
During the early years of independence, Algeria's Arab policy 
followed a low profile because of Ben Bella's great involvement in 
panafricanism and Nasser's hegemony over Middle East politics that had 
become tangible since the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. The Algerian
president did not attempt to challenge Egypt's Arab diplomacy, being 
anxious to maintain the militant alliance with Egypt which proved useful 
when Algeria was entangled in the 1963 border conflict with Morocco. 
Like the Egyptian President, Ben Bella came to support the Iraqi regime 
against the Kurdish rebellion and at the May 1965 Arab Summit held in 
Cairo, the two leaders severed diplomatic relations with West Germany 
because of her support of Israel. In contrast, Boumedienne then Defense 
Minister and his aides of the General Staff were irritated by Nasser's 
patronizing attitude and to express their own points of view they came to 
cultivate strong links with the Palestinian armed branch 'Fatah' and its 
young militants, among them Yasir Arafat. The commitment of Fatah to a 
guerrilla welfare free from Egypt's tutelage certainly appealed to 
Boumedienne and his group. It was under their pressures that Algeria
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volunteered at the 1964 PLO founding meeting in Cairo to provide military 
training facilities to Fatah guerrillas. At this meeting, Bouteflika 
emphatically declared that there "is no freedom for Algeria without the 
liberation of Palestine.”  ^ This statement could be regarded as a
disguised signal of the Algerian army's opposition to Nasser’s strategy 
which aimed at ensuring his leadership over the Arab world. Immediately 
after, Palestinian ccmbattants received training at the ANP's camps and 
the PLO established a bureau in Algiers. After the June 1965 coup, 
Algeria's relations with Egypt reached a low point. Hostilities between 
Boumedienne and Nasser increased because the latter's sympathies 
obviously rested with Ben Bella‘S and also because the new Algerian 
president reaffirmed his preference for a Palestinian front free from any 
Arab state leadership, notably that of Egypt. As a result of these 
disagreements, Egyptian military advisers and a certain number of 
teachers were sent home, and in reprisals for Nasser's decision not to 
attend the Arab Summit Algeria hoped to hold in September 1966, 
Boumedienne postponed his trip to Egypt in August. However, the
concentration of the new Algerian regime on domestic issues prevented 
Boumedienne from playing an active role in Arab politics, and, until the 
June 1967 war, Algerian Arab policy followed a passive course.
The war provided Boumedienne with a valuable occasion to express his 
militancy and fulfil his country's responsibilities vis-a-vis the Arab 
cause. On May 8, 1967, the Algerian president addressed letters to the
leaders of Egypt and Syria offering Algeria's support and a week later a 
delegation led by the ANP chief of staff Colonel Zbiri was despatched to
^Quoted in Chagnollaud, P: Maghreb et Palestine (Paris,
Sindbad, 1977), p.120.
^See article of Hassanain Haikal in favour of Ben Bella in
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Cairo to offer military assistance to Egypt in the eventuality of a war 
with Israel. The Algerian media called for the mobilization of the
people, stressing the need of Arab unity and predicting victory. By the 
end of May, the 'council of revolution' announced officially the
mobilization of the people and took the decision to send 2,500 troops to 
the front. The Algerian government despatched 19 Soviet-built M19
jetfighters to the front in addition to the 15 aircraft promised by 
Bouteflika during his visit to Cairo on the day following the outbreak of 
the war.^ It also decided to take measures against the USA and Great 
Britain as reprisals for what it perceived as an Israeli-imperialist plot 
against the Arab nation.- On May 31, the Algerians cancelled negotia­
tions with Washington concerning the import of 200,000 tonnes of wheat 
and announced the closure of Algerian ports to US shipments as well as to 
those which supported Israel. Two days later, oil exports to the USA 
and Great Britain were cut off and their oil companies operating in
Algeria were taken over by the state. Though these nationalizations 
concerned companies exploiting only a small amount of Algerian oil, they 
were presented by Algerians as an expression of their solidarity with
Arab brothers to fight imperialism as a whole. Diplomatic relations 
with the USA were broken as a gesture. 1
1 See the article of ' A. Ammim o u r , former adviser to
Boumedienne: Baina assumud wa tassady (between resistance
and rejection in A1 jumhuriya, October 14, 1982).
According to Mahmoud Riad, then Egypt's foreign minister,
Bouteflika informed him that Algeria was placing all it had 
in military equipment at the disposal of Egypt and that 
Boumedienne had decided to send all available planes to the 
front. See his: struggle for peace in the Middle East
(London, Quarttet books, 1981), p .301.
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However, Algeria's hopes for an Arab victory over Zionism and 
imperialism turned to a deeply resented military defeat and humiliation 
after only six days of fighting. The acceptance by Egypt of a ceasefire 
was regarded by the Algerians as an act of treason toward the Arab cause 
and they immediately reacted by expressing sharp criticisms of Nasser's 
failure and rejected the US-mediated ceasefire. Huge anti-Nasser
demonstrations were organized by the FLN throughout the country and 
efforts to mobilize youth were pursued in the hope that an armed struggle 
against Israel could be resumed. For a people who had successfully 
fought a colonial power, defeat proved just unbearable. It was reported 
for instance that in reply to Nasser's fear that the Israeli army was 
able even to occupy Cairo, Boumedienne angrily said: "so what? If Israel 
had occupied Cairo or Damascus, it would have been the beginning of its 
end because Israel could not defeat the Arab nation for two obvious 
reasons: the geographical factor and the human potential of the Arab 
world ." 1
The shift of Egypt and Jordan toward the quest of a political 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict led the Boumedienne regime to break 
away from the Panarabist ideas preached by Egypt and to attempt to 
challenge Nasser in Arab fora. Therefore, it was under Algerian 
insistence that the Arab summit held in Cairo endorsed the subsequent 
trip of Boumedienne to Moscow on July 17 to request military assistance 
needed to continue the war. But the Soviets did not respond to
Boumedienne' s quest. Disappointments over the USSR's reaction, added to 
the frustrations over the moderate attitudes of Egypt and Jordan, 
increased Algeria's intransigence with regard to the Arab-Israeli
M: Baina assumud
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conflict. Along with the Syrian leader, Boumedienne did not attend the 
Arab summit convened in Khartum in August 1967, as an expression of his 
refusal to endorse any compromising initiative on the Palestinian 
question which might be worked out by the Summit under the influence of 
Egypt and other moderate Arab states. As the Algerians expected, the 
resolutions neither mentioned the principle of the pursuit of military 
actions against Israel nor did they call for any economic sanctions 
against it. And while Egypt accepted the resolution 242 of the UN security 
council, the Algerians firmly withheld their approval of this resolution 
on the grounds that it ignored the national rights of the Palestinian
people because the Palestinians were simply referred to as refugees.
The split between Algeria and Egypt became overt when Boumedienne
opposed the plan proposed by the Egyptian defense minister General Fawzi 
at the Arab summit conference convened in Rabat on December 21-23, 1969.
The Algerian president rejected the demands of the Rais for more 
financial and military aid from other Arab states to make Egypt
definitely superior to Israel over a period of time, disapproved of the 
three year waiting time stipulated by the Egyptian plan, and regarded its 
demands as unreasonably big. On his way back to Cairo from Rabat,
President Nasser stopped at Algiers in an attempt to heal the breach but 
Boumedienne was adamant against modifying his position.
The rupture between the Algerian militant line and Egyptian 
moderation was confirmed when Egypt accepted in July 1970 a peaceful 
settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict drafted by the US state 
secretary, William Rodgers. For Boumedienne, this plan would "bring a 
catastrophe to the Arabs as it merely aimed at neutralizing the
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Palestinian resistance." ' Concrete manifestation of his disagreements 
with President Nasser was Boumedienne's decision on August 12, to recall 
the Algerian troops that had been stationed on the Suez canal since the 
1967 war and his later refusal to attend the Arab summit held in Cairo on 
September 22—27. But most important was to appear as champion of the 
Palestinian cause. Thus, the Algerian government moved to provide the 
Palestinian resistance with great support, especially in the context of 
the combativeness of the Palestinian guerrillas against Israeli targets 
carried out from the bases in Jordan and Southern Lebanon. These 
activities directed by the PLO under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, 
after the removal of the pro-Nasser Hammuda, gave the Algerians a good 
opportunity to prove their conviction that only a partisan war would 
enable the Palestinians to regain their territory.
With the increase of the guerrilla war, relations between the 
Palestinian resistance and Jordan as well as with Lebanon became heavily 
strained and resulted in bloody confrontations in Summer 1969. The 
Algerians promptly condemned the attempts of the Jordanian troops to 
dismantle the Palestinian bases and called for an immediate ceasefire. 
Represented by Kaid Ahmed, the Head of the FLN, Algeria participated 
together with Egypt, Libya and Sudan in a committee of enquiry to bring 
about a peaceful settlement to the dispute. And on September 26, 
Colonel Chabou, the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry, was 
despatched to help take all the necessary measures to implement the 
cease-fire agreement reached at Cairo between King Hussein and Arafat. 
However, as this ceasefire was violated by Jordanian forces and the 
Algerian embassy in Amman hit by bomb attacks, Algeria decided to cut off
'speech, August 24, 1970 quoted in Balta, P and Rulleau, C :
La strateqie de Boumedienne (Paris, Sindbad, 1978), p.292.
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diplomatic relations with the Hashemit Kingdom in July 1970 and after 
repeated Jordanian attacks on the Palestinian bases, Boumedienne severely 
criticized King Hussein in a speech delivered on March 29, 1971.
This firm alignment of Algeria with the Palestinian resistance was 
confirmed by the emergency meeting of the council of revolution in 
September 1971 which decided an increase of aid, amounting to $20 million 
worth of arms and equipment.^ By that time 80 per cent of the Fatah 
armaments were believed to have been provided by Algeria.2 In addition, 
hundreds of Palestinians, mainly teachers and students, were living in 
Algeria and the PLO was granted broadcasting facilities on July 14, 1970 
following the closure by the Egyptians of the Cairo-based "voice of 
Palestine". On the diplomatic level, Algiers accredited as Ambassador 
to Lebanon, M'hamed Yazid, a veteran militant diplomat known for his 
pro-Palestinian feelings in a clear attempt to establish permanent 
contacts with the Beirut-based Palestinian leaders. This unflagging 
support was accompanied by backing what were seen in the west as 
terrorist actions, especially the hijackings carried out by George 
Habbash's popular liberation front (FPLP) over the period 1968-1970.2
Under these circumstances, Algeria's diplomatic isolation from the 
Arab world increased. Besides Egypt and Jordan, relations with Syria 
became complicated when the new President Assad moved toward a working 12
1N. Grimaud also reported that Algeria provided the 
Palestinians with $400,000 and an additional aid amounting 
to DA 200,000 offered by the Algerian red crescent. N. 
Grimaud: La politique exterleure de 1 1A1ger1e . . . , p.301.
2M'hamed Yazid, in L'Orient le jo u r , August 14, 1971.
2On June 13, 1968, a civil plane belonging to the Israeli
airline El-Al was hijacked to Algiers by militants of the 
FPLP. Only non-Israeli passengers were liberated there.
As reprisals for this lenient attitude, the world
organization of pilots threatened to boycott Algerian plane 
and passengers.
relationship with Egypt involving a political settlement to the Middle 
East conflict- An incident to highlight Algeria's dissonances with 
Syria was the decision of the Syrian authorities to intercept and 
confiscate large shipments of heavy and light armaments sent by China to 
Fatah via Algeria.
The only major Arab country to share Algeria's intransigence 
vis-a-vis the Palestinian question was Iraq. In mid-June 1970, a senior 
official of the Iraqi Baath party Aysami visited Algiers and had talks 
with the FLN leaders. The joint communique affirmed the principle "of 
the armed struggle to liberate Palestine and the occupied Arab territo­
ries".^ This convergence of attitude was further confirmed during the 
visit of an FLN delegation to Baghdad in July the same year.
2. Consolidating Arab solidarity for the grand design
Attempts to break this diplomatic isolation resulted from the desire 
to adapt to the changes that occurred on the international scene, notably 
within the world energy market. Having overcome major challenges to her
regime at home, nationalized the French oil interests and succeeded in 
laying foundations for a detente in the Maghreb, Algeria needed the 
solidarity of other Arab countries to succeed in her grand design, i.e.s 
to lead the third world coalition in its battle for restructuring the 
international economic order. To make this project possible, the state 
technocratic group induced Boumedienne towards a moderate attitude in 
Algerian Arab policy. This eased relations with other Arab conservative 
states which held been strained because of Algeria's militant standpoints. 
Indeed, in addition to its intransigence with regard to the Palestinian
335
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question, Algeria had also granted recognition to the liberation front of 
Onan, adopted a positive attitude towards the independence of the United 
Arab Qnirats, and supported the republican rebels in North Yemen.
The change in attitude was highlighted by the visits of the Saudi 
King Faisal in June 1970 and June 1973, Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi in 
May 1972, and of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salem in March 1973. 
The change was also noticeable in Boumedienne's declaration that the 
future of the Arab natioq is "linked with the liberation of the occupied 
territories ... (while) thè destiny of the whole Arab nation will remain 
linked with that of Palestine".1 Most tangible manifestation of
Algerian commitment to Arab solidarity, however, was the unconditional 
and massive contribution to the Arab cause during the October 1973 
conflict. When the war broke out, Algeria promptly sent about 5,000 
soldiers to the front, made available 60 jetfighters most of them 
Soviet-built Mig 21s, 100 tanks and supplied Egypt with 2 million tonnes 
of oil and Syria with 1 million. But most significant was Boumedienne's 
order of armaments from the Soviet Union that amounted to $200 million 
which he paid cash and in dollars. This amount of support was a
substantial financial sacrifice with regard to Algeria's need of foreign 
currencies for the second four year development plan. But for the
Algerians this was made for the sole sake of Arab solidarity and it was 
this line they came to emphasize since in practical terms, Arab 
solidarity would help them in their search for the restructuring of the 
international economic order. • When Egypt accepted the US-sponsored 
ceasefire agreement on October 23, the Algerian government in contrast to
'speech to the address of Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi, May
1972 in Discours du President (4), p.8.
^For this purpose, Boumedienne went to Moscow on November
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its attitude after the 1967 war, did not disclose its position immedi­
ately. It was only a week later that an official communique announced 
that Algeria's support to the front line arab states remained unaltered.
To many foreign observers and leftwing militants in Algeria, this 
reaction not only sharply contrasted with Algeria’s attitude after the 
ceasefire ending the 1967 war but was also regarded as a betrayal to her 
own commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the Algerian leaders 
regarded the 1973 conflict as a military and above all a moral victory 
for the Arabs, believing that if the military manoeuvres had ceased, the 
struggle against Israel had not stopped. The war, they claimed, had to 
be pursued through other means, namely the consolidation of Arab 
solidarity, the use of Arab economic and financial potential to force 
Israel and her allies to accept peaceful negotiations that would lead to 
the recovery of Arab-occupied territories. At Algeria's initiative, the 
first Arab meeting after the war was convened in Algiers on November
2 4 -2 9 .  For Boumedienne, it constituted an occasion to try to establish 
himself as the champion of the Arab cause and ensure the Arab solidarity 
that was apparently cemented after the war. All the Arab leaders with the 
exception of Iraq's Hassan Al Bakr attended the conference. Algeria
proposed and had accepted the recognition of the PLO as the sole and 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Also important in 
the eyes of the Algerians were the adoption of resolutions reaffirming 
the need to reinforce intei— Arab military and economic cooperation as 
well as strengthen Arab solidarities with Black Africa. The use of the 
oil weapon was in the direct line of Algeria's objectives and expecta­
tions. I f  the oil embargo agreed upon at the October 17, 1973 OAPEC
meeting in Kuwait was conceived as an important leverage to bring the
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Western world to exercise pressures on Israel, it also constituted in the 
eyes of the Algerians a valuable means for the Arab oil-producing 
countries to increase the prices of their oils and thus of oil revenues 
in order to finance their economic developments. At this meeting, the 
Algerians pushed for and obtained a cut in Arab oil exports to countries 
which supported Israel, by a minimum of 5 per cent with immediate effect 
and then every month until an Israel withdrawal from the occupied 
territories. If Algeria insisted on an oil embargo on the USA,
Netherl ands, Portugal and South Africa, she showed a soft attitude
towards the other EEC countries for reasons inherent in her own
interests. The oil embargo she herself imposed on the USA was not
detrimental to either her foreign earnings (oil supplies to the USA
represented at that time onl y 5 per cent of her total exports) or
diplomatic relations (which had been cut off since June 1967)
In addition, at the Kuwait OAPEC meeting, the Algerian delegates made 
subtle efforts to prevent the extension of the embargo to gas exports 
since they were then involved in huge gas deals with US companies. 
Therefore, given the small amount of petroleum they were selling to 
America, the Algerians pressed the other Arab countries notably Saudi 
Arabia to maintain embargo on their oil shipments to the USA but in 
contrast they resisted the attempts of the Gulf states to increase 
pressures on the European nations which aimed at forcing them to withhold 
support to Israel in favour of the Arab cause. For the Algerians, an 
alliance with Europe would help weaken the hegemony of the Western bloc 
and would enhance the chances of Euro-Arab co-operation as both sides 
shared interdependent economies: the Arabs needing technology and the 
Europeans energy. The other Arab countries accepted Algeria's demand for
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strengthening dialogue with Western Europe but decided at the Oapec 
meeting held in Vienna on March 18, 1974 to lift the oil embargo upon the 
USA. Though the Algerians were reluctant to end the oil embargo, they 
agreed in order to maintain a common attitude necessary to enable the 
diplomatic efforts of the Arab countries which aimed at inducing the USA 
and Israel to accept negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Middle 
East conflict.
To facilitate convening an international conference over the 
Palestinian question, which Egypt and Syria firmly favoured, the 
Algerians received in December 1973 and October 1974, the US State 
Secretary Henry Kissinger who had been pushing forward his 'step-by-step' 
strategy aiming at providing a political solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
3. The return to radicalism
Since the mid-1970s, Algeria's involvement in Arab affairs has 
steadily declined. Domestic problems coupled with preoccupation over 
the Western Sahara forced the Algerian leadership to adopt a low profile 
in its Arab policy but with a more pronounced radicalism as a response to 
the support of most of the Arab countries for Morocco, the deterioration 
of relations with Prance and the backing of the USA for King Hassan.
With the bipolarism that appeared in the Arab scene following 
President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in September 1977, Algeria strongly 
supported the Palestinian cause and joined other Arab radical states in 
the efforts to isolate Egypt diplomatically and countei— attack the 
moderate line pursued by some conservative Arab countries towards the
Palestinian question
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Gathered in a "front of steadfastness and rejection" set up in 
Tripoli on December 2-5, 1977, Algeria along with Libya, Syria, South
Yemen and the PLO called for a freeze of diplomatic relations with Egypt, 
the boycott of Egyptian companies that would cooperate with Israel, and 
the transfer of the Arab league headquarters from Cairo. After Egypt 
signed the Camp David agreements in September 1978, Algeria and her 
partners in the steadfastness front succeeded in calling an Arab summit 
in Baghdad on November 2-5 without the presence of Egypt and issuing a 
resolution condemning t'he' Camp David agreements.' To rally wider
support against these agreements, Boumedienne toured the Middle East, the 
USSR and Yugoslavia on -November 3-16 but his efforts failed as Saudi 
Arabia which had emerged as a key element in Arab affairs was determined 
to lead a moderate Arab consensus.
The rise of Chadli to power did not alter this radical line because 
of pressures by Benyahia and the radical officers to pursue a 
Boumediennist line not only with regard to the Western Sahara but also 
within Arab circles. A radical attitude was then maintained with Algeria 
boycotting the Arab summit held in Amman in November 1980 as a result of 
the PLO's decision not to attend. The reason given was that the 
Algerians did not want "decisions to be taken in the absence of the 
Palestinians" since they feared that the Amman meeting would nullify the
' A f t e r  t h e  v i s i t  o f  t h e  S a u d i  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r  t o  K u w a i t ,  
Q a t a r ,  A r a b  E m i r a t s  and Oman,  t h e  G u l f  s t a t e s  d e ma n d e d  on 
O c t o b e r  30 t h a t  E g y p t  mus t  n o t  be e x p e l l e d  f r o m  t h e  
m e e t i n g ,  p r o b a b l y  b e c a u s e  a r a p p r o c h e m e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  A r a b  
s t a t e s  and E g y p t  was  u n d e r  way  t h r o u g h  t h e  g o o d  o f f i c e s  o f  
K i n g  H a s s a n  o f  M o r o c c o  who had s e c r e t l y  r e c e i v e d  t h e  
E g y p t i a n  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  Tuhami  on O c t o b e r  2 1 .
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October 1974 resolution which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people and endorse King Hussein's plan 
for a solution of the Middle East conflict that would exclude the PLO.
Previous political alignment was maintained as President Chadli 
attended the two summits of Arab steadfastness held in Libya, the first 
at Tripoli on April 13-15, 1981 and the second at Benghazi on September
16-18, reiterating commitments agreed upon at the first conference. 
Moreover, Algeria declared her support to the Iranian revolution which 
she came to regard as a positive event, though she disapproved of the way 
it had been conducted. For the Algerian leaders, it was important that 
Iran was no longer the US policeman of the Gulf as it used to be during 
the Shah. Also important for them, was that the new Iranian regime 
supported the Palestinian resistance and the struggle waged by the 
Polisario Front.
The militant line pursued by Algeria was thought necessary to respond 
to what she called the renewed aggressive policies of imperialism against 
the Arab world, particularly in Southern Lebanon.
During hostilities between Palestinians and Israeli troops in May 
1981, the Algerians expressed their support to the Lebanese government 
and Arafat through messages from President Chadli and called for an 
emergency meeting of the Arab league to examine the situation in Lebanon. 
The Arab foreign ministers met at Tunis on May 22, and expressed 
solidarity with Syria and the PLO. They also called for an immediate 
ceasefire and respect for the unity and integrity of Lebanon. When on 
August 7, the PLO accepted the US plan for a ceasefire drafted by Philip 
Habib, the Arab foreign ministers were due to meet but strong disagree­
ments prevented the convening of the conference. A bloc of the
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moderates led by Saudi Arabia manoeuvred to obtain a meeting that would 
discuss a global settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict while Algeria 
and the other states of the steadfastness front demanded a meeting that 
should deal exclusively with the Lebanese issue. In fact, the Algerians 
were anxious to see an emergency conference held as they hoped it could 
strengthen Arab militant solidarity in order to prevent US and Israel 
from pursuing their policies in Lebanon. As a step to unite the Arab 
ranks, the Algerians attempted to reconcile the conflicting parties in 
Lebanon. Though their sympathies lay with the progressive Lebanese 
factions and the Palestinian resistance, they came to stress the 
necessity of dialogue and unity to counter what they regarded as Israeli
CX Aexpifaesionism (with the annexion of the Golan Heights) and plots against 
the Palestinians, with the announcing by the Saudi Crown Prince Fahd of 
his peace plan. For this purpose, the Algerian Ambassador to Beirut met 
Premier Chafik A1 Wazzan in September and Lakhdar Brahimi the presiden­
tial adviser on Arab affairs went to Lebanon and Syria in mid-November to 
preach unity among the conflicting parties on the eve of the Arab summit 
conference. The main source of inter-Arab divergences appeared to be 
point 7 of the Fahd' s plan which implicitly called for the recognition of 
Israel by the Arab states. The moderates -Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Morocco in particular - seemed willing to accept the principle of
recognition providing that Israel withdrew from the Arab-occupied
territories and accepted the establishment of a Palestinian states on the 
West Bank and Gaza. In contrast, Algeria and her hard line partners 
insisted that Israel should implement these demands without any
condition. Israel's recognition, they argued constituted a mere
secondary question for the time being.
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Against this background, Chadli, Assad and Qadhafi declined to attend 
the Fez summit held in November, leaving their respective foreign 
ministers with the mission of preventing the adoption of the Fahd' s plan 
by this meeting. In fact the conference reached a deadlock and was 
postponed sine die though the final declaration asserted that the debates 
over the plan were only adjourned. For the Algerians, the breakdown of 
the summit was regarded as a success for the steadfastness front and for 
the Palestinian cause, believing that the Palestinians had at Fez
"escaped the peace of cemeteries." ^ Behind scenes, the Algerians along
v
with Libyans and Syrians were backing the Palestinian radical factions of 
the FDPLP and FPLP as well as other influential PLO officials such as 
Qaddumi and Abu Jihad to prevent Arafat and his moderate allies from 
accepting the Fahd plan. This intransigence aimed also at weakening
the position of King Hussein who seemed to favour the other peace plan 
issued in September by President Reagan which stressed only the principle 
of autonomy for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and 
gave an important role to Jordan in eventual negotiations with Israel at 
the expense of the PLO.'* Immediately after the visit of King Hussein to 
Washington, El-Moudjahid criticized "Jordan's search for a US solution".
^ l g e r i e - f t c t u a l i t e s  ( 8 4 2 ) ;  D e c e m b e r  3 - 9 ,  1981 ,  p . 1 5 .
2 E l - Moud j a h i d  r e p o r t e d  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  Qaddumi  i n  w h i c h  he 
r e j e c t e d  t h e  p o i n t  7 o f  t h e  Fahd p l a n  ( E l - Moud j a h i d  , 
N o v e m b e r  17,  1 9 8 1 ) .
3 I n  an i n t e r v i e w  t o  BBC i n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 82 ,  K i n g  H u s s e i n  
r e v e a l e d  t h a t  he had c a l l e d  t h e  PLO t o  r e c o g n i z e  I s r a e l  and 
t r a n s m i t t e d  a m e s s a g e  t o  t h e  I s r a e l i  l a b o u r  p a r t y  i n  w h i c h  
he d e c l a r e d  h i s  r e a d i n e s s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a s e c u r i t y  a g r e e m e n t  
w i t h  I s r a e l  ( i n  Le  M o n d e , N o v e m b e r  11,  1 9 8 2 ) .
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The fragmentation of the Arab world was further increased by the 
Iran-Iraq war, the aggravation of the civil war in Lebanon and the 
repeated interventions of Israel in this country in June 1982. In this 
dramatic context, the Algerians watched helplessly the dislocation of the 
Arab ranks. The death of their foreign minister in May 1982 while in a 
mission of good offices between Iran and Iraq was traumatic and stirred 
up their frustrations over the incapacity of the Arab and Muslim 
countries to mend their fences.
The escalation of the' Middle East crisis came when Israeli troops
invaded Lebanon in an attempt to dismantle the PLO bases and help the
Lebanese government to establish its authority over its own territory.
Algeria immediately reacted to the Israeli move by President Chadli
sending messages to his Lebanese counterpart and to Arafat expressing
Algeria's support as well as dispatching two high FLN officials Mehri and
Messadia to Damascus on June 11. Later, the new foreign minister Ahmed
Taleb Ibrahimi went to the Syrian capital to obtain the approval of
President Assad and other leaders of the Palestinian resistance for the
convening of an emergency Arab summit. But this conference did not take
place probably because some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia were
hoping that a US mediation would bring about a peaceful settlement to end
hostilities between Israeli and Palestinians. With this obstacle, the
Algerians could do nothing but attend the meeting of the Arab foreign
/
ministers that was convened on June 26, three weeks after the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. At this meeting, Taleb-Ibrahimi presented a working 
paper hoping that it would serve as a basis for the proceedings of the 
conference. The document called for 1) unanimous indignation at the 
Israeli invasion) 2) the support for the Palestinian and Lebanese
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combattants; 3) the condemnation of the US support of Israel; 4) the 
reaffirmation of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people; 5) the revision of Arab relations with other 
countries on the basis of their position vis-a-vis the situation in 
Lebanon; and finally, 6) the dispatching of ministerial delegations to 
the capitals of the members of the security council.  ^ The Algerian plan
was rejected and only its last suggestion was accepted. Accordingly,
Taleb led one of the two delegations set up by the meeting to Paris, 
Moscow and Pekin.
As a result of Israeli intervention, most of the Palestinian
guerrillas were forced to withiraw from Beirut in August 1982. While 
some of these forces pulled out toward the Bekaa Valley where Syrian 
troops were stationed, about 5,000 Palestinian combattants left Lebanon 
for remote places like Jordan, South-Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia. At the 
PLO's request, Algeria received 700 of them while Arafat came to Algiers 
on September 11 in search for more assistance from the Algerian
government "in the tragic moments faced by the Palestinian resistance".^
The Palestinian tragedy in Lebanon ended neither with the cease-fire 
negotiated by Philip Habib the US mediator, nor with the PLO withdrawal 
from Beirut. On September 17, 1982, the Palestinian civilian camps of
Sabra and Shatila in the Lebanese capital, were atrociously massacred. 
According to the Algerians, these massacres were committed by the Israeli 
troops under the personal responsibility of General Ariel Sharon, the 1
1E1-Djeich (232), September 1982, p.20.
2E 1 - Djeich, the ANP's news organ hailed "the arrival of the 
Beirut heroes at Biskra” where the Algerian army disposes 
of a training camp for commandos. E l - D j e i c h , September 
1982, p . 20.
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Israeli defense minister.^ As an expression of its deep sorrow, the 
Algerian government cancelled the festivities that were to be organized 
to celebrate a religious feast as well as the preparation to celebrate 
the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Algerian revolution.
With the danger of the crumbling of the Palestinian resistance, the 
Algerians began to emphasize the necessity to reach an Arab consensus as 
an indispensable means to fight Israel, arguing that ideological 
conflicts which had split the Arabs were detrimental to the Palestinian 
cause. Given the dynamics'of the 'diplomatic readjustment' initiated by 
Taleb Ibrahimi, they attempted to demarcate themselves from the Arab 
steadfastness front and break away from the radical stance which proved 
costly in the past. This new strategy resulted in a rapprochement with 
Saudi Arabia, a more balanced attitude between Iran and Iraq and a clear 
support to the PLO leadership in particular, in contrast to Syria and 
Libya.
4. Preserving the Arab consensus and Palestinian resistance
It was at the PLO's request that Algeria - represented by Taleb 
Ibrahimi - endorsed the Arab peace at the summit which took place again 
in Fez in September 1982. This plan differed from the initial project of 
Fahd (now King) as its resolutions asserted the "reaffirmation of the 
Palestinian people's rights for self-determination under the leadership 
of the PLO its sole and legitimate representative and the creation of a 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital." Under these terms. 1
1El-Moud j ahld carried on its front page "Massacres dans les 
camps p a l e s t i n i e n s " in big characters, together with 
"babies, children, women shot face to the wall" and a big 
picture showing a small girl who had been killed 
(El- Moud j a h i d , September 22 , 1982 ). The Algerian paper 
estimated at 3,000 the number of victims slain in these 
attacks, compared with 1,400 given by Arafat (interview to 
T i m e , September 27, 1982) p.10.
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Algeria participated in the committee of the seven Arab countries that 
toured the capitals of the security council's members in Novembei—  
December. However, the Arab mission failed because of the opposition of 
Israel and its allies notably the US and Great Britain to associate the 
PLO in peace negotiations unless this movement publicly recognised the 
existence of the state of Israel.
As a result, the PLO leadership came to consider a common attitude 
with Jordan at the expense of other radical Palestinian faction and 
Syria. To counter a Jordanian-PLO solution to the Middle East crisis, 
Syria moved to set these factions as well as the Shi'it groups in Lebanon 
against Arafat and his moderate allies. President Assad was in fact 
anxious to regain a grip over the PLO which he lost after the evacuation 
of Beirut by the Palestinian guerrillas and after the rapprochement 
between King Hussein and Arafat. In his eyes, a compromise between 
Jordan and the PLO and the recovering by Lebanon of its independence and 
territorial integrity would deprive Syria of a serious card to bargain 
with in case of negotiations with Israel over the Golan heights. Being 
supported by the Soviet Union which was poised to gain a substantial 
weight in the Middle East politics and by revolutionary Iran and Libya, 
President Assad attempted to emerge as the key figure in any peace 
negotiations even at the exclusion of the Arafat-led PLO leadership.
Though Algeria was aware that there will be neither peace nor war 
without Syria, she was extremely reluctant to back Hafed A1 Assad against 
the PLO in order not to weaken the Palestinian movement. For President 
Chadli most important is Palestine as it "constitutes the central issue 
in the Middle East"' while the occupied territories are merely "an
'speech, November 1 , 1983 in El-Moud j ahid, November 2 , 1983.
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extension of the Palestinian question."^ Thus the Algerians turned to 
the moderate Arab countries Saudi Arabia in particular to help secure the 
cohesion of the PLO.
The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the assistance to Yasir 
Arafat were highlighted by the visit of King Fahd to Algiers in November
1982. The presence in the Saudi delegation of the ministers of oil, 
labour, planning in addition to the foreign minister Saud A1 Faisal, 
indicated Algeria's search for economic co-operation with the Saudi 
Kingdom as well as for a common attitude to help maintain Opec status in 
the world energy market following the oil glut. Beside these common 
objectives, the Algerians stated that it was the duty oif the two sides 
"to grant the PLO all assistance it needs to achieve its objectives".2 
The presence of Arafat in Algiers at the time of Fahi’s visit and his 
participation in the talks between Chadli and Fahd certainly reflected 
these concerns. In concert with the Saudis, the Algerians attempted to 
help achieve Palestinian unity as they offered to host the meeting of the 
Palestinian congress (PNC) in contrast to Syria and Libya which seemed 
to favour an alliance of the leftwing Palestinian organizations against 
Yasir Arafat. On January 16, 1983 the Libyan capital held a meeting
gathering the representatives of the radical factions FPLP, FDPLP, 
FPLP-GC of Jibril and the pro-Syrian Saika. Their resolutions firmly 
rejected the Reagan plan, the Fez decisions and the PLO-Jordanian 
negotiations.
'interview to the French TV FR3 in Discours d u  pre'sident 
1 1 ) , p . 5 0 .
2Declaration of Taleb-Ibrahimi in El- Moud j ah i d , November 25,
1982.
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After intensive efforts, Algeria succeeded in bringing all the 
Palestinian factions to convene the PNC meeting in Algiers in mid- 
February. In the opening speech to this conference, Chadli called for
unity among the Palestinians, referring to the example of the wartime FLN 
which, he argued, had been able to overcome its internecine conflicts on 
its own. His recommendation could be regarded as a hidden criticism of 
the failure of the Palestinians to solve their internal problems without 
the interference of other Arab states.
Throughout the meeting and behind the scenes, Taleb-Ibrahimi and 
Messadia worked tirelessly, to preserve the unity of the Palestinian 
ranks, stressing at the same time Algeria's neutrality iri order to avoid 
being criticized for manipulating the Palestinians or favouring one 
fraction over another. Their main preoccupation had been to help 
preserve the cohesion of the Palestinian resistance as Taleb-Ibrahimi 
declared that Algeria would "accept all the decisions taken by the PNC" 
and that she would "work for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion 
of the Palestinian and Arab ranks as well as for aSyria-PLO rapproche­
ment."^
The PNC conference reaffirmed the rejection of Reagan's plan and Camp 
David agreements but approved of the pursuit of dialogue with Jordan. 
Such a consensus appeared as a clear triumph for the moderate line 
preached by Yasir Arafat. However, this victory was short-lived as the
1Amid t h e s e  e f f o r t s .  P r e s i d e n t  
S a u d i  K i n g  on J a n u a r y  17 
d e s p a t c h e d  h i s  a d v i s e r  on A r a b  
and Da ma s c us .  He had a l s o
H a b b a s h ,  Hawatmeh and  I b r a h i m  2
D e c l a r a t i o n  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  
E l - Moud j  a h i d , F e b r u a r y  2 0 - 2 1 ,
C h a d l i  s e n t  a m e s s a g e  t o  t h e  
and i n  e a r l y  F e b r u a r y  he 
a f f a i r s  L .  B r a h i m i  t o  R i y a d h  
s e p a r a t e  t a l k s  w i t h  A r a f a t ,  
K o l e i l a t  t h e  H u r a b i t u n  c h i e f ,  
p r e s s ,  F e b r u a r y  19,  1983 ( i n
1983 ) .
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May 3 meeting between Assad and Arafat broke down and heavy fighting 
broke out in Lebanon between Syrian-backed dissidents of Fatah led by Abu 
Musa and the troops loyal to Arafat.
Shortly after, Chadli's adviser Lakhdar Brahirai flew to Damascus to 
induce Assad to work out a compromise with Arafat and after receiving the 
Palestinian leader, the Algerian president went to the Syrian capital in 
June, in an apparent effort to heal the Syrian-PLO breach. His attempt 
did not succeed as the Syrian-backed Fatah dissidents went on dismantling 
the strongholds of the trdops loyal to Arafat in Tripoli, thus forcing 
them to evacuate the second biggest town in Lebanon. As a result about
4,000 of Arafat men left for Yemen, Egypt and Algeria.
Algerian bitterness and sorrow were expressed in Chadli's statements 
that "it was the Palestinians and only the Palestinians who should take 
decisions to determine their destiny especially in the event of a future 
international conference on Palestine."1 Accordingly, the Algerian 
president stressed that he would oppose any attempt that aimed at 
imposing any foreign grip on the PLO.2 And to mark Algeria's solidarity 
with the PLO, the FLN organized a popular meeting in Algiers at the end
of October, with the presence of Abu Iyad, a close aide of Arafat.3
Furthermore, Algerian diplomats attempted to reconcile the various
Palestinian factions and help to preserve the credibility of the PLO.
At the end of March 1984, Arafat came three times to Algiers, while
'interview of Chadli to Afrique-Asie (297), June 6, 1983,
P.12.
2 Chadli's statement in a report to the FLN fifth congress in 
Revolution A f r i c a i n e , December 30, 1983 - January 5, 1984,
p.25. And in an article entitled "it is enough",
El-Moudjahid condemned the violent actions of Fatah
dissidents (El- Moud j a h i d , November 4-5 , 1983 ).
3In an interview to El-Mou d j a h i d , Abu Iyad declared that 
"Algeria has taught us the spirit of independence and of 
decision in El- Moud j ahid , November 2 , 1983 .
351
President Chadli received other Palestinian leaders and in mid-May, 
Messadia toured the Middle East to gain support for the PLO. As a
result, two intei Palestinian meetings were gathered in Algiers in April 
and May to work out a compromise and agree for the convening of the PNC's 
conference. However, it seems that differences among the Palestinian 
leaders prevented a consensus, as the Palestinian movement remains 
profoundly divided. In this context, the Algerians could only issue a 
declaration calling the Arabs to transcend their futile conflicts, 
respect the independence of the Palestinians and consolidate their unity 
as well as work for a concensus to dissuade Israel from another military 
aggression.1
Another example of Algerian distancing from the front of steadfast­
ness and from the radical policies pursued by Libya and Syria had been 
the refusal to join them in condemning the negotiations carried out by 
the Lebanese government with Israel under the auspices of the US State 
Secretary Schultz.2 The Algerians did not disclose their position over 
the acceptance by the Lebanese government of the US mediated plan on May 
17, 1983. On May 21 the FLN political bureau met and issued a statement
reiterating support to the Palestinian resistance but did not attack the 
policies of President Gemayel. It seemed that the Algerians did not want 
to alienate the Lebanese leadership as a hostile attitude would ruin the 
chances of a national reconciliation in Lebanon, retard the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops and obstruct a rapprochement between Gemayel and the PLO.
'Meeting of the FLN political bureau April 1 0, 1984 in 
E l - M o u d j a h i d , April 11, 1984.
2 Dem and s made during the visit to Algiers of Labidi, the 
Libyan foreign minister on March 15 and Faruk Al Charaa the 
Syrian State Secretary for foreign affairs on May 20. In 
between, the Algerians received Al Bissat, the special 
envoy of President Gemayel.
352
Algeria's main attacks had been directed at the terms of the Schultz plan 
itself which she accused of attempting to neutralize Lebanon and deprive 
the PLO of its bases in this country.'
As a reward for this constructive approach, President Gemayel paid a 
successful official visit to Algiers on November 4.
Beside this moderate attitude in Arab affairs, Algeria moved from 
overt support to Iran to a more balanced approach between Teheran and 
Baghdad in order to attenuate bipolarism that affected both the Arab and 
Islamic worlds. Pressed by some Arab countries, Algeria agreed to resume 
her mediation between the two warring parties but Iran's obstinacy proved 
a great obstacle for the Algerian diplomats to overcome.^ Torn between 
their fundamental support for the Iranian revolution and requests from 
the Gulf states for Algerian mediation, they moved to adopt a discreet 
attitude and a much tempered ideological approach to the Iran-Iraq war.2 
Thus they attempted to develop economic links with these two countries in
'see El - Moud j ahid June 14, 1983; June 18, 1983 and
Resolution Af r i c a i n e , June 24-30, 1983 , p p . 27-34.
2 In October 1983 , the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh S a 'ad 
A1 Sabah declared that "we will demand from Algeria - 
because of her good relations with Iran - to help end the 
war in the Gulf and convince Iran to negotiate with Iraq." 
(Interview to Le M o n d e , October 4 , 1983 .)
JAt the ministerial meeting of the Arab league held in 
Baghdad on March 4, 1984, the Arabs called upon Iran to
accept a cease-fire, otherwise they would reconsider their 
relations with Teheran. As Algeria favoured the call for 
negotiations between the belligerent countries, the Iranian 
foreign minister Dr Akbar Velayati came to Algiers the same 
d a y  the Arab foreign ministers met in Teheran in an attempt 
to induce the radical members of the Algerian government to 
prevent Taleb-lbrahimi from putting in practice the 
resolutions agreed upon at Baghdad. In his declaration to 
the Algerian press he reiterated Iran's conditions for the 
settlement of the war, conditions regarded by the moderates 
as unacceptable since they demanded the total and 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the reimbursement 
by Iraq of Iran's war costs estimated at $150 billions and 
the public judgement of Saddam Hussein by an international 
tr i b unal.
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order to de-emphasize political considerations in their dealings with 
them. These concerns explain the visit of the Iranian deputy Prime 
Minister to Algiers in March 1984 and the signature by Algeria of an 
important economic agreement with Iraq following the visit of the Iraqi 
minister of water works in June 1983.
Along with this ideological de-emphasis, the Algerians contributed to 
the efforts of other Arab and Muslim states to bring about a political 
settlement to the war, especially after the risks of its extension to 
other states of the Gulf' following attacks on oil tankers by the two 
belligerent countries and Iran's subversive activities in Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. These concerns explained the visits TalOb Ibrahimi paid 
to Teheran, Damascus and Riyadh on March 21-24, 1984. On May 7,
President Chadli received the Pakistani foreign minister whose country 
embarked upon a mediation between Iran and Iraq and in early June he 
despatched to Teheran Rabah Bitat, the President of the National Assembly 
and Abdelghani, the state secretary to Baghiad. The choice of two junior 
officials reflected Algeria's drive to participate in the existing 
efforts to help ease tensions in the Gulf without being directly involved 
in another mediation which might prove unsuccessful because of Iran's 
intransigence and the suspicion of certain extremist groups in Iran over 
Algerian partiality. As the war went on, this careful attitude seemed the 
only way for the Algerians to work for an Arab consensus without 
seriously offsetting their relations with either belligerent party.
Located far from the confrontation zone of the Middle east and being 
relatively aloof from the crux of Arab politics, Algeria could easily 
afford to adjust her Arab policy according to events affecting the Arab 
world as a whole and to her own interests without great costs. And if
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she has been flexible with the use of Arab solidarity, her commitment to 
the Palestinian issue may help her enhance her image of a radical and 
revolutionary country whenever needed.
C. The quest for a militant non-aligned movement
Until the early 1970s, Algeria's non-alignment expressed a political 
and radical content directed mainly at raising the consciousness of the 
third world, helping national liberation movements to get rid of the 
colonial grip and reinforcing the socialist bloc against what the 
Algerians regarded as Western imperialism. But with the increase in 
power capabilities and need to cope with the new changes in world 
political and economic affairs, Algeria came to underline economic issues 
as the main objectives of developing countries. From the mid-1970s, her 
role in lining up non-aligned countries declined because of the lack of 
cohesion and weakness of its state members and the harsh realities of 
world politics. To remedy the withering of the third world coalition, 
Algeria shifted from a radical attitude to moderation so as to preserve 
non-alignment as an active force in the context of the resurrection of 
the cold war threats that came to mark the early 1980s.
This evolution does not, however, suggest a clear cut between 
ideology and pragmatism, as Algeria's non-aligned policy has been a quite 
subtle blend of the two ingredients in which the emphasis shifted 
according to immediate interests, concerns and changes in priorities. 
In this sense, militancy has been tempered with realpolitik without 
seriously undermining basic values essential to her process of national
identi fication
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1. Emphasis on revolutionary ideals
Among the first manifestations of the FLN's establishment of a 
diplomatic identity was to inscribe its foreign policy within the 
neutralist movement of newly independent states that emerged in reaction 
to the persistence of colonialism and to entanglements in the cold war 
coalitions.^ To gain support for its own struggle of national
liberation and identify with the movement of the new states, the FLN was 
permitted to participate in the first gathering of what were then called 
the third world countries at Bandung in April 1955. As the Algerian 
delegates expected, the conference condemned colonialism in all its forms 
and most important it adopted an Egyptian motion proclaiming Algeria's 
right for independence. However, the hope of the Algerians that the 
neutralist movement would emerge as a decisive force to hasten the 
decolonization of their own country and reduce East-West tensions became 
shattered given the divisions within the third world on ideological 
grounds and alignment with the great powers. With the Suez affair in 
1956, the coup in Iraq in 1958, the crisis of Berlin 1958-1962, Cuba 
1961-1962, the renewed tension over Formosa and the troubled decoloni-
'Besides the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) 
signed between Europe and the USA in April 1949, there were 
the Warsaw pact concluded on May 14, 1955 between the USSR 
and its European satellites; the South-East Asian Treaty 
organization (SEATO) signed at Manila in 1954 between the USA, 
UK, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Pakistan and 
Thailand and the Baghdad pact set up on Feb. 24, 1955, 
between Iraq, Turkey joined by the UK on April 5, Pakistan 
on September 3, Iran on November 3 and Jordan on December 
1 3 .
The competition between the Communist and the free worlds 
in the first half were manifested by the crises of Korea, 
Formosa in South-East Asia; Guatemala and Costa Rica in 
L atin-Arnerica , Syria and Iraq in the Middle East. Concerns 
of national security led the Prime Ministers of India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia at Colombo from 
April 28 to May 2 and at Bogor in Djakarta on December 28, 
1954 as a prelude to the Bandung conference.
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zation process in the Congo, the FLN thought it more opportune to gather 
support for its cause from the neutralist states than in engaging in 
ideological debates that might complicate its search for the independence 
of Algeria. Support for Algerian independence was granted at the
meeting of the Afro-Asian people's solidarity conference in Cairo in 
December 1958 and in Conakry in April 1960 as well as at the conference 
of independent African states held in Addis Ababa in January the same 
year. However, ideological cleavages among the new states affected
their attitude toward the Algerian conflict.
11 former French colonies, met at Abidjan in October 1960, called for 
a peaceful solution to the Algerian conflict in a way hot to alienate 
France.1 And at their meeting in Brazzaville in December, they favoured 
the principle of a referendum in Algeria and urged France to enter 
negotiations with the FLN to end the conflict. But for the FLN leaders 
this moderate attitude aimed at helping France to safeguard her stakes in 
Algeria, notably her hold over the Saharan oil which De Gaulle wanted to 
salvage regardless of a political settlement of the Algerian question.
To counter the moderate policies of these states, known then as the 
Brazzaville group, and the other group of Monrovia formed out of moderate 
states of Gambia, Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia and Togo, the FLN joined 
Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR in a radically oriented 
gathering set up at Casablanca in January 1951. This group was strongly 
critical of French colonial policies, and support to Israel and very 
hostile to the moderate African states and their alignment with the 
Western capitalist world. Despite these divisions, the new states felt 
the need to unite given their status in the world scene and the common
1T h e  B r a z z a v i l l e  g r o u p  i n c l u d e d  a l l  t h e  F r a n c o p h o n e  s t a t e s  
i n  A f r i c a  e x c e p t  M a l i ,  G u i n e a  and T o g o .
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problems they faced. Thus in an attempt to secure their own independ­
ence at a time when the cold war polarized the world into two antagonis­
tic blocs, these states met at Belgrade in September 1961 in what was to 
become the first summit conference of the non-aligned movement. There 
they adopted resolutions defining a non-aligned state as a country 
pursuing a foreign policy of national independence based on peaceful 
coexistence, supporting the national liberation movements and eschewing 
multilateral or bilateral military alliances with a major power. This 
evidently excluded a great number of moderate countries and newly 
independent Francophone states and exacerbated the cleavages within the 
non-western world.
After Algeria's independence, Ben Bella forced the dissolution of the 
radical group of Casablanca in an attempt to advance the cause of unity 
among the newly independent states, especially in Africa. But despite 
the founding of the OAU in March 1963, divisions among radicals and 
moderates remained acute in Africa as elsewhere. Feeling that his country 
had a special role in the third world conferred upon it by its struggle 
in remodelling the international system, the Algerian leader resolutely 
indulged in a foreign policy directed against colonialism and imperialism 
and set out to rally the progressive forces, especially through the 
Afro-Asian movement. A clear evidence of Algeria's revolutionarism was 
a hostile attitude adopted toward the conservative regimes of Morocco and 
Tunisia as indicated by the acute tensions of Autumn 1963. And to 
manifest Algeria's anti-colonial ism, Ben Bella provided diplomatic and 
military support to most of the national liberation movements in Africa. 
At the first OAU council of Ministers in September 1963, he announced 
that 1,000 soldiers of African movements were trained in Algeria and that
358
he had 10,000 Algerian volunteers at the disposal of the African 
revolution. He also called on the African states to set up a unified 
force with the mission of liberating the rest of Africa. His sugges­
tions were not approved by other members of the OAU and instead a 
committee of liberation was established in which Algeria eventually 
played a prominent role. This setback did not prevent Ben Bella from 
personally involve in the anti-colonial struggle by receiving the leaders 
of the liberation movements in Algiers and by establishing direct 
contacts with African heads of state, especially the progressive ones 
such as Modibo Keita, Nyerere, Sekou Toure, N'Krumah and Nasser, despite 
the Ghanean and Egyptian Presidents' resentment at Ben Bella's excessive 
exposure in Afro-Asian circles. Nevertheless, his anti-imperialism 
manifested itself through the overt support he gave to the Congolese 
rebels and, with the help of President Nasser, he attempted to exclude 
Tshombe the Katangese leader from the OAU and non-aligned summits held in 
Cairo in 1964. It was this militant trend that Ben Bella came to stress 
in the Afro-Asian gatherings attempting to emerge as a champion of the 
progressive camp against the efforts of Yugoslavia which was preoccupied 
with the assertion of the non-aligned movement as a neutral force in the 
East-West confrontation. Despite the attempts of Tito to convince Ben 
Bella - when the Algerian leader visited Belgrade in March 1964 and when 
he himself came to Algiers in April 1965 - Algeria did not back up the 
convening of the non-aligned conference because of the divisions among 
its member states and threats against their security as highlighted by 
the US bombings in Vietnam.
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Having been chosen to convene the second Afro-Asian conference, Ben 
Bella did not want to miss the occasion to reinforce the progressive and 
revolutionäry trend in this movement.^ For these reasons, he was not 
disposed to take sides in the Sino-Soviet split that had affected the
cohesion of the Afro-Asian coalition. Tshu En Lai was cordially
welcomed when he visited Algiers in December 1964 and in March 1965 and 
Ben Bella paid a highly successful visit to Moscow in May 1964. But on 
each occasion, the Algerian leader abstained from any involvement in this
dispute. Strict neutrality was observed though the Algerians had been
irritated by the polemics between Moscow and Pekin and their negative 
implications for the Afro-Asian movement. These effects were particu­
larly tangible during the meeting of the executive committee of the 
Afro-Asian organization (AAPSO) held in Algiers in March 1964. At this 
meeting, M'Hamed Yazid, the chairman of this committee made the worries 
of the AAPSO clear as he declared that the Sino-Soviet dispute "must not 
be raised anew at any future meetings of this organization. The
Afro-Asian people participating.. .cannot tolerate a resumption of the 
dispute at organization meetings. Otherwise, it will become difficult for 
them to participate in the organization meetings in the future... In order 
to preserve its solidarity the Afro-Asian people will use every available
' wh e n  a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  P r e s i d e n t  
S o e k a r n o ,  21 A f r o - A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  m e t  a t  D j a k a r t a  i n  A p r i l  
1964 t o  c e l e b r a t e  t h e  t e n t h  a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  B a n d u n g ,  i t  was  
l e f t  t o  t h e  OAU t o  d e s i g n a t e  one  o f  i t s  c a p i t a l s  t o  d e c i d e  
t h e  v e n u e  o f  t h e  n e x t  A f r o - A s i a n  c o n f e r e n c e .  And a t  i t s  
m i n i s t e r i a l  m e e t i n g  o f  J u l y  17,  A l g i e r s  was  u n a n i m o u s l y  
c h o s e n .
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means to prevent resumption of the dispute."^ And to maintain the 
cohesion of the movement, Yazid was charged by the AAPSO secretariat with 
a mission of conciliation to the major African-Asian capitals.
The June 1965 coup against Ben Bella did not help the new Algerian 
leaders to convene the Afro-Asian meeting as scheduled despite intensive 
efforts of Bouteflika. Some African states, especially Egypt, Ghana and 
Guinea called for the postponement of the conference, while China was 
against any participation of the Soviet Union in this conference. 
Visibly annoyed by the attitude of China and other member states, the 
Algerian issued an official communique stating that "postponement will 
not signify a victory of the Chinese position but rather a victory for 
the imperialists who have all alone banked on divisions among the 
progressive forces." With this postponement, the demise of Afro-
Asianism was sealed off while the decline of the non-alignment became 
tangible in the second half of the 1960s because of the diminution of 
cold war tensions and schisms that appeared in the great powers blocs. 
Anti-colonialism also began to wither away as a unifying force as more 
and more colonies achieved independence. Moreover, attempts to
invigorate the non-aligned movement proved extremely difficult after the 
deaths or departures of Nehru in 1964, Modibo Keita, N'Kruraah in 1966, 
Soekarno in 1967 and the decline in prestige of Nasser following the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli war. In this context, the Boumedienne leadership 
adopted a passive attitude in the late 1960s being itself preoccupied
'Quoted in Kimche, D: the Afro-Asian movement; ideology and 
foreign policy of the third world (Jerusalem, Israel 
University Press, 1973)
^Quoted in Mena (Middle East News Agency), April 11, 1964,
p.51 in Neuhauser, Ci Third world politics; China and the 
Afro-Asian p e o p l e ’s solidarity organization 1957-1967 
(Cambridge, M a s s a chussets, 1970)
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with its internal problems. But this did not prevent Algeria maintain­
ing the image of a revolutionary country as she attempted to revive the 
radical trend particularly in Africa. Addressing the UAR national
assembly in November 1966, Boumedienne called for a common front of 
socialist countries and newly independent peoples to resist the various 
types of imperialist pressure forcing them to give up the policy of 
non-alignment and preventing them from completing their solidarity. '
In February 1967, an FLN delegation led by Salah Boubnider and Major 
Hoffman went on a 20 day African tour to promote a conference of 
revolutionary and progressive parties in Africa. In April, Boumedienne 
- along with Nasser, Nyerere and Ould Daddah - attended a little summit 
of revolutionary African states in Cairo. However, these efforts were 
without a success and as a result, the Algerian leaders adopted a quite 
legalistic approach and a more pragmatic line, without abandoning their 
support for the national liberation movement. Indeed, Algeria was among 
the first African countries to sever diplomatic relations with the United
Kingdom on December 18, 1965 following the unilateral declaration of
2independence of Rhodesia. One of the bitterest critics of the Biafran 
secession was Boumedienne who not only launched blistering attacks on the 
"imperialist backed autonomists" but also barred the Biafran delegates 
from attending the OAU summit he hosted in September 1968. The
convening of this summit in Algiers as well as the Panafrican cultural
Africa research b u l l e t i n , December 1-13, 1966.
2Along with Ethiopa, Ghana, Somalia, Sudan and UAR, Algeria 
participated in the OAU committee of five on Rhodesia to 
recommend concrete actions against the Rhodesian regime. 
The committee met at Addis in February 1966 and at Lusaka 
in October. Algeria was also a member of the committee
set up by the UN security council to supervise the 
application of economic sanctions decided against the 
Salisbury regime.
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festival in July 1969 appeared as a deliberate attempt to participate in 
African affairs after a relative period of isolation due to domestic 
problems and involvement in Arab affairs. This overture towards African 
solidarity was highlighted by the visits to Algiers made by Senghor in 
February 1967, Traore in January 1970 and General Gowon in August, visits 
alternated with that of the pro-Marxist leader N'Gouabi in March 1969.
These diplomatic contacts also indicated Algeria's desire to gather 
support for her battle against the French oil companies and for her 
attempts to lead the non-aligned movement on a militant basis around the 
crucial issues facing developing countries, notably on the economic 
level. The Algerian leaders welcomed Yugoslavia's suggestion of the 
necessity of convening a non-aligned summit (made during Tito's visit in 
November 1969) and duly participated in a 16 member committee charged to 
prepare this summit conference planned to take place in the Zambian 
capital in September 1970. But from the outset, the Algerians made it 
clear that they would oppose the conception of a non-aligned movement as 
a moral and political force only. Thus, they announced that Algeria would 
withdraw from this movement if the South Vietnamese provisional 
government was not admitted as a full participant in the Lusaka meeting.^ 
However with the determination of Yugoslavia and South-East Asian states 
and with the desire of other moderate countries not to radicalize the 
movement of the non-aligned, the Vietnamese provisional government was 
admitted only as an observer. Another setback for the Algerians was 
that the Cambodian seat was left vacant as a result of the coup against 
President Sihanouk. Boumedienne declined to attend the meeting, making 
clear his opposition to a non-alignment as a mere organizational
'speech of Bouteflika to the Lusaka meeting in
El-Moud j a h i d , September 1 3, 1970.
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principle. In his view, the process of detente between the super powers 
might be a good opportunity for the developing countries to make more 
demands on the West so as to assert themselves on the world scene. 
Thus, Algeria tried to lead a joint alignment of the third world states 
in contradistinction with both East and West in an attempt to accelerate 
the loosening of bipolar ism and the hegemony of the super-powers over the 
world's political and economic affairs.
This new concept of non-alignment was meant to go "beyond the system 
of political conferences where actions were limited to defining world 
wide objectives without proceeding to their implementation. The
non-aligned policies should be instead effective in the economic domain, 
because non-aligned states which do not control their natural resources 
are in fact dependent and aligned toward a bloc in spite of their own 
will."' The implication of this new philosophy is that demand for a 
redistribution of the world economic resources may contribute to the 
individual's search for the definition of a post-colonial personality and 
identity. Thus, a more pronounced emphasis on transforming the basis of 
North-South relations was conceived as an extension of the initial 
solidarity of protest that the non-alignment movement had attempted to 
identify with since its emergence.
To push forward the demands of the third world, the Algerians wished 
to see a nucleus of radical states capable of engineering a militant 
approach which would be trusted by other developing countries.
Solidarity of the third world 'became then the leitmotive of Algerian 
diplomacy. For analytical purpose, the political aspects of Algeria's
’speech to the UGTA congress, April 4, 
President (4), p.221.
1974 in Discours du
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designs are discussed in this sub-section, while the economic issues 
linked with North-South debates will be treated in more detail in the 
section related to her strategy of development.
2. Attempts and failure to line up a militant coalition
Having put an end "to French neo-colonial interests in Algeria after 
the 1971 oil nationalizations", and ensured a detente in the Maghreb with 
improved relations with moderate Arab countries, the Algerians attempted, 
in concert with other progressive countries, to direct the non-aligned 
movement toward militancy and revolutionary commitments. At the
Georgetown ministerial meeting, they lobbied for and had approved the 
admission of the Vietnamese provisional government and Sihanouk's Grunk 
as full participants and with the help of radical states such as Cuba, 
Iraq, Syria and Libya, they succeeded in passing a resolution that called 
for a systematic support to the liberation movements in Africa and 
elsewhere and to the governments of Chile, Peru arid Panama in their 
attempts to reduce US influence over Latin-America. Moreover, at the 
ministerial conference of the group of 77 held in Santiago in August 
1972, Algeria and her allies pushed for a radical restructur ing of 
international economic relations against the propositions of the moderate 
countries which favoured limited propositions that might be more easily 
accepted by the North.'
After intensive diplomatic efforts, the Algerians were able to host a 
successful fourth summit conference of the non-aligned states in 
September 1973, considered by many political observers as a second
'The group of 77 was originally formed out of 75 developing 
countries at the UN General Assembly session of November 
1963. It was extended to two other countries making 77 a 
number by which the group is still known, though it 
includes more than 120 members at the present time.
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Bandung not only with regard to the high level of attendance but also to 
the number of prestigious leaders present at the meeting.1 From the 
outset, this meeting guided by the Algerians, was marked by a dramatic 
shift of interest and preoccupation. The resolutions adopted there 
condemned Israel, recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the 
Palestinian people, called for self-determination in the Western Sahara, 
insisted on the increase of support to the liberation movements and 
rejected the hegemony of the super-powers.
Other recommendations of the meeting endorsed an economic programme 
largely influenced by the Algerian doctrine. There was no doubt that in 
the eyes of the Algerians, the struggle against colonialism and 
imperialism combined with the quest for a new international economic
order was the only way for the non-aligned movement to achieve economic 
emancipation and political independence of its member states and the most 
effective means to transcend internecine ideological divergences such as 
those raised between Castro and Qadhafi at the Algiers meeting. To 
ensure third world solidarity, the Algerians concentrated on helping 
reach a political under standing between Arab and African states and 
winning the support of Asian and Latin-American countries which had been 
on the margin of the non-aligned movement.
The Arab-African dialogue emerged with the desire of the Arabs
especially Algeria, Egypt and Libya to isolate Israel in Africa
diplomatically by showing that the "struggle of Africans against 
colonialism and racial discrimination was not different from the struggle
1 T h e  c o n f e r e n c e  r e g r o u p e d  77 p a r t i c i p a n t  s t a t e s  ( 6 5  f u l l
m e m b e r s ,  16 n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  m o v e m e n t s ,  3 o b s e r v e r s :  
A u s t r i a ,  Sweden  and S w i t z e r l a n d ) .  Among  t h e  p r o m i n e n t  
t h i r d  w o r l d  l e a d e r s  p r e s e n t  w e r e :  B a n d a r a n a i k e , C a s t r o ,  
F a i s a l ,  G h a n d i ,  Gowon,  K u a n d a ,  Q a d h a f i ,  S a d a t ,  S e n g h o r  and 
S i  h a n o u k .
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of the Arabs against Zionism and imperialist domination".' It was with 
this argument, by which Israel and South-Africa were depicted as pursuing 
the same philosophy, that 28 African states voted at the UN General 
Assembly of November 1975, an Arab-sponsored resolution stating the 
equation: "colonialism=racialism=zionism". To cement this Arab-African 
convergence, the Algerians succeeded - at the Arab summit they hosted in 
November 1973 - in inducing other Arab countries to sever links with 
Portugal, Rhodesia and South-Africa, impose an oil embargo against these 
states and provide African countries with oil and financial aid. At 
this meeting attended by President Mobutu of Zaire as a representative of 
the OAU, the Arabs decided to set up funds to help "African brothers" 
promoting their economic development. As a result about $6.7 billion of 
assistance has been committed by the Arab states between 1973 and 1981 
through various organisms such as the Arab Bank for economic development 
in Africa and Opec's special fund for development. with this substan­
tial assistance, the African connection proved useful for the Arab cause 
as most of the African states broke their diplomatic relations with 
Israel and it was with their help that Yasir Arafat the PLO leader was 
permitted to address the UN General Assembly in September 1974 and attend 
the OAU summit conference held in Kampala in July 1975.
To extend the impact of the non-aligned movement, and strengthen its 
position in the imminent negotiations with the North, Boumedienne visited 
Cuba and South-East Asia in March 1974 and received in July 1975, 
Echeverria the Mexican President who had emerged as an ardent advocate of 
North-South dialogue. And in order to counter US manoeuvres to weaken 
the third world coalition by playing off the Opec member states against
'speech of Boumedienne to the OAU summit conference held in
Addis, April 26, 1973.
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non-oil developing countries, the Algerians successfully lobbied for the 
adoption of a motion affirming the solidarity of the third world states 
with their Opec brethren at the joint meeting of the non-aligned 
countries and the group of 77 held in Dakar on August 4, 1975 only as few 
days before the second session of the preparatory meeting of the Paris 
conference on international co-operation.
The militant approach Algeria pursued so zealously did not, however, 
bring tangible gains for the third world coalition. In fact, most of 
the economic demands put 'forward by the Algerian-inspired group of 77 
failed because of the reluctance of the North on the one hand and because 
of the divisions among developing countries on the other. If in the eyes 
of Algerians, the reluctance of the former was predictable, disunity of 
the third world constituted a great setback. The risk of the crumbling 
of this coalition came with a combination of political disputes and 
economic disparities:
1) Within Opec, Algeria's search for increases of oil prices was 
hampered by Saudi Arabia's drive for a moderate pricing policy to avoid 
aggravating the world's economic crisis and jeopardizing the good 
relationship the Kingdom enjoyed with the USA. After the 1979 second 
oil boom, Opec' s status in the world energy market and its bargaining 
power steadily declined as a result of the oil glut.
2) Cohesion between third world states did not live up to Algerian 
expectations as the non-oil developing countries badly hit by the world 
economic crisis and oil bills began to show a hostile attitude to Opec 
and particularly to Algeria and her radical allies who had refused to 
temper their demands or grant them concessional oil prices. Opposition 
to Algeria's radical stance inevitably grew as many of the non-oil
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developing states especially in Africa and Latin-America started looking 
for trade and financial arrangements with the industrialized nations, 
thus undermining Algeria's design of radically remodelling the interna­
tional economic structures.
3) On a similar basis, Arab-African solidarity did not make further 
progress, as the African states became increasingly critical of the Arab 
stand. On the moral level, the African leaders resented the arrogance 
of some Arab states which in some cases reminded them of memories of past 
slavery. Politically, they were not willing to become the appendage of 
the Arab world or become entangled in intra-Arab disputes. And after 
Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1977, they felt there was no 
need to maintain a cold war with Israel. Thus at the OAU summit held in 
Monrovia in 1979, many African states refused to condemn the Camp David 
agreements, while others such as Central-Africa, Gabon, Ivory Coast and 
Zaire responded to Israel's diplomatic offensive in Africa in order to 
counter Libyan ventures and subversive policies. With these difficul­
ties, the foundations of Arab-African dialogue laid down at the Cairo 
meeting in March 1977 proved fragile. It was not surprising that the 
first session of the joint ministerial conference scheduled to take place 
in September 1978 was delayed until June 1979 and then simply cancelled.
Besides these divisions between groups, the cohesion of the 
non-aligned movement became seriously undermined with rivalries between 
moderates and radical states as highlighted by the polemics between 
Castro and Tito, and by the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco, Libya 
and Egypt, Libya and Chad, Uganda and Tanzania, Vietnam and Cambodia, 
Zaire and Angola, and the Iraq-Iran war in particular. If these
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cleavages were perceptible at the non-aligned conference in Colombo in 
1976, they were acute at the 1979 Havana meeting and responsible for the 
cancellation of the summit conference due to convene in Baghdad in 1982.
Algeria did not escape being entangled in these internecine disputes.
She was herself being accused of adopting a radical stand often aligned 
with Moscow's position, while she accused Morocco of violating the 
principles of the non-aligned movement through territorial expansionism. 
Criticisms against Algeria mounted after she supported the Soviet—Cuban 
involvement in Angola, Her anti-Sadat policy and hostility to the 
Moroccan regime. This radicalism led Algeria to clash with many moderate 
states and increased her isolation within the non-aligned movement. 
Indeed, despite her efforts, the 1976 Colombo summit did not endorse 
Algeria's call for the recognition of the Polisario Front. President 
Tito, for instance, insisted that the Western Sahara question should be 
left to more appropriate regional and Arab gatherings. And at the
meeting of the bureau of the non-aligned held in Algiers in June 1976, 
the Algerian position faced a strong Moroccan lobby represented by 
Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Zaire in particular. Over the Angolan issue, 
the Algerian radical stand was also rejected by a number of moderate 
sub-Saharan states as expressed by the anti-Algerian feelings among these 
states, at the OAU special ministerial session on Angola held at Addis in 
February 1976.' Given her concerns over national security as exacei—  
bated by the Western Saharan issue, Algeria had clearly chosen her camp
'it was the Minister of Trade Layachi Yaker who represented 
Algeria in this meeting perhaps in order to keep the 
prestige of Boumedienne and Bouteflika clear of the
mud s i i n g i n g s , Africa Confidential ( 17 ), 4, 1976, p.4.
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by supporting for instance Tanzania against Uganda and participating in 
the project of setting up an anti-imperialist front to advance the world 
revolution.1
Internecine problems of non-alignment were inevitably affected by the 
feelings of the resurrection of the cold war as manifested by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet-Cuban ventures in Africa, 
Israel's intervention in Lebanon, US "aggressive policies" in Central 
America (Nicaragua) and the persistence of Western colonialism (Falkland 
I si and s).
In the context of ideological divisions among non-aligned states and 
their aggravation by East-West rivalries, commitment to the spirit of 
non-alignment lost substance and effectiveness. Efforts to attenuate 
dissensions were regarded by the Algerian leaders as necessary to 
transform the non-aligned movement into an effective force between the 
East and West blocs. Return to non-alignment principles and the
rejection of foreign intervention in the affairs of developing nations 
constituted then the two issues Algeria began to call for. As far as she 
was concerned, she moved toward a political moderation that emphasized an 
attachment to the basic values of a non-aligned state. Thus, in the
framework of the political readjustment initiated by President Chadli, 
the stress has been put on asserting Algeria's Arab-islamic identity 
diversifying her military and economic relations. As a result, the
1 At a conference held in Cotonou in January 1978 and which 
regrouped Algeria, Libya, Guinea, Cuba, Angola, the Soviet 
Union, North Korea, the Saharawi republic, and the 
communist parties of France, Portugal, Italy, Ethiopa and 
Somali a .
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paradox between alignment on the Soviet standpoints and military supplies 
on the one hand and economic dependence on the Western capitalist 
countries on the other was gradually dissipated.
This new image of moderation was particularly stressed by President 
Chadli during his tour of 11 African states in April 1981 as he 
reaffirmed Algeria's attachment to the OAU, her respect for the 
principles of non-interference in other countries' affairs and the need 
for Africa to oppose military alliance with foreign powers and free 
itself from entanglement in East-West competition. To illustrate his 
conceptions, he revealed his disagreement with Libya's intervention in 
Chad and subversive activities in sub-Saharan Africa by calling for a 
conciliation between the Chadian factions and refusing to help Libya by 
sending Algerian troops to Chad.
With this political moderation that exemplified a respect to the 
non-alignment spirit, and with evidence that Morocco was violating the 
principles of both the OAU and the non-aligned movement (through 
territorial expansionism and military alliance with the USA), Algeria was 
able to obtain recognition for the Polisario's self-proclaimed republic 
by the OAU and the recognition of this movement by powerful non-aligned 
states such as India, Yugoslavia and Nigeria. In demonstrating an
authentic orientation of the non-aligned movement. President Chadli paid 
official visits to Yugoslavia, and India in April 1982 where he called 
for a new breath and invigoration of this movement.' It was these
'support for the non-aligned movement was also sought from 
China, as Chadli visited Pekin in April 1982. The quest 
of the Algerian president was facilitated by the desire of 
the Chinese leaders to reinforce solidarity with the third 
world and their backing of the right of the Saharawi people 
for self-determination. This convergence was confirmed by 
the visit to Algiers in December 1982 of Zhao Ziyang, the 
President of China's state council •
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objectives, he stressed with vigour when addressing the seventh summit 
conference held in New Delhi in March 1983. And to put into practice 
his commitments, the Algerian leader renewed contacts with other Latin 
American countries. The Falkland Island crisis, the tough policies of 
the Reagan administration in Central America and the economic problems of 
the Latin-Amer ican continent certainly gave him a good opportunity to 
induce Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela to join the non-aligned 
movement as did Columbia in August 1982. For this purpose, Chadli 
toured Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil in May 1985 and it was with the 
credentials of a non-aligned state that he paid a visit to the USA a 
month earlier, a visit which aimed at expressing the important role that 
the non-aligned movement should play in world politics and at being heard 
and taken into consideration by the super-powers.
D . An alliance of interests with Eastern Europe
Attempts to cultivate links of friendship and mutual co-operation 
with the socialist bloc appeared in a direct line with the desire to 
pursue nationalist objectives on the grounds of asserting Algeria's 
specific identity and political independence. Though the Algerian path 
of development was different from that of the socialist countries, the 
USSR in particular, and despite Algerian emphasis on a non-aligned stance 
in her foreign policy manifestations, the relationship with the socialist 
bloc proved useful with regard to the evolution of Algerian needs and 
expectations. Friendship with the socialist bloc was thought to serve 
Algeria with regard to two sets of interrelated objectives: 1) To enhance 
the radical image of Algeria so as to reinforce the process of the 
state's identification and to gather support for her anti-imperialistic
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line. 2) To benefit from economic and particularly military assistance 
from the socialist bloc to improve the national economic capabilities as 
well as ensure the state's security and territorial integrity in face of 
foreign threats. However, in their experience on the foreign level, the 
Algerians came to realize more and more that the socialist countries had 
also their specific interests and objectives which did not always 
correspond with their own concerns. These differences came then to mark 
the sometimes troubled relationship with the socialist countries, 
alternating common interests with divergent options.
1. Socialist but not marxist
From the outset, Algerian socialism differed from the Marxist 
conceptions as the Algerians did not see incompatibility between Islam 
and their socialism. This distinct identity was publicly affirmed by Ben 
Bella to Khrushchev as he stated that "our Islam is a militant one and 
perfectibly compatible with socialism and that is why I told my 
interlocutors (Nasser and Khrushchev) that Algerian socialism is a Moslem 
one. Furthermore our friends and notably Khrushchev well understood that 
we were Moslems and socialist and there again, Algeria made a positive 
contribution to the development of socialism."’
On ideological terms, the Ben Bella regime stood closer to the 
orthodox conception of socialism than the Boumedienne leadership. The 
1964 Algiers Charter implicitly referred to the class struggle as it 
warned of the potential dangers of the petty bougeoisie. In contrast, 
the 1976 national charter remained silent on the existence on any form of 
class conflicts, stressing instead the unity of the people and the unity
’speech on the occasion of the first part of the High 
Assouan Dam scheme, quoted in the Egyptian Gazette, May 20, 
1964 in Orient (2), 1964, p.67.
of its revolution, while socialism was given an essentially economistic 
and developmental meaning. As the 1976 charter put it, socialism in 
Algeria does not stem from "materialistic metaphysics and is not linked 
to any dogmatic conception alien to our national genius... (and) the 
socialisation of the means of production constitutes the fundamental 
basis of socialism."^
In the conceptions of the military-technocrats coalition, the 
proletariat in Algeria's socio-economic structure (and in the new states 
in general) has no significant weight because the colonial or neo­
colonial exploitation did not result in the "formation of a relatively 
important working class/ but it accelerated the empoverishment of the 
2peasantry." Thus, the basic principle of the Marxist orthodoxy of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat has no real potency in the case of 
Algeria. Ideological cleavages between the regimes of Ben Bella and that 
of Boumedienne may suggest a different conception of relationship toward 
the socialist bloc, especially given the different model of socio­
economic change pursued by two Algerian leaders. But in either case, 
there has been a cautious demarcation from national experiences carried 
out in the Eastern European countries and from their foreign policies 
which the Algerians regarded as opportunistic and not always conform only 
to the basic principles of international socialism. Though from Ben 
Bella to Chadli, the basic standpoints of Algerian external policies had 
been in convergence with those of the Soviet Union, the Algerian leaders 
attempted to conduct a stance independent from Moscow, making clear that 
their country did not wish to become a Soviet client, having rather its 
own experience of socialism to develop in line with its own interests and
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National C h a r t e r , 1976, p.23.
‘i b i d .
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specific values. Therefore, while indulging in a revolutionary rhetoric, 
using sometimes a Marxist discourse with regard to the state of world 
affairs, there was no guarantee that the Algerians would proceed to 
establish the Soviet Union's brand of socialism or act as a simple pawn 
in Soviet foreign designs.
In confirmation of his rejection of Soviet-style socialism, Ben Bella 
banned the Algerian communist party in November 1962, making clear his 
intention to make the FLN the single party in Algeria. The Soviets did 
not strongly criticize this move, expressing only their "deep regret and 
anger" and discreetly showed support to the militants of the Algerian 
communist party and the leftwing ministers in Ben Bella's cabinets. As 
a result links between the CPSU and the FLN remained distant despite the 
quite good state-to-state relations. At the twenty third congress of 
the Soviet communist party in March 1966, the FLN delegation led by 
Cherif Belkacem walked out of the conference room in protest of the 
presence of representatives from the Algerian underground Avant-garde 
socialist party (PAGS). Further incidents occurred when the PAGS was 
invited to participate in the meeting of the world communist parties held 
in Budapest in 1968 and the world conference in Moscow in June 1969. To 
stress his country's ideological choices, the minister of religious 
affairs Mouloud Kasim spoke at a mosque - when visiting Moscow in August 
1971 - "of fraternal ties uniting Algeria with the Muslim of the Soviet 
Union." Visibly angered by this statement, the Soviet authorities 
promptly cut short Kasim's visit. But with Algeria's determination to
make the FLN the sole state party and the awareness of the salience of 
this party in Algerian politics, the Soviet leaders allowed the Algerian 
communists to slip into obscurity and moved to establish ties with the
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FLN. This change of attitude, however, cannot be clearly understood 
without reference to the shift in Moscow1 s theoretical approach to the 
third world. Since the 1960s, the stress in Soviet ideology had no 
longer been on the necessity "of the political leadership of the working 
class headed by its avant-garde whatever the form of transition to 
socialism”' but on the flexible concept of "national democracy" and 
"national leadership" in the new states to pave the way for a non­
capitalist path of development and building of a socialist society in the 
long term.
Algeria was certainly conscious that she was held as a practitioner 
of a non-capitalist way of development by Khrushchev and his successors 
and regarded as useful in their designs in the Mediterranean notably to 
get access to warm waters, increase their naval deployment in this sea, 
erode Western influence and meet Chinese competition when manifested 
there. These beliefs increased the reliance of the Algerians on Soviet 
support when needed despite divergences of ideological options and of 
national interests.
2. Ultimate congruity despite divergent interests
a . a convergent anti-imperialistic line
During the first years of independence, the alignment with Moscow 
helped Ben Bella to emphasize his revolutionary credentials in the 
Afro-Asian movement as his policies were eventually directed at putting 
an end to colonialism and opposing what he called the imperialist plot. 
In this struggle, the third world line shown by Moscow, in a context 
marked by a relative cold war, was necessary for Algeria given her lack
'speech of Khrushchev to the twentieth congress of the CPSU 
in February 1956 quoted in Rush,M (ed ) : the international 
situation and soviet foreign policy (Columbus, Ohio, 
Charles E. Merrill, 1970), p.184.
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of power capabilities and the weakness of non-alignment as a new force in 
world politics. Convergence with the socialist bloc appeared in the 
common attitude taken by both Algiers and Moscow against "manifestations 
of imperialism and Neo-colonialism" throughout the world and particularly 
in the new states. In issues of decolonization like those of the Congo, 
Vietnam and Portuguese Africa, Algeria adopted a line that coincided with 
the attitude of the socialist bloc in issuing declarations, voting 
resolutions at the United Nations and providing military support for the 
liberation movements with radical political options.
A common anti-imperialistic stance was also tangible in the cases of 
the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, after attending the UN 
General Assembly in November and conferring with President Kennedy in 
Washington, Ben Bella went to Havana where he condemned the US blockade 
over Cuba and expressed Algeria's support to the Cuban revolution.
Having fulfilled their duties in contributing to the anti-imperialist 
struggle, the Algerians turned to Soviet assistance for their own needs. 
On the economic level, they obtained from Moscow a loan of $100 million 
in 1963 and $128 million in 1964. And to transform an army of peasants 
into a modern and professional one as well as help ensure the state's 
security and the country's territorial integrity, Boumedienne, then the 
Defense Minister, visited Moscow from September 27 to October 5, 1963 to 
secure an important arms agreement. During the conflict with Morocco in 
mid-October, the Soviets responded favourably to Algerian request for 
more armaments and Cuba quickly provided Algeria with T34 tanks 50 
military experts and about 400 tank troops.
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At the end of 1964, Algeria received 25 Mig 15s, 17s and 21s, 35
11-28 bombers and 150 tanks. In March 1965, 260 officers went to the 
USSR to receive military training and in April following the visit of 
Boumedienne to Moscow, Algeria secured an agreement on arms and training. 
For the Soviets, it was clear that their assistance would permit Algeria 
to spread revolutionary ideals in North Africa and reinforce the Arab 
militant front around the Cairo-Algiers axis so as to counterbalance the 
US and French influences exercised through the conservative regimes of 
Morocco, Tunisia and the Gulf states. A significant manifestation of 
this convergence was the two-week visit Ben Bella paid to Moscow in May 
1964 where the Algerian president was warmly welcomed by Khrushchev, made 
a hero of the Soviet Union, and awarded the Lenin peace prize. The joint 
communique at the end of the visit stated that the "Soviet side very 
highly appreciated Algeria's policy of positive neutrality and non- 
alignment" while the Algerian delegation "fully supports the tireless 
struggle of the Soviet government and personally of Khrushchev for 
relaxation of international tension."^
The departure of Khrushchev in 1964 and the coup against Ben Bella in 
June 1965 did not have a serious impact on Algerian relationships with 
2the socialist bloc. For the Algerians, the maintaining of such a 
friendship was necessary to help them revise privileged relations with 
France and acquire a military superiority over their neighbours that 
would act as a deterrent for their territorial irredentia. On their 
part, the Soviets continued to hold up Algeria as a practitioner of a 
non-capitalist development and saw her as useful in their attempts to
1 Or i en t (Hamburg), (2 ), 1964 .
2 In contrast to the USSR, Cuba was critical of the coup and 
as a result the Cuban press agency was urged to close its 
Algiers bureau (see Le M o n d e , July 2, 1965).
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challenge the West's hegemony over world affairs. This convergence 
resulted in Boumedienne leading an important delegation to Moscow in 
December 1965 to obtain more economic and military assistance. After 
Boumedienne1 s trip to Moscow, Algeria concluded several contracts through 
which the Soviets contributed to the realization of a number of projects, 
such as a glass unit at Oran producing 10,000 tonnes a year, a metal­
lurgical mercury complex at Ismael with an annual capacity of production 
of 377,000 tonnes, an iron-ore plant at Al-Abed and an electric plan at 
Annaba. However, the major venture in which the Soviets participated at 
that time was the huge Al-Hadjar steel plant the cost of which was 
estimated at $300 million. They also helped to build several technical 
centres, among them the Boumerdes institute specializing in the training 
of engineers and technicians, mainly in the energy domain. Besides, 
Soviet cultural assistance had been quite important as by 1967, 3,000
Soviets were working in Algeria: 500 teachers, 300 physicians,. 300 oil 
teachers. By 1972, 2,200 local engineers and technicians and over
13,000 skilled workers had been trained by the Soviets in Algeria.'
As a result of this economic and cultural cooperation, the volume of 
Algerian-Soviet trade increased by 250 per cent from 1965 to 1967, rising 
from $12 million in 1966 to $55 million in 1967 and to $145 million the 
following year. By that time, the USSR ranked third in Algeria's exports 
and sixth in her imports. The major feature of this intensification of 
trade exchanges had been the signature of an economic agreement on 
December 28, 1968, through which the Soviet Union agreed to import from 
Algeria annually and for a seven year period, 25,000 tonnes of citrus
'Revolution A f r i c a i n e , July 22-29, 
military r e v i e w , July 7, 1972, p.53.
1968, p.21 and Sovlet
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fruits, 500,000 tonnes of oil, 5 million hectolitres of wine and 100,000 
tonnes of minerals. In return she would supply industrial equipment and 
finance industrial projects in Algeria.
Besides this intensive economic cooperation, Algeria responded 
favourable to the call made by the Soviets in 1966 for an alliance 
between the progressive Arab states to confront imperialism and 
reaction.' Indeed, alongside the USSR, Algeria was adopting a radical 
and militant foreign policy, notably in Arab affairs. This honeymoon was, 
however, perturbated by Soviet attitude towards the June 1967 Arab- 
Israeli conflict, as Boumedienne's request for more arms to enable the 
Arab to continue the war was met by Soviet circumspection and reluctance.
Visibly irritated, Boumedienne criticized the USSR's opportunism 
noticing a "contradiction in the Soviet's political analysis. For
instance, they insisted on violently resisting reactionary forces 
throughout the Arab regimes while at the same time calling for a total 
Arab alliance regardless of extreme ideological differences.”2
To atone for these divergences, the Soviet President Podgorny was 
sent to the Arab capitals in June-July 1967 to mend fences with the Arab 
leaders promising more arms to the Arab confrontation states notably 
Egypt. In July 1968, the Soviet Defense Minister Grechko paid a visit to 
Algiers to fulfill these commitments at a time when the Boumedienne 
regime was urging French troops to withdraw from their bases in Algeria 
and when US naval deployment in the Mediterr anean became increasingly 
important. By the end of .1968 there were in Algeria 2,000 Soviet 1
1New York T i m e s , May 18, 1964.
^Confidence made to the Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud 
R i a d . See Riad, M: the struggle for peace, p.50.
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military advisers and about 2,000 naval advisers. ^ Concerns of national 
security were behind Algeria's soft attitude towards the Soviet presence 
in the Mediterranean, though she believed that the most effective 
deterrent against any foreign military intervention could be the 
neutralisation and demilitarization of this sea. Thus while denouncing 
US naval incursions in the Medi terranean, she came to tolerate Soviet 
manoeuvres there because it could constitute a counterbalance for the US 
in this region. Boumedienne made his optimism clear by declaring "we are 
not like those who had ‘been alarmed by the Soviet presence in the 
Mediterranean ... We regard the presence and activities of the US sixth 
fleet dangerous for our independence. In our eyes, the entry of the 
Soviets in the Mediterranean represents a factor of balance. But it 
goes without saying that we prefer to see neither of them exercising 
power in the region. The Medi terranean for Medi terraneans is the best
formula. We are ready to co-operate with any power which sincerely aims
2at this objective."
Despite the fact that the Algerians consider the neutralisation of 
the Mediterranean as a remote possibility given fierce East-West rivalry 
there, they attempted through various conferences to strengthen the 
impact of this ideal among Mediterr anean countries, especially the 
progressive ones.^ And though they looked for military assistance and 
protection from Moscow, they have denied the Soviets acquisition of
'interview to Lacouture ¡J. and S., quoted in El-Mo udjahid ,
March 1 1 , 1 9 6 9 .
2
^ln a speech addressed to the Soviet Premier Kosygyn during 
his visit in October 1971, Boumedienne demanded the
dismantling of all foreign bases in the Mediterranean. 
This was also echoed by Bouteflika in his lecture
'L'Algerie et 1 'Europe1 delivered in Brussels on June 29,
1972.
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military bases in Algeria, granting the communist power only naval 
facilities, airfield landing and refuelling privileges. Rumours in 1968 
and 1969 that Algeria turned over to the USSR the Mers el Kebir base were 
firmly rejected by the Algerian leaders.1 They only occasionally
threatened to do so in case of pressures frcm Nato's military exercises 
and strategies in the Mediterranean.
As an expression of her desire to maintain a useful friendship with 
the Soviets, Algeria came to the rescue of the USSR in the UN debates 
over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, although she has in 
principle always shown a great hostility to foreign intervention in 
domestic affairs of sovereign states. Algeria certainly would have 
preferred to avoid this dilemma through the adoption of a passive and 
equivocal silence, but unfortunately she had to make her standpoints 
clear as she was a rotating member of the security council at the time of 
Soviet invasion. Before the meetings of this council, the Algerian
delegation tried with much energy to delay debates which would in 
practice maintain a status quo favourable to the Soviet Union. The 
Algerian representative Bouattoura pointed out that "no real discussions 
and consultations had taken place among all members of the council" and 
the haste of some representatives, he complained, was "in great contrast 
to the complacency shown when it wa3 question of Africa, Asia, Latin- 
America or the Middle East." He went on arguing that Algeria "firmly 
adhered to the principle of self-determination, withdrawal of foreign 
troops, and the settlement of all problems within the framework of 
establishing peace based on justice and stability. Those principles as 
set out applied as much to Czechoslovakia as to Vietnam and Palestine ...
1 El- Moud j a h i d , June 24, 1968 and January 17 , 1969 .
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In this present situation, the path of cold war chosen by the council was 
damaging to socialist Czechoslovakia and would block a just solution."1 
Algeria then duly abstained from voting on a resolution condemning the 
Soviet invasion passed by the security council on August 23, 1968.
To highlight this cordial relationship, Bouteflika went to Moscow in 
March 1969 and Podgorny the Soviet President paid a visit to Algiers on 
April 26, the Bulgarian leader on May 24 and Marshall Sychalsky the 
president of the Polish State council on October 6. This alliance was 
then feared by Washingtoh as the US Secretary of Defense McNamara 
observed that "the Soviet thrust into the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East represented a potentially serious threat on the equilibrium of this 
region and the West Mediterranean. The Maghreb and the horn are the 
areas of Africa of most immediate strategic concern to the US -North 
Africa covering the southern flank of Nato and the Horn standing at the 
approaches to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Arab-Israeli war and 
the continued Soviet-sponsored Algerian military build up added to the 
basic instability of the area. The delivery of over $200 million worth
of Soviet equipment to Algeria since 1965 continues to alarm her moderate
2neighbours."
The early 1970s witnessed a shift in Moscow's objectives in the third 
world, bringing about what the Algerians regarded as pragmatic and 
opportunist strategies. However, instead of distancing themselves from 
the communist power, they attempted to accommodate to this new Soviet 
design for the purpose of maintaining friendship without subscribing to 
the USSR's conceptions of world detente and economic pragmatism.
'Meeting of the Security Council, August 22, 1968, in United 
Nations Yearbook (22), 1968, p.301.
2 Me Namar a , R . S . : the essence of security (New York, Harper 
and Row, 1968). p.28
384
b. Accommodation to Soviet pragmatism and opportunism
The motivations of the Brezhnev leadership seemed to be related more 
to trade and economic co-operation with many of the third world countries 
than with political and ideological affinities.1 It was in this context 
that Prime Minister Kosygyn toured the North African countries in October
1971. In Rabat, he considered the development of friendly Soviet- 
Moroccan relationship as "another example of the effectiveness of the 
policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems," 
and in Algiers he observed that "with Algeria embarking upon her economic 
development schemes under its new plan, new possibilities are arising for 
economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and other states belonging to 
the socialist system where economy is planned on the basis of long range 
state plans."3
Seemingly, the Algerians were not disturbed by the balanced policy 
Moscow attempted to follow in North Africa as such pragmatism responded 
also to their own efforts of maintaining detente in the Maghreb, 
diversifying their country's trade relations and lining up the developing 
world against the hegemony of the West. To assert their new pragmatic 
approach, the Algerians received the Chinese Minister of Trade on October 
20, only a few days after Kosygyn's visit and in March 1972,3 they were 
the hosts of the President Cauesescu of Rumania who had begun to show
'in a speech to the twenty fourth congress of the CPSU in 
1971, Kosygyn regarded socio-economic co-operation with the 
third world countries as "mutually advantageous and by 
expanding trade with them, the Soviet Union will gain the 
opportunity of satisfying fully the requirements of its own 
national economy", in Pr avd a , April 7, 1971.
3Katin, V: The Soviet Union and the Arab world: defining a 
new relationship (in the new Middle East ( 3 9 ) ,  December 
1971 ,  pp. 16 -  18)  , p . 18 .
3ln November 1972, the Algerian Trade Minister Yaker led a 
delegation to China and North Korea.
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many similarities with the policies of the non-aligned movement thus 
establishing a greater autonomy vis-a-vis the Kremlin. Moreover, the 
Algerian press did not miss opportunities to stress Yugoslavia's 
independent foreign policy and choice of self-management. If Moscow's
strategies in North Africa responded to setbacks it faced in the Arab 
world, it also indicated its desire to strengthen economic co-operation 
and friendship in Algeria particularly in the clear attempt to have a 
greater share in Algerian market after the end of 'privileged relations' 
between Algeria and her former metropole. On the occasion of the Moslem 
year, only forty-eight hours after the Algerians announced the national­
ization of the French oil interests (February 24, 1971), the Soviet
leadership sent a message to the Algerian government stating that "the 
continuing strength and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the 
Algerian republic fully accords with the interests of the peoples of our 
two countries, the cause of peace and universal progress."1 And during 
his visit to Algiers in November, Kosygyn expressed his considerations
for Algeria's dynamic non-alignment directed at supporting struggles
2against imperialism and foreign domination and consolidating peace.”
However, as Algeria reinforced her economic links with the Western 
world especially the USA and as she attempted to lead the third world 
coalition in the North-South debates, relationship with the Soviet Union 
became less warm, though remaining cordial because of the convergence of 
interests. The Algerians observed that in the early 1970s, the Soviet 
attitude toward the Arab world was ambiguous and opportunistic. In 
Algerian analysis, the Soviet stand toward the Middle East shifted from 
the support for the Arabs to fight Israel by all means to a more moderate
' In El-Moud j a hid , February 26, 197 1
2 i b i d , November 9, 1971.
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stance since Brezhnev's meeting with the US president Nixon in 1973. To 
stress his bitterness, the Algerian leader declared that "Moscow is not 
the dynamic centre of the revolution as it used to be in 1917." And it 
was perhaps in order to embarrass the Kremlin that he defiantly made 
public a supposedly confidential message Leonid Brezhnev sent to him on 
October 8, 1973 as a response to Algerian letters to each of the
permanent members of the security council following the outbreak of 
hostilities between Arabs and Israelis. In this message, the Soviets 
urged Algeria and the Arabs to strengthen their solidarity and make 
available all possible assistance to Egypt and Syria in their war 
efforts. In Algerian eyes, this was simply contradictory with Soviet 
practice, since the Soviet leadership refrained from providing the Arabs 
with effective support in order not to jeopardise detente with the USA. 
For Algerians, detente should be global and involving all states great
and small and not circumscribed by a bai ance between Moscow and
Washington at the expense of the security of the new states and
developing countries. This Soviet-American connivance and bipolar detente 
were denounced by Boumedienne when he declared at the opening speech of 
the non-aligned held in Algiers in September 1973 that the "world is 
divided between rich and poor". Immediately the Soviet leaiership reacted 
through a message sent by Brezhnev to Boumedienne contesting that the 
Soviet Union should be put on the same level with the USA. Nevertheless, 
a critical attitude to Soviet's pragmatism and opportunism did not 
prevent Algeria from maintaining friendly relations with the USSR with 
regard to her new needs and expectations, especially because of tensions 
with Morocco over the Western Sahara.
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In the beginning of this conflict, the Soviet Union supported the 
right of the Western Sahara people for self-determination as she voted 
for the Algerian sponsored resolution at the UN General Assembly in 
September 1975. This attitude was then based on ideological grounds as 
Moscow seemed to prefer seeing the Algerian style of socialism spread 
down the Atlantic coast through the establishment of an independent state 
in the Sahara close to Algeria, a matter that would substantially reduce 
Western, especially French influence over this region. In the aftermath 
of the clash between Algerian and Moroccan troops at Amgala in early 
1976, the USSR promptly agreed to meet Algeria's request for more 
military assistance following the visit to Moscow of Colonel Yahaoui on 
May 30.
To many foreign observers, this was interpreted as a reward for 
Algerian contribution in Soviets' efforts to help the Angolan regime 
against the Western backed 'rebels' of the FLNA and Unita. During this 
conflict, Algeria was reported to have served as a "major transit for 
Soviet arms and airlift to Angola while Algerian pilots were believed to 
have helped man Soviet-built Migs based in Brazaville".1
However, as the war in the Western Sahara went on, the USSR began to 
show a neutral attitude dictated by economic considerations which seemed 
to have prevailed over ideological affinities with Algeria and her 
protegee the Polisario Front. Indeed on March 16, 1977, the USSR signed 
a 30 year agreement worth $2 billion hailed by King Hassan as the 
"contract of the century"^ and unconfirmed rumours emerged from Rabat 
that Moscow assured Morocco of its neutrality over the Western Sahara
'Durch, w.J: The Cuban military in Africa and the Middle 
East; from Algeria to Angola (in Studies in Comparative 
Commun i s m , Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 34-74 ), p.55.
^Le M o n d e , June 3, 1977.
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conflict.^ In addition to their interests in phosphates and fisheries 
potential of Morocco, the Soviets perhaps came to believe that an 
intensive economic co-operation with Morocco would provide them with a 
foothold and enhance their image with various groups in the Kingdom in 
order to be better placed to benefit from any revolutionary upheaval that 
might occur in this potentially unstable country. To achieve these
objectives, Moscow cautioned Algeria not to pass military aid on to the 
Saharawi movement. Obviously, the Soviet-Moroccan co-operation had
infuriated the Algerians but nevertheless they avoided a resolutely 
hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, being poised to maintain Soviet 
military assistance they badly need in case of future confrontation with
Morocco. In fact, the FLN's organ 'Revolution Africaine' addressed
2severe criticisms mainly at the Moroccan regime.
Such an attitude seemed to have paid off when the Russians accepted 
Algeria's demands for more armaments after increasing hostility between 
Algeria and France combined with the overt support of the USA to Morocco. 
In early 1977, a delegation from the Algerian Defence Ministry flew to 
Moscow to inform the Soviet leaders of the mobilization of French 
intervention troops based at Dakar, and in December of the same year, the 
Soviet Chief of Staff paid a friendly visit to Algiers, probably to 
discuss arms agreements.^ Cuba also responded to Algerian need of
^International Saudi Repo r t , March 9, 1981.
2 Issue of June 1, 1977.3 Presumably it was French raids against a Polisario column 
operating near the Mauritanian border that had given a good 
reason for the Algerians to ask for more arms and a part of 
which was to be channelled to the Polisario front, see Le 
Mond e , January 14 , 1979. According to the US government
data, Soviet Union transferred to Algeria $1.8 billion 
worth of modern arms from 1975 to 1980 , see Remnek, R. Bt 
Soviet military interests in Africa in Orbi s (28 ), 1984, 
pp. 123- 143.
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military equipment and diplomatic support. Fidel Castro came to Algiers 
in March 1977, followed by the six-day visit of his brother and Defence 
Minister Raul in June. As a result, Cuba sent a small number of
aircrafts and technicians and, allegedly, Cuban military experts helped 
the Polisario guerrillas.
Among the objectives of Boumedienne's trip to Moscow in January 1978 
were the search for moral and military support for Algeria and for the 
Arab front of steadfastness and rejection set up to counter Egypt's peace 
treaty with Israel. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit 
stated that the Soviet side supported the right of the Saharawi people 
for self-determination -in accordance with the UN resolutions, and 
condemned the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel.^ Soviet 
attitude, however, seemed quite cautious as there was no mention of the 
Polisario front or condemnation of Moroccan policies in the occupied 
territories in order to avoid completely alienating King Hassan. But 
Boumedienne seemed quite satisfied with the Soviet stand as he apparently 
achieved his main objective of convincing the Kremlin to increase 
military supplies to his army. In a message he sent to the Soviet 
leaders in November 1978, the Algerian president praised their "tireless 
efforts to strengthen friendship and reinforce world peace".
After the death of Boumedienne in December 1978, the Algerian-Soviet 
relationship became less friendly. The Kremlin leaders were obviously 
deceived by the election of Chadli to the Algerian presidency since they 
founded their hopes on the FLN'è strongman Colonel Yahaoui, one of their 
closest friends. The dismissal of Yahaoui and other Boumediennist
officials from power in 1981, the relative economic liberalization
1 See "tournee du President Boumedienne au pr oc h e - o r i e n t , en
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pursued by President Chadli since then and his efforts to diversify 
Algeria's political and trade relations contributed further to the 
coolness of Algerian-Soviet relationship. In this perspective, the
Soviets seemed t o , have turned to Libya which had in the meantime showed 
an aggressive attitude toward Western interests in the sub-Sahara and a 
resolutely anti-US standpoint. It seemed then that in the context of 
the resurrection of cold war threats, the USSR had been looking for 
faithful allies to reinforce the socialist bloc.
With the deterioration of its relations with Qadhafi, the Chadli 
government was alarmed at the amount of modern weapons the USSR provided 
for Libya. Chadli made known his worry to the Soviets when visiting 
Moscow on June 8, 1981, a little more than a month after Qadhafi's trip
to the Soviet capital (April 25-27). Apparently, the Algerian president 
did not respond positively to Soviet request of adopting a harsh 
socialistic line or firmly allying himself with the Soviet-backed 
Libyan-Syrian axis. Instead, he had been slowly attempting to wipe out 
the image of radical and extremist Algeria forged in Boumedienne1 s time 
by stressing Algeria's islamism and positive non-alignment.' Under the 
drive of Taleb-Ibr ahimi the 'diplomatic read justment' also implied a 
marked shift from an alignment with the Soviet stand over foreign policy 
issues. In addition to the moderate line followed in Arab politics, the 
strengthening of economic relations with Western Europe as well as the 
relaxation of relations with the USA given the concerns of national
^At the Islamic conference held in Islamabad in January 
1980, Algeria in contrast to Libya did not firmly oppose a 
Saudi sponsored resolution condemning Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan and at the summit conference of the Arab 
steadfastness front convened in Tripoli in September 1981, 
Algeria opposed the proposal made by Libya and South-Yemen 
that the front should sign a defense treaty with the Soviet 
Union .
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security, Algeria moved to consolidate political and economic relations 
with China and Yugoslavia. However to stress his non-aligned policy and 
calm Soviet suspicions. President Chadli paid official visits to Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia in April 1984 while receiving the East German leader 
Honecker in November and the Polish president Jaruzelski in December 
1985. In Budapest and Prague, the Algerian presidential delegation
obtained declarations supporting the OAU resolutions that called for 
direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario front as well for 
the implementation of the national rights of the Palestinian people.1 
Indeed, despite his visit to the USA in April 1985, President Chadli was 
anxious to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union in a clear 
attempt to establish a balanced attitude between Moscow and Washington. 
The visits made by a high ranking military delegation to Moscow at the 
time of Chadli' s trip to the USA and that of Messadia the FLN's Deputy 
Head in December 1985, as well as the visit to Algiers in December 1984 
of Marshall Gorchkov, the Soviet first Vice Minister of defence indicated 
the congruity of interests between the two sides: Algeria needing Soviet 
military and economic assistance and the USSR desiring to secure a 
working relationship with Algeria in its attempts to erode the West's 
influence in the West Mediterranean. This convergence seems likely to 
continue despite occasional divergence inherent in their specific 
interests.
Joint communiques in El-Moud j a h i d , April 28 and 30, 1984 .
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Since independence, Algeria has been pursuing an economic policy 
largely conditioned by a combination of two basic factors specific to a 
former colony that gained political sovereignty through a national war of 
liberation: 1) the colonial legacy illustrated by a dependent economy 
based on commodity products and 2) the nature of the political leadership 
that emerged with the national struggle for independence.
In the official discourse, the process of economic development was 
not demarcated from ideology as it was regarded as a means to cement the 
country's identity and independence and transform a backward society into 
a socialist and modern one.
To achieve these objectives, the Algerian leaders had adopted a 
hostile attitude toward private enterprise and foreign capital through a 
predominant role the state played in nationalizing foreign interests, 
mobilizing resources for development and in directly controlling and 
managing the country's economy.
The relation of development to foreign policy has been highlighted in the 
link between power capabilities and the ambition to play an active role 
in world politics. "To have an efficacious foreign policy argued 
Boumedienne, it is indispensable to have first a healthy economy as the 
task of development will necessarily lead us to a well defined foreign 
policy not only with regard to the struggle for freedom but also for the 
just causes in the world."1 This parallelism between economic development 
and foreign policy has been well articulated in their evolution which 
followed three distinct phases:
'speech to the seventh conference of the presidents of 
communal assemblies, February 14, 1973 in d i scour s d u
President (3) , p . 184 .
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1. The first period stretching from 1962 to 1967 was characterized 
by a policy of improvisation that emphasized revolutionary ideals in the 
absence of economic experience•
2. Since 1963, the implementation of an ambitious economic 
programme coupled with changes in the world energy market contributed in 
enhancing Algeria's position in third world gatherings and in the 
North-South axis.
3. By the mid 1970s, thorny domestic problems coupled with the 
preoccupation over the Western Sahara and the decline of Opec's 
bargaining power, contributed in the loss of prestige in the internation­
al scene and accounted for the drive toward political moderation both at 
home and on the foreign level. This shift became tangible with the rise 
of Chadli to power corresponding to a period of conservatism as the state 
settles down breaking away from revolutionary euphoria and rhetoric.
A. STRATEGY FOR RAPID DEVELOPMENT 
1. The triumph of the technocratic model
It was in revolt against the socio-economic patterns of colonial 
domination that the wartime FLN nationalists formulated, through the 
Tripoli programme, the broad lines of an economic strategy to be 
implemented in independent Algeria through radical reforms. The 
consensus includes two basic foundations for this policy: 1. the call 
for a socialist-oriented economy based on nationalization of local 
private large business and foreign capital in all sectors, particularly 
the French and 2. the prominence of the state in the economic activities. 
The Algerian political elite which emerged with the process of a 
revolutionary war, particularly the professional soldiers of the ALN and
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the group of technocrats was ideologically committed to development goals 
and favoured a form of state capitalism to preserve their own position, 
gain social privileges and eventually meet the demands of the various 
segments of the Algerian people eager to benefit from the acquisition of 
political independence.
The Algiers charter formulated by the Ben Bella regime in 1964 
confirmed the central role of the state in the national economy and the 
socialist orientation of this economy through the nationalization of the 
means of production. However, pushed by a certain number of former 
maquisards and leftist intellectuals, as well as by radical militants of 
the trade union movement, Ben Bella endorsed the principle of self­
management, following the take-over by poor Algerian peasants of land and 
properties left behind by the French settlers. After declaring these 
properties vacant, the Algerian president decided to nationalize and give 
a legal status to the workers' self-management (autogestion) through the 
March 1963 decrees. In the agrarian sector, about 1,200,000 hectares 
representing a third of the country's cultivable land and employing
200,000 permanent and seasonal workers came under self-management, while 
in the industrial sector, only 450 enterprises employing 100,000 workers 
and concerning mainly small-scale industries and trade business were 
touched by autogestion. However, behind rhetoric, attempts to make the 
self-managed sector an organized political and economic force were not 
enough to overcome obstacles that hindered its implementation. The 
disastrous economic situation resulting from high unemployment, 
large-scale uprootedness among rural masses, lack of skilled manpower, 
financial resources and modern techniques impaired the development of the 
self-management process. In addition, the hostility of peasants and
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workers to state-directed collectivisation and bureaucratic practices 
seriously hampered efforts to carry out this experience. And conflicts 
over leadership and absence of a coherent ruling elite prevented attempts 
to embark upon an effective development policy. Large segments of the 
political elite, particularly the Oujda-group-led professional officers 
and the civilian technocrats disapproved of Ben Bella's economic policy 
on the grounds that it was marked by improvisation and decisions of 
prestige without rational planning. Further criticism was that it was 
influenced by Trotskist advisers such as Harbi and the Greek Pablo Raptis 
whom they accused of making Algeria a terrain for revolutionary 
experiment and trying to implement self-management principles at the risk 
of creating anarchic situations and ideological adventurism. Other 
social groups, such as the industrialists and landowners, were also 
hostile to Ben Bella's inclinations to the East-European type of 
development on the basis that it would result in the marginalisation of 
the private sector. Moreover, these fears were shared by the stratum of 
small businessmen as Ben Bella immediately opted for the setting up of a 
form of parastatal network in the small scale entrepreneurship under the 
control of the self-management committees.
However, pressures from the Oujda group and the technocrats forced 
Ben Bella to strengthen the role of the state in economic management by 
setting up national corporations and extending its control over foreign 
interests in the country. As a result state-owned companies were 
created in 1964 such as Sonatrach (hydrocarbons) and SNS (metallurgy) 
while state's participation in the exploitation of the country's 
resources was also Increased. Therefore partial nationalizations
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were undertaken as the Algerian state took shares in the SN Repal oil 
company, gas plant at Arzew and in car (Renault) and lorry (Berliet) 
assembly plants.
With the June 1965 coup, the experience of self-management to which 
Ben Bella was devoted had been steadily swept away by the development 
policy carried out by the managerial group led by the minister of 
national economy, Belaid Abdeslam. This economic strategy departed from 
the basic assumption that the country should not remain a supplier of 
cheap raw materials and labour for the industrialist world and an 
importer of its manufactured goods, but it should utilize the national 
resources, especially oil and gas to build up large enterprises as to 
manufacture intermediary' products to meet the needs of the industrial 
sector and provide a major stimulus for the modernization of the agrarian 
sector. The petrochemical industry for instance would provide insecti­
cides and fertilizers for soil to boost production.
Based on the theory of 'industrializing industries' developed by 
the French economists Perroux and De Bernis, this strategy gave little 
attention to the manufacture of consumer goods as the objective was that 
an export-oriented development strategy could make Algeria an industrial­
ized country by the early 1980s. To carry out this strategy, heavy 
industry was regarded as the real engine for economic development. This 
type of industry envisaged by the Tripoli programme was not arbitrary but 
resulted from the nature of Algeria's economic resources, namely oil and 
gas and the model of economic development experienced during the colonial
period
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Having inherited a relatively we 11-developed infrastructure,
Algeria intended to continue many of the objectives of the Constantine 
plan which conceived the country's economic development around the 
establishment of a steel work plant at Annaba and petroleum and gas 
complexes at Skikda and Arzew. The technocratic group also believed
that agriculture, in a country where cultivable land is relatively 
limited, agrarian structures distorted, techniques archaic, rural working 
force unskilled and exodus to town massive, could hardly provide a source 
for the state's primitive accumulation of capital, especially as, besides 
sizeable mineral deposits of copper, iron-ore, lead, phosphate, uranium 
and zinc, Algeria has substantial oil resources and huge gas reserves in 
her Sahara desert. Oil made Algeria the tenth biggest producing country 
in the world in the late 1960s, with an annual average production of 40 
million tonnes, while gas made her the world's third with reserves 
estimated at 3,6 trillion cubic metres.
To achieve a substantial level of industrialization, the Algerian 
leadership embarked upon a long process consisting in extending the 
public sector and developing the energy sector which it regarded as the 
backbone of the country's industrialization.
The setting up of huge state corporations in all sectors of the 
economy initiated during Ben Bella's rule was continued in order to 
control all stages from exploration to marketing. Extensive decision­
making power and huge financial resources were allocated for these 
enterprises which had been run by state-appointed managers most of whom 
had been trained abroad. Eight of these state-owned firms have absorbed 
some 35 per cent of total investment allotted to industry since 1970. 
The oil company Sonatrach the biggest of them all, employed more than
398
100,000 workers and imposed itself as one of the most important oil 
companies of the third world with regard to activities ranging from 
exploration, drilling and production of oil and gas to refining, 
transportation and marketing.
The extension of state control over the national economy was 
accelerated by a process of nationalizing foreign assets in the country 
in order to better use these resources in promoting the 'industrializing 
industries' and engineer a large scale economic infrastructure by 
boosting basic industries such as iron and steel as well as those of the 
metallurgical and mechanical sectors. In 1965, the Algerian state
nationalized banks, insurance companies and in April 1966, it took over 
the mining industry as well as the interests of Anglo-American oil 
companies Esso and Shell in August 1967, Sinclair in April 1969, Amif, 
Philip's petroleum in June 1970 and Mobil oil in November the same year. 
And as a result of the February 1971 nationalization of French oil 
assets, the share of Sonatrach in oil production rose from nearly 4 
million tonnes in 1966 to 38,5 million tonnes in 1972.
The success of Sonatrach in managing and marketing oil helped 
Algeria get access to world markets, while the booming rise of oil prices 
since 1971 encouraged the Algerian leadership to increase oil production 
to obtain more revenues to be invested in other basic industries. Sales 
of energy products necessitated the construction of new liquifaction 
plants, pipelines and special tankers. In 1966, two oil pipelines were 
built, one linking In-Amenas to La Skhirra on the Tunisian coastline (775 
kilometres) and the other linking Haoud al-Hamra to Skikda (805 
kilometres). In 1973, the latter was doubled with another pipeline and 
in 1983 was completed the undersea pipeline from La Skhira to Sicilia.
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Two gas pipelines were constructed in 1972 and 1973, the first one 
linking Hassi R'mel to Skikda and the second Hassi R'mel to Arzew. Oil 
refineries were set up at Hassi Messaoud and two huge gas plants were 
completed one at Skikda with a capacity of 8,2 million cubic metres a 
year and the other at Arzew with 10,5 million cubic metres annually.
It was clear that the Algerian planners wanted to expand the 
hydrocarbon sector as they intended in the framework of the Valhyd 
project elaborated with the US company Chemical Bechtel, to invest $50 
billion in ten years to develop oil and gas production and reach the 
level of 115 billion cubic metres of liquified natural gas (LNG) to be 
exported by the early 1980s. This amount of money seemed impressive as 
it corresponded to treble Algerian GDP in 1977. The importance of the 
hydrocarbon sector could also be seen in terms of absorption of public 
investment, contribution to the GDP and to the country's exports and 
foreign earnings as shown by tables VI:1, VI:2 and VI:3.
The vital importance of the hydrocarbon resources in Algeria's 
economic development affected Algeria's foreign policy in two ways: the 
continuous push for increase in oil prices and secondly the search for 
markets for her energy exports, as well as technological assistance and 
finance from abroad especially the Western 'capitalist' countries, to 
implement the highly intensive capital industries.
2 # Foreign trade: the logics of the national development policy
To develop the national economy, the Algerians had been seeking 
technology, markets and finance from everywhere, regardless of considera­
tions of political and ideological nature. Moreover, the determination 
to lessen the economic dependence on France led the Algerians to 
diversify trade relations but the requirements of the policy of
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"industrializing industries" resulted in the heavy reliance of the 
country's economy on the Western technology and outlets. And this,
despite the revolutionary rhetoric and anti-imperialism zeal exalted by 
the Algerian leaders.
The magnitude of the volume of trade with the Western capitalist 
world is shown by the fact that the EEC countries and the US accounted 
for nearly 90 per cent of Algerian external exchanges for the whole 
period 1963-1978 and in value, Algeria's trade with the USA alone (DA 
63097 million) was nearly twice the trade with Eastern Europe, Africa, 
Latin-America and the Arab world put together.
Table; Algeria's foreign trade: geographical division (1963-1978)
Countries
EEC
USA
Eastern Europe 
Latin America 
Africa 
Arab World 
Total
in volume (millions 
of DA)
200273 
63097 
15739 
9605 
4 580 
4252 
340382
in percentage
58.54
19.17
4.60
1.99
0.77
0.75
Source i adapted from annual statistics provided by the Direction des 
Douanes Nationales
As it appears co-operation and trade with the non-Western capitalist 
bloc had been negligible, despite some efforts to expand economic 
relations with countries of Eastern Europe and those of the third world. 
In fact, the very nature of Algerian economic policy and natural 
resources had considerably limited the possibility of Algeria to turn to 
a close economic co-operation with these countries as many of them do not 
have what Algeria needs most: technology and capital. Neither could they 
constitute a major market for Algeria's energy exports.
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a • Limits of the co-operation with the Eastern bloc
During the 1960s, Algeria's co-operation with Eastern Europe, the 
USSR in particular, substantially strengthened for two main reasons: the 
availability of Soviet assistance at a time when Algerian economy was 
heavily dependent on France and when economic ties with the EEC partners 
and the USA was not yet developed because the country's capacity of 
absorption was still limited. However with the implementation of the 
industrializing industries requiring Western technology and markets, 
co-operation with the Eastern bloc inevitably declined for the whole 1970 
decade.
From the point of view of Algerian technocrats, the development of 
trade with the Socialist bloc was hampered by the latter's reluctance to 
sign more long-term global agreements such as those concluded in 1964 and 
1968. Indeed, the accord signed in February 1972 with the USSR was valid 
for two years only. The Soviets also refused to accept certain products 
of Algeria's light industries, grant loans at low interest rates, and put 
into practice an agreement through which they accepted to load on their 
ships half of the volume of the goods they imported from Algeria. 
Besides, the mechanisms of trade exchanges proved too inadequate to 
permit the development of Algerian co-operation with the Eastern bloc. 
As it was practised, the 'system of clearing' had not been advantageous 
for the Algerians who preferred to sell their goods - especially oil - in 
the dollar currency instead of exchanging them for other products. They 
also complained that the products, particularly those imported from the 
Soviet Union, were sold above the world market prices, while the prices 
paid by Moscow for Algerian goods were far below world market prices. 
Another complaint was that the Soviet Union bought minerals from Algeria
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at a low price and sold them to Western Europe for foreign currencies and 
at higher prices. Furthermore, the slow bureaucratic procedures
inherent in the heavily centralized economies of East European countries, 
their rigid trade structures and rigorous methods of state planning had 
been responsible for the delays in the signing of contracts and their 
implementation. For instance, it was not until 1973 that the Soviets 
signed an agreement on maritime co-operation negotiated five years 
earlier.^ The importance of these problems certainly explained the 
visits to Algiers of the Soviet trade minister Petolichev in February 
1972 and that of Zorin, the roving Ambassador in April the same year.
However, if these problems reflected the coolness of Algerian-Soviet 
relations in particular in the early 1970s, they were also due to the 
nature of the Algerian development policy and the limits of Soviet 
assistance especially its energy expertise which was not really adequate 
for the specific needs of the Algerian economy. In fact, the USSR
itself needed to import sophisticated technology from the West to promote 
its own hydrocarbons industries and most important, energy also 
constituted an issue of contention between Algiers and Moscow since the
former feared Soviet competition with regard to winning West-European 
2markets. 1
1This agreement concerned the sharing of freight costs by 
the two countries. It was accepted by the USSR after
pressing demands from the Algerians, notably at the 
February 27, 1973 meetihg between Bouteflika and Grusinov
the Soviet Ambassador to Algeria.
^According to an agreement signed in 1981, Western Europe 
would import 25 per cent of its gas consumption from the 
Soviet Union by 1985, corresponding to 45 million cubic 
metres a year. The deal with west Germany includes a
price of $5.40 per million of BTU, a level well below $6.11 
Algeria was demanding to achieve price parity with her oil.
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As Algeria turned to an extensive co-operation with the Western 
World to implement her economic project that required sophisticated 
technology expertise and capital, trade exchanges with the East European 
countries inevitably declined. As a result, Algeria's imports of raw 
materials and semi-products from the Eastern bloc attained a mere 5 per 
cent of her total imports in this category in the late 1970s. And 
during that period, the participation of the East European countries in 
Algeria's economic programme remained limited to the realization of small 
and medium-sized projects, mainly in light industries sector, agriculture 
and waterworks.
Like with the Eastern bloc, the very nature of Algeria's development 
policy and natural resources did not permit Algeria to strengthen 
economic co-operation with her third world peers. Thus what was
regarded as a striking paradox between her militant foreign policy and 
orientation of trade relations reflected in fact an economic pragmatism 
that aimed at developing Algeria's capabilities on the basis of the 
economic policy carried out by the state technocratic team, 
b. Co-operation with the third world
Globally, Algeria's relations with the third world countries on the 
economic domain remained quite limited as her trade with them still 
represents a minor part in percentage of her total external exchanges. 
Not only the volume of this trade remained small but it was fluctuated 
from one year to another. And though Algeria set up joint commissions 
with several developing countries and signed a great deal of contracts, 
many of which have not been fulfilled or at least only partially, a 
number of these accords concerned only a small volume of trade exchanges.
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Much of Algeria's imports from the third world were made up of raw 
materials as she was importing for instance coal from Mozambique, frozen 
meat from Argentina, timber, gold and crude diamonds from Ghana, sisal, 
skins and coffee from Angola and Ivory Coast, while exporting mainly 
small quantities of oil and petroleum products as well as textiles, 
tinned food and electrical appliances.
The main features of Algeria's co-operation with fellow developing 
countries consisted mainly in supplying technological expertise, setting 
up joint companies and providing loans and free grants on the basis of 
common interests and mutually beneficial association. For instance, she 
claims only 40 per cent of capital in these mixed companies, ensuring 
that the partner retains' the majority of shares and control over the 
venture in conformity with one of Algeria's most cherished leitmotive, 
i.e. the right of developing countries over their natural resources. 
Under these terms, mixed companies had been set up with Guinea in 1973 to 
exploit jointly iron-ore deposits at Nimba, fishing companies with Benin 
and with Guinea-Bissau in 1975, and companies to process timber with 
Mozambique and Congo through the building of plants with a capacity of 
production of 15,000 and 100,000 tonnes respectively, a part of which 
will be imported by Algeria. Moreover, the Algerian oil company Sonatrach 
has set up joint associations with Yemen'soil firm Yemeco and Syria's 
Syapco to help these countries exploit their oil resources. It is in this 
domain that Algeria's co-operation with the third world has been most 
important as the North African country could with no exaggeration, claim 
to possess one of the most advanced and perhaps the most competent 
expertise and know-how in the whole South with regard to oil industry. 
In fact, Sonatrach is also currently conducting operations of boring and
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billing in the Mafia Islands in Tanzania, a venture in which the 
Algerians contributed a $10 million loan with flexible terms of 
reimbursement. It is also currently involved in the setting up of 
national hydrocarbon industries in Ghana, servicing refinery at 
Nouadhibou in Mauritania and oil prospection in Mozambique, while its 
subsidiary companies are helping to consolidate Mali's national company 
of petroleum Petrostock and build four stock containers for oil products 
la the regions of Gao and Timbuctu. Possibilities of exchanging
technology in the oil industry has also been reviewed with Mexico 
following the visit of President Chadli to Mexico in March 1985.
On the cultural level, Algeria has many agreements with Arab and 
African countries. In addition to exchanges of cultural programmes and 
organization of Algerian cultural weeks, Algeria contributed in the 
formation of cadres from the third world countries. Since independence, 
17,742 technicians coming from sixty two developing countries and from 
national liberation movements have received training in Algeria. 52 per 
cent were Africans and forty five per cent from other Arab countries.^ In 
1979, 459 African students were registered at Algerian universities and 
institutes and in 1982 there were 2250 students coming from over 50 
countries belonging to the Southern hemisphere. These universities
offered a wide range of social and scientific subjects such as studies in 
energy provided by the well-known institute of hydrocarbon situated at 
Boumerdes near Algiers and in Telecommunications at the Oran institute. 
In addition, a great number of Africans from mainly Guinea, Congo, Mali 
and Mauritania received paramilitary and technical training at the Somaa 1
1 APS (Algerian news agency): Le s axes f ond amentaux de la
co-operation Internationale in El-Moud j a h i d , January 1,
1 9 8 5 .
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police academy near Algiers and at institutes for the formation of 
gendarmes* Algeria also made available grants for African and Arab
students. In 1982, 500 Africans and 50 Yemenis were the recipients and 
for the 1983-1984 academic year, there were 3,500 from the third world 
studying in Algeria, 2,500 of whom were sponsored by the Algerian 
government • *
Another form of technical assistance consisted in sending experts 
and cadres to the Southern countries. In 1982 about 150 Algerians were 
working in Sub-Saharan Africa. Algeria also financed the building of 
secondary schools in Ruanda and granted Ethiopa one million dollars aid 
to carry out a campaign against illiteracy.
On the level of communications, the network between Algeria and the 
rest of Africa happened to be quite limited, although she has, since 
independence, lobbyed in African fora for the strengthening of road, 
airline, and maritime links among Africans to permit the development of 
an inter-continental co-operation which would serve as a basis for mutual 
understanding and working relationships. At the OAU meeting at Addis in 
1964 Ben Bella backed the project of building a Transaharan road and 
experts from 13 African countries reached unanimous basic agreement on 
its construction estimated at $800 million.^ But as these joint efforts 
proved slow, Algeria decided to build her own highway with public finance 
and the use of labour force provided by the national service conscripts, 
without however renouncing through the Transaharan committee at gathering 
the financial participation of other countries and international 
organisms into this project.^ 1
1 i_bid .
20rlent (2), 1964, p.7.
2The Committee held talks in Jeddah in February 1978 over
the question of financing the unified parts of the highway.
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Nigeria was at one time interested in this project and in the 
building of the section linking Agades to Kano to help channel some of 
its exports to Europe through Niger and then Algerian ports, but it 
finally decided not to do so. Some Nigerian officials might have seen in 
the highway a means to enable Algeria to expand her influence in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Islamic parts of Nigeria and thus challenge 
Nigeria's claims for leadership in West Africa. Economically, the 
highway aimed not only at getting Algeria's Saharan confines out of 
isolation, improving their economic infrastructure but also at increasing 
road traffic and exchanges of goods between Algeria and her Southern 
neighbours especially Mali and Niger as two sections of the Saharan road 
are being built to these countries' border. The Algerian-owned
transport company SNTR is operating a regular overland lorry service from 
Algiers to Kano. In addition, the discovery by the Algerian state-owned 
firm Sonarem of substantial deposits of gold, tungsten and uranium near 
these frontiers made the importance of the highway quite vital in 
Algeria's nuclear plans.
Beside road communications, Algeria has direct telephonic connec­
tions with the Maghreb countries and Mali and satellite links with 
Angola, Ivory Coast and Sudan. She also helped some sub-Saharan African 
countries such as Benin and Seychelles set up telecommunications centres. 
In the domain of airline, maritime transportation and freight she has 
certainly made a great effort to establish airline connections with most 
of the Arab countries and a certain number of sub-Saharan Africa such as
Delegates were from Algeria, Nigeria, Mali and from 
various financial such as the African Bank for Development, 
the Opec special fund, the UN development fund and the 
Saudi fund for development.
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Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal 
as well as Cuba. Maritime links have also been set with Guinea-Bissau, 
Ghana and Mozambique.
However, co-operation with the third world like with the socialist 
bloc remained, in comparison with economic ties with the western world, 
marginal not only in volume but also in value, a matter that indicated 
the integration of Algerian economy in the international capitalist 
market.
c* The need of Western co-operation
. The magnitude of this co-operation
The prominence of the western world in Algeria's global trade and 
economic co-operation could be seen at two levels: 1) the volume of this 
trade and 2) the level of technological transfer and financial assis­
tance. For the period 1963-1978, Western countries accounted for nearly 
90 per cent of her total trade exchanges. Moreover, the EEC and the US 
provided more than 70 per cent of Algerian imports of capital goods and 
semi-finished products which as a category constituted more than 65 per 
cent of Algeria's total imports for the whole period. Another aspect of 
Algeria's dependence on the West was indicated by her almost exclusive 
reliance on European and American markets for her energy exports which 
represented nearly 95 per cent of Algerian total exports for the decade 
1967-1977. Since the early 1970s, the USA imported more than 45 per 
cent of Algerian oil while the rest was delivered mainly to France, 
Western Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan. These countries had also been 
the main importers of Algerian natural and liquefied gas.(Table VI:4)
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Such a dependence on foreign outlets becomes highly significant if 
one considers that American purchase of Algerian oil which averaged 55 
per cent of Algeria's total petroleum exports hardly accounted for more 
than 8 per cent of US total oil imports. In addition, the 17.6 billion 
cubic metres of Algerian LNG imported by the USA in 1977 represented 28 
per cent of Algeria's gas exports but a mere 2 per cent of US gas 
consumption.^
The prominence of EEC in Algeria's trade and economic co-operation 
rested evidently on geographic proximity, historical links and on the 
complementarity of exchanges between the two sides. Until her
independence, Algeria was treated as an integral part of the European 
community. Afterwards, she continued to benefit from the de facto 
membership privileges conferred upon her by the relationships to her 
ex-metropole. In 1964, she entered formal negotiations with the EEC in 
an attempt to obtain a global agreement covering the entire field of 
technical and financial assistance, the status of Algerian workers in the 
community member states and trade exchanges but these efforts failed. 
Formal arrangements were reached by the 1976 agreement permitting Algeria 
to export duty-free about 7.7 million tonnes of refined petroleum 
annually, to have preferential access for olives and oil as well as loans 
and grants, but these measures were regarded by Algerians as hardly 
satisfactory because of the EEC's refusal to grant entry of Algerian 
workers to the European labour market, the unequality in trade exchanges 
between the two sides and because of the limitations imposed on some 
Algerian exports. In addition, Algeria complained that her products
which benefited from the de facto preferential access to the EEC markets
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represented in fact only between 3 to 4 per cent of the value of her 
total exports.^ The provisional agreement of 1977 did not meet her 
demands as she was even forced to reduce exports of wine to the community 
by 80 per cent.^ However, these disagreements did not prevent an
increase of trade between Algeria and EEC member states individually 
although Algeria experienced a considerable trade deficit. This
diversification into other European partners, also helped Algeria to 
reduce her trade dependence on France which until 1976 was her first 
trading partner. Conversely, it left room for a substantial rise in her 
trade with the USA which resulted in making this country supplant France 
as Algeria's most important trade partner in the mid-1970s. Indeed, 
Algeria's exports to the USA increased from $200 million in 1973 to $2200 
in 1974 representing 42 per cent of her total exports, while her imports 
from North-America rose from $167 million in 1973 to 487 in 1978.^
. content and forms of the co-operation with the West 
The contribution of Western countries in Algeria's efforts of 
development covered a wide range of operations: constructing oil and gas 
liquefaction plants and industrial complexes; supplying equipment and 
machinery and providing technical as well as financial assistance. France 
contributed to the implementation of a high proportion of economic 
projects in her former colony especially in the 1960s. West German 
companies have since then been mainly responsible for the realization of 
projects in the mechanical industry as they accounted for a third of the
1See speech made by Dr.iss Jezairy, former Ambassador to 
Bruxelles and EEC to the conference on co-operation with 
the EEC, held under the auspices of the Friedrich Ebert 
foundation quoted in El- Moud j ahi d , December 14, 1981; see 
also his interview to Radio france quoted in L 'ac ti o n , 
March 15, 1981.
2 El - Moudj a h l d , July 1 1 , 1977 .
^Africa C o n f i d e n t i a l , May 12, 1978, p.2
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contracts concerning this branch between 1968 and 1975. One of their main 
ventures had been the building of the bicycle and motor cycle factory at 
Guelma in Eastern Algeria.^ Meanwhile firms from the USA, Japan, and to a 
lesser degree Great Britain had been prominent in the expansion of 
Algeria* s petrochemical industry. US companies, in particular, had also 
been involved in projects as varied as telecommunications, electrical, 
agrarian and water-works.
This type of co-operation did not take the form of direct investment 
as it was experienced in countries with free market economies, but was 
regulated under the control of the Algerian state which had been imposed 
on all the country's external transactions since 1967.  ^ From that time, 
foreign firms had been commissioned by state organisms and national 
companies to help implement industrial projects scheduled in the 
successive development plans, through a complex mechanism of selective 
criteria in the framework of the state's monopoly over foreign trade. 
Successful foreign contractors were then engaged in joint ventures 
through the setting up of mixed companies or on a turn key basis. These 
forms of association had been widely used, especially in the domain of 
oil exploitation and the first venture of the mixed company type was 
experienced with the US oil firm Getty in October 1968. In accordance
i * ,Breves e c o n o m i q u e s i relations Algero-Francaises, Ministry 
of Commerce, Algiers, 1976.
 ^B . Hamza rightly argued that "direct foreign investment as 
traditionally defined has no major role to play in the 
economy of Algeria. However this may be a misleading
impression of the true involvement of foreign investment.
By way of example, US investment in Algeria is less than 
$100 million. Such a modest sum does not represent the US 
economic and commercial activities which included more than 
70 firms with contracts totalling several US billion 
dollars." B. Hamza: the legal aspects of technology from 
development to developing countries with special reference 
to the Algerian experience (un3ubmitted PhD Thesis, law 
School, University of Warwick, March 1984,) note p.262.
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with this agreement, Getty agreed to hand over to Sonatrach 51 per cent 
of its assets in exchange for the lifting of government controls, 
exploration permit and liberal fiscal regime. It also accepted to be 
taxed at 55 per cent, invest $160 million for prospecting over a 5 year 
period, and grant the Algerian company $225,000 in donations. Moreover, 
Sonatrach acted as the operating company and was to receive 88 per cent 
of the profits from the jointly owned company. Similar conditions were 
imposed on other foreign companies which entered this form of joint 
venture with Algerian state-owned enterprises. Between 1970 and 1974, 
mixed companies were also set up with several US firms such as Altest 
pits tests. Baker oil tools incorporation, Aldria (Sondage) and Dresser 
industries to provide the necessary machines for drilling. With Italy's 
oil company ENI, Sonatrach created a joint company ALCIP for the 
construction of a 2,500 km gas pipeline to link Hassi R'Mel to Cap Bon in 
Tunisia and thence to Mazara del Vallo on the Sicilian Coast at the 
initial cost of $850 million.
The second form of association with foreign capital had been the use 
of the turnkey system through which foreign firms plan, build, equip the 
plants and help the Algerians to operate them. They pull out as soon as 
the operation can be left entirely to the nationals. The most important 
venture on a turnkey basis had been the contract signed by Sonatrach and 
the US El-Paso company on October 9, 1969, considered at that time as the 
major A1 gerian-American economic project as well as the world's biggest 
LNG deal. Through its terms, Sonatrach agreed to supply the US with 10 
billion cubic metres a year of liquefied natural gas and for a 20 year 
period. The deliveries were expected to start in 1978 after the
building of gas refineries at Arzew and Skikda with the help of mainly
4 13
American companies and loans. One of these companies, the giant Bechtel 
corporation was commissioned to complete work on the LNG 1 at Arzew, the 
world's largest liquefaction plant, after the dismissal of the US 
company, Chemico corporation, while another American firm Pullman-Kellog 
was earmarked for the building of another plant LNG 2 with a similar 
capacity production (10.5 billion cubic metres annually). Japanese
companies (Isoh and Japan gazoline) were commissioned for the construc­
tion of a smaller refinery plant (2,5 million tons of oil) regarded at 
that time the largest business contract Japan had signed with an African 
country. A British company, Pritchard-Rhodes was awarded in May 1971 a 
$50 million contract to build the fifth and sixth liquefaction units at 
Skikda to increase production of LNG. And a West German firm Deminex 
and a consortium won a contract on a turnkey basis for exploration 
providing for the supply of 30 million tonnes of crude oil by 1977 and 
involving an investment of DA 230 million over 12 years.
Several other ventures on this basis had also been set up with 
Western companies in other branches of industry. For instance, the 
contract between SNMC and West German companies: Klockner Hambot Deutz 
concerning the construction of an entirely automated cement plant with a 
1 million tonne capacity production a year, and with Wedag for the 
building of a cement complex at Meftah near Algiers with a similar 
capacity and considered then as the largest in Africa. On its part the 
steel manufacturer company SNS signed a 10 year technical assistance 
agreement with Nippon Steel to realize an integrated steel plant at La 
Macta in Western Algeria, while Japanese Mitsubishi electric company and 
America's GTE international system won contracts to set up an earth 
satellite communication system.
4 )4
However, problems of maintenance, shortage of spare parts, the 
quickly-outdated form of technology imported, the low level of local 
expertise added to the extra costs due to the evei— rising price of 
imported equipment and capital goods had rendered the turnkey formula 
less effective than the Algerians expected. To remedy these inefficien­
cies, they proposed a new form of contract on a turnover basis by which 
the foreign companies involved are bound to provide technical training, 
assistance for young Algerian cadres and ensure maintenance after 
completing the construction of plants and factories. Foreign contrac­
tors have nevertheless been reluctant to accept this new formula on the 
grounds that time and cost involved proved considerable, but in the eyes 
of Algerians, this attitude merely shows the reluctance of the Western 
countries to permit a developing country to acquire and master advanced 
technology that may increase its competition in Western markets and 
elsewhere. The Algerians were also not prepared to invest a huge amount 
of money most of which acquired through foreign loans, as long as 
transfer of technology remains only a form through which foreign firms 
maximise their profits at the expense of their country's economic 
development. The financial burden proved quite hard to bear as Algeria 
massively borrowed from Western financial organisms and the World Bank to 
help implement a great number of ventures she set up with Western 
companies. As a way of example, the huge Sonatrach-El Paso deal of 1969 
was financed by several Western banks through loans and credit facilities 
totalling $658 million. The reliance on these sources for domestic 
investments resulted in the increase of Algeria's external debt for the 
plans 1974-1977 and 1978, estimated at nearly $18 billion and represent­
ing about half of the country's GDP of 1978. It also led to threats from
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Western banks especially US to restrict further loans except on projects 
bringing a quick return to investment because of Algeria's poor credit 
rating due to a drop in her oil revenues in the mid-1970s.
To reduce the structural dependency of their economy on the Western 
markets and outlets, the Algerians attempted with a great zeal to switch 
the attention of the developing countries on the necessity of radically 
remodelling the international economic patterns.
B. THE NECESSITY OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO)
1. Algeria's global strategy and practice
a) A revolt against the inequalities of the world system
In their experience of a modern nation-state building, the Algerians 
felt the weight of their colonial legacy and the inequalities between 
developing countries and the industrialized nations as heavy burdens on 
their economic development and on that of their third world peers. The 
growth of modern capitalism in Western countries is believed to have 
resulted from the exploitation of the third world through colonization 
and unequal exchanges.' In a speech addressed to the Conference of the 77 
group convened in Algiers in October 1967, Boumedienne pointed out that 
"Europe and the US have exploited the national resources of the third 
world countries. The independence of the great bulk of these countries 
did not put an end to old colonialism which is still maintained in these 
countries through diverse forms such as the right of foreigners over
'speech delivered by H.E.A.Rahal, Algerian representative to 
the UN in From a new i n t e r n a t i on a 1 political order to a 
NIEO (undated document. Ministry of foreign affairs.
p p . 1-29)
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property, their control over national wealth, the acquisition of raw 
Materials at cheap prices and the exports of manufactured products at 
high prices and through the banking system."^
In Algerian views, the link between national development and 
international economic structures is particularly stressed, since the 
implementation of their economic policy depended also on the regulations 
of the international economic market. In practice, the Algerians came to 
realize that the mechanisms regulating technology transfer, price 
indexation of primary commodities and manufactured goods, as well as 
access to markets of the industrial world and loan facilities have all 
been manipulated by the Western countries for their own interests at the 
expense of the developing' ones. To sustain their arguments and especially 
the point concerning indexation of the prices of raw materials, the 
Algerians argued that copper, which constituted 22 per cent of the LDC's 
exports, saw its price falling from $7377 a tonne in 1970 to 1367 in 
1978, iron-ore from $24 a tonne to 12 and cotton from $161 a tonne to 
138. And as far as oil is concerned, they observed that its purchasing 
power has deteriorated because of the rise in the price of manufactured 
goods, capital equipment and technology imported by the Opec countries. 
They also complained that aid allocated to the third world has not always 
served the interests of the recipients, while loan conditions as 
practiced by the World Bank have in many cases impaired the effective 
implementation of economic projects in the developing countries. The 
World Bank, the Algerians claimed, refused financing the first plant of
^Bournedienne's speech, 77 group Conference, Algiers, October 
10, 1967 in Les discours du President (2), p.308.
^Reunion internationale pour la cooperation et le 
d é v e l o p p e m e n t , Cancún , Mexico, October 22-23, 
(Ministry of foreign affairs, 1981), p.3.
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ammonia and nitrogeneous fertilizer products they intended to build 
themselves on the basis that it was too large for the needs of Algeria, 
but once built and solely with national financing, the production 
capacity of the plant, they argued, was not even sufficient to meet half 
those needs.1 Moreover, Algerian request for a loan from the World Bank 
to finance boat building capacities was rejected because the Bank 
favoured instead loans to the Algerian private sector for importing 
boats.
The Algerian approach to the problems of the international economic 
relations has been global, linking for instance the problems of 
information and news, as well as the exploitation of the seabed to the 
issues of world commodity and the NIEO. Thus, if problems facing the 
third world are various and sectoral, their solution should be global as 
the Algerians believed that the aspects of the international system are 
intimately interlocked and interdependent. Therefore, this global
perspective has been stressed by Algerians in the North-South debates 
with a great zeal and determination.
b. Efforts to mobilize the third world around the North-South 
debates.
To push forward the third world demands they consistently called 
for the solidarity of the developing countries which they regarded as 
necessary to bolster the South's bargaining power; but to be effective, 
this solidarity should be paired up with economic independence of the 
third world countries which requires national ownership and control over 
natural resources as well as- the promotion of industrialization and 
self-reliance•
1i bid .
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The desire to play a leading role within the third world coalition 
led the Algerians to involve themselves deeply in North-South debates* 
At these fora, the Algerian representatives and particularly the state 
technocrats displayed a great deal of diplomatic skills in presiding over 
conferences and working groups, formulating strategies, drafting 
resolutions and narrowing the gap between conflicting attitudes in order 
to push further the third world demands. Algeria also hosted numerous 
gatherings of the developing countries, in particular the meetings of the 
group of 77 in October 1967, the non-aligned conference summit in 
September 1973 which adopted economic programmes largely inspired by the 
Algerian doctrine, endorsing its main precepts: self-reliance, sovei—  
eignty over national resources, industrialization as the key for economic 
independence.
However, the failure of the third world to break the opposition of 
the North to reform the international economic system at the UNCTAD held 
in Santiago in 1972 was deeply resented by the Algerians who therefore 
came to realize how fragile was the weight of the South and how tenacious 
was the determination of the developed countries in rejecting demands for 
a NIEO.’ As a consequence the initial enthusiasm gave way to a more 
rational but more aggressive approach as the Algerians found themselves
’a s  Boumedienne put it after the Santiago UNCTAD III: "hopes 
of developing countries had been once more shattered by the 
selfish attitude of the rich countries and how, in such 
conditions, not to realize that the only solution for these 
countries is that of the complete take over of all the 
natural resources to be used for the development and 
emancipation of their peoples" (Conference, 8th Arab 
petroleum congress, Algiers, May 28, 1972 in les discours
d u P r e s i d e n t , (4) p.34). Bouteflika also echoed that:
"the road of third world economic emancipation does not run 
through UNCTAD but rather through third world institution 
to reclaim control over economic resources" (in El- 
Mo ud j a h i d , November 8, 1972 .)
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at the forefront of the South in its confrontation with the countries of 
the Northern hemisphere that became tangible in the context of the energy 
crisis of the early 1970s. The immediate objective of the Algerian 
diplomacy was then to preserve and strengthen the unity of tne third 
world particularly with regard to US desire to play off the LDCs against 
the Opec member states which were then accused of being responsible for 
the world's economic crisis and inflation and for the severe recession 
that badly hit the economies of many of the developed as well as 
developing nations.
Given their vision that the world's crisis is global and its 
solution should cane from structural reforms of the international 
economic system, the Algerians promptly requested the UN to convene a 
meeting where all primary commodities should be considered. Although 
the session was convened under UN auspices in April 1974 and on behalf of 
the non-aligned movement, the Algerians regarded it as a major success 
for their constant diplonatic work. Evidently, their great satisfaction 
was that a UN General Assembly was studying the problems of raw materials 
as a whole and not only the problems of energy as proposed by most of the 
Western countries and a few non-aligned states such as India, Sri Lanka 
and Guyana. The special session ¿adopted a Declaration on the establish­
ment of a NIEO and the programme of actions designed to implement this 
declaration. The main resolution endorsed most of Algerian suggestions 
formulated by Boumedienne in his speech to the Assembly, namely: 1) 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to national­
ization according to national law; 2) the right of developing countries 
to establish commodity 'producers' associations, and 3) a proposal for
linking commodity export prices of LDCs to the price of imported goods
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from the industrialized world.  ^ The recommendations of this special 
session were short-lived, a matter that bitterly disappointed the 
Algerians. Their reaction was to blame the cupidity of the Western world 
and of the US in particular for being responsible for the North-South 
stalemate.
Nevertheless, Algeria found herself entangled in a diplomatic battle 
as pressures mounted from developed countries and others of the third 
world to convene a conference entirely devoted to the energy problems, 
because oil prices were held responsible in many cases for their economic 
stagnation and decay. To resist these pressures, Algeria attempted to 
win the support of Opec and the non-aligned movement for the gathering of 
an international meeting that would not be confined only to discuss 
energy problems as it was initially suggested by President Giscard 
D'Estaing of France.^ Although Opec agreed on the principle of global 
negotiations at its ministerial meeting held in Algiers on January 24, 
1975, some of its member states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran seemed 
later quite reluctant to endorse it in order not to upset their American 
ally. But at the summit conference of this organization they hosted in 
March, the Algerians succeeded in inducing the Saudis to back the 
principle that the Paris conference should concern problems of raw 
materials and economic development in line with the previous resolutions 
issued at non-aligned and 77 groups fora. 1
1 Memorandum on petroleum, raw materials and development 
presented by Algeria on the occasion of the UN Special 
Session, April 1974.
^The idea of an international conference on North-South 
issues was first suggested by Sheikh Yamani at Opec Geneva 
Meeting in August 1974.
After obtaining support from the Opec organization, Algeria 
succeeded in getting the backing from other non-aligned countries for her 
policy of confrontation with the North by assuring them of financial 
assistance from the oil-producing countries. Thus, at the first meeting 
of the Heads of state of Opec he hosted in March 1975, Boumedienne 
proposed the creation of a fund with $10 to 15 million initial capital 
and it was under his insistence that the spokesman of the group of 77 was 
invited by the meeting to present the specific demands of the developing 
countries. *
It was in this position of strength that the Algerians approached 
the first session of the preparatory meeting on North-South dialogue 
which took place in the French capital in April 1975 gathering represen- 
tatives from both hemispheres. However clashes over the agenda soon
arose: while the US maintained their initial intention to see a
conference dealing exclusively with energy problems, the Algerians 
instead pressed for structural reforms of the international economic 
system. The preparatory meeting failed to agree on the definition of
the agenda as the representatives of the third world led by Algerian
delegates firmly resisted American pressures and although accepting that 
energy would be treated separately, they adamantly rejected US attempts 
to make it the central theme of the conference. The Algerians
criticized Kissinger's suggestion of a new gathering on energy with some 
discussion on raw materials and accused Washington of attempting to
42 1
'see his opening speech to this conference in Les discours du 
président , (6 ), 1975 .
* The participants were 4 Opec countries: Algeria, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela; 3 re pre sentatives of non-Opec 
developing countries: Brazil, India and Zaire; the USA, 
EEC, Canada and Japan.
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separate energy issue from the economic development of the third world 
and to impose a solution to the problems of oil prices that would 
consider US interest only.'
Boosted by the support of Opec and of other developing states, the 
Algerian delegates approached the second session of the preparatory 
meeting of the Paris conference with a greater confidence and determina­
tion. The preparatory committee now extended to 17 other participants 
met them on October 13-15 to determine the composition of the four 
commissions and the co-presidences. ^ Algeria obtained a seat in two
commissions: energy and development and co-presiding the latter (with the 
EEC) as a tribute for her sustained efforts in the North-South spleen.^ 
But after a harsh and long process of negotiations in early February and 
from June 1976 to June 1977, the Paris conference reached a deadlock and 
was finally cancelled as the interests of the two sides proved irrecon­
cilable .
The Algerians perhaps more than any other participant, resented the 
collapse of the Paris conference and the failure of a radical approach in 
the North-South debates for which they had been largely responsible. 
The reluctance of the West to meet the demands of the third world such as 
the indexation of raw material prices and the increase of public aid in 
favour of LDCs led some powerful countries of the third world coalition 
to attempt evicting the radical states led by Algeria from directing the 
movement's search for a NIEO. Thus the preparatory meeting of the
^Comment of Algerian 
New York T i m e s , May 5 
2The new participants 
Canada, Egypt, Iraq, 
Peru, Spain, Sweden, 
Co-Presidenee of the 
Ait Chalal, Algerian
official Press Agency (APS), quoted in 
, 1975.
were: Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
Commission on co-operation went to M. 
Ambassador to Belgium and the EEC.
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non-aligned at Lima in May 1975 saw the efforts of Argentina, India and 
Yugoslavia to impose a more moderate line in the dialogue with the North.
Algeria’s aggressive policy in this dialogue also received a setback 
when some LDCs concluded separate agreements with the EEC known as the 
Lome convention and which received the support of the UN economic 
commission for Africa and of the OAU.
In this unfavourable context, Algeria's efforts to preserve 
solidarity within the world coalition, particularly in the meetings 
devoted to South-South co-operation were doomed by the increasing gap 
between Opec member states and other third world non oil countries as a 
result of the increases of oil prices. The oil bill did not fail to 
have devastating inflationary effects on the economies of the latter, a 
matter that seriously jeopardized the solidarity of the third world. ' 
To counter this disunity, the Algerians embarked upon a campaign to 
explain that Opec was not responsible for the deficit of the balance of 
payments of other developing countries as it was claimed, as well as make 
clear that South-South co-operation in general and Opec aid to the third 
world were not a substitute for North-South dialogue. Thus, they rejected 
demands that Opec should grant concessional prices for oil for its fellow 
third world countries on the grounds that only the 'valorization' of 
export products could help them remedy the deficit of their balance of 
payments. But pressures on Algeria and Opec mounted at the 1976 Colombo 
summit meeting of the non-aligned movement, as a group of countries led 
by India, Yugoslavia and Guyana demanded that South-South dialogue should
'in 1974, the oil imports cost them $1,500 million and about 
$57.8 billion in 1980. See C. LUNs oil prices and
developing countries in the World Today (30), 1974,
pp.400-410 and Van Praag: Deadlock in the North-South 
debates, ibid (36), 1980, pp.469-475.
424
exclusively consider the problems of energy, thus excluiing other fields 
of co-operation. And at their June 1980 meeting held in Manila, the 
Asian countries urged Opec to adopt a specific programme in the field of 
energy in favour of other developing countries. Among the proposals 
made were the establishment of a system of compensation for oil bills and 
a system of preferences for these countries, the guarantee of their 
supplies in petroleum and the creation of a fund to finance urgent 
projects in a certain number of developing countries. The Algerians 
regarded these proposals as an attempt by some of these states to have a 
right of say in the fixation of oil prices, and lobbied instead for a 
conference that should embrace all aspects of South-South co-operation in 
which energy could be ohe of several items on a wide-ranging agenda. 
And in a deliberate attempt to switch the attention of non-Opec countries 
away from the issue of energy problems, they proposed to convert Opec's 
special fund into an agency for development, at the ministerial meeting 
of this organization which took place at Taef in May 1980.^
Behind these divergences, however, the conflict concerned whether 
the debates devoted to co-operation among developing countries should be 
the impetus for North-South dialogue. The Algerians ware adamant that 
South-South co-operation is but a supplement to North-South issues. But, 
with the lack of progress in North-South relations, the weakness of the 
non-aligned movement and the risk of the crumbling of the third world 
coalition, they moved to adopt a more flexible attitude with regard to 
demands formulated by other countries. This temperance was also
'This agency was to be endowed with $20 million initial 
capital to finance economic development with an emphasis on 
loans and profits that would foster trade among developing 
countries and lessen their dependence on the industrialized 
nations .
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necessary to gather support for their stand over the Western Sahara, an 
issue that had contributed in the division of the non-aligned movement 
since the Colombo summit. To head off the growing resentment felt
against their militant foreign policy and against Opec in both hemi­
spheres, the Algerians attempted to invigorate the bargaining power of 
the third world coalition through advocating the idea of global 
negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations.
c . Global negotiations as a means to maintain the North-South 
dialogue
Launched at the 1979 Havana non-aligned summit, the Algerian 
initiative received support from developing countries and as a result a 
committee to prepare the global negotiations conference scheduled to take 
place in September 1981 was created at the UN and chaired by Driss 
Jezairi one of Algeria's most technocratic and skilful diplomats. 
However, as world recession became acute and problems caused by the 
energy crisis urgent, Algeria's long-term programme of radically 
reforming the international economic structures started to lose support 
especially from non-oil developing countries. The global negotiations 
were indefinitely delayed as the Western world made it clear at its 
summit held in Ottawa in July 1981 that it was not prepared to entrust 
crucial agenda items to the decision of the UN General Assembly where the 
third world has a decisive voting majority. In addition, Algeria's
insistence on discussing structural problems such as inflation and 
deterioration of trade exchanges was opposed by some moderate developing 
countries such as India, Sri Lanka and other African and Latin American 
states which favoured debates restricted to emergency measures to be 
taken in favour of the developing countries. Most of these countries 
had been badly hit by the world recession; especially by the increase of
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oil prices in 1979 and the deterioration of trade terms which led to a 
slump in their exports earnings and consequently in the rise of their 
external borrowings. The economies of many of them remained so heavily 
dependent on commcxiity trade that tariff preferences for manuf actured 
goods which could be obtained from commodity policy and even the 
stabilization of export earnings (Stabex scheme) as envisaged by the Lome 
convention did not compensate for decrease in their commodity export 
earnings. Their attention was therefore concentrated on monetary
problems as they demanded at the fifth UNCTAD convened in Manila in 
May-June 1979, the creation of a new longe!— term facility to finance the 
deficit of their balance of payments through improvement and liberal­
ization of the IMF compensating financing facilities. They also urged 
the World Bank and the financial institutions in the developed world to 
find a solution for their external debts whose rates reached alarming 
level s.
With the emergence of monetary problems, Algeria's quest for global 
negotiations based on long-term perspectives was overshadowed by other 
initiatives such as the Brandt report and the plan initiated by the 
Mexican president Portillo, presented to the 34th session of the General 
Assembly. The Algerians criticized the former on the ground that it
did not propose structural changes in the existing international economic
See programme of s u r v i v a l , report of the independent 
commission on international development issues under the 
chairmanship of the former West German Chancellor W. Brandt 
(Pan books, London, 1980, 304p.). For Algeria's criticism 
of Portillo's plan see the work of A. Sid Ahmed a former 
official at the Ministry of Industry and Energy, n o r d - sud i 
les enjeux (OPU, Algiers, 1981).
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structures and rejected the latter because it gave a sheer priority to 
the problems of energy, thus overlooking other crucial problems the South 
has been facing for decades.
Nevertheless, with the failure of UNCTAD meetings at Nairobi(May 
5-31, 1976) and Manila(May 7-June 3, 1979) over North-South issues,
pressures mounted for an international conference outside the UN. Mexico 
was therefore able to gather 22 heads of state from developed and 
developing countries at Cancún in October 1981. On this occasion, the 
Algerians led by President Chadli clashed with the US who reiterated 
their opposition to Algeria's idea of global negotiations under the UN 
auspices opened to all states, favouring instead another round of 
consultations with only the countries that were present at Cancún. The 
Algerians regarded this move as a deliberate attempt by Washington to see 
the North-South issues discussed in specialized organisms where the 
voting power of the Western world predominated.1 Such fears were
confirmed when the conference convened in Dakar in March 1982 between 
African banks and the World Bank and the IMF failed to meet African 
demands. The report presented by the World Bank maintained in fact, the 
rigid conditions for lending and overlooked major structural problems 
faced by the developing countries, e.g. the rise of interest rate.
'see interview of the Foreign Minister Benyahia to Algerian 
Radio (in French) in E l - M o u d j a h i d , October 28, 1981 and of 
the Ambassador to Belgium and the EEC, Driss Jezairi in Le 
Courrier (7) 1982, pp.6-7.
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stabilization of the price of primary commodity products, trade 
protectionist policies adopted by industrialized economies as well as the 
increase of the third world external debts.'
In their efforts to conciliate between the discussion of urgent 
problems and those related to the structural remodelling of the 
international economic system, the Algerians proposed at the non-aligned 
summit conference held in New Delhi in March 1983, a strategy based on 
two phases: the first stage would consist in launching negotiations in 
January 1984 with selected agenda of emergency problems to be discussed 
while the second step over three years, would concern long-term questions 
relevant to the reform of the world economic order. But this strategy 
did not receive a wide support from other developing countries on the 
ground that it was time consuming and longer lasting as many of them
wanted to find immediate solutions to their most urgent problems: debt
and inflation especially as the growth of GDP in the third world fell by 
3 per cent in 1980 to 0.6 in 1981. The acuity of monetary and financial
problems facing the South obliged the Algerians to rally other developing
countries in their demands for emergency solutions, thus tempering their 
drive for global negotiations at the UN. At the Belgrade UNCTAD meeting, 
Algeria was elected deputy spokesman of the 77 group over monetary and 
financial questions while her new foreign minister Ahmed Taleb pleaded 
for the convening of an international conference on these problems when 
addressing the 38th General Assembly of the UN in October 1983.
'see report made by the Algerian Minister of finance, 
Benhammouda at this meeting and also the memorandum drafted 
by the conference and presented by its rapporteur, A. 
Bessakhouad, Director of the Algerian Central Bank (BCA) in 
Revolution Africaine , March 12-18, 1982, p.13.
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2 • Valorization1 of oil resources through the preservation of Opec 
Unity
Algeria1s role within Opec has largely reflected the country1s
economic needs and objectives as well as the limits of a small oil-
producing country within this organization. For the Algerians, the
emergence of this third world oil cartel constituted "the most concrete 
and spectacular example of the importance of raw materials to the oil 
producing countries, the vital need for them to control their resources, 
operate the levels of price control, and lastly the great possibility of 
a union of raw material-producing countries."1 But the recovery of 
natural resources, they stressed, has no significance without those 
countries assuming the control of prices since oil is an exhaustible 
natural resource and evolving capital risk and dependence on internation­
al trade as well as on highly sophisticated technology imported from the 
West. And given drastic changes in the international energy market in 
the late 1960s, they were eager to transform the income of oil, a mere 
form of rent into the forms of productive activities to enable the 
country achieve a certain degree of economic development in a relatively 
short time. As domestic economic growth depended largely on oil
industry, the Algerians aimed through Opec activities at achieving two 
main objectives: 1) the national control over natural resources and 2) 
the control over price indexation in order to expand oil industry which 
in return would engineer a large-scale economic development.^ In their 
eyes, only the quest for unity among the so much differentiated member 
states, would lead to the effective implementation of these objectives
^Algeria's Memorandum on petroleum, raw materials and 
development •
See interview of Belaid Abdeslam, the minister of industry 
and energy to El- Moud j ah i d , February 2, 1971.
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since the position of Algeria with regard to the level of oil production 
was not strong to impose their own strategies on other Opec members. See 
table VI:5.
If Algeria has then constantly been pushing for an increase of oil 
prices, she was nevertheless cautious not to adopt an extremist attitude 
that would isolate her within Opec, or ruin the chances of reaching a 
consensus that would more or less work for her own interests. Her 
dilemma then, has not been between adopting a hawkish line and preserving 
the unity of Opec without fulfilling her own objectives, but the ability 
to reconcile these two aims to realize at least some of her basic 
objectives. A balanced approach seemed not only the most concrete and 
viable strategy to follow as Algeria could not afford to opt for either 
extreme. Thus, it was not surprising that she alternated the two forms 
of tactics within reasonable limits in an attempt to preserve the 
cohesion of the Opec organization which she joined in 1969 in a context 
marked by two main features: her involvement in a harsh dispute with 
France over the oil issue and changes in the structures of international 
energy market.
a) the quest for national control over oil resources and prices
Opec emerged against the low prices practiced by the cartel 
companies which dominated the oil market until the 1950s. Later, the 
decline of the hegemony of the major oil companies resulting from the 
existence of a free market outside of their control (USSR's exports), and 
from the multiplicity of smaller but effective oil firms, combined with 
the booming demand for oil (as less coal was available on the energy 
market in the late 1960s), helped to strengthen the bargaining power of 
the oil-producing countries, thus enabling them to extract better
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concessionary terras from the multinational oil companies. The June 1968 
declaratory statement on petroleum policy issued by the Opec organization 
decided that "tax preferences prices to be unilaterally determined by 
governments and the participation of the producing countries in existing 
concessions justified by clausula rebus sic stantibus that is to say by 
reasons of fundamental change of circumstances."'
This also favoured Algeria and Libya because of the closing of the 
Suez Canal after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the break in a 
pipeline in Syria forcing the Western countries to shift their oil 
supplies from the Middle East to North Africa. Compared to the Middle 
East, their crude oil enjoyed an appreciable value in the international 
market due to its enhanced freight advantage and better quality. And 
with the fall of 1969 witnessing a sharp increase of Western demand for 
petroleum and particularly for Libya's oil, the Algerians were impatient 
to get access to the control of the oil process from production to 
marketing which was largely dominated by the French companies. The 
objective behind this was also to boost their country's economic 
capabilities in order to emerge as the central power in North Africa in 
the face of Libya's booming power. In the late 1960s, Libya had in fact 
become Europe's biggest oil supplier and in a deliberate attempt to 
increase its bargaining power, Tripoli decided in summer 1970 to reduce 
its oil output from 3,000,000 barrels a day to as little as a million, 
provoking a relative disarray in the Western world since many European 
countries had only 60 to 65 days of oil supply, a fact which forced them 
to deal directly with Opec.
'j.W.Levyi oil power (in World Affairs (4), 1971,
p p . 652-668), p.657.
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However, the Algerians did not want to let Libya become the sole 
impetus for revolutionizing Opec strategy vis-a-vis the Western oil 
cartel. Thus they moved to set a working relationship with Tripoli as 
the Algerian minister of industry and energy Belaid Abdeslam invited his 
Libyan counterpart for talks in Algiers in an attempt "to co-ordinate the 
position of the two countries and unify their efforts to create a 
powerful front capable of preserving the interests of the two peoples 
against the monopolies." The next step was to put into practice demands 
for higher oil royalties and it was following Algerian initiatives, that 
the Opec meeting held in Caracas in December 1970 decided to adopt the 
resolution (120) that established a 55 per cent minimum rate of taxation 
on profits, an increase in posted prices and a definition of a new basis 
for the calculation of quality differentials. Until the late 1960s, the 
price at which Algeria was selling her oil to the French companies was 35 
per cent cheaper than those of Libya while the posted price of Algerian 
oil was 20 per cent below those experienced by other Opec states. To 
increase her price to these levels and particularly to Libya's, Algeria 
demanded a referential price to be fixed at $3.33 a barrel and urged the 
oil companies to accept the principle that to each tonne of oil extracted 
should correspond a new tonne discovered.1
After the stalemate of the Teheran meeting of February 1971, due to 
the refusal of the Western oil cartel to accept Opec's demands, Algeria 
joined Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in a meeting held in Tripoli on March 
21, 1971. There they fixed the level of taxation at 55 per cent, an
'see interview of Belaid Abdeslam to 
El-Moud j a h i d , January 31, 1971.
• l ’avenirre' in
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increase of 52 cents per barrel in posted prices including 10 cents 
premium for low sulphur crude (Algeria and Libya) and an annual increase 
of 5 cents in posted prices.
Being assured of Opec solidarity at least in words, the Algerians 
announced a day later the partial nationalization of French oil assets in 
Algeria, thus setting an example for the other Opec member states to 
follow. Algeria's prestige within Opec increased with France being unable 
to counter the 1971 nationalization measures and with Libya, Iraq and 
Venezuela emulating the Algerian take over of national resources.
If the recovery of these resources constituted for Algerians a 
resounding success for their strategy, it did not, however, mean for them 
the end of the domination of the Western countries over price indexation.
The assumption underlining the quest for indexation was that the real 
value of the oil commodity has decreased in terms of trade vis-a-vis oil 
consuming countries since 1974 in the sense that the rise in oil prices 
did not compensate for the deterioration of the purchasing power of oil 
resulting from the regulations of the international financial system that 
had been exclusively manipulated by the Western states.^ Since the US 
dollar had been the money through which oil exports were paid, its 
devaluation against gold by 7.89 per cent decided by the Nixon admini­
stration on August 15, 1971 was regarded by Algeria as responsible for
the reduction of the purchasing power of Opec oil. This situation led
the Algerians to attempt to put the oil-producing states in a better 
position to regulate the mechanisms for fixing oil prices in order to
increase oil revenues to finance national economic development. At the
'see lecture given at the conference organized by the 
West-German Fredrich Ebert foundation by the Opec
Secretary-General , the Algerian A. Lamine-Khene in
El-Mu j tamaa (Bonn) (7), July-August 1973, p.3.
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two Geneva meetings held in the second half of 1972, the representatives 
of Algeria and other Opec states made the oil companies accept a 8.49 per 
cent and then 11.9 per cent rise in price as a compensation for the 
effects of the devaluation of the dollar. They also decided that prices 
would in future be adjusted monthly according to a weighted average 
movement of eleven major currencies against the dollar. But the 
Algerians preferred instead a viable formula of price indexation to 
protect the purchasing power of oil. In their views, a pricing system
based on occasional adjustments in line with the fluctuations of the US 
money and of other currencies proved inadequate and too dilatory to 
compensate for the decline of the value of oil. As a way of example, 
the rise of Opec oil prices decided in the aftermath of the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli war was followed by a downward trend of prices and revenues 
in 1974-1975. Consequently, the price of the Algerian light fell from 
$14 a barrel in the first quarter of 1974 to a mere $11.73 in the third 
quarter of 1975. See Table VI:6.
At the Opec ministerial meeting held in Algiers in February 1975, 
Belaid Abdeslam proposed a new formula to counter the erosion of oil 
prices and revenues. In his conception, the rise of these prices should 
not be linked to the fluctuations of the dollar but to a complex system 
which should take into account a number of criteria such as the price of 
manufactured goods, the rate of inflation and the terms of transfer of 
goods and technology for the economic growth of developing countries. 
But beyond these technical mechanisms, Saudi Arabia'3 determination to 
slow down the increase of oil prices for geopolitical and strategic 
reasons proper to the Kingdom, proved the major obstacle to Algeria's 
drive for a more adequate system of price indexation.
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Indeed, to protect their own interests, the Saudis were adamant in 
their refusal to accept much higher prices which "will hasten the days 
when Opec's grip is loosening and if we force Western countries to invest 
heavily in finding alternative sources of energy, they will. This could 
take no more than ten to twenty years and could result in reducing
dependence on oil as a source of energy to a point which would jeopardise 
Saudi Arabia's interests. Saudi Arabia will then be unable to find
markets to sell enough oil to meet its financial requirements. This
picture should be understood."^
At the Opec meeting in Quito in June 1974, the Saudis had unilater­
ally decided to increase their country's oil output and lower the price 
of its Arabian light by' $2.50 a barrel. If this move irritated the 
Algerians, it did not however lead them to adopt an extremist attitude 
that could alienate Saudi Arabia, being aware that the Arab Kingdom could 
use the oil tap to force an oil slick that may result in the crumbling of 
oil prices. Therefore, at the Vienna meeting of December 1974, the 
Algerian delegation accepted the Saudi initiative to freeze the oil
prices for a nine month period.
Moderation was necessary to cement the unity of the Opec organiza­
tion in order to reach two sets of interlocked objectives: 1) a formula 
of price indexation that could protect the deterioration of the 
purchasing of the Opec oil and 2) the consolidation of the Arab consensus 
and the solidarity between Opec and the third world that emerged after 
the October 1973 war. Concerns for this unity in the context of
North-South debates were apparent behind the good working relationship
^Sheikh Zaki Yamani , 
11-17, 1980, p .77
interview to the economi st Apr i 1
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existing between Algeria and Saudi Arabia despite deep ideological 
differences as well as behind Boumedienne's efforts to reconcile Iraq and 
Iran at the first Opec summit conference held in Algiers in March 1975.
However, after the euphoria of the mid-1970s, and despite the 1979 
oil 'shock', Opec's bargaining power in terms of regulating the prices of 
oil and spurring the demands for a NIEO considerably decreased. Besides 
the failure of the Paris conference and the crumbling of the third world 
coalition, the rise of the oil prices in 1979 resulting from a political 
upheaval in Iran was artificial and short-lived. The apparition of an 
oil glut due to the increase of production in non-Opec countries and to 
large cuts in energy consumption in the western world proved quite 
detrimental to Opec's dominance over production and exports and to the 
economies of its member states. In this new context of challenge,
Algeria and her Opec partners attempted to avoid the fall of oil prices
and to preserve the organization status in the world energy market.
b . the preservation of the Opec's price structure and the future 
of the organization
Until the oil glut, the Opec system of price fixation has worked 
with demand for light balanced by weaker demand for the cheaper heavy 
crude. The situation has now changed as modern refineries can produce
as much products from the heavier crude as from the light. Thus demand
for Algerian (as well as Libyan and Nigerian) oil witnessed a substantial 
slump. Japan for instance refused to continue importing oil from
Algeria because of this country's expansive blend. This situation
worsened with Saudi Arabia's drive to slow the oil spiral by flooding the 
market in order to increase its foreign earnings as reserve currencies 
started to dry up. Thus Saudi's highest ever increase of oil output 
reached in early 1980, 10.3 million barrels a day up from 9.5 previously.
437
The outcome of the Kingdom's freedom to fix its price, the better 
competitive prices it practiced and its high level of oil production 
resulted in heavy pressure on Algeria and other populous Opec member 
nations and in this context, confrontation within this organization was 
looming as disaccord on fixing the reference posted prices sharpened at 
the Opec ministerial meeting held in Caracas in early 1980. There Algeria 
and other hawkish states failed to make Saudi Arabia set its reference 
price at around $28 a barrel. ^ Fearing that divisions may split up the 
organization, Algeria stressed the necessity to reach a compromise to 
preserve its unity, because as the Algerian minister of energy put it, 
"the state of oil market and economic relations between the industrial­
ized and developing nations coupled with Opec's interests and responsi­
bilities required a strong organization."2
At the ministerial meeting he hosted in Algiers in June 1980, Nabi 
was joined by the oil ministers of Iran, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria in 
pressing for higher prices of oil, demanding that the crude marker should 
be set at $32 a barrel and differentials at up to $5 a barrel and 
promptly agreed to increase their posted prices to the §37 a barrel 
limit.^ However, Algeria and her allies soon faced Saudi opposition to 
a rise in the price of the Arabian light as it stayed at $28 a barrel 
weeks later. After constant pressure from Algeria and the hawkish 
states and months of haggling about the price structure, a consensus was
1 See interview of Belkacem Nabi to F.G.Robin in Rev olution 
( P a r i s )  . March 28- April 13, 1980, p. 28—  29.
2 Belkacem N a b i 's statement in the T i m e , December 15, 1980.
2The price of Saudi crude (Arabian light 34° API) was taken 
as a marker or a benchmark for which prices for other crudes 
are measured taking into account quality and freight 
advantages (proximity to markets).
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reached at Bali in December and the price of the Saudi crude marker was 
fixed at $36 a barrel while the price of better quality blends and oil 
with freight advantages was put at $41 a barrel.
Algeria's satisfaction with these decisions was soon undermined: 
while some countries like the war-torn Iran and Iraq, and Venezuela 
raised their oil prices by 10 per cent to obtain more revenues, others 
like Saudi Arabia increased their oil outputs. To force the Saudis to 
revise their policies, the Algerians brought together at Hassi Messraoud 
on June 22, 1981, representatives from Opec African countries: Gabon,
Libya and Nigeria which possess better quality crude. Algeria obtained 
from them an engagement to co-ordinate energy policies and to refuse to 
meet Saudi demand to lower oil prices. These pressures partially
succeeded when the Saudis agreed at the October 1981 Geneva meeting to 
cut their oil output from 9.5 million barrels a day to 8.5, but this 
level was higher than the one requested by Algeria: 7 million barrels a 
day. Moreover, the price of the Arabian light remained unchanged ($34 a 
barrel) and in these conditions Algeria and other Opec countries realized 
the difficulty to set differentials for their light crude because Saudi 
Arabia was also demanding in return a doubling of the fixed $1.50 price 
differential between its Arabian light and the African sweet crude. But 
Algeria and her African partners firmly rejected the Saudi demand on the 
ground that the prices of their light were already selling above their 
spot market rate. In the third quarter of 1981, the price of Algerian 
Saharan blend averaged $40 a barrel.
Moreover, the aggravation of the world's glut did not fail to have 
disrupting effects on the hard-reached cohesion of the African members of 
Opec. While Algeria was pressing for a drastic reduction of oil
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production by the major producers of this organization to combat the oil 
slump, Nigeria for instance proposed levels of differentials between 
heavy crudes and light ones at only $2.5 a barrel higher than the Opec 
benchmark price. The meeting finally settled for a compromise deciding a 
maximum of $4 a barrel differential. Thus the price of the Algerian 
sweet crude was put at $37.90 a cut of $2.0 a barrel. Moreover, when
Indonesia, Iran and Nigeria, burdened with many domestic problems, were 
forced to sell their oil $1 a barrel cheaper than the Algerian oil, 
Algeria found it difficult to win new clients for its light crude, though 
Libya was facing a boycott from American oil companies and the caprices 
of the French ones J  Algerian exports were then reduced to 470,000
barrels a day and revenues slightly decreased despite a rise of the price 
of condensat by $2 a barrel from November 1981.
With the oil glut worsening, oil prices crumbling, threats to Opec 
unity were deeply felt by Algeria and in an attempt to find a solution to 
the problems of overproiuction, she joined other member states at Quito 
to set production ceilings for each country. Thus Opec' s total oil 
output was put at $17.5 million a day and Algeria was assigned 650,000 
barrels a day which represented 61.9 per cent of her average oil
2production over the last ten years. The implication for Algeria was that 
she needed an output of 1,200,000 barrels a day to balance her current 
accounts. If the Algerians subscribed to these restrictions, they were 
also infuriated by the lack of discipline within Opec which prevented a 
uniform price structure and quotas of production to be respected by all 
the member states.
'Nigeria sold its oil $36.5 a barrel instead of $37, 
Indonesia (Sumatra light) $34 instead of $35, Iraq $34.60 
(34.60) in El-Mou d j a h i d , November 6-7, 1981.
N a t i o n a l  Concord, March 14, 1981.
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The direct result of indiscipline was a rise of Opec production to 
23 million barrels a day while demands for Opec oil averaged only 18.5 
million barrels a day and despite the efforts of Algeria within the Opec 
monitoring committee at its session held in Vienna in December 16-18
1982, illegal practices within Opec persisted.1 And when Nigeria
decided to cut down its oil price by $5.5 a barrel in February 1983,
Algeria immediately called for an emergency conference in an attempt to 
find a viable solution to the slump in Opec foreign earnings and the 
collapse of unity. At the meeting which took place in London in early 
May, she received the support of Iran, Venezuela and Ecuador in demanding 
the maintenance of the benchmark price at $34 a barrel and the reduction 
of Opec total output down to 14 million barrels a day. After harsh
debates, the Saudi-led moderates decided a cut of the Saudi marker price
to $29 a barrel but obtained in return the fixation of differential 
prices around an average of $1 to $1.57 a barrel. But while Iran 
rejected the new price and Venezuela refused the production ratio it was 
allocated, Algeria opted for a more moderate line, aware of the fragility 
of the Opec unity. Indeed the Algerian minister of energy did not 
favour a policy of obstructing the consensus reached in principle.
' i t  p r o v e d  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  i n s t a n c e  t o  d e f i n e  e x a c t l y  t h e  
b o u n d a r y  b e t w e e n  l i g h t  and c r u d e  o i l  and c o n d e n s a t e  and 
s i n c e  g a s  l i q u i d s  w e r e  n o t  c o v e r e d  by  Opec  a g r e e m e n t s ,  a 
number  o f  t h e  member  s t a t e s  h a v e  b e e n  s e e k i n g  t o  m a x i m i z e  
t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n .  On t h e i r  p a r t ,  t h e  A l g e r i a n s  f i r m l y
o p p o s e d  t h a t  c o n d e n s a t e -  and o t h e r  g a s  l i q u i d s  us e d  i n  
p e t r o c h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r y  s h o u l d  be  c o v e r e d  b y  Opec  a g r e e ­
m e n t s .  I n d e e d ,  t h e y  w e r e  by  no mea ns  w i l l i n g  t o  s e e  t h e  
p r i c e s  o f  r e f i n e d  p e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t s  r e s t r i c t e d  as  t h e s e  
i t e m s  had s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c o m p e n s a t e d  f o r  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  o i l  
e x p o r t s  and w e r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e c o me  w i t h  g a s  e x p o r t s ,  t h e  
ma i n  s o u r c e  o f  f o r e i g n  e a r n i n g s  as  p l a n n e d  b y  t h e  f i v e  y e a r  
p l a n  1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 9 .
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despite the fact that he admitted that his country would be deprived of 
$2 billion in revenues as a result of the fixation of the price of its 
oil at $30,5 a barrel.^
The lessons learned by the Algerians with regard to the Opec 
policies in the early 1980s were that even if this cartel reaches 
compromises on production quotas and differentials from one meeting to 
another, the average cost of Opec may remain well above that of the 
member states to sell their full quotas without offering illicit 
discounts. The prospects for the organization seem also gloomy with its 
share in the world-wide business dwindling from 53 per cent in mid-1975 
to barely 30 per cent a decade later and with the unsuccessful efforts to 
persuade Mexico to join Opec or induce Great Britain or Norway, not to 
lower their oil prices. Consequently, the poorer and more populous 
members seem unlikely to be willing to put the organization's good ahead 
of their own pressing economic needs. In this context, Algeria's dilemma 
is that she also cannot sustain a downward trend of oil prices because it 
may result in the decline of the prices of her gas and petroleum products 
as well. And as the exports of these items constituted her main
long-term objectives, she tried to salvage the unity and the cohesion of 
Opec since this organization still represented for her the only forum to 
exercise a substantial leverage on the West with regard to price
indexation of raw materials which is regarded as vital for the growth of
2her own economy. When the Iranian oil minister strode from the
'interview of Belkacem Nabi to A f r ique-Asie, May 9,  1983 ,
p.47 .
zThe third Arab conference on energy she hosted in Algiers 
in early May 1985 may have been an attempt to discuss some 
proposals of a long-term strategy. For this perspective 
see interview of Nabi to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Madjaless 
in El- Moud j a h i d , December 2 3 ,  1984 .
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conference hall at the July 1985 Geneva meeting in protest at any 
reduction in average Opec prices, Belkacem Nabi promptly followed him in 
an attempt to persuade him back to the negotiating table. This gesture 
undoubtedly reflected Algeria's concern to help preserve Opec's unity and 
perhaps ensure its survival.
With these gloomy aspects, the dependence of Algerian economy on 
energy exports appeared quite dramatic and it became urgent for the 
Algerian leaders to remedy this situation.
C. THE SEARCH FOR A MORE BALANCED NATIONAL ECONOMY 
1. Restructuring of the economy
The policy of 'industrializing industries' did not bring about a 
well-balanced economic growth and did not extirpate the mechanisms of
economic underdevelopment from Algeria. Major problems such as the 
neglect of agriculture, the heavy reliance on hydrocarbons as well as 
obstacles inherent in the transfer of technology had impaired the
transfer of economic performance.
The marginalization of agriculture was indicated by the decline of 
the share of this sector in the GDP from 12.9 per cent in 1967 to a mere 
7.2 per cent in 1978.^ And while agrarian production per capita increased 
in Morocco by 18 per cent and in Tunisia by 35 it decreased by 13 per 
cent in Algeria between 1960 and 1976. Imports of foodstuffs
dramatically increased the draining of a substantial amount of the
country's foreign assets and forced the government to stringent 
limitation on consumer goods and causing occasional food shortages as 1
1Bilan economique et social de la décennie 1967- 1978
(Ministry of planning, 1980), p.87.
^Valeurs actuelles, January 1, 1979, pp.27-29.
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population in Algeria nearly doubled after independence, reaching 20 
million in 1978. In addition to the lack of capital, equipment and 
fertilizers, as well as rural exodus, disorganization and weakness of the 
marketing network, the sector of 'agrarian revolution' also suffered from 
the subtle opposition of former landowners, the tediously inefficient 
bureaucratic practices and peasants discontent with collectivisation. 
Moreover, the socialist agrarian sector has been hit by structural 
disorganization, degradation of its infrastructure and the ageing of the 
work force and of the arboriculture patrimony.^ On the social level, 
the 'industrializing industries' policy did not generate massive 
employment for the growing manpower. Only 1,100,000 jobs were created for 
the decade 1967-1978 making a rate of unemployment oscillate between 19 
and 25 per cent of the active population. The priority given to 
production of capital goods at the expense of consumer goods resulted 
also in the partial neglect of social services and needs, particularly 
housing, a problem that proved hard to solve, notwithstanding substantial 
efforts made by the government in recent years.
On the industrial level, economic performance remained low as nearly 
95 per cent of the state's export earnings were made up by the exports of 
oil and gas. The heavy reliance on this sector and on foreign borrowing 
to meet manufacturing deficits, did not encourage the manufacture of 
local goods, while the import of technology proved costly and quickly 
outdated. In this respect, total expenditure of the three development 
plans (1967-1978) reached 402.5 billion DA, this being well beyond the 
level of 146.4 billion DA of planned investments.^ Moreover, most of
'Speech of Selim Saadi, the minister of agriculture in 
Revolution A f r icaine, December 31, 1982-January 1, 1983,
p.24.
‘‘Bilan economlque et social, p.3.
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the state-owned companies faced deficit and many of the huge plants, such 
as the Skikda plant, built with massive foreign assistance and loans, had 
been running at only thirty per cent of their capacity of production.^
As it appeared, neither the euphoria of the 1973-1974 booming 
increase of oil prices, nor the setting up of gigantic industrial 
complexes and hydrocarbon plants were able to prevent the emergence of 
many of Algeria's socio-economic problems. The failure to make Algeria 
"the Japan of North Africa" partially impaired Algeria's revolutionary 
elan in third world forums and marked the relative failure of her policy 
of confrontation with the West. These limitations on the foreign level 
coincided with Algeria's increasing entanglement in regional affairs with 
the appearance of the Western Sahara problem on her Western borders.
Since its coming to power, Chadli's government introduced new 
changes in the country's economic policy in an attempt to remedy the 
decrease in national capabilities, ensure domestic stability and enhance 
the position of the new regime. Therefore, a greater attention has been 
given to satisfy the social needs of a rapidly growing population, by 
partly removing the economic austerity imposed by Boumedienne.
To remedy sectoral imbalances that have affected the national 
economy, the Chadli regime embarked upon reforms characterized mainly by 
attempts to improve agriculture, associate national private capital in 
the country's economic development and reduce dependence on the 
hyd r oc ar bon sec tor • 1
1 The production of cement for instance was estimated at 5.2 
million tonnes in 1978 meeting only 52 per cent of Algeria's 
needs (in bilan economique et soci a l , p.83).
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In the agrarian sector, farmers have been allowed to sell crops 
directly to the public as a result of the removal of the commercializa­
tion co-operatives set up by the past regime in the framework of the 
'agrarian revolution'« And peasants of the private sector who
-representing 60 per cent of the peasantry and tilling 4.1 million 
hectares - have been granted better access to public loans, material 
equipment and fertilizers. A substantial rise in agrarian production 
has been achieved since, although many problems inherent in the nature of 
climatic conditions, lack of fertile land, working force and spare-parts 
remain acute.
Signs of a gradual, though slow economic liberalization, became 
tangible with the desire of the Chadli regime to help the private sector 
in general increase its participation in the national economic develop­
ment. Under Boumedienne, this sector was heavily criticized for its 
huge profits, parasitic practices and was more or less resolutely kept 
away from politics, especially in the early 1970s when Algeria underwent 
a markedly radical model of development. However, in spite of the 
predominance of the public sector and the state monopoly over foreign 
trade, the importance of this sector in the growth of GDP was by no means 
negligible. In 1973, it made up for more than half of the industrial 
production: 5884 million DA against 9049 made by the public sector, but 
by 1976, it contributed for 5609 against 22471. This share seems quite
important when one considers that a large part of the production value 
achieved by the public sector came initially from energy exports. In
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other sectors, such as textiles, leather and shoe industries, the 
production realized by the private sector was higher than that of the 
public one.1
The new regime initiated several measures in favour of the private 
in an attempt to control the increasing growth of the private sector and 
make it more useful in the country's economic development as to partially 
compensate for the poor economic performance of the state-owned 
industries. Thus the sixth session of the FLN's Central Committed held on 
December 22-24, 1981 was entirely devoted to the situation of this sector 
on the basis of a report of an ad hoc commission set up in May. 
Undoubtedly, seeds of a move toward a more economic liberalization are 
there. A law codifying investments of the private economy (82-11) was 
adopted in August 1983 through which a series of facilities were granted 
to the private sector such as bank loans, fiscal incentives and 
allowances to import duty-free capital equipment up to DA 100,000. In 
1983, 117 projects above DA 3 billion presented by private investors were 
given a go ahead by the national commission of investments. Many of these 
projects concerned building materials, foodstuffs, textile industries and 
tourism, sectors that have direct social impact and which were underpriv­
ileged during Boumedienne's time.
The lessening of the heavy dependence of the country on hydrocarbon 
revenues constituted one of the main objectives of the five year 
development plan launched in 1980 as it attempted to encourage industri­
alization mainly to satisfy consumer needs that had been met formerly 
through imports as well. Therefore, investments allocated for industry
^Algerian association for demographic and socio-economic 
research: summary document - structure and production. 
Study on the private capital by D. Liabes, ministry of 
planning, November 1979.
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and hydrocarbons estimated at 157.7 billion DA represented 38.6 per cent 
of total planned investments for the period 1980-1984 while in the 
preceding plan, their share in total investments corresponded to 43.4 per 
cent. The plan also envisaged a decrease of the hydrocarbon's share in 
the GOP and a Substantial rise of the material production, given the 
tangible improvement in this sector since 1980. During this period, 
industrial production and services reached an annual average of 7.7 per 
cent of the GDP growth and the output of industry alone increased by 20 
per cent in 1932 from the previous year.^ In contrast, hydrocarbons saw 
their share declining from 36 per cent in 1980 to 27 in 1984.
Limited reserves of oil combined with the downward trend of oil 
prices in 1980 and with the gloomy prospects for international trade of 
LNG have led the Chadli government to adopt a long-term strategy — 
formulated at the December 29-31, 1980 session of the Central Committee 
of the FLN - based on the preservation of oil reserves to meet growing 
domestic demands and on the development of the gas industry as Algeria 
has huge potential of this energy.
Indeed, with the share of crude oil in the hydrocarbons sector 
dropping from 83 per cent in 1980 to 48 per cent in 1983, condensates, 
petroleum refined products (LPG) and natural gas in particular were 
planned to make up 80 per cent of the country's exports by 2000.
El-Moud j a h i d , January 20, 1983 .
448
Table: Hydrocarbons exports 1970-2000 (million tonnes
equivalent)
1970 1983 1990 2000
Crude and products 50 28 24 25
Condensates 0.5 15 18 14
Natural gas/LNG 1 17 30 36
LPG 0 0.6 3 4.8
Totals 51.5 60.6 75 79.8
Source: Ministry of energy quoted in the South, special report on 
Algeria, December 1985, p.70.
2, The gas battle
One of the major features of the new energy policy was to break away 
with the project of the Abdeslam team to make Algeria the biggest LNG 
exporter in the world (115 billion cubic metres annually in the late 
1980s) because of the gloomy prospects for the exports of this form of 
gas and the exorbitant costs made to develop the country's capacity of
natural gas. These costs involved the setting up of refineries,
pipelines and distribution network achieved through large investments, 
most of which had been financed by loans from abroad. Moreover, the LNG 
venture had been even more expensive because of high transport costs,
loss of volume in the process of production and in the operations of
freezing and unfreezing. Beside these intrinsic problems, the future of 
the LNG industry looked grim with regard to changes that affected the 
international energy market.
In the early 1970s, LNG was thought a lucrative business because of 
the availability of the US markets, technology and finance as well as of 
high levels of oil prices. But in the late 1970s, prospects for LNG 
exports became gloomy because of new discoveries of gas in the USA, the
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existence of cheap petroleum resulting from the world's oil glut, the 
reduction of energy consumption in the Western countries and their switch 
to coal and other sources of energy. On the other hand, technology 
related to the construction of undersea pipelines for the transport of 
gas has been satisfactorily tested and proved cheaper and safer than the 
transport of gas through special tankers. Given this unfavourable 
context for LNG, Algeria cancelled a certain number of economic projects, 
in particular the huge LNG III plant at Arzew. However, to compensate 
for the loss of exports' earnings and offset investments made in the 
past, she moved to ask for higher prices for the gas she was selling to 
Western countries on the basis of pricing her gas exports at the Btu 
equivalent of the landed price of her own sweet crude.'
From the outset negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere
resembling the context of the oil battle with France in the late 1960s.
Again, as a producing country, Algeria was tempted to play a pioneering 
role in pushing for an increase of energy prices to assert the state's 
control over the price indexation of its raw materials. But in this 
battle, she felt she was isolated because of the refusal of major gas 
producing countries (USSR and Denmark) to seek parity between oil and gas 
prices and of the failure of the Oapec to set up a common strategy over 
the indexation of the gas prices, at its meeting in Algiers in June 1980. 
Because of oil abundance, some Opec countries of the Middle East did not 
develop the gas industry while others were discouraged by the costs 
involved, the cheap image of gas and by the existence of gas exporters 
such as Soviet Union, Netherlands, Mexico and Canada. Moreover, Abu
'see the article of Sonatrach's Director of gas exports, M. 
Belguedj: Natural gas and long term supply for Europe in
'the challenge of e n e r g y ' , edited by Khouja, M.W. (London,
Longman, 1981), pp.91-98.
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Dhabi which had emerged as an important gas exporter among the Arab 
states, thought needless to internationalize the gas issue since it was 
selling most of its gas to Japan at a price above the world market.
However, these obstacles did not discourage Algeria in her search for 
higher price of her natural gas perhaps for 3 main reasons: 1) the
contracts should be somehow honoured as Algeria and her EEC partners made 
substantial investments to cover for the whole operations related to the 
natural gas deal. Thus, she warned that she was prepared to abandon her 
entire liquefaction programme if customers would not agree to pay 
substantially higher prices for LNG. 2) Algeria has been an important 
market for these countries since they accounted for more than 90 per cent 
of her global exchanges. * For France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, Algeria
has been one of their most important clients in the whole developing
world and arguably one of their most valuable interlocutors in third 
world politics. 3) Algeria also constitutes a reliable source of gas 
supplies outside the Soviet grip, a matter that enhanced her position in 
the East-West bargain over the gas issue. This was the argument
defended by the US government in his attempt to prevent the EEC member 
states from increasingly depending on the Soviet gas, encouraging them 
instead to deal with Algeria.
Algeria's policy of revising the gas prices concerned the contracts 
signed with her main clients El Paso (USA); Gas de France, ENI (Italy); 
Distrigas (USA) and Enagas (Spain). After the 1979 oil shock, the 
Algerians believed that the right price of gas should be at least $6.11 
per million of Btu, a level promptly rejected by their clients as
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exorbitant. By that time, Algerian gas was priced between $2.60 and 
$3.70 per million Btu at the terminal flange depending on contract and 
destination•
Main purchasers of Algerian gas and evolution of the selling prices
Annual Price end FOB price landed deliveries
quantity 
(cm/bn)
1979
($mBtu)
October
1982
(SmBtu)
price 
J anuary 
1985 
(SmBtu)
status
1986
GDF 9.1 3.70 5.12 5.47 current
Distri-
gas
Belgium 5.0 4.80 5.47 current
Di stri- 
gas (US) 1.15 3.92 4.44 5.47 halted
Panhandle
(US) 4.5 3.92 7.18 suspended
El Paso 
(US) 20.0 3.05 - - cancelled
Snam/ENI
(Italy) 12.0 2.92 4.40 5.18 current
Enagas 
(Spain) 5.0 current
The US energy authorities (FPC), noted that Algeria's asking price 
was above the landed price in the USA territory, about $5 per million of 
BTU and was determined not to accede to Algerian demands in order to 
avoid similar requests from Canada and Mexico, the gas of which was being 
sold at the US borders at $4.95 and $4.85 a million of BTU respectively. 
To dissuade the Algerians from making any further demands, the FPC 
withheld in December 1978 approval of the gas contract signed between the
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American company Tenneco and Sonatrach. Immediately, the Algerians 
linked US reticence to national security questions concerning their 
socialist orientation and support to the Polisario front.
In April 1980, Sonatrach held up shipments to France and to the USA 
in an attempt to force them to reopen negotiations which were broken at 
the request of GDF and El Paso. However, these tactics failed because 
Algeria could not cut back on gas production and exports without 
jeopardising the financing of future economic programmes. Thus she was 
willing to consider setting aside the earlier parity in return for an 
increase in economic co-operation and for a continuation of gas supplies.
As a result her asking price dropped to $3.50 a million of BTU. This 
flexibility resulted in the resumption of negotiations with El-Paso in 
April with the Italians during the visit of President Pertini to Algiers 
in May and with the French on October 30 with the visit of Giraud the 
French minister of energy. While Americans and Italian failed to meet 
Algerian demands, the French offered first a basic price of $3.20 a 
million of BTU, then $3.60 to be applicable as from January 1 , 1980.
The Algerians rejected this proposal and in retaliation for French 
refusal to accept their asking price, they supplied GDF with only 2.5 
billion of cubic metres in 1980 instead of 4 billion cm as scheduled and 
reduced CFP's quota of Algerian crude from 10 million tonnes down to 3.^
Besides these negotiations, the Algerians were able to conclude a 
contract with British Gas Corporation in early February 198 1 through 
which the latter agreed to import 1 billion cm of LNG from January to 
June the same year at an FOB price of $4.60 which is expected to reach 
$4.80 by July. This small but real success invigorated Algeria's will
 ^Le M o n d e , January 2, 198 1 and February 4, 1981.
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to push forward her demands with her other more important clients. And 
in February 1981, the Algerians succeeded in bringing representatives of 
El Paso back to the negotiation table after a freeze of 10 months during 
which the Algerians claimed to have lost about $600 million because of 
the suspension of gas deliveries. To many observers, this move was 
dictated by Algeria's hope that her role in securing the release of 
American hostages in Iran in January, would induce the Americans to 
accept her demands of raising the gas price. Whatever the validity of 
this assumption, the negotiations conducted by Sadek Boussena a General 
Director at the energy ministry and Dean Hinton the US State Secretary 
for economic affairs were broken off.
Negotiations with the Italians were not successful either, despite a 
meeting between Nabi and Pandolfi, the Industry Minister in Rome in 
February 5-7. The reason perhaps was that the Italian state company ENI 
was reported to be close to signing a contract for Soviet gas concerning 
8.5 billion cubic metres a year and at prices around $4.70 a million of 
BTU at the Czech frontier. Obviously, the Italian negotiators were 
testing Algeria's patience and awaiting the outcome of negotiations 
between Sonatrach and GDF of France, before deciding on the next move. 
Resenting Soviet competition and infuriated by the game played by their 
clients, the Algerians imposed slow custom procedures on Fiat light cars 
and trucks worth $77 million in an attempt to force the Italians to 
accept their demands. Further actions were taken such as the decision to 
reconsider a $400 million contract signed with the Italian Pirelli group 
for a tyre project and another contract worth $500 million for the 
building of a plant to construct industrial vehicles concluded with Fiat
Suddentshe Zeitung, (151), July 6, 1981, p.15.
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in December 1980. Most important, however, was the postponement of the 
start of gas supplies to Italy through the Hassi R'mel-Sicilia pipeline, 
scheduled to take place in mid-1981. Algerian pressures seemed to have 
paid off as the Italian ministers of trade (E. Manca) and of industry 
(M. A. Bisaglia) rushed to Algiers in August to attempt to secure the huge 
trade interests Italy has in Algeria. Meanwhile, Algeria's confidence 
in obtaining a rise in gas prices grew following the agreement of the 
Belgian company Distrigas in April 1981, to import 5 billion cubic metres 
annually from Algeria for a 20 year period and at a basic price of $4.80 
per million of BTU FOB applicable as from January 1, 1981. The success of 
Algeria was relative as the contract concerned only a small quantity of 
LNG exports in comparison with the existing contracts with El Paso or GDF 
for instance and included a price lower than the one she had been asking 
for. Eventually, the price was derived from an indexation system based 
as to 50% on the value of a basket of oil imported by Belgium and 50% on 
the value of crude oil by LNG producing countries.
Nevertheless, following Belgium, the French signed on February 3, 
1982 a contract with Algeria involving an FOB price fixed at $5.12 
million of BTU believed to be 20 per cent higher than the price agreed 
upon between GDF and Soviet company Soyougas exports. The acceptance by 
France of this price termed as 'political' resulted from the Mitterand 
government's desire to strengthen political and economic relations with 
Algeria. The success obtained with France and Belgium certainly
enhanced Algeria's bargaining power with the Italians who were still 
refusing to accept her demands. Because exports to Italy concerned
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natural gas and not LNG, Algeria demanded an FOB price to be fixed 
between $4.40 and $4.5 per million of BTU, while the representatives of 
ENI were proposing only $3.75.
The French example forced Italy to accept Algeria's request on 
similar grounds, in exchange for an increase of Algerian imports from 
Italy after negotiations highlighted by the visits to Rome of Benyahia in 
late January 1982 and Nabi in June 1983.^
In contrast, the Algerians have been unsuccessful with the 
Americans. After a long process of international arbitration, the
Algerians received in December 1983 news that Trunkline-Panhandle decided 
to suspend its gas imports because of the deterioration of the LNG prices 
on the US market. This decision surprised the Algerians who were
earlier given assurances by Hodel the US secretary for energy that the 
Sonatrach-Panhandle contract would not be affected. As a result, the US 
imported in 1983 only 1.1 billion cubic metres of Algerian natural gas in 
line with the terms of the Distrigas contract.
With Spain, negotiations proved hard and long, but after agreements 
signed with France, Belgium and Italy, the Algerians concentrated their 
efforts to force Enagas to accept their demands. A round of negotia­
tions took place in March 1983 and Nabi met with his Spanish counterpart
2Solchaga in Madrid in early April and in Algiers in May. But despite 
these contacts and the trip to Algiers of Solchaga in mid-December, 
negotiations between the two sides proved fruitless, as Spain, it was 
reported, was revising its national energy policy to limit the use of LNG
'indeed, the Minister of Trade, Nicola Capria came to Algiers 
in September.
^The importance of these negotiations was reflected by a 
meeting in Algiers on March 3, 1983 between Chadli and 
Alfonso Guerrero the Spanish Vice-President.
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in its programmes. With Algeria's efforts to find alternative clients 
to compensate for the loss of the Spanish market^ and reduce imports of 
Spanish goods, the Spanish government agreed on a rise of Algerian gas to 
secure its economic interests in Algeria which until then, had been 
Spain's first trade partner in Africa. During the visit to Algiers in 
February 1985 of the Spanish Foreign Minister Moran, an economic 
agreement was signed and Enagas agreed to indemnify Sonatrach $500 
million in compensation for a suspension of gas imports.
The conclusion of contracts with Belgium, France, Italy and Spain 
involving 'political' prices has been a resounding success for the 
Algerians. Not only political relations were consolidated but also 
bilateral trade exchanges. The visits made by President Chadli to 
Bruxelles (December, 1982), Rome (November, 1982), Paris (November, 
1983), Madrid (June, 1985) and that of Taleb Ibrahimi to Bonn (September, 
1985) were alternated with visits to Algiers of the Presidents Pertini of 
Italy in May 1983,- Mitterand of France in October 1982; and Gonzales of 
Spain in March 1985. If this indicated the politics of interdependence, 
it did not, however, constitute a permanent state of affairs given the 
sometime troubled relationship Algeria has had with Western Europe. 
Problems related to divergences in interests were highlighted by the
These efforts resulted in a formal agreement with Austria 
following the visit of W. Pahr the Austrian foreign 
minister on January 11,. 1983. Japan had accepted to 
increase oil and gas exports from Algeria at already agreed 
prices in conformity with international market new 
developments, in return Japan was granted a contribution in 
Algeria's five year development plan. Finally, Yugoslavia 
was believed to have signed a contract with Sonatrach for 
the importation of 20 million cubic metres of LNG over 
twenty years.
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deterioration of political relations with France since mid-1984 and with 
Spain which had readjusted her diplomatic relations in favour of the 
Atlantic world.
The fragility of the 'political' prices was confirmed by rumours 
over recent demands made by France and Italy on Algeria to lower the 
selling price of gas as a result of the decline of oil prices to which 
the price of Algerian gas was aligned.^ However, the Algerians firmly 
denied these allegations assuring that the price of their gas remained 
2unchanged. But the late decisions to revise some contracts involving 
French companies, notably the construction of the Algiers underground may 
stand as an evidence of the existence of such a bargain and of the 
uncertainty of the terms of the gas deals as agreed upon. A strong 
assumption may be that Algeria wants to keep these deals at least for 
some time to come, being confident that oil prices will go up again in 
the future. Time seems then a primordial factor in Algeria's game and 
only an analysis in retrospective would tell if the Algerians were right. 
Meanwhile, trade exchanges remain in the background as a solid element in 
the convergence of interests whenever possible and as a means for Algeria 
to diversify her commercial relations in the framework of the new 
economic policies. Indeed, both the restructuring of the national
economy and readjustment of political relations sensibly affected the 
orientation of Algerian foreign trade in recent years.
Notably the visits to Algiers of the French minister of 
energy Auroux in September 1984 and the Italian Premier
Craxi on November 11.
^For Algeria's denial, see Marche's_____ Tropicaux e t
M e d i t e r r a n e e n s , September 21, 1984, p.2323.
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3 • Reorientation of trade relations
Structurally, the accent has been put on productivity and developing 
agriculture and other sectors such as textiles and light industries in 
order to improve the efficiency of the impressive economic infrastructure 
that was laid down through the setting up of huge plants, complexes and 
capital-intensive projects. Therefore, the policy of big contracts with 
foreign countries and the import of massive technology was abandoned as 
there was an insistence of using the country's existing over capacity 
before building new firms and units. To prepare the period of
'i 1 apres-petrole', this was regarded necessary because an increase of 
exports of manufactured goods would help Algeria diminish her trade 
deficit in the short-term as well as compensate for the decline of oil 
revenues. And given the multiplicity of small and medium-sized projects 
and concerns of improving maintenance, a greater diversification of trade 
relations was also needed. On the level of trade exchanges, the part of 
the Western world remains, however important, about 90 per cent of 
Algeria's total foreign trade, but two notable changes have occurred: the 
decline of trade with the USA on the energy domain and the expansion of 
co-operation with other EEC countries, Japan and Canada as well as some 
countries of East Europe and the third world.
a) A reappraisal of the content of co-operation with the Western
countries
Because of the cancellation of the gas contracts, exports to the USA 
represented only 15 per cent of Algeria's total exports in 1982, while 
they accounted for 55 per cent in 1980. At the same time, US share in
Algerian total energy exports fell to 20 per cent in 1983 as the USA
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bought only a third of Algerian oil production (327,000 barrels a day) 
while they were importing about 56 per cent of this production in the 
second half of the 1970s.
However, while co-operation in the energy domain abruptly declined, 
efforts to obtain US expertise to modernize the agrarian sector succeeded 
in agreements between the two countries with the visits of the US state 
secretary for agriculture, John Block, on February 2, 1984 and that of
President Chadli to Washington in April 1985.1 As a result in June, 
Algeria became the first country to benefit from the newly instituted 
export subsidiary programme, purchasing $117,000,000 worth of grain. In 
parallel, or perhaps as a result of the departure from the past period 
policy of gigantic projects especially in the energy sector, Algeria has 
been borrowing less from US private companies, privileging instead credit 
facilities from the World Bank which accepted to finance a certain number 
of medium-sized projects in agriculture, transports and water works.2 
If Algeria has been considered as a good credit risk by private financial 
organisms, the turn to ths international public organisms may have also 
political implications, i.e. the desire to fashion out of these links, 
exemplary relations between the Western dominated financial institutions 
and a developing country eager to assert its political independence and 
sovereignty. The Algerian state-owned press agency (APS) praised the 
policies of the World banks towards Algeria, noting that this bank 
provides assistance to developing countries by giving priority to 
investments that help them to become productive.^ This statement seems
'The presidential delegation included also the minister of 
agriculture, Kasdi Merbah/
2By the end of 1983, the World Bank financed 26 projects in 
Algeria worth $1 billion (El-Moud j a h i d , January 20-21, 
1984).
3E l - M o u d j a h i d , January 19, 1984.
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surprising when one looks at previous negative comments of the APS on the 
conditions the World Bank fixed when negotiating loans with the third 
world countries* It may not be exaggerated to believe that the 
development of links with the World Bank aimed also at easing the 
political divergencies between the USA and Algeria.1
Political considerations also help to explain the strengthening of 
economic relations with the EEC countries, especially France, Belgium and 
Italy. Trade exchanges blossomed with the acceptance by these countries 
of high prices for Algerian natural gas and from their more or less 
positive attitude toward the Algerian-backed principle of self-determina­
tion for the Saharawi people. This increase was manifested by the fact 
that Algeria accounted for 20 per cent of EEC's total imports of natural 
gas in 1983, while 60 per cent of her total supplies came from these 
countries. France, on its part, became Algeria's first trade partner in 
1983 accounting, however, for only 2 0 per cent of her former colony's 
total trade. This indicates the efforts of diversification pursued by 
Algeria as in 1962, 90 per cent of her total trade exchanges were 
conducted with France. In October 1981 and January 1982, the planning 
ministers of the two countries discussed agreements related to $2 billion 
new French contracts and after the economic convention signed between 
Taleb Ibrahimi and Cheysson on June 2, 1982, bilateral trade totalled
$5.07 million. And as a result of the 'political price* of gas.
1The President of the World Bank M. Clausen paid a visit to 
Algiers in January 1984, and had talks with Premier 
Abdelghani and the foreign minister Taleb Ibrahimi.
France's imports of hydrocarbons from Algeria amounted to F26 billion 
while Algeria's imports from France increased from F4 billion to F25 
billion in 1983.^
Beside reasons inherent in the politics of the 'political price' of 
gas, a particular effort had been made toward Japan and Canada« If Japan 
had been a traditional partner for Algeria in terms of business because 
of its advanced technology, efficient expertise combined with absence of 
political content in the relations with algeria, the recent overture 
toward Canada may be explained by the pro-third world shown by this 
country and its ability to channel North-American technology packaged in 
French.^
Japan then, became the fourth most important supplier of Algeria in 
1982 providing equipment and technology in return for quantities of oil, 
about 5000 tonnes of copper annually, and 42,000 tonnes of iron-pig to 
facilitate the payment of the pipelines. In addition, to a $50 million 
sale of 15,000 Honda cars paid with crude oil, Japan had been awarded two 
major hydrocarbons contracts backed by Japanese soft loans after the 
visit made to Algiers in April 198 1 by a high-ranking delegation from the 
Japanese federation of economic organizations: one worth $54,4 million 
involving Mitsubishi corporation and concerning the building of 
associated gas extraction and treatment facilities at zerzaitine; the 
other ($250 million) was won by Kobe steel for the building of 1.2 
million tonne a year LPG recovery and processing plant at Hassi R'mel.
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Marches troplcaux et Mediter r a n e a n s , October 10, 1984,
p . 2 62 3 .
^The S o u t h , December 1985, p.84.
3Maqhreb s e l e c t i o n , November 11, 1981, p.2.
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Co-operation with Japan is expected to expand, especially in the domain 
of energy where Japanese expertise may be needed to partly make up for 
the loss of US technology in this domain.
With Canada, co-operation concerned exports of wine, phosphates, 
ammonia, non-ferrous metal and citrus fruits in return for expertise and 
assistance in building works (such as the Makam al Shahid) and railway 
sectors. In 1981, Algeria received 13 of the locomotives it agreed to 
buy from Canada and in November 1982 she signed 2 contracts providing for 
the construction of 32 centres of maintenance and 2 institutes for 
training in favour of the national transport companies SNTR and SNTV.
Like in the case of Japan, trade with Canada is expected to expand 
because of the absence of a political climate surrounding the relations 
between the two sides, a matter that would attenuate political connota­
tions usually linked with business with Western capitalist countries. An 
intensive co-operation with these two countries may look less striking 
and less controversial than economic links with France with which 
memories of past domination are still vivid in the conscience of some 
Algerian leaders or with the USA which has been held responsible for the 
world's ills in the Algerian official ideology. In any case, the 
separation between ideology and business is once more prevalent, since 
what matters for the Algerian ruling elites is national development.
Ideological considerations remain however also important in
Algeria's efforts to a more balance non-aligned policy. Therefore, the 
new Algerian leaders tried to develop economic links with some countries
'for the prospects of an increase of Japanese contribution 
in Algerian economic programme see the interview of A. 
Bencheikh, Algerian Ambassador to Tokyo, given to Pana 
(review of Japanese public opinion on the Islamic world), 
weekly report, May 10, 1980.
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of Eastern Europe and of the third world, since a greater diversification 
of trade relations may give Algeria a larger room of manoeuvre in third 
world politics and enhance her image of a truly sovereign nation, 
b) A steady shift to some countries of Eastern Europe
The coolness of the political relations between Algeria and the 
Soviet Union resulted also in the decline of economic links between the 
two sides. Since 1978, Algeria has no longer been the most important 
trade partner of the Soviet Union in Africa. Since then, it was Romania 
which eventually ranked first in Algeria's global trade with East- 
European bloc. Moreover, the decrease of the Algerian-Soviet trade was 
also highlighted by the failure of the USSR to fulfill its engagement to 
grant Algeria a loan amounting to DA13 billion according to the terms of 
the 'accord-cadre' signed in April 1980.
To warm up political relations and strengthen cooperation
between the two countries. President Chadli paid a visit to Moscow in 
June 1981. And after the meeting of the joint committee in Algiers in 
November, the USSR agreed to undertake a number of economic projects in 
Algeria. In the industrial sector, the communist power was to carry out 
prospect studies in the raw material-rich Hoggar as well as build a 
cement plant at Jelfa with 500,000 tonne annual capacity, a flat glass 
factory at Oran, new facilities at El-Hadjar steel complex and a thermic 
central at Jijel. However, the financing of the last project was to be 
entirely made by Algeria. To help improve the agrarian sector, a formal 
agreement was signed in December 1982 by which the USSR agreed to set up 
three pilot-farms in Eastern Algeria and send 15 experts to assist 
Algeria in the domain of forestry and pasture.^ Soviet expertise in some 1
1Algerie information, December 1982.
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aspects of agrarian development and prospection for natural resources 
seemed to attract the Algerians' attention given the priority accorded to 
agrarian development to reach self-sufficiency and to new discoveries in 
mineral wealth. Therefore, the Soviet Minister of water works visited 
Algiers on June 4, 1983, while at the inauguration of the week of
Algerian-Soviet friendship in October, the Soviet delegation was led by 
the minister of geology Rouniv.
Because of ups and downs that characterized the political relation­
ship with the Soviet Union, Algeria attempted to increase economic 
co-operation with other countries of Eastern Europe. The turn to these 
countries would not only compensate for an eventual defection of the 
Soviet Union but would also help Algeria win their sympathy for her 
assertion of political independence and a more balanced non-aligned 
policy.
On practical terms, the East European countries were believed able 
to participate in the projects that were given priority: agriculture, 
housing, transports and light industries, sectors which demand less 
investments and less expertise than the hydrocarbons industries for 
instance. These considerations led the State Ministry for foreign trade 
to organize an international conference on trade between Algeria and the 
Eastern bloc in December 198 1, as well as to a session of the joint 
A1gerian-Czech committee which had not met since 1972.
Trade volume with Czechoslovakia increased from $6.6 million in 1970 
to 76 in 1982, while exchanges with Hungary jumped from $80 million in 
1980 to $140 million three years later. In the housing sector Romania 
was expected to build 20,000 houses and flats in Western Algeria (Saida, 
Mascara and Mostaganem); Hungary about 5,000 flats in the East of the
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country (Annaba and Guelma) and West Germany companies were earmarked for 
the construction of 34 training institutes and equip 28 other centres for 
professional education. In other sectors/ Czechoslovakia was to help 
build a transmission centre at Tipasa near Algiers, an electrical plant 
at Skikda, a shoe and leather factory at Sidi Bel Abbes and a complex of 
pumps at Berrouaghia in Central Algeria. With Bulgaria an agreement was 
signed in November 1981 and this country accepted to construct a section 
of the road linking Hassi R'mel to Alghar. In addition to this form of 
co-operation, Hungary granted Algeria a $100 million loan after the visit 
of the Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja in April 1982.
The dialectics of the political readjustment involved also some 
efforts to develop Algeria's co-operation with the South, especially 
those countries which have a certain impact in third world politics,
c) The utility of co-operation with the South
Narrowly, the improvement of economic relations with these countries 
may be advantageous for Algeria in the sense that she could trade with 
them on an equal basis. And generally, while affirming that South-South 
co-operation is not a substitute for North-South co-operation, she 
believes that a greater co-operation between developing countries could 
lead to identifying common objectives which favour partnership and 
co-operation between North and South. However, if these two sets of 
considerations reflected the strengthening of trade relations with 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for instance, the turn to co-operation with 
China, India, Senegal and Yugoslavia followed Algeria's option for a more 
balanced line with regard to third world issues.
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Having good capacities for exporting some manufactured and capital 
goods as well as a good deal of expertise in energy, Algeria favoured the 
increase of trade and co-operation among developing countries on this 
basis instead of calling for regional economic integration or being 
involved in lengthy discussions over financial and monetary problems 
facing the third world. Such concerns explained the convening of an
international conference in Algiers in early May 1982 devoted to 
South-South co-operation in the domain of capital goods. This sector 
has been of a particular interest for Algeria since her policy of 
'industrializing industries' required a massive absorption of capital 
goods necessary for expanding industrialization and increasing the volume 
of manufactured goods for exports.
As fulfilments of these objectives, Algeria has been able to sign in 
May 1983 a contract with Yugoslavia for the supply of 10 millions of 
electrical bulbs made by the state-owned chemical manufacturer company 
SNIC. In May 1985, she agreed to help Senegal construct a factory for 
car spare parts. Sonatrach is currently participating in the exploita­
tion of Tanzania's Kimbid area in a venture regarded by Algerians as 
ideal for this co-operation since it combines financial assistance
provided by the Opec fund, know-how by a developing country (Algeria) and
69managerial control by Tanzanians. Another example of this form of
South-South co-operation has been the signature of a contract in 
September 1981 between the Algerian state-owned manufacturer company SNS 
and India's public firm Bharat heavy and plate vessels. This contract 
was regarded by the Algerians as the first major technological transfer 
venture involving developing countries, and according to its terms, the
6 9 Interview of B. N a b i , the Minister of energy to 
A l g e r i e-Actualites, May 9, 1983.
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Indians agreed to supply Algeria with experts and technology in the 
dcmain of timber-work and copper smith brazier's ware as well as technical 
training for Algerian workers in this sector.
Among other important new developments in Algeria's turn to 
developing countries concerned domains traditionally reserved for Western 
countries: nuclear research, energy and finance. Nuclear co-operation 
may help Algeria produce some kind of armaments and obtain additional 
source of energy to be used for other purposes as her proven reserves of 
uranium in 1981 were believed about 50,000 tonnes. For these purposes, 
Argentina agreed to provide a 500kw and 20 per cent uranium-enriched 
nuclear reactor. Brazil was also solicited for nuclear research
assistance following the visit of Yala the Minister of finance on June 
5-6, 1981 • * On the energy domain, an agreement was signed with
Yugoslavia in April 1980 for the prospection of gas resources in Algeria. 
And following the July 1984 visit of the Mexican Minister of energy, F. 
Ochoa, Algeria signed an important ' accord-cadre' with Mexico providing 
for the setting up of joint companies for exchange of technology in the 
hydrocarbon sector in particular.
Finally, with the new political understanding reached with the 
conservative Arab countries of the Middle East, Algeria has been able to 
benefit from Arab finance. In 1984, she received about $701 million
development financing from funds sponsored by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
2the Islamic Bank. Saudi contribution in some economic projects in
Algeria has been quite consistent in recent years. At the end of
'visit preceded by that of Major Abdeslam Touati, the 
director of the ANP's military fabrication department
(DFM).
^A large part of which was obtained by Benhammouda the
Minister of finance at the meeting of the council of the 
governors of Arab banks held in Algiers on April 18 ,  1984 .
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November 1983, an agreement was signed through which Algeria was granted 
a $51 million loan from the Saudi fund for development (SFD) to partly 
finance the build up of a port at Jenjen near Jijel; 66.7 million of DA 
for the reconstruction of the city of El-Asnam which was badly hit by an 
earthquake in Summer 1981. And following the visit of a Saudi financial 
delegation in early 1984, Algeria was awarded a long-term credit of DA 5 
million for the building of two dams and the extension of the railways 
network. Other loans from the Saudi Kingdom were expected to finance 
the construction of a railway line between M'sila and Bordj Bou Arreridj 
as well as two dams at Gargar and Ain Dalia. And with Saudi help, the 
Islamic Bank agreed in May 1983 to provide the state-owned steel 
manufacturer SNS with credit facilities worth $20 million.' Financial 
assistance from Kuwait was also important as Algeria received DK 4.5 
million loan reimbursable in 15 year period to finance the Algerian 
section of the fourth intei— Arab telecommunications network aiming at 
linking the Maghrebi countries. Another loan ($18 million) from the
Kuwaiti-based fund (Fades) was made available to finance the construction 
of a hospital in Tiaret. In addition to credit facilities to help 
financing the building of a dam at Meskiana and the extension of the rail 
network in the Wilaya of Annaba, the Algerians encouraged the possibility 
of creating joint companies with Kuwait for the production of pharmaceu­
tical products.2
Diversification of trade relations will certainly be pursued with a 
much greater determination not only given the dialectics of restructuring 
the national economy but also the dynamics of political readjustment
'a ! chark al A w s a t , May 9, 1983.
2Grand Maghreb (8), January 1982, p.4.
^According to Algerian health authorities, such a project
would save Algeria an estimated $200 million a year.
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carried out by Taleb Ibrahimi. There has been, indeed, a belief that 
these processes would help lessen the country’s economic dependence on a 
determined country or a group of countries and ensure a greater political 
independence. In this vein, the Minister of trade Khellef toured
successively, Moscow and Washington in mid-April 1984, Paris in mid-July 
and paid a visit to London in December 1985. For similar reasons, Taleb 
Ibrahimi went to Sofia and Bonn in September 1985 while Premier Brahimi 
visited Greece in January and Yugoslavia in March the same year. In 
parallel, Claude Cheysson as an EEC Commissar came to Algiers in November 
to discuss with the Algerians plans for extending trade exchanges with 
the European community. Important economic agreements were also signed 
with Hungary in January, Mauritania in March, Italy and Yugoslavia in 
July. However, with attempts to assert a more balanced non-aligned 
policy, trade relations may continue to diversify but this trend may be 
affected by the outcome of rivalries existing between groups forming
Algeria's ruling elite.
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CONCLUSION
Foreign policy in Algeria appears to constitute part and parcel of 
the process of building a modern nation-state as it plays an important 
role on consolidating the foundations of the new states (political 
legitimacy); its physical preservation (territorial integrity); material 
basis (economic development) and cultural ferment (identity). These 
tasks have been intimately interlocked on the basis of an interraction 
between internal dynamics and external constraints and have been 
articulated essentially around the political stratum that expressed 
itself exclusively through the prominence of the state in conducting 
domestic and foreign policies. Structurally, the state in modern Algeria 
rests on formal institutions that permitted neither mass participation 
nor class conflict with regard to the conception of a state as a forum 
for power struggle. It remained in fact as an executive and legislative 
organ of the society firmly controlled by a relatively small political 
elite dominated by a number of groups where officers and technocrats tend 
to predominate.
The nature of colonial dialectics and the war of liberation in 
Algeria prevented the orientation of the state toward either the forms of 
political liberalism or socialistic collectivism. In this process, both 
the national bourgeoisie and the working class were weak and thus unable 
to emerge as leading political forces. Seeds for political conservatism, 
as defined in terms of traditionalism, were not possible, given the 
decline of traditional strata and aristocracy with regard to power and 
cultural influence that resulted from the destruction of Algeria's 
traditional structures during French colonialism. In the course of the 
war, the army emerged as a revolutionary force with its own model of 
nation-state building, in contradistinction to capitalism conceived as a 
form of economic organization of the society and conservatism as an
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expression of political aspirations and beliefs of the national 
bourgeoisie. The result was the institution of a form of state 
capitalism as the members of the military core elite as well as the 
technocrats came from neither liberal or traditional upper classes but 
from the petty and middle classes expressing a revolt against colonial 
domination in its aspects of archaic capitalism and cultural oppression. 
In the absence of nation builders and with the power of the gun conferred 
upon it by the necessities of the war °f liberation, the army turned into 
a political institution an(j played the role of the guardian of the 
revolution and of the constitutionalized state. A strong and centralized 
state in which the army assumes the central role of nation-state builder 
appeared the only means for the military stratum and the technocrats as 
the engineer of socio-economic chan9e not only to preserve and consoli­
date their de facto power but also to muster privileges that would derive 
from the prominence of the state in the socio-economic and political 
li fe.
Culturally, this process of consolidating power and gaining 
interests has been expressed through a technocratic vision of the 
national ideology that rejecte(j political conservatism, on the basis of 
its reactionary character, an£j scientific socialism, on the grounds of 
its incompability with Arabo-Islamic values although these values have 
been perceived through a radical angle in an effort to demarcate from the 
orthodox conception of Arabo-Islamism usually linked to moderate and 
conservative segments of society. This military-technocratic project of 
nation-state building appears omnipotent and was channelled through a 
coherent continuum whether politically» economically or culturally. It 
is therefore in this light that the relation between nation-state
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building and idiosyncratic factors is well ascertained and it is on this 
basis that sovereignty, territorial integrity and identity of the 
nation-state have been articulated.
National sovereignty conceived in reaction to colonial sequels and 
to dependency on France helped to consolidate the military-technocratic 
project in the sense of asserting independence vis-a-vis France
economically and culturally. By breaking the dependency status, economic 
capabilities of the state were improved thus enhancing the power of the 
military-technocratic stratum. At the same time, the weaning of cultural 
alienation appears necessary as the assertion of a distinct identity 
based on cultural decolonization helps 'immortalize' the material sense 
of national sovereignty.
Territorial integrity could not be dissociated from the security of 
the state and therefore from the consolidation of power of the elites. 
The accentuation of Algerian nationalism - as defined by the rejection of 
any supra-national authority and the desire to emerge as the central 
power in the Maghreb - finds its material expression in the attempts to 
preserve the territorial integrity and security of the state. Territo­
rial irredentia claims waved consistently by Morocco and occasionally by 
Tunisia and Libya were met with a firmness stemming from the instinct of 
existence and preservation of the self. Bilateral dispute crystallized 
by the conflict of the Western Sahara attests to the accentuation of 
nationalisms in the Maghreb in which Algeria's centrality, status and 
ambitions cannot be overlooked.
These effects of consolidating the state ensuring national 
sovereignty, identity and territorial integrity have not been without 
social tensions as highlighted by discrepancies in wealth and influence 
at home and, without, regional tensions and a cleavage between aspira­
tions and realities in the outer world.
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Building a strong and centralized state endowed with theoretically 
well articulated political institutions did not generate a circulation of 
elites on the basis of extensive political recruitment and mobilization 
but produced a relatively small circle of rival groups in which the 
members have been integrated and eliminated through a system of 
clientelism. Indeed, national-decision making remained in the hands of a 
powerful group around which gravitated a mosaic of clans hard to locate 
given the secretive character of the Algerian political elite and the 
rapidly changing alliances and countei— alliances based mainly on 
conflicts between persons.' To the Boumedienne-led clan of Oujda seemed 
to have succeeded the group of high officers from Eastern Algeria 
centered around the Chief- of Staff, General Belloucif.
Paradoxically, this closed system has been able to survive perhaps 
because political recruitment obeyed this system of clientelism which has 
also been used extensively given the highly centralized pattern of 
administrative and technocratic employment on the one hand and the 
relatively easy means of embezzlement and quick social promotion on the 
other. These procedures and achievements were made possible by 
privileges deriving from the specific nature of a centralized administra­
tive structure, civil service and omnipotence of the public sector in the 
socio-economic sphere. Needless to mention that the technocracy's
inducements were also important because of the huge resources drain from 
the hydrocarbon exports especially during the early 1970s.
During the early stage of consolidation of the Boumedienne regime 
(1965-1969), political opposition was mastered through the use of the 
power of the gun (assassination, purges, forced retirement). But the 
period stretching until 1976 was marked by a high domestic stability and 
the strengthening of the core elite thanks to the combined oil health and 
important role played by Algeria on the foreign level. Since then,
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chronic deficiencies of the economic strategy aggravated by the dwindling 
of oil revenues could no longer conceal the increasing social differen­
tiation and fragmentation. Popular discontent emerged especially against 
the bureaucratic stratum which has been, therefore, criticized for 
cultural westernization, huge privileges, bureaucratic malpractices, food 
shortages and housing crisis.
The effect of social disparities naturally embraced the cultural 
field as highlighted by the cleavage between Arabophones-Francophones and 
more recently exacerbated by the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism and 
Berber cultural protest. Both phenomena resulted from a contradiction 
between extensive arabization and the choice of economic development. 
While the increase of Arabization did not satisfy the Arabic-speaking 
lower classes because of their exclusion from jobs and professional 
responsibilities, segments of the Kabyle population felt that too much 
arabism would lead to the extinction of the Kabyle dialect and values and 
therefore to their existence as a distinct ethnical group. If extremism 
shown by some Berber and Muslim militants is deplorable and dangerous for 
the unity of the Algerian people, this reality should not be dissociated 
from problems related to inequalities in income in general. Whether
directed against the westernization of the state bureaucracy or against 
the arabism preached to the political elite, cultural protest reflects in 
fact the anger of segments that were left on the margin of national 
decision-making.
In this context, the call for more injection of arabism in political 
and administrative life, stemmed from a large number of the traditionally 
devout Muslim population who regarded the return to Muslim precepts as a 
means to restore a kind of social-justice as outlined in the basic 
principles of the Sharia (Muslim Law). Given the acuity of socio­
economic problems, the fundamentalist militants found a good opportunity
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to channel the discontent of the impoverished classes, principally in the 
cities' outskirts and rural areas. This form of opposition to the 
technocratic model of development came initially from Arabic-speaking 
students during riots on campuses in the years 1975-1977 and with the 
deepening of social disparities, it turned into an underground opposition 
which launched subversive actions against the state forces (police and 
gendarmerie) since 1981. And an extremist group led by Said Bouali had even 
set up a maquis in the region of Larbaa near Algiers which the central 
authorities had failed to dismantle. It is reported that this group and 
that of Sheikh Mountadhiri' had gained increasing support in the wave of 
the resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism that is sweeping the entire Arab 
world since the outbreak of the Iranian revolution.
The other aspect of the identity crisis as expressed by the Kabyle
protest came from the impetus represented by some Kabyle-speaking
students during riots at the University of Tizou Ouzou in 1981 and a
certain number of Kabyle intellectuals gathered in the outlawed "Ligue
/Algerienne des droits de l'homme". In the eyes of the regime, the danger 
of the Kabyle protest may not be crucial as long as it remains confined 
to specific cultural demands but the risk may be that some Berber 
militants, especially within the migrant Kabyle circles in France, may be 
tempted to raise the sensitive problems of ethnic divisions which until 
recently have not been a serious issue for the central authority.
Whatever the nature of the cultural clash, the crux of the problem for 
the regime remains in its ability to contain discontent through 
socio-economic reforms. Both the Kabyle protest and fundamentalism
represent a danger for domestic stability as the Chadli government 
appeared torn between maintaining the dour brand of socialism as
experienced during the Boumedienne era, and pursuing a certain form of 
liberalism under pressures from the private bourgeoisie which became
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increasingly important as a result of the contradictions of the 
state-managed economy. Indeed, to opt for the former would only increase 
discontent from large segments of the population who had suffered from 
the economic austerity imposed by Boumedienne, while to embark upon the 
latter would not attenuate this discontent as many in Algeria believe 
that an open door a la Sadat would benefit only the privileged classes 
and increase the country's dependence on foreign outlets. President 
Chadli has so far adopted a lenient attitude towards Berber and Muslim 
activists (as highlighted by the light sentences pronounced against some 
of them in December 1984), perhaps in order to maintain national cohesion 
and preserve his own regime. This moderate and balanced approach proper 
to the personality of the Algerian leader, may probably not remedy this 
situation as socio-economic unrest appears inevitable given the decrease 
of oil revenues and the deficiencies of the past economic policy despite 
recent adjustments. Whatever the choice, it appears that the deepening 
of social disparities may be hard to alleviate as the tackling of these 
problems may change with the outcome of rivalries between the clans 
composing the ruling elite.
Economic problems combined with the nature of the political 
leadership had also become acute with the lingering problem of the 
Western Sahara which has been viewed by the regime as having direct 
implications on the state's security and territorial integrity. Indirect 
involvement over this issue proved a heavy burden on the country's 
financial resources and a constraint on the conduct of its foreign 
policy.
Until recently, Algeria and the Polisario Front had rejected any 
political settlement that did not consider the right of the Saharawi 
people for self-determination and the Polisario movement as the 
legitimate representative of this people. Neither military victory of
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the Saharawi guerrillas nor the war of attrition to erode Morocco's hold 
over the Western Sahara as expected by Boumedienne, proved possible 
because King Hassan could not hand over this territory without seriously 
dooming the foundations of his throne. Indeed, in contrast to Algeria, 
the question of the Sahara became a national issue in Morocco and perhaps 
the most effective means for the King not only to divert the attention of 
his people away from domestic problems but also to line up the political 
opposition solidly behind him. Therefore, after a long and painful 
tension between Algeria and Morocco and the huge sacrifices made by each 
of them to force the issue in its favour, the conflict reached a 
stalemate. This kind of status quo seems hard to maintain given economic 
problems both came to face.
One way to break this negative deadlock, may be a generalized war 
but in a context of equilibrium of forces neither side wants it, having 
probably learnt lessons from the fruitless Iraq-Iran war. It is also 
difficult to see how the Polisario Front and Algeria would accept the 
principle of a referendum over the Western Sahara. This solution may 
prove inoperative even though the referendum would be carried under the 
UN or OAU auspices. Had the referendum taken place, disagreements would 
still remain as it may be expected for instance, that after their return 
to their homeland to participate in the referendum, the Saharawi refugees 
from Algeria would have found themselves merely swamped and the polling 
easily skewed by imported Moroccans posing as Saharawis. On the other 
hand Morocco has always rejected population statistics given by the 
Polisario front (more than 700,000) as it recognizes the number of 
Saharawis at only 74,000 in conformity with the census conducted by Spain
in 1974
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In this intricate situation, there may be solid reasons not to 
believe in the possibility of a political settlement of the Saharan 
dispute on the basis of a referendum. The alternative may consist in 
finding a compromise formula through direct negotiations between 
Moroccans and Saharawis with the participation of Algerians and 
Mauritanians as interested parties. In this vein, one option favoured by 
Algeria may be the setting up of a federation between Morocco and the 
RASD in the framework of a united Maghreb conceived on the basis of 
intensive regional co-operation and co-ordination of foreign policies.' 
To sustain the viability of their argument, the Algerians stressed that 
this form of unity would help the Maghrebi states to remedy their 
socio-economic problems which are in many cases similar, and to preserve 
political stability threatened by Libya's subversive actions on the one 
hand and what the Algerians regard as imperialist aggression against the 
Arab world on the other. The implicit concern for the Algerians is 
undoubtedly their desire to ease tensions in the Maghreb and prevent the 
entanglement of this region in East-West competition in order to 
concentrate on economic issues which they consider as the most crucial 
challenge for the stability of the respective regimes at the present 
time. Thus, the Algerian leaders came to believe that only a solution to 
the economic problems could prevent a socio-political unrest in the 
Maghreb as each state faces potential threat represented by the Muslim 
fundamentalists who have been increasingly irritated by the long-standing 
tensions between the regimes. It was therefore not surprizing that on 
the aftermath of US bombings of Libya in April 1986, the Chadli 
government issued a declaration emphasizing the necessity of the Maghrebi
'intensive diplomatic contacts between all the Maghrebi states have been 
made recently in addition to the indirect negotiations that took place in 
new York in mid-April between Moroccans and Saharawis, through the offices 
of the UN Secretary General and Meddoune Fall on behalf of the Senegalese 
president Abdu Diouf,the acting chairman of the OAU.
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states to embark upon a common economic programme as a solid step toward 
a united Maghreb. This pragmatism, however, may be hampered by the 
exacerbation of political conflicts between the Maghrebi states and their 
inability to cope with an eventual social unrest. In this condition, the 
use of a war as a means of diversion may not be a remote possibility, 
especially in Morocco where the Saharan venture has a profound popular 
ad hesion.
Apparently, the Algerians are conscious of this risk as a war would 
have a devastating effect on their economy. Against this background, 
pragmatism may be pursued on the basis of reinforcing links with Tunisia 
and Mauritania and attempting to calm down Qaihafi's adventurism. And to 
strengthen this approach, Algeria may continue the diversification of its 
political and economic relations as well as maintaining the image of a 
serious and responsible non-aligned country. Consequently, a more 
balanced attitude between the super-powers and the consolidation of 
economic links with the West European countries perhaps with more vigour 
than in the past may be expected.
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1962
July I: Referendum in Algeria.
5: Proclamation of Algeria's independence.
1963
January 8: Alge ri an-Tunisi an negotiations over the border issue.
15: Moroccan delegation in Algiers to discuss the problem 
of frontiers.
18: Laroussi Khelifa, Minister of industry in London (gas 
exports)•
Tunis severs diplomatic relations with Algeria
20: Military delegation led by Raid Akmed arrives in 
Leopoldville•
* Popular meeting in Algiers between Ben Bella and 
Roberto Holden, the leader of the Angolese national 
liberation front.
March 11: Khemisti in Paris.
April 4: A. Francis, Ministry of finance in Paris.
10-15: Official Visit of President Nasser.
September 15: Ben Bella elected president of the Algerian 
republic•
October 5 - 
November 2: Algerian-Morocean border conflict.
1964
January 16: Negotiations between Boumaza and De Broglie (wine).
25: Bouteflika in Bamako (Ad hoc committee on Algerian- 
Moroccan conflict.
28: Periple of Kaid Ahmed in sub-Saharan countries.
February 1-4: Visit of U. Thant.
21: The National Assembly ratifies Algeria's adhesion to 
the Arab League.
21-25: Visit of Ben Bella to Guinea.
22: Meeting Bouteflika-Couve De Murville in Paris- 
9ui— Marne.
March 1-5: Visit of Ben Bella to Yugoslavia
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13: Brief meeting between De Gaulle and Ben Bella at 
Champs •
19-23: Visit of Guinea's President A. Sekou Toure.
27: Visit of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio.
April 17: Visit of Mali's President Modibo Keita.
20: Bourguiba's visit delayed.
24-29: Visit of Eric Williams.
25-18 Visit of Ben Bella to the USSR (until May 5), May 
Bulgaria (6-11); Czechoslovakia (11-13); Egypt 
(14-18).
28: Meeting of Algerian-Moroccan mixed committee in 
Tlemceh (agreement on free circulation of persons).
June 13: Visit of Driss M' hammedi. General Director of the 
Moroccan royal cabinet and G1 • O u fk i r  , Director of 
security forces (Algeria's implications in clashes at 
Oujda between the royal troops and dissident forces).
B o u te f l ik a  denies th e s e  a l le g a t io n s .
24-27: Visit of Massemba Debat of Congo.
July 19: Meeting in Cairo between Ben Bella, Bourguiba and 
Hassan II.
August
17-21: Visit of Modibo Keita.
September 28 
- October 3: Visit of Niger's President Hamani Diori.
October
5-10: Summit conference of the non-aligned countries.
12-14: Visit of Cuba's President Osvaldo Dorticos.
November 5: Second summit conference of the Arab League.
24: Meeting of the FLN political bureau (Congo events).
26: Visit of Choi Yong Kan, President of North Korea.
26-28: Meeting of Maghrebi ministers of economy in Tangiers.
December
4-8: Visit of Libya's premier Muntassir.
18-22: Visit of Che Guevarra.
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1965
January 5-9: Boumedienne in Baghdad and from 9 to 12. Attends the 
Cairo Arab summit.
25-29: Visit of Che Guevarra as Cuba's minister of 
industry.
March 25-29: Visit of Eric Williams, Premier of Trinidad.
April 13-19: Official visit of Tito.
14-16: Ben Bella in Bamako and then in Conakry where he 
attends a meeting with Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita and 
N 'Krumah.
27: Meeting in Cairo between Bouteflika and Nasser.
May 11: Boumedienne in Moscow.
12: Ben Bella meets Hassan in Saida.
18-19: Official visit of Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani.
June 10-12: Meeting at Tammanrasset between Ben Bella and the 
Nigerian president H. Diori.
19: Coup against Ben Bella led by Defense Minister 
Boumedienne •
July 27: Setting up of the FLN's 'secretariat executif'.
August 17: Bouteflika in Conakry to obtain Guinea's support for 
the convening of the Afro-Asian conference.
September
13-17: Arab summit in Casablanca.
December
13-18: Official visit of Boumedienne to Moscow.
18: Diplomatic relations broken off with the UK 
(Rhodesia's question).
1966
February 2: Opening of the third oil pipeline linking Hassi 
Messaoud to Arzew.
March 14-17: Arab summit- in Cairo.
May 8: Nationalization of mining resources.
27: Nationalization of insurance companies.
September 15: Publication of the code of investment.
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22: Ministerial reshuffle.
November 4: Meeting Boumedienne, Nasser, Zouayen of Syria.
1967
January 1: Ordinance related to communal code.
February 2: First communal elections.
May 22-27: Seminar on Arab socialism.
May 24: Tahar Zbiri, ANP's chief of staff in Cairo.
25: Meeting of the council of revolution announcing the 
mobilization of the people.
29: Decision to send troops to the Middle East front.
J une 5: Arab-Israeli war breaks out.
6: Nationalization of some US and British oil compa­
nies.
Diplomatie relations with USA severed.
12-13: Brief visit of Boumedienne to Moscow.
21-23: Official visit of Bouteflika to Paris.
July 9: Bounedienne visits Cairo, Damascus and Moscow.
12-17: Restricted Arab summit in Cairo attended by 
Boumedienne .
17 : Boumedienne and the Iraqi President in Moscow (arms 
deal)•
22-27: Seminar of Arab Lawyers in Algiers.
25-26: Visit of Syrian Prime Minister Zouayen.
December 15:
1968
Aborted coup against Boumedienne.
March 3-4: De Gaulle reiterates his invitation to Boumedienne to 
visit Paris.
« Official visit of M. Riad, the Egyptian foreign 
minister. ‘
7: Ministerial reshuffle.
June 7: Official visit of Libya's Prime Minister.
549
July 16: Speech of Boumedienne to the meeting of the OAU 
liberation committee held in Algiers.
22-23: An Israeli plane is hijacked to Algiers by the FPLP.
September
13-16: Fifth OAU summit in Algiers.
26: Visit of G1. Fawzi, the Egyptian defense minister.
October 20: Official visit of the Chinese trade minister Hsiang 
Kim.
1969
January 8: Launching of the first four year plan, 1970-1973.
11-16: Official visit of Boumedienne to Rabat
15: Algerian-Moroccan treaty signed.
March 10: Meeting in Algiers of the African ministers of 
Labour
April 10-13: Official visit of Libya's Crown Prince Hassan Reda.
26: Official visit of Podgorny, the President of Soviet 
praesidium.
26: Adoption of the Charter of the Wilaya.
May 16: Official visit of N'Gouabi, President of the 
Congolese people's republic.
24: Election of first municipal assemblies.
June 24: Official visit of Todor Zivkov, President of 
Bulgaria •
July 2: Algeria becomes a member of OPEC organization.
21: Ordinance related to the constitution of government.
Opening of the Panafrican festival in Algiers.
September 1 : Qadhafi seizes power in Libya.
22-25: Islamic summit in Rabat
October 2-3 : Visit of Schumann, the French Foreign Minister.
6: Official visit of Marshall Spychalsky, President of 
the Polish Council of State.
November 5: Visit of Tito.
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December
21-23: Fifth Arab summit in Rabat.
1970
January 1: Visit of the Malian President Traore.
February
2-6: Official visit of Syria's President Atassi.
April 16-19: Official visit of Qadhafi.
May 23: Algeria becomes a member of OPAEP.
27: Meeting in Tlemcen between Boumedienne and Hassan 
II.
June Official visit of the Saudi King.
July 27 
August 4: Egypt and Jordan accept the Rodgers plan.
August 12: Algerian troops stationed on the Suez Canal called 
back.
September 14: Meeting Boumedienne-Hassan and Ould Daddah.
19: Meeting Boumedienne-Hassan in Mohammedia.
22-27: Arab Summit in Cairo (boycotted by Algeria).
28: Death of President Nasser.
26-30: Official visit of Boumedienne to Libya.
October 4-8: Official visit of Kosygyn.
11-12: Meeting Boumedienne-Qadhafi at Ouargla.
21-22: Meeting Boumedienne-Ould Daddah in Algiers.
1972
April: Belaid Abdeslam visits Riyadh and Damascus.
20-27: Official visit of Boumedienne to Tunis.
May 4-6: Meeting in Algiers between Boumedienne, Sadat and 
Qad hafi •
9: Visit of Fidel Castro.
22: Visit of President Bourguiba.
23-
June 6: Fifth OAPEC summit in Algiers.
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June 10-11: Boumedienne in Tripoli.
28: Official visit of Cambodia's President Sihanouk.
July 1-12: First Arab youth festival in Algiers.
September 7: Official visit of the Sengalese president Senghor.
1 1: Official visit of Ahidjo, the President of Cameroon,
November: Bouteflika attends the Arab ministerial summit held 
in Kuwait.
December 5: Official visit of the Chilean President, Allende.
1973
February
17-18: Meeting Boumedienne-Qadhafi in Constantine.
March 17-23: Official visit of Saeb Salam, the Lebanese Premier.
April 26: Completion of the first section of the Transaharan 
Highway El-Golea-InSalah.
May 11-13: Meeting Bourguiba-Boumedienne at Kef.
27-29: Boumedienne stops over at Cairo and Jeddah en route 
to the Addis Ababa OAU summit.
June 10-12: Official visit of Faisal, the Saudi King.
July 23-24: Meeting Boumedienne-Hassan-Ould Daddah at Agadir.
September: Fourth Non-alignment summit in Algiers.
29: Boumedienne announces end of Algerian emigration to 
France •
October 6-11: Fourth Arab-Israeli war.
7: Algerian Jetfighters arrive in Cairo.
13: Algerian-Jordanian diplomatic relations resumed.
14-15: Brief visit of Boumedienne to Moscow (arms deal).
18: oil embargo decided .
November
2-6: Boumedienne visits Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait 
and Riyadh.
24-29: Arab Summit in Algiers (PLO recognized as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people.
552
December 13: Stop over of Kissinger at Algiers.
29-30: Official visit of Bourguiba.
1974
January 12: Aborted attempt of unity between Libya and Tunisia.
February
13-14: Restricted Arab summit between the leaders of 
Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
22: Islamic conference in Lahore, attended by 
Boumedienne•
22-23: Visit of Boumedienne to Tunis.
25-
March 1: Boumedienne ' s tour of South-Asia.
April 19 - 
May 2: Emergency session of the UN General Assembly on raw 
materials (Boumedienne delivers a speech-programme).
1 1 : Boumedienne meets Nixon and Kissinger in Washington.
June 12-16: Boumedienne meets Sadat and Arafat at Alexandria on 
his way home after attending the OAU summit held at 
Mogadiscio.
25: Launching of the second four year development plan, 
1974-1977.
October
14-15: Visit of Kissinger.
29-30: Arab summit in Rabat.
November 12: Diplomatic relations resumed with the USA.
15: Nationalization of 15 French enterprises.
1975
January
24-26: Visit of Mitterand, leader of the French socialist 
party.
March 26: Boumedienne, Sadat and Assad meet with King Khaled.
April 10-12: Official visit of Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
May 4-6: First summit between heads of state of Opec countries 
in Algiers. Boumedienne mediates between the Chah of 
Iran and Saddam Hussein, Iraq's vice-president.
June 10: Meeting Boumedienne-Ould Daddah at Bechar.
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July 1-4: King Hassan receives Bouteflika.
14-17: Visit of the Mexican president Echeverria Alvarez.
19: Meeting Boumed ienne-Bourguiba in Annaba.
September 9: Secret meeting in Algiers between El-Ouali, 
Polisario's Secretary-General and Cortina Mauri, the 
Spanish foreign minister.
October 21: King Hassan announces the Green March.
December
20-23 : Opec ministerial conference in Vienna. Ministers held 
hostages by a pro-Palestinian terrorist group, 
liberated in Algiers.
28: Meeting Boumedienne-Qadhafi .
30: Algerian and Morocco call back their respective 
Ambassadors.
1976
February
2-3: Boumedienne receives Jalloud the Libyan Premier•
13-14: Boumedienne in Tripoli.
March 7: Morocco and Mauritania cut diplomatic relations with 
Algeria•
8-9: Boumedienne meets Qadhafi and Kountche Niger's 
President in Ouargla.
November
23-24: Meeting Qadhafi-Boumedienne-Kountche in Tripoli.
December 10: Bouraed ienne elected president of the Algerian 
republic.
14-15: Official visit of Iraqi's vice-president Saddam 
Husayn •
1977
March 6-9: Boumedienne attends the Afro-Arab summit in Cairo.
20-22: Boumedienne attends the summit of Saharan states in 
Niamey.
May 10: Official visit of the Togolese president Eyadema.
July 24-26: Boumedienne in Tripoli and Alexandria to mediate 
between Egypt and Libya.
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October
16-2 1: First congress of Arab African trade unions in 
Algiers.
November 2: Visit of Libya's premier Jalloud.
19: Visit of Sadat to Jerusalem.
December
1-5: Summit conference in Tripoli of the Arab steadfast­
ness front.
13: Visit of G. Marchais, Secretary-General of the French 
Communist party.
1978
July 2: Meeting in Geneva between Bouteflika and Guedira, 
Adviser to Hassan.
September 17: Camp David agreements.
October 3: Visit of Stolern, French State Secretary for 
immigration.
28: Boumedienne send messages to presidents Al Bakr of 
Iraq and Asad of Syria.
November
3-16: Boumedienne tours the Middle East, Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Malta.
28: Boimedienne send a message to Nimeiry, OAU's 
president.
December 2: Death of Boumedienne.
1979
January : Chadli Bendjeddid elected President of the Algerian 
republic.
2: Message of Chadli to the Presidents of the two Yemens 
calling on them to end the conflict between the two 
countries•
14: Message of Chadli to Ayotollah Khomeiny, expressing 
Algeria's solidarity with the Iranian revolution.
June 23-24: Visit of the French foreign minister J-F. Poncet.
August 8: Accord between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in 
Algiers, ending the war between the two sides.
1980
Januai y
18-20: Benyahia in Paris.
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February 11: Visit of Malian President Traore (OAU Ad hoc 
committee).
March 22-29: Chadli's Middle East tour (Saudi Arabia, the two 
Yemens, Arab Bnirat, Qatar, Bahrein, Kuwait).
April 27: Chadli sends message to Khomeiny and Beni Sadr 
expressing Algeria's support after US operations to 
rescue hostages held by the Mujahidin.
May 4: Visit of Stolern, the French secretary for immigra­
tion .
25 : Visit of the French Foreign Minister, J-F. Poncet.
June 4: Benyahia visits Syria, Kuwait, Arab Bnirats, Qatar 
(mediation between Jordan and Syria).
October
11-12: Meeting in Paris between the French-Algerian joint 
commission.
November 8: Official visit of Da Costa, president of Sao Tome.
1 1: Official visit of Masire of Botswana.
December
8-11: Official visit of Mozambican president Machel.
14-19: Official visit of General Giap.
1981
January 3: Visit of Christopher Warren , US Deputy Secretary of 
State in connection with Algerian mediation between 
Washington and Teheran over the US hostages.
7: Polisario's attacks at Bou-Craa and Bais Lakehal.
10 : Benyahia in Tunis.
1 1: Visit of the Tunisian foreign minister, Caid 
Essebssi•
11-13: Official visit of Gensher, the West-German foreign 
minister.
12: Visit of Jalloud, the Libyan premier.
20: Visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi, the presidential adviser to 
Niger and Mali.
20-2 1: US hostages released by Teheran arrive in Algiers.
February 5: B. Nabi, the minister of energy in Rome.
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10: Visit of Premier Abdelghani to Tunisia.
17-19: Meeting in Algiers between foreign ministers of 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mali and Chad.
March 16: Aborted coup in Mauritania.
17: Taleb Ibrahimi and L. Belkheir, Secretary-General of 
government in Nouakchott.
24: Polisario’s attacks on Guelta zemmour.
April 12: Chadli tours 11 African countries.
14: Tension on Algerian-Moroccan border.
16-18: Ministerial session of the co-ordination bureau of 
the non-alignment movement on Namibia, held in 
Algiers.
19: Chadli meets Qadhafi in Algiers.
May 18: Visit of Canadian Prime Minister.
26-28: Visit of British foreign minister Lord Carrington.
June 7-9: Opec ministerial meeting in Algiers.
9-11: Official visits of Chadli to Soviet Union and 
Buigaria•
July 12: Visit of Syria's president Asad.
August 5: Chadli sends a message to Khaled, the Saudi King.
6-8: Visit of French foreign minister Cheysson.
October
28-30: Visit of Edem Kodjo, Secretar y-General of the OAU.
November 6: Meeting in Paris between the French socialist party 
(Jospin) and the FLN (Hoffman).
7: Visit to Paris of H. Khederi, Head of the police 
security.
9: The UN General Assembly decolonization committee 
adopts a resolution (73 for, 7 against and 34 
abstentions) calling Morocco and the Polisario front 
to negotiate.
24: Chadli receives Dreyfus, the French minister of 
industry.
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24-26: Twelfth Arab summit held in Fez (Benyahia represents 
Algeria) .
December 15: Talks between Benyahia and Walter Vernon, special 
envoy of the US State Secretary, A. Haig,
30 : Visit of Lord Carrington, the British Foreign 
Minister.
1982
February
8-9: Second meeting of the OAU ad hoc committee to discuss 
the Western Saharan question, Chadli attends but 
Hassan declines the invitation.
May 4: Meeting in Algiers of the political commission of 
Arab steadfastness front.
16: Official visit of President Asad of Syria.
19: Stopover at Algiers of President Mitterand of 
France.
J une 5: Israel invades Lebanon.
1 1: FLN delegation led by Mehri to Damascus.
12: Visit of the Saudi foreign minister.
J uly 15: Visit of the Iranian president Musavi Khomeiny.
August 1: Declaration of the FLN's politburo over the situation 
in the Middle East.
29: Visit of Presidents Haidallah of Mauritania and 
Traore of Mali.
September 14: Arab summit conference held in Fez.
9: FLN politburo examines the situation in the Middle 
East •
October 3: Visit of President Habyanimana of Rwanda.
6-8: Taleb-Ibrahimi presides over the sixth ministerial 
conference of the 77 group at the United Nations.
9: Visit of Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Lebanese 
socialist party.
12: Meeting in Washington between Taleb and the US 
vice-president Bush.
10-15: Symposium on the development of Arab-African 
co-operation held in Algiers.
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12-16: Fifth congress of the Polisario front. Boualem Baki, 
the minister of justice represents Algeria.
18-20 : Official visit of Strongal, Head of the Czech 
government •
19: Visit of the French President Mitterand.
22: The Committee of the 7 led by King Hassan arrives in 
Washington. Taleb represents Algeria.
25: Visit to Nouakchott of Prime Minister Abdelghani.
26 : Visit of Arafat.
November 9: The Iraqi president Saddam Husayn stops over at 
Algiers.
10-12: Conference of democrat lawyers in Algiers - theme: 
"Mediterranean: lake of peace".
21-23: Official visit of the Saudi King Falri.
21-24: Official visit of Perreira, President of Cap Vert 
Island s•
December 6: Official visit of the Portugese president, Ramalho 
Eanes.
6-8: Visit of M. Baldridge, US State Secretary for Trade.
7: The Committee of 7 arrives in Pekin.
10: The Committee of 7 in Moscow.
10-17: Official visits of Chadli to Italy, Belgium and a 
stop over at Paris.
20: Visit to Moscow of Premier Abdelghani.
Visit of Major Al Hamidi, member of Libya's 
revolutionary commandment.
24-27: Official visit of Zhao Ziang, President of China's 
State Council.
1983
January, 6: Convention of delimitation of frontiers signed 
between Chadli and Kountche.
17: Message from Chadli to King Fahd.
: Chadli receives the Mauritanian foreign minister Ould 
Mlnih.
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18: Chadli receives Hawatmeh (FPLP) and Habbash (FDPLP) •
19: Official visit of Mugabe, the Prime Minister of 
Zimbabwe•
30: Official visit of Ali Nasser, the South-Yemeni 
president•
February 3: Arafat in Algiers.
Meeting of the Palestinian National Council in 
Algiers •
9: Visit of Taleb Ibrahimi to Cuba.
end of proceedings of the Algerian-Malian commission 
related to the delimitation of the common border.
23: Abdelghani visits Upper Volta, people's republic of 
Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.
Chadli meets King Hassan near the Algerian-Moroccan 
border•
March 6: Second conference of Arab-African youth in Algiers.
18: Visit of Chadli to Tunis and signature of Algerian- 
Tunisian friendship treaty.
April 23: L. Brahimi, special envoy of Chadli in a mission to 
Damascus, Amman and Riad.
May 7: Abdelghani in Teheran.
Chadli receives Boutaleb the Moroccap special envoy.
15: Official visit of President Gemayel' s special envoy. 
Message from Qadhafi to Chadli.
13: Visit of the Italian president Pertini.
21: Meeting of the FLN's Politburo to discuss the Middle 
East crisis.
Visit of A1 Charaa, Syria's assistant minister for 
external affairs.
24: Chadli receives Vernon Walter, the US roving 
Ambassador.
25: Chadli receives Bal y the Tunisian defense minister.
25-27: Yala, the minister of interior in Rabat.
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28: Chadli receives Boutaleb, the Moroccan special 
envoy.
29: Official visit of Bourguiba.
J une 4: Visit of Arafat.
30- 
July 3: Visit of Qadhafi to Rabat.
August 18: Treaty of Oujda signed between King Hassan and 
Qadhafi.
September 9: Visit of French premier Mauroy.
November 26: Message to Chadli from King Khaled.
December 15: Message' to Chadli from Qadhafi.
1984
J anuary 1: Celebration by the FLN of the twentieth anniversary 
of Al- Fatah.
9: Visit of Arafat.
: Meeting between Talen Ibrahimi and Rumsfeld, Reagan's 
special envoy to the Middle East.
19: Official visit of Bourguiba.
Islamic conference in Casablanca.
22: ANP (Algerian people's assembly) ratifies frontier 
convention signed between Algeria and Mauritania as 
well as the adhesion of Mauritania to the treaty of 
friend ship.
23: Important ministerial reshuffle.
31-
February 2: Visit of the US State Secretary for agriculture.
2: Visit of Traore, the Malian president.
28: Mauritania recognizes the RASD (Polisario's 
self-proclaimed republic).
March 11-14: Visit of Iran's foreign minister Dr Velayati.
15: Visit of Relief the Trade Minister to Washington.
21-22: Taleb Ibrahimi visits Teheran, Damascus and Riad .
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April 10: Declaration of the FLN's politburo on the situation 
in the Maghreb,
12: Messages from Chadli to King Husayn and to Qadhafi. 
Message to Senegalese President Diouf.
15-17: Official visit of Olof Palme, Sweden's premier.
16: Visit of Kuwait's foreign minister.
18: Meeting in Algiers of governors of arab banks 
(Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and Saudi Arabia),
19-22: Meeting in Algiers between representatives of 
Palestinian factions.
24-26: Official visit of Chadli to Hungary and Czechoslova­
kia.
29: Meeting in Rabat between representatives of Morocco's 
Istiglal party, Neo Destour and the FLN to celebrate 
the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Tangiers meeting. 
Mehri and Yazid represented Algeria.
May 3: Meeting between Nabi, the Minister of energy and his 
French counterpart, Auroux.
3-7: Official visit of Pakistan's foreign minister.
13: Visit of General Capillon, Chief of Staff of the 
French armed forces.
Official visit of Albert Rene, president of the 
Seychelles.
14-15: Second session in Algiers of the inter-Palestinian 
commission.
15-16: Visit of Messadia to Damascus.
17: Tunisia calls back its high commissioner from 
Tripoli.
26: Visit of C. Nucci, French minister of co-operation 
and development.
28-30: Meeting Nabi-Auroux.
June : Messages from Chadli to Ali Khomeiny carried by Rabah 
Bitat and to Saddam Husayn (by Abdelghani).
September 15: Tripartite meeting at Nouakchott: Ould Daddah, Chadli 
and Traore.
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18: Official visit of President Ali Nasser of South 
Yemen•
19: Visit of the French President Mitterand.
November 4: Visit of the Lebanese president Gemayel . Chadli 
awarded the Lebanese high distinction.
1 1 : Chadli attends the twentieth OAU summit conference 
held at Addis Ababa.
17: Official visit of Honecker, First Secretary of the 
East-German Socialist Party.
24 : Chadli receives message from Mauritania's new ruler 
Ould Taya.
1985
January 4: Visit of Caid Essebssi the Tunisian Foreign Minister.
7-11: Official visit to Greece of Premier A. Brahimi.
8: Visit- of R. Guedira, adviser to King Hassan.
17: Meeting in Tripoli between Messadia, FLN's permanent 
Secretary and the Libyan Premier Jalloud.
2 -25: Visit of the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn 
Abi ul a zi z.
28: Visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi to Tunis.
February 2: Visit of Caid Essebssi.
4-6: Official visit of Turgut Ozal, the Turkish Prime 
Minister.
6-13: Official visit of G1 . Giap, Vietnam's vice- 
president.
9-10: Visit of A. Brahimi to Tunis.
9-12: Talks in Paris between the PS and the FLN•
10-12: Official visit of Ghana's president Rawlings.
11-14: Official visit of King Husayn.
19: Official visit of Chadli to Burkina Faso.
29: Accord Sonatrach - Enagas of Spain.
March 2: Taleb Ibrahimi in Tunis.
563
3: Official visit of the South-Yemeni President Ali 
Nasser•
11: Official visit of Spain's Premier Gonzales.
13: Taleb Ibrahimi visits Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali and
Niger.
14: Meeting between Yala and Guedira.
17-18: Official visit of Chadli to the USA.
19: Official visit of Zhao Ziyang, President of the 
Chinese state council.
25: Official visit of A. Brahimi to Yugoslavia.
May 3: Third Arab meeting on energy held in Algiers. 
Visit of Kountche, President of Niger.
8-15: Official visits of Chadli to Mexico, Cuba and 
Vene z-uel a .
16: Visit of Chadli to Senegal •
24-25: Visit of N'Guessou, President of the People's 
Republic of Congo.
June 10-12: Visit of friendship of Indian Premier Ghandi.
15-16: Landing at the Algiers airport of the US plane 
hijacked by a shi' t extremist group.
23: Visit of Messadia to China.
25: Official visit of Mali's president Traore. 
Visit of French Premier, Fabius.
25-26: Official visit of Sweden's Premier Palme.
July 1-3: Visit of Chadli to Spain.
12-13: Visit of Abdelghani, State Secretary to Bengladesh.
16: President Mitterand receives Khellef, Minister of 
commerce. .
18-20: Twentieth OAU summit conference in Mdis Ababa.
24-25: Visit of the Cuban foreign minister, Malmierca.
30: Signature of an agreement over oil and gas exports 
with Yugoslavia.
564
August 4: Algeria announces its non-participation in the Arab 
summit to be held in Fez.
21: Meeting of the FLN's politburo to discuss the 
"edification of the Maghreb".
25: Visit of Tunisia's foreign minister.
29: Visit of Cuba's foreign minister.
September 2: Visit of Chadli to Tunis.
18: Official visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi to Bonn.
28-30: Visit of M'Zali, the Tunisian premier.
October 2: Meeting FLN's politburo (Israel's raid over PLO's 
base in Tunisia).
10: Visit of Chadli to Tunis.
19-24: Visit of Mauritania's leader Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya.
25-27: Visit of Messadia to Iran.
December 2: Visit of Poland’s president Jaruzelski.
Visit of Senegal's president Diouf.
: Official visit of a Soviet military delegation.
13-14: Visit of Messadia to Moscow.
15: Talks between Chadli and the Chadian President 
Habre.
23-25: Fourth congress of the FLN•
• Death of Ferhat Abbas, the former president of the 
GPRA.
Taleb-Ibrahirai visits Mali and Burkina Faso (border 
conflict)•
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II: THE NINE HISTORIC CHIEFS 
Names
Ait Ahmed, Hocine 
Ben Bella, Ahmed 
Ben Boulaid, Mustafa 
Ben M'Hidi, Larbi 
Boudiaf, Mohamed 
Bitat, Rabah
Didouche, Mourad 
Khider, Mohamed 
Krim, Belkacem
Position in 1985
Opposition, lives abroad
Opposition, lives abroad
Dead in 1956
Dead in 1957
Opposition, lives abroad
President of the Algerian 
people's assembly
Dead in 1955
Assassinated in Madrid in 1967
Assassinated in Frankf urt in
1970
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12: MEMBERS OF THE FIRST CNRA, August 1956
Full Members 1985 position (new incumbents 
onl y)
Abbane, Ramdane Assassinated in Morocco in 1956
Abbas, Ferhat
Ait-Ahmed, Hocine 
Ben Bella, Ahmed
Ben Boulaid, Mustafa
Retired (Dead in December 1985)
Benkhedda, Benyoussef 
Ben M'Hidi, Larbi 
Bitat, Rabah 
Boudiaf, Mohamed
Retired
Dahl ab, Saad Retired
Debaghine, Mohamed-Lamine 
Khider, Mohamed 
Krim, Belkacem
Retired
Madani, Tewfik Dead in 1984
Ouamrane, Amar Retired
Yazid, M'hamed Head, FLN commission 
for solidarity with the 
peoples.
Zighout, Youssef Dead in 1959
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13: First GPRA, September 1958
Names Positions 1985 Status 
(new incumbents 
onl y )
Abbas, Ferhat 
Krim, Belkacem
Ben Bella, Ahmed 
Debaghine, Lamine
Bentobbal, Lakhdar 
Chéri f, Mahmoud 
Boussouf, Abdelhafid
Francis, Ahmed
Yazid, M'hamed 
Benkhedda, Benyoussef
Madani, Tewfik
Mehri, Abdelhamid
Ait-Ahmed, Hocine 
Bitat, Rabah 
Boudiaf, Mohamed 
Khider, Mohamed 
Khene, Lamine
President
Vice-President,
Armed forces
Vice-President
Minister of 
foreign affairs
Minister of interior
Minister of armaments
Minister of General 
Liaisons
Minister of economic 
affairs
Minister of information
Minister of social 
affairs
Minister of cultural 
affairs
Minister of North Ambassador,
African affairs Paris
Minister of state
Minister of state
Minister of state
Minister of state
Secretary of state Secretary-
General ,
UNIDO
Retired 
Head, SNS 
Retired
Dead
Dead
Oussedick, Onar Secretary of state Retired
Stambouli, Mustafa Secretary of state Dead in 1984
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Second GPRA, January 1960
Abbas, Ferhat President
Krim, Belkacem Vice-President, 
External affairs
Ben Bella, Ahmed Vice-President
Bentobbal , Lakhdar Minister of interior
Boussouf, Abdelhafid Minister of armaments
Francis, Ahmed Minister of economic 
affairs
Mehri, Abdelhamid Minister of social 
and cultural affairs
Yazid , M*hamed Minister of information
Ait-Ahmed , Hocine Minister of state
Bitat, Rabah Minister of state
Boudiaf, Mohamed Minister of state
Khider, Mohamed Minister of state
Mohammedi, Said
Third GPRA, August 1961
Minister of state
Benkhedda, Benyoussef President
Krim, Belkacem Vice-President, Interior
Ben Bella, Ahmed Vice-President
Dahlab, Saad Minister of foreign 
affairs
Boussouf, Abdelhafid Minister of armaments
Yazid, M'hamed Minister of information
Ait-Ahmed, Hocine Minister of state
Bitat, Rabah Minister of state
Boudiaf, Mohamed Minister of state
Khider, Mohamed Minister of state
Mohammedi, Said Minister of state
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14: ALGERIAN GOVERNMENTS 1962-1984 
1 • MEMBERS OF BEN BELLA'S THREE GOVERNMENTS 
A. First cabinet, September 1962
Names Cabinet Post 1935 Position
(new incumbents only)
Bentoumi , Amar Justice Lawyer
Med eg hr i , Ahmed Interior Dead (1974)
Khemisti, Mohamed Foreign Affairs Dead (1963)
Francis, Ahmed Finance
Ouzegane , Amar Agriculture Dead ( 1980)
Khobzi , Mohamed Commerce Merchant
Khelifa, Laroussi Industry-Energy Civil Servant
Boumendjel, Ahmed Reconstruction, 
Public works Retired
Bounaza, Bachir Work & Social 
Af fairs Retired
Benhamida,
Abderr ahmare Ed ucation
Nekkache, Mohamed Health Medecine practice
Mohammed , Said War Veterans
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Youth & Sports Lives abroad
Madani, Tewfik Religions
foundations
Hadj Hamou, Mohamed Information Lawyer
Hassani , Mohamed Post and 
Telecommuni­
cations
Retired
B. Ben Bella's Second Government (September 1963)
Names Position
Ben Bella, Ahmed President
Boumedienne, Houari Defense
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Mohammedi, Said Vice-President
Ouzegane, Amar Minister of State
Hadj Smain, Mohamed Justice Retired
Medeghri, Ahmed Interior
Bouteflika, Foreign
Abdellazi z Affairs
Boumaza, Bachir Economy
Mahsas, Ahmed Agricul ture Opposition 
Lives in Paris
Boumend jel, Ahmed Reconstr uction Retired
Nekkache, Mohamed Social Affairs
Chérif, Belkacem National
Orientation
Lives abroad
Madani, Tewfik Religious
Foundations
Zaibeck, Abdelkader Posts and
Telecommunic-
cations
Deputy
Kaid, Ahmed Tourism Dead
Batel, Said Under Secretary, 
Youth & Sports
Public accountant
C. Ben Bella's Third Government (December• 1964)
Names Position
Ben Bella, Ahmed President
Boumedienne, Houari Vice-President 
and Defense
Mohammedi, Said Vice-President
Cherif, Belkacem Ed ucation
Cherif, Abderahmaue Minister delegated
to presidency Retired
Bedjaoui, Mohamed Justice Judge at the Hague
Court of Justice
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Foreign Affairs
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Mahsas, Ahmned Agricul ture
Dellici , Nourredine Commerce Ambassador
Boumaza, Bachir Industry and 
Energy
Hadj Smain, Mohamed Reconstruction 
and Housing
Boudissa, Safi Work
Ne kkache , Mohamed Health, War 
Veterans
Batel, Sadek Youth & Sports
Heddam, Ted j ini Religions
Foundations
Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia
Zaibeck, Abdel kader Posts and 
Telecommunic­
ations
Amrani, Said Administrative 
Re form
Ouzegane , Amar Tourism
Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed Undersecretary 
for Public Works
Ambassador to 
Belgium
2. BOUMEDIENNE’S GOVERNMENTS
A. First Government, July 1965
President, Defense Minister Colonel Houari Boumedienne
Secretary of State Rabah Bitat
Foreign Affairs Abdel a zi z Bouteflika
Interior Ahmed Medeghri
Agriculture Ahmed Mahsas
War Veterans Boualem Benhammouda
Commerce Nourredine Delleci
National Education Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi
Finance Ahmed Kaid
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Housing & Reconstruction 
Religious Affairs 
Information & Culture 
Youth & Sports 
Justice
Posts & Telecommunications
Health
Touri sm
Work
B. Second Government, April 1977
Head of State, Defense Secretary
Ministej— Adviser to the President
Minister to Presidency in charge 
of religious affairs
Interior
Agriculture and agrarian 
re form
War Veterans 
Commerce
Energy & petrochemicals
Fundamental and secondary 
ed ucation
Higher education and 
scientific research
Water works, environment 
& forests
Finance
Housing & construction 
Light industries 
Heavy industry
El-hadi Hadj Smain 
Belaid Abdesslam 
Bachir Boumaza 
Abdel krim Benmahmoud 
Mohamed Bedjaoui 
Abdelkader Zaibeck 
Tedj ini Haddam 
Abdelaziz Maoui 
Aldelaziz Zerdani
Houari Bounedienne
Mouloud Kassim
Colonel Ahmed Abdelghani
Larbi Tayebi 
Mohamed Said Mazouzi 
M'hamed Hadj Yala 
Sid-Ahmed Ghozali
Mostafa Lacheraf
Abdellatif Rahal
Colonel Ahmed Bene her if 
Mohamed-Seddick Benyahia 
Lt.Colonel Mohamed Aouchiche 
Belaid Abdeslam 
Mohamed Liassine
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Information and culture 
Youth & Sports 
Justice
Posts Si Telecommunications
He al th
Tourism
Transports
Work and professional 
formation
Public Works
State Secretary for 
planification
Secretary General to 
the Government
Red ha Malek 
Djamel Houhou 
Abdelmalek Benhabyles 
Colonel Mohamed Zerguini 
Said Ait-Messaoudene 
Abdelghani Akbi 
Colonel Ahmed Dr ai a
Mohamed Amir 
Boualem Benhammouda
Abdellah Kamel Khodja
Smail Hamdani
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3. MEMBERS OF CHADLI•S THREE GOVERNMENTS
First government: March 8, 1979.
Abdel ghani, Ahmed Benahmed Prime Minister and Interior
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Adviser to the President
Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb Adviser to the President
Benhabyles, Abdelmalek Secretary-General of
Presidency
Benyahia, Mohamed-Seddick Foreign affairs
Saadi, Salim Agriculture
Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed Water Works
Ghazali, Ahmed Ali Public Works
•Nabi, Belkacem Energy and petro­
chemical industries
Ait-Messaoudene, Said Light industries
Liassine, Mohamed Heavy industry
Yala, M'hamed Hadj Finance
Brahimi, Abdelhamid Planning
Bouhara, Abderrazack Health
Brerhi, Abdelhak Higher education.
Kharroubi, Mohamed-Cherif Education
Oumeziane, Mouloud Labour
Akbi , Abielghani Commerce
Zerguini, Mohamed Posts and tele-
communications
Aouchiche, Abdelmadjid Housing and construction
Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif War Veterans
Baki, Boualem Religious affairs
Houhou, Djamel Sports
Goudjil, Sal ah Transport
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Soufi , Lahcen Justice
Mehri, Abdelhamid Information and culture
Houhat, Ahmed State Secretary for
fisheries
Brahmia, Brahim State Secretary for forests
Allahoum, Abdelmajid Tourism
Hamdani, Smail Secretary-General to
government
Second government: July 15, 1980 
Abdelghani, Ahmed Prime Minister
Lt «Col•Belkheir, Larbi Secretary-General to the 
presidency
Ibrahimi , Ahmed Taleb Foreign affairs
Saadi, Salim Agricul ture
Yala, M'hamed Interior
Baki, Boualem Justice
Ait Messaoudene, Said Light industries
Allahoum, Abdelmadjid Tourism
Goudjil, Sal ah Transports and fishing
Bouhara, Abderrazak Health
Oumeziane, Mouloud Labour
Ghazali, Ahmed Al i Housing and urbanism
Kherroubi, Mohamed Cherif Ed ucation
Brer hi, Abdel hak Teaching and scientific
research
Brahimi, Brahim Energy and petro­
chemical industries
Brahimi, Abdelhamid Planning and territorial 
improvements
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Bakhti Nemiche, Djelloul War Veterans
Bessaiah, Boualem Information
Khellef, Abdelaziz Commerce
Kasdi, Merbah Heavy industry
Rouis, Bachir Posts and tele-
communications
Bekka, Abdenour Youth and sports
Kortebi, Mohamed Public works
Chi bane , Abderrahmane Religious affairs
Nabi , Mohamed Professional formation
Meziane, Abdelmadjid Culture
Secretaries of state
Rouighi , Mohamed Forest and agricultural 
development
Benfreha, Ahmed Fishing and maritime
transport
Quid Khelifa, Larbi Secondary and technical
ed ucation
Khatib, Djelloul Civil service and 
administrative reform
Oubouzar, Ali Foreign trade
Mne Ounissi, Zhour Social affairs
Third  government: December, 1983 
Brahimi, Abdelhamid Prime M in is te r
Abde lghan i,  Mohamed ben Ahmed M in is te r  o f  s t a t e  t o  the 
p re s id en cy
Ib rah im i,  Ahmed-Taleb F ore ign  a f f a i r s
Y a la ,  M* hammed Hadj I n t e r i o r
Ben Hammouda, Boualem Finance
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Baki, Boualem 
Mer bah, Kasdi 
Rouis, Bachir 
Bessaiah, Boualem
Goudjil, Salah 
Nabi , Belkacem
Saadi, Selim 
Messaouii, Zitouni 
Rouighi , Mohamed
Khellef, Abdelaziz 
Kharroubi , Mohamed-Cherif 
Brer hi, Abdel hak 
Nabi, Mohamed
Bouchama, Kamel 
Houhou, Djamel-Eddine 
Ounissi, Zhor, Mme. 
Benfreha, Ahmed 
Bakhti Nemiche, Djelloul 
Belayat, Abderahmane 
Chibane, Abderahmane 
Meziane, Abdelmadjid 
Oubouzar, Ali 
Deputy ministers:
Benzaza, Mostafa 
Ettayeb, Leila, Mne.
Justice 
Agriculture 
Information 
Posts and tele­
communications 
Transport
Energy and petrochemical 
industries
Heavy industry
Light industry
Irrigation, environment and 
forests
Commerce
National education 
Higher education 
Labour and professional 
training
Youth and sports 
Heal th
Social protection 
Public works 
War Veterans 
Construction and housing 
Religious affairs 
Culture and tourism 
Planning
Fisheries
Secondary and technical
ed ucation
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Harbi , Noureddine Co-operation
Aber kane , Mohamed Foreign trade
Mazouni , Mohamed Mechanical, electric and 
electronic industries
Isli , Mohamed-Are zki Building materials
Bel kaid , Abubakr Construction
Abbdellaoui, Aissa Environment and forestry
Ben amar, Mostafa Budget and public property
Men tour i , Mohamed-Salah Sports
Hocine, Had j Chemical and petrochemical 
industries
Azzouz, Amar Labour
Sakfali, Zi ne al abidine Tourism
Nourani , Abdelmalek Urban planning
Hararouche Mouloud Secretary-General of the 
Government
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15: COUNCIL OF REVOLUTION, July 1965
Names Position 1985 status
Abdelghani, Ahmed 
Banharaed , Colonel
Head, fourth
military region State Secretary
Abid, Said, Colonel Head, first
military region Dead, December 1967
Belhouchet, Abdallah, Head, fifth
Colonel military region ANP's inspector
Bencherif, Ahmed,
Colonel Head , Gendarmerie Retired
Bendjeddid, Chadli, Head, second
Colonel military region Head of State
Benhaddou, Othman,
Colonel Co-ordinateur ,FLN Dead, 1977.
Bensalem, Abderrahmane, Commander of
Major national navy Dead
Boubnider, Salah, 
Colonel Retired
Boudjenane, Ahmed, Member, General
Major Staff Dead, 1968
Boixtiedienne, Houari ,
Colonel
Boumaza, Bachir Minister of
national economy
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Minster of foreign
affairs
Chabou, Mourlay Abdel- Secretar y-General,
Kader, Colonel Ministry of Dead, 1971
Defense
Cherif, Belkacem Minister of na
Draia, Ahmed, Colonel Head of police 
security Retired
Kaid , Ahmed 
Khatib, Youssef
Minister of finance
Retired
Mahsas, Ahmed Minister of 
agriculture
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Medeghri, Ahmed
Mend jel i , Ali
Mohammedi, Saad, 
Colonel
Minister of interior
Ould - Had j , Mohand , 
Colonel Dead, 1972
Soufi , Salah Head of third
military region Dead, 1975
Tayebi , Larbi Retired
Yahaoui , Mohamed- 
Salah. Colone1 Retired
Zbiri, Tahar, Colonel Chief of Staff Retired
581
16: MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE FLN 1962-1984
First Political Bureau, August 1962
Names 1985 status 
(new incumbents only)
Ben Allah, Hadj 
Ben Bella, Ahmed 
Bitat, Rabah 
Khider, Mohamed
Retired
Mohammedi, Said
Second Political Bureau, April 1964
Names Current Position
Ait A1 Hocine Deputy Retired
Ben Allah, Hadj Vice-President, 
Assembl y
Ben Bella, Ahmed President
Benmahijoub, Omar Deputy Retired
Boumedienne, Houari Defense Minister
Boumaza, Bachir Minister of Economy
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Chaabani, Mohamed Head, fifth military
region Executed in 1964
Khatib, Youssef Deputy Secretary of State
Mahsas, Ahmed Minister of Retired lives 
Agriculture abroad
Medeghri, Ahmed Minister of Interior
Mendjli, Ali Vice-President,
Assembly Retired
Ould Hadj, Mohand De ail, 1972
Nekkache, Mohamed-Se g hi r Minister of Social
Affairs
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Zahouane, Hocine Re tired
Zbiri, Tahar Chief of Staff
Political Bureau, February 1979
Abdelghani, Ahmed Prime Minister, 
Minister of Interior
Abdeslam, Belaid Head, FLN commission
Affane Guezzane, 
Djill ali
Amir, Mohamed Retired
Belhouchet, Abdallah Vice-Minister of 
Defense
Bencherif, Ahmed Head, FLN commission
Bend j eddid , Chad 1i •President
Benhammouda, Boualem
Benyahia, Mohamed Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bitat, Rabah President, National Assembly
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz Mviser to President
Draia, Ahmed
Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb Aiviser to President
Mazouzi, Mohamed Head, FLN commission Retired
Merbah, Kasdi Head, military security
Tayebi, Larbi
Yahaoui, M-S FLN1 s ' co-ordinateur '
Political Bureau, June 1980
Belhouchet, Abdallah
Bendjeddid, Chadli
Benhammouda, Boualem Minister of Interior
Bitat, Rabah
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz
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Mazouzi , Mohamed 
Yahaoui , Mohamed-Salah
Political Bureau, June 1981
Abdelghani, Ahmed Prime Minister
Baki , Boualera Minister of religious 
affairs
Belhouchet, Abdallah 
Bendjeddid, Chadli 
Benhammouda, Abdallah
Benyahia, Mohamed Seddick 
Bitat, Rabah
Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif Minister of war veterans
Yala, Hadj M'hamed Minister of finance
Political Bureau, December 1983 
Full members
Abdelghani, Ahmed State Secretary
Baki , Boualem Minister of Justice
Belhouchet, Abdallah 
Benjeddid, Chadli
Army's Inspector
Benhammouda, Boualem 
Bitat, Rabah
Minister of Finance
Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Messadia, Mohamed- 
Cheri f
Head, FLN 'secretariat 
permanent'
Yala, Hadj M'hamed 
Alternate Members
Minister of Interior
Benloucif, Mostafa 
General Major Chief of Staff
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Benyelles, Rashid, 
General
Brahimi, Abdelhamid 
Merbah, Kasdi 
Rouis, Bachir
Secretary-Gener al, 
Ministry of defense
Prime Minister
Minister of agriculture
Minister of information
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PRESIDENTS
Ben Bella, Ahmed:
Born in Marnia near the Moroccan border in 1919. Son of a small 
shop-keeper. Primary education received in French in his native 
town. A passionate for football, played for local teams and was a 
trainee at the Olympic club of Marseilles. During the Second World 
War, he served in the French army and participated in the Italy 
campaigns where he gained numerous distinctions for his bravery and 
courage. After the war, he returned home and militated in the PPA 
and was a founding member of its "organisation speciale" (OS) and then 
its President. Arrested in 1950 for masterminding the hold-up of the 
central post-office in Oran. Escaped the same year and fled to
Egypt. He was a founding member of the FLN and an active element of 
its external delegation (1954-1956). At Cairo he cultivated close 
relations with Colonel Nasser. Arrested in August 1956 after the 
hijacking of the plane carrying him with other FLN leaders from Rabat 
to Tunis. Remained in prison in France until the March 1962
cease-fire. Allied himself with the Boumedienne-led General Staff
against the authority of the GPRA, a matter that enabled him to become 
the first Prime Minister of independent Algeria and then her first 
President until June 19, 1965 when he was toppled from power by his
defense minister. Colonel Boumedienne. In prison in secret
confinement until 1980. Married in prison to a journalist and
adopted two children. Remained in house arrest until 1981, since 
then he lived in self-exile in Switzerland and France and became the 
President of an Arab-sponsored league of hunan rights based in London. 
Turned to Muslim fundamentalism and is currently heading an opposition
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movement to President Chadli, the MDNA. In December 1985, he and
Ait-Ahmed issued in London a political programme for a united 
opposition front.
Boumed ienne, Houari:
Born (probably on August 23, 1932) in Heliopolies, near Guelma,
Eastern Algeria of a poor family of peasants. His real name is Mohamed 
Boukharrouba. He went to French primary school in Guelma and then to 
Koranic school of the Kettania. In 1952 he left Algeria to avoid 
being drafted into the French army for military service and went to 
Tunis and then to Cairo where he attended the A1 Azhar University. 
After the outbreak of the insurrection he came in contact with the FLN 
external delegation and underwent training at the military academy of 
El Helwan. In 1955 at the age of 23 he joined the maquis of Wilaya V 
in Western Algeria. His organization skills, firmness and authoritari­
anism helped him to become assistant to Colonel Boussouf, the 
commander of Wilaya V whom he replaced in October 1957. He became a 
colonel shortly after, and in September 1958 was named commander of 
the COM western branch. In February 1960 he was appointed the Head 
of the General Staff of the entire ALN with headquarters at Ghardimaou 
in Tunisia. There he forged a strong military basis and power and
was able to challenge the authority of the GPRA whom he disliked the 
political moderation and the policy of compromise in the negotiations 
with the French government. After resisting the orders of the GPRA 
President Benkhedda to dismiss him from the ALN and dismantle the 
General staff, he joined Ben Bella in a tactical alliance. Appointed 
defense minister in the first government formed in September 1963,
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first vice-president as well a year later and a member of the FLN PB 
in April 1964. Masterminded the process of the modernization of the 
Algerian army and decisively helped Ben Bella to eliminate potential 
military and political opposition to his regime. He succeeded in 
overthrowing Ben Bella through a well organized and a bloodless coup 
on June 19, 1965 and held the function of President of the council of 
revolution, Head of State and of the Council of Ministers, Minister of 
Defense and Chief of Staff. Elected President in December 1976. 
Died in December 1978 of a rare blood disease.
Bendjedid, Chadli:
Born March 14, 1929 in Bouteldja a small village near Annaba, Eastern
Algeria, of a relatively well-off family of wheat peasants. After 
attending French primary school, he held several modest jobs. Joined 
the maquis in 1955 at the age of 26 and fought in Wilaya I (Aures) . In 
1960, he received the grade of Captain and became Head of the 13th 
battallion of the ALN external army based in Tunisia and then Deputy 
Head of the operational commandment. Northern regiop. During the 
1962 summer crisis he supported the Boumedienne-led General Staff 
against the GPRA's leadership. Appointed head of the military region 
of Constantine in 1963 and then of Oran a year later. He became 
member of the council of revolution after the June 1965 coup retaining 
the commandment of the Oran military region and in 1969 he was 
promoted to the grade of Colonel. After the death of Boumedienne he 
was the army's candidate for the presidency. Elected on February 7,
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1979 and re-elected in December 1983. At the same time he has been 
the Secretary General of the FLN and the de-facto Minister of 
Defense .
FOREIGN MINISTERS
Khemi sti, Mohamed i
Born in Marnia, Western Algeria. He was orphaned and later nursed by 
Ben Bella's mother. At the outbreak of the war he was a student and 
became one of the metropolitan leaders of the UGEMA. He served as 
directeur de cabinet to M. Fares the President of the "executif 
provisoire" 1960-1962. After independence he was named Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, a post he held until April 11, 1963 when he was shot, 
victim of a crime of passion.
Bouteflika, Abdelazizi
Born, March 2, 1937 in Oujda, Morocco. Son of a turkish bath owner.
After the strike called by the UGEMA, in 1956, dropped his studies at 
a secondary school and joined the ALN, Wilaya V. There he became a 
close assistant to Boumedienne then commander of this wilaya, and 
obtained the grade of major under the nickname of Si Abdel kader A1 
Mali in connection with his supervision of military operations of the 
ALN in the Sahara along the borders with Mali. With Major Slimane 
(Kaid Ahmed), Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem and Tayebi Larbi they came to 
form what was then called the "group of Oujda" extremely loyal to 
Boumedienne. When Boumedienne moved to the Ghardimaou headquarters 
of the General Staff in 1959, Bouteflika went with him, therefore
cementing a close friendship During the GPRA’s negotiations with
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the French government, he served as Boumedienne1 s special envoy to Ben 
Bella and other FLN leaders imprisoned in France. In the first
government formed by Ben Bella in September 1962, he was appointed 
Minister of youth and sports thanks to Boumedienne. He became
Minister of foreign affairs, after the death of Khemisti in April
1963. As a member of the Oujda clan and a Boumedienne protegee he 
came into conflict with Ben Bella who attempted to have an ascendancy 
on the conduct of Algerian foreign policy. Ben Bella's decision to 
oust Bouteflika from government in late 1964 was one of the major 
reasons of the Boumedienne-led coup of June 19, 1965. Since then
Bouteflika was made a member of the council of revolution and has held 
the foreign minister portfolio until February 1979. The death of 
Boumedienne led to his demotion to the formal post of adviser to 
President Chadli (February 1979-December 1980) and to political 
disgrace as he was dismissed from the FLN political bureau and 
suspended from the Central Committee in 1981. He has lived since in a 
self exile in Switzerland avoiding trial for misuse of funds. 
Apparently retired and has been involved in no political opposition, 
suffering from a kidney disease.
Benyahia, Mohamed-Seddick:
Born January 3, 1932 in Jijel of a socially modest family. Graduated 
in Law from the University of Algiers. In 1955 he became president
of the Algiers section of the UGEMA and a year later he was elected 
alternate member of the CNRA set up by the FLN Summam congress. 
Secretar y-General of the GPRA 1958-1962, participated in the Melun and 
Evian negotiations and in numerous international conferences as an FLN
590
representative, notably to the United Nations along with Yazid and 
Chanderli. Ambassador to Moscow (1963-1965), London ( 1965), and
after the June 1965 coup he held successively ministerial posts of 
information and culture (1966-1970), higher education ( 1970-1977), 
finance (1977-1979) and lastly foreign affairs until his death on May 
3, 1982, while in a mediation mission between Iraq and Iran*
Tale b-1br a himi, Ahmed:
Born in 1932 near Setif in Western Algeria in a well-off arabic- 
educated family. His father Bachir was the president of the Ulama 
association. Brought up in Tlemcen in an intellectual and bourgeois 
milieu and received a doctorate conciling between medicine and arabic 
literature. President of the UGEMA until his arrest in 1957 for
nationalist activities he remained in prison in Fresnes, in France, 
until the independence of Algeria. Imprisoned by Ben Bella for two 
years because of his opposition to revolutionary socialism. After 
the June 1965 coup he was put in charge of the ministries of national 
education ( 1966-1970), information and culture ( 1970-1977) and then 
adviser to the Presidents Boumedienne (1977-1978) and Chadli
(1979-1982). Minister of foreign affairs since the death of Benyahia 
and a member of the FLN politburo.
TOP POLITICIANS 
Abdelghani, Ahmed Benahmedi
Born March 27, 1927 in Ghazaouet, Western Algeria. Became member of 
the PPA at the age of 16, arrested in 1945 for nationalist activities 
and liberated a year later. Served in French armed forces before
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joining the raaquis in 1955, Wilaya V under the Commandment of 
Boumedienne. After Algeria's independence he was put in charge of 
the first military region, Algiers 1962-1964 and then of a battallion 
in Western Algeria, where he led a dissent movement of ex-maquisards 
against Ben Bella's authority. Arrested in April 1964 and condemned 
to death but was pardoned by Boumedienne. After the coup, he was made 
a member of the council of revolution, commander of the fourth 
military region, Ouargla (1965-1967), President revolutionary court, 
Oran (1969). Promoted Colonel (June 1969) while in charge of the
fifth military region, Constantine until 1974 when he replaced 
Medeghri as minister of interior. Believed extremely ambitious, he 
came into rivalry with President Boumedienne and then Chadli. In 
February 1979, he became a member of the Politburo and at the same 
time Prime Minister in charge of the Heme Office. In 1981, he was 
outstripped of this ministerial portfolio and in December 1983 he was 
demoted to the post of state secretary.
Bencherif, Ahmed i
Born April 25, 1927 at Djelfa in the Central high plains. He was a
sergeant in the French army and attended officers school at Saint 
Maixemet in France. In 1957, when as a second lieutenant stationed at 
Cherchell, he was arrested for providing arms to the ALN. In July 
1957 he defected from the French army and joined the Wilaya IV and in 
July 1960 became commander of this wilaya and a member of the CNRA. 
In October 1960, he was captured and condemned to death but escaped 
execution after the intervention of the international Red Cross. He
remained in prison until March 1962 and went to Wilaya VI, gaining the
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rank of Colonel. On September 17, 1962 he became Head of the
Gendarmerie until 1977 when he was demoted to the minor ministerial 
post of environment following his opposition to the agrarian 
revolution enacted by Boumedienne. After the latter's death he was a 
potential contender for the presidency along with remaining members 
of the council of revolution. However lacking sufficient support he 
backed Bouteflika against Yahaoui the FLN's strongman. Member of the 
FLN political bureau (March 1979) and head of the party's commission 
for youth and sports. Removed from the party in 1981 being accused of 
embezzlement and corruption, but the charges were dropped. Retired 
from politics. A powerful figure in the army until his disgrace in 
1977. Considered a moderate and close to Bouteflika.
Cherif, Belkacem:
Born July 31, 1933 at Beni Mellal , Morocco, of a bourgeois family. 
He attended French schools and university in Morocco. He joined the 
maquis (Wilaya V) after UGEMA's strike in 1956. He became head of 
the General Staff, western branch and a close aide of Boumedienne. 
He was elected to the National Assembly in September 1962 and a year 
later he was appointed minister of national orientation. He was
demoted to minister of education in December 1964 as a result of Ben 
Bella's efforts to undermine the Boumedienne clan. After the June 1965 
coup he was named co-ordlnater of the FLN Executive Secretariat and 
remained in that post until pecember 1967. In March 1968 he was put 
in charge of the ministry of finance. Increasing disonances with 
Boumedienne led to his disgrace as he was demoted to the honorific
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post of State Secretary in July 1970. He was forced to resign in 
1975 and leave the country after indiscretions related to his private 
life. Regarded as a moderate.
Praia, Ahmed:
Born May 10, 1929 at Souk Ahras in Eastern Algeria. He joined the ALN 
early in the war and was involved in the plot against the GPRA in 
1958. After serving a two year prison sentence, he was charged to 
help a maquis in Southwestern Algeria. After independence he
commanded the ANP forces in that area and in September 1963 he 
integrated the national security forces, becaning its Head in March
1965. After the coup d ' Etat he was made a member of the council of 
revolution, retaining his hold over the national security until 1977 
when he was demoted to the ministerial office of transports. He was 
made a member of the FLN politburo in February 1979 but was soon 
removed from the party organs shortly after alongside the other 
"barons of the ancient regime". Retired from active politics but 
believed to have retained a substantial influence within the Army and 
the national security forces (police), notably among radical officers 
of Eastern Algerian origin.
Kaid, Ahmed (alias Major Slimane);
Born March 17, 1927 in Tiaret of wealthy landowner parents. He
attended French school in his native town, the French military school 
at Hussein-Dey in Algiers. He militated in Ferhat Abbas's UDMA but 
joined the FLN immediately after the outbreak of the insurrection.
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He became a member of the General Staff, western branch and then 
assistant chief of staff of the ALN. Being close to Boumedienne he 
supported the Tlemcen group against the GPRA during the 1962 summer 
crisis. He was elected to the national assembly in September 1962 
and a year later he was named minister of tourism but was forced to 
resign by Ben Bella in December 1964. He was elected a member of the 
FLN central committee in April 1964 as a Boumedienne 'protege'. 
After the coup, he was made a member of the Revolutionary Council and 
put in charge of the ministry of finance until December 1967 when he 
was appointed head of the FLN. In 1972 he was forced to resign
because of his opposition to Boumedienne' s socialist policies, notably 
the agrarian revolution, as he was believed to represent the class of 
big landowners. He died in exile in Morocco in 1976 after leading a 
kind of opposition to Boumedienne. Regarded a moderate, close to 
conservative middle classes.
Medeghri, Ahmed i
Born July 23, 1934 in Saida, Western Algeria. He was a teacher there 
until the war broke out. He joined the maquis, and fought in Wilaya 
V where he came to cultivate close ties with Boumedienne and attained 
the rank of major. After independence, he served for a short time as
wali of Tlemcen and then in September 1962 he was elected to the 
national assembly and named minister of interior thanks to 
Boumodienne. He was also elected to the FLN politburo. He resigned 
from the interior ministry in July 1964 in protest at Ben Bella's 
efforts of concentrating executive powers. After the coup of June
1965, he was made a member of the council of revolution and named
again minister of interior, a post he held until his mysterious death 
in 1974. A powerful minister and chief architect of the administra­
tive and constitutional organization of the Algerian state. Believed 
to have challenged Boumedienne's authority. He was considered a 
moderate and a close friend of Bouteflika.
Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif:
Born in 1930 in Souk-Ahras of a modest family. Joined maqui s early 
and fought alongside the Tunisian border, attaining the rank of 
Captain. He was involved in the 1958 plot of the colonels against
the GPRA. Like Draia, he was sent to Southern Algeria to organize a
maqui s there, having benefited from Boumedienne's grace. After 
independence, he became an FLN official (commissaire national) but was 
expelled from the party because of his opposition to Ben Bella. 
After the June 1965 coup, he reintegrated the party and was put in 
charge of its information department. In 1974 he was elevated to the 
unofficial post of Head of the FLN, a charge he held until 1977. In 
February 1979 he became a member of the newly formed oentral committee 
and named minister of war veterans. In December 1983 he became Head 
of the permanent secretariat of the FLN1 s central committee and the de 
facto assistant Secretary General of the party. A panarabist, close 
to radical officers of Eastern Algeria origin.
Nekkache, Mohamed-Seqhlri
Born in the Tlemcen region, Western Algeria. Trained as a doctor and 
joined the FLN after the war broke out. After independence, he became 
close to Ben Bella and was named minister of health (September 1962),
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social affairs (September 1963) and health, social affairs, war 
veterans (December 1964). Elected to the political bureau in April 
1964, He was arrested, during the coup of June 1965 and remained in 
prison until November 1968. Since then he practiced medicine in Oran. 
He was arrested in 1983 following charges of supporting Ben Bella's 
opposition movement and accused of detaining illegal arms. Released 
shortly after but was put before trial in December 1985 for the same 
charges. He was, however, relaxed. He is considered extremely 
loyal to Ben Bella.
Rouis, Bachir;
Born February 2, 1940 in Medea, Central Algeria. He joined the
maquis in 1956 and fought in Wilaya IV. ANP officer 1962-1967 in 
Oran military region (1962-1967) and chef de Cabinet of its Commander, 
Chadli. Gener al-Director Ministry of agriculture in charge of a 
national enterprise, Onalait. Elected Deputy 1977, Secretary of the 
Blida Muhafada 1981? Minister of posts (1981), information 1983 and 
alternate member. Political Bureau. A moderate, attached to the basic 
principles of the Algerian revolution
Yahaoui, Mohamed-Salah:
Born in 1932 in Barika, Aures region. Educated Koranic school; 
joined maquis in 1955 and fought in Wilaya I where he alternated 
guerrilla operations with political activities, in his role of 
political Commissar. Delegate of the ANP to the FLN congress, April 
1964, and member of its central committee. Member of the council of
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revolution and Head of the third military region 1965-1969, Director 
of the Cherchell military academy until November 1977 when he was 
nominated the FLN 'co-ordinateur' . Promoted Colonel in 1970.
Potential candidate to the presidency after the death of Boumedienne. 
Deputy Head of the FLN and member of the political bureau until 1981 
when he was removed from active politics because of his challenge to 
President Chadli • Retired from politics but believed to have
retained a substantial influence in military and party circles, 
particularly among officers and militants of Eastern Algeria origin. 
A convinced Boumediennist, a socialist hardline and close to the 
Panarabist core.
HIGH OFFICERS:
Allahoum, Abdelmadjld (Major) i
Born February 3, 1934 in M'sila, Eastern Algeria. Militant FLN 
•federation de France' (FFLN) 1956-1958, ALN officer 1958-1962, 
Director military education and schools 1963-1965. Head protocole of 
presidency 1966-1977, Secretary General of presidency 1977-1979. 
Graduate, political science institute, Algiers. Member FLN central 
committee and minister of tourism 1979-1981, Ambassador to Moscow 
since 1983.
Attailia, Mohammed (General);
Born in Guelma, Eastern Algeria. Fought in Wilaya I and lost an arm. 
ANP officer, Deputy commander, fifth military region Constantine. In 
1974, he was put in charge of the first military region (Blida).
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Promoted General in 1984. He successfully resisted the efforts of 
Chadli to wreck his military fiefdom. A powerful figure in the ANP 
and a hardliner with however a limited political credo being committed 
to the basic principles of the Algerian revolution.
Bouhara, Abdulrazack (Lieutenant-Colonel) :
Born December 1, 1934. ALN officer 1956-1962. After independence 
served in ANP batallion. Military attache, Paris, 1965; Commander
of an ANP brigade in post over Suez during the 1967 Arabo-1srae 1 i war; 
military attache Moscow (1968-1970), Ambassador to Hanoi (1968-1970), 
promoted Lt. Colonel (1974), Wali of Algiers (1970-1975), President 
FLN commission 1978, member of central committee, minister of health 
(1979-1981), Head FLN commission for external affairs since 1982. A 
radical
Belhoucchet, Abdullah (Colonel) :
Born June 1, 1924 at M'Daourouch near Sedrata, Eastern Algeria. He
was a Sergeant in the French army be fore joining the maquis and
fighting in Wilayat I and II. In 1958, he was involved in the
■conspiracy of the colonels' against the GPRA and like Draia and 
Messadia was arrested in January 1959 by the Tunisian army at the 
request of the ALN. Released from prison in October 1960, he joined 
Bouteflika in the maquis along the Mali border and then became 
Commander of that maquis. • In the 1962 summer crisis he sided with 
the Tlemcen group as a supporter of Boumedienne. After independence 
he was put in charge of the commando school at the Cherchell military 
academy and in 1963 he wa3 named head of the FLN federation in the
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Saoura department. In June 1964, he was appointed commander of the 
fifth military region (Constantine). After the coup, he was made a 
member of the council of revolution and in December 1967 he became 
commander of the first military region (Blida). He was loyal to 
Boumedienne. Member of the FLN politburo since February 1979 being 
at the same time inspector general of the array. His authority has 
declined in recent years, but remains a symbol of the spirit of 
ex-maqui sard.
Chabou, Abdelkader (Colonel):
Born in 1924 of a rich family of Western Algeria. He attended French 
schools and passed his A levels and then went on to the French army 
cavalry school at Bou-Saada. With the rank of major, he deserted the 
French army in 1958 and joined the ALN in Morocco. After independ­
ence, he was named Chef de Cabinet of the ministry of defence, a post 
he held until 197 1 when he died in a plane crash in the Algerian 
desert. A skilful strategist and very close to Boumedienne.
Hoffman, Slimane (Major);
Served in the French army and graduated from Saint Cyr military 
academy. He deserted the French army in 1961 and joined the maquis 
where he won Boumedienne's confidence. After independence ha became 
commander of the Tank officers. He helped Boumedienne carry out the 
coup of June 1965 and successfully prevented the march of armoured 
division towards the capital during the attempted coup of Tahar Zbiri 
in December 1967. In 1969 he was named wall of Algiers. In 1979, 
he was elected to the FLN Central Committee and was put in charge of
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its department of external affairs until 1983. A highly trained 
officer, loyal to Boumedienne and close to the group of radical 
officers. Believed to have been a key figure in the intelligence 
service and in Algeria's relations with the liberation movements, 
especially the Polisario front.
Merbah, Kasdi (Colonel):
Born in 1937 in a small village near Benni yenni in Greater Kabylia. 
ALN officer 1956-1962. After independence, served in the central
direction, ministry of defense, head of military security 1967-1979, 
Secretar y-General ministry of defense 1979-1081 and member of FLN 
political bureau, ministry of heavy industry 1981-1983 and of 
agriculture since. Alternate member, political bureau since 1983. 
A radical
Saadi, Selim (Lieutenant-Colonel):
Born October 25, 1936. ALN officer. Director of transports,
ministry of defense (1963-1967); head armoured division ( 1967-1970); 
head operational divisions (1970-1972); commander third military 
region and in charge of the green dam works 1972-1979. Graduate 
school. General Staff. Member Centred. Committee, Minister of
agriculture 1979-1983 and of heavy industry since 1983. A radical
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Zerguini, Mohammed (Colonel);
Born April 23, 1922 in Derguina a village near Bejaia, Smaller
Kabilya. ALN officer in charge of the education of mujahidine, 
General Staff until 1962. Deputy Commander, seventh military region 
1962-1964; military studies 1964-1966; head operational bureau. 
General-staff 1966-1967. Commander Algerian troops over Suez Canal 
during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Head fourth and then third 
military region until 1975. Promoted to the grade of Colonel, November 
1969. General inspector of ANP 1975-1977; minister of posts 1977-1979; 
member Central Committed, Ambassador to Mauritania until 1981. 
Retired. A moderate; a close aide of Boumedienne.
PROMINENT TECHNOCRATS 
Abdeslam, Belaid;
Born July 1928 at Dehemcha near Setif, Smaller Kabylia; educated 
University of Grenoble, BSC economics; instructor FLN school at Oujda, 
Morocco; trained. Cabinet of Tunisian home minister Taieb Mehri 1960; 
political adviser. Cabinet of Benkhedda, Tunis, 1961. In charge of 
economic affairs, GPRA until 1962. General manager, Sonatrach 
(1964-1966); minister of industry and energy (1966-1977); minister of 
light industries (1977-1979); member central committee, head economic 
commission 1979-198 1. Ousted from central committee, lives abroad. 
A radical. Spearhead of the national economic policy 1966-1979.
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Ait Messaoudene, Said:
Born on July 25, 1933, Greater Kabylia. Graduated school French air
forces, joined maquis and led various military missions to China, Iraq 
and USSR. Commander airforces 1963-1972; Minister of posts and tele­
communications 1972-1977; health 1977-1979. Member central committee, 
minister of light industries 1979-1983. Member secretariat executive 
FLN. A radical and loyal to Boumedienne.
Benhabyles, Abdelmalek:
Born in 192 1 at Chevreuil near Setif. Graduate in law, vice-
president UDEMA association of North African students; founder of 
UGEMA; representative FLN to Damascus, Tokyo; Chef de Cabinet, 
mninistry of external affairs 1961-1963; Head of Eastern Europe 
division, ministry of external affairs 1961-1963; Secretary General, 
ministry of foreign affairs 1963. Ambassador to Japan 1964-1967; 
Tunisia 1967-1970; Assistant Secretary-General , ministry of foreign 
affairs (1970-1974); Secretary-General (1974-1977); minister of 
justice 1977-1979; Secretar y-General to presidency March 1979-1981 . 
Ambassador to Geneva since 1981. Considered leftist intellectual.
Benhammouda, Boualem, (Dr);
ALN officer. Gr ad ua te in Law in arabic, Algiers University
Minister of war veterans 1965-1977, of public works 1977-1979
Member political bureau, minister of interior 1979-1981 and since then 
of finance. Sympathetic to moslem traditionalist forces.
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Brahimi, Abdel hamid (Dr)i
Born April 2, 1936 at Milia in the Constantine region of a well-off
and traditional scriptural milieu. ALN officer 1956-1962. Wali of 
Annaba 1963-1965; Director, Paris Bureau-based bureau of the 
Algerian-French co-operation organism 1963-1970. Graduate in
economics, Paris University; lecturer University of Algiers 1970-1973.
Adviser to ministry of industry and energy 1974-1976. Head Sonatrach 
bureau in Washington 1976-1979. PhD in Economics, Harvard
University. Member Central Committee, minister of planning 1979-1983; 
Prime Minister since January 1983. A moderate, loyal to president 
Chadli and close to the current foreign minister, Ahmed Taleb- 
Ibrahimi.
Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed ;
Born March 31, 1937, Nedroma, Western Algeria. Graduate, Paris 'ecole
des ponts et chaussees'. Member student section of FLN in Paris 
1958-1962. Director, minister of energy 1962-1963; adviser to
ministry of national economy 1963-1964; Assistant-Secretary of state 
for public works 1964-1965; Director-General of Sonatrach 1966-1979. 
Minister of energy and petrochemical industries 1977-1979. Member 
central committee, minister of water works. Suspended from the
central committee in 1981 and prosecuted for mismanagement. Ambassador 
to Brussels since 1983. A leftist intellectual close to Abdeslam.
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Hamdani, Smail i
Born March 11 , 1930. Member of UGEMA 1956-1962. A lawyer; charge
d'affaires in Brussels 1963-1964; Director, consular affairs, ministry 
of foreign affairs, 1964-1968; adviser to presidency 1968-1970; 
Secretary-General to presidency 1970-1977. Ambassador to 1981-1984. 
Currently Secretary-General ministry of foreign affairs. A moderate 
although with Labour movement sympathies.
Liassine, Mohamed ;
Born in 1934 at Dellys, Greater Kabylia. Graduate, Paris polytech­
nic; Engineer, roads development; Director, ministry of industry 1963; 
Director industrial production, office Algérien de l'action 
commerciale (OFLAC); national managing director, national steel 
corporation (SNS), 1964; General Manager, bureau d'etude et de 
realisations industrielles ( BERI ) ; member, advisory council for 
hydrocarbons, mines and energy 1967-1977. Minister of heavy industry 
1977-1981; retired. A close assistant and friend of Abdeslam.
Mahroug, Smail;
Born October 21, 1926 in Bougaa, Smaller Kabylia. Education Paris
University, BSC, MSc in economics. Joined FLN in 1962. Director of 
planning. Director Cabinet of head of economic affairs, GPRA ( 1962); 
Director Caisse Algérienne de développement 1963-1965; Director 
General, ministry of finance 1965-1966; economic adviser to President 
1966-1970; Chairman group of 24 IMF 1976; minister of finance
605
1970-1976; Chairman group of 24, IMF 1974--1976. Dismissed from the 
government in 1976 and has been since then director of a private 
financial organism based in Paris.
Mehri, Abdelhamidi
Born April 3, 1926 at Souk-Ahras, Western Algeria of a well-off and
traditionalist family. Graduate, Arabic literature, Zitouna, Tunis. 
Representative of PPA to Tunis from 1947 to 1951; member "Comite 
executif et de co-ordination" CEE (1957-1958); Minister of Maghreb 
affairs, GPRA 1958-1959; Minister social affairs, GPRA 1959-1961. 
Lecturer of Arabic 1962-1964; Director school of teachers training, 
Bouzareah 1964-1970; Secretary-General , Minister of primary and 
secondary schools 1970-1977. Director Bouzareah school 1978-1979. 
Member of FLN central committee, minister of information and culture 
1979-1981; Head FLN's commission of cultural affairs 1981-1983; 
Currently Ambassador to Paris. One of the central moslem tradition­
alist figures in Algerian ruling circle-
Nabi , Belkacem;
Born March 2, 1929. Engineer. Member MTLD until 1954; member FLN
federation de France. Director of energy 1963-1968; Head SN Rapal 
1965-1967; Adviser to the ministry of finance 1968-1970; Wall of 
Tlemcen 1970-1974; Adviser, to the Presidency 1974-1979. Member
Central Committee and Minister of energy since 1979. A moderate.
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Yala, M'hamed Hadj:
Born December 29, 1929 in Smaller Kabylia. Political commissar at 
Kheuchela during the war of liberation 1954-1956; Adviser FLN mission 
Belgrade 1959-1960; Head FLN mission Prague 1960-1962. Plenipotenti­
ary Minister. Head, division socialist countries, ministry of
foreign affairs 1962; Ambassador to Guinea 1963, to Pekin 1964. Wali 
of Algiers 1964-1970; of Constantine 1970-1974. Adviser to the
President 1974-1977; minister of commerce 1977-1979. Member FLN
political bureau, minister of finance 1979-1981 and since then of 
interior. A moderate
PROMINENT AMBASSADORS 
Bed j aoui, Mohamed ;
Born September 21, 1929 at Sidi Bel Abbes in Western Algeria.
Educated Grenoble University. PhD in Law, diploma, political
studies. Director Cabinet of President of GPRA. Member GPRA
delegation, Evian negotiations 1960-1962. Director Cabinet of
president of national constituent assembly, September 1962-Ncwember 
1962. General Secretary of government November 1962-December 1964; 
president board of directors of the national railways company 1964; 
Dean faculty of Law Algiers 1964-1965. Minister of justice 1965-1970; 
Ambassador to Paris 1970-19 ; representative to the United Nations
1979; judge international court, the Hague. A leftist intellectual.
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Brahimi, Lakhdar;
Born in 1934, Eastern Algeria. Political science graduate.
University of Algiers, representative FLN and later GPRA in South-East 
Asia (1956-1961); General Secretariat of external affairs ( 1961-1963); 
Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, Sudan; Arab League ( 1963- 
1970); Ambassador to UK 1971-1980; Adviser to President Chadli 
(1980-1983). Civil Servant Arab League, Tunis since 1983. A
moderate with pro-Arab inclinations, close to Bouteflika.
Houhou, Djameli
Born October 23, 1934 in the Constantine region. Graduate in
economics. University of Grenoble, member FLN Federation de France 
1955-1958; Vice-president UGEMA; central direction GPRA. Director, 
French affairs division, ministry of foreign affairs 1962-1971. 
Ambassador to Canada ( 1971-1974), Cairo (1974-1977); minister of youth 
and sports (1977-1979); Anbassador to Paris 1979-1983. Minister of 
health since 1983. A moderate.
Kafi, Ali Hussain;
Born October 7, 1928 in Batna, Eastern Algeria. Son of a Mufti.
Educated, faculty of Constantine, higher studies, Zitonna, Tunis. 
Colonel ALN 1954-1961, fought in Wilaya I. Head of GPRA diplomatic 
mission in Cairo (1961-1962). Ambassador to Beirut 1963-1966, to
Damascus 1967. Attached to the basic values of the Algerian
revolution, sympathetic to the Moslem progressives.
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Kellou, Mohamed-Messaoud !
Born March 17, 1931 at Mausourah, near Setif. Educated faculty of
Law, Universities of Lawof Algiers and Montpellier, Diploma of 
advanced studies 1955; Lawyer in Algiers; Vice-president of UGEMA in 
charge of foreign affairs. Member of FLN, representative in the UK 
1957-1961, Head of GPRA's diplomatic mission to Pakistan (1961-1962); 
Director, African, Asian and South-American affairs. Ministry of 
external relations (1962-1963). Ambassador to UK (1963-1964), to 
Czechoslovakia 1964-1970, to Hungary and Poland 1965-1970, to 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia since 1970, Zimbabwe (1983). A 
radical, sympathetic to progressive forces in the third world.
Mai e k, Red ha :
Born December 12, 1931, Batna. Son of a lawyer. Graduate faculty of
letters Algiers and Paris, member UGEMA; Director of El-Mudjahid 
(1957-1961); Speaker of the delegation of GPRA to Evian meetings 
(March 1961-March 1962); Ambassador to Belgrade 1963-1965; Paris 
1965-1970; Moscow 1970-1977, minister of information and culture 
1977-1979. Ambassador to Washington 1979-1982, to UK (1982-1984). 
Retired. A leftist intellectual, one of the closest friend of
Benyahia
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Oussedick, Omar;
Born January 1922, Greater Kabylia. Member of PPA; major ALN
1954-1958; Secretary of State, GPRA 1958-1960; representative FLN in 
Guinea 1960-1961. Ambassador to Bulgaria 1963-1965, USSR, 1965-1970, 
to India 1974-1979. Retired. A leftist, a personal friend of Frantz 
Fanon.
Rahal, Abdelatif;
Born in 1922 in Algiers in a family coming from Tlemcen. Educated; 
teachers training, Bouzareah and graduated from Bordeaux University. 
Teacher of maths, Marnia, Mostaganem; Supervisor at 'Lycee d'Azrou', 
Morocco (1954-1962). Director of Cabinet, ministry of general
affairs, GPRA (June-August 1962), director of cabinet of Ben Bella 
(September 1962-January 1963); Ambassador to Paris 1963; Secretary 
General, ministry of foreign affairs, July 1965-March 197 1; Permanent 
representative of Algeria to the United Nations March 197 1-June 1977. 
Minister of higher education (April 1977-March 1979), permanent 
delegate to UNESCO since 1970-1979.
Yazid , M ’hamed;
Born in Blida near Algiers. His father served in the French army. 
Educated in French in his native town. He militated in the PPA-MTLD 
and in the 1953 session of this party he sided with the 'centralists' 
against the leader of the MTLD, Messali. He joined the FLN in 1955
and was made a member of the CNRA. Active member of the FLN
'delegation exterieure' and attended various international conferences
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including the Bandung meeting as FLN representative along with 
Ait-Ahmed. He was with Chanderli, responsible for the FLN bureau in 
New York and worked tirelessly for the inscription of the Algerian 
question on the UN agenda as well as for gathering support for the 
Algerian cause. Minister of information, GPRA, 1958-1962 and
participated in the negotiations with the French government in Evian. 
At independence he was elected to the National Assembly and became the 
head of its committee on foreign relations. He also served as Ben 
Bella's personal envoy and as Algeria's representative to the 
Afro-Asian people's solidarity organization (AAPSO). He became
Algeria's permanent representative to the United Nations in 1966, a 
post he held until 1971 when he was appointed Ambassador to Lebanon 
until 1979. During that period he was believed to be the link
between the Algerian government and the Palestinian resistance. In 
February 1979, he was elected to the FLN's central committee and in 
1981 he was put in charge of the Arab league bureau in Paris. He was 
called back to Algiers in April 1984 and has been since then a member 
of the Permanent Secretariat of the FLN's central committee in charge 
of solidarity with peoples. A leftist, with strong links with
progressive forces and national liberation movements, especially the
PLO
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of August 27, 1965.
THE MINISTER
Algerian Embassies
The Secretary-General
General inspection of 
diplomatic posts
The Deputy 
Secretary-General
GENERAL political, economic
DIRECTION cultural and social Division Internal
affairs organizations
Direction political 
affairs
Division
Arab
countries
Division
Africa
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Europe
North-
America
Division
Asia
Latin-
America
Division
socialist
countries
Direction economic, cultural 
and social affairs
Division 
Economic and 
financial affairs
Division 
Cultural and 
social affairs
DIRECTION French affairs
Service 
Technical and 
cultural co­
operation
DIRECTION Jurisdical and
Consular affairs
Service
Political affairs
Service 
Economic and 
financial affairs
Bureau Service Service
refugees and administrative consular 
and social conventions
conventions 
and inter­
national unions
Service
chancelleries
and
DIRECTION General administration
Sub-Direction
Personnel
Sub-Direction 
bud ge t and 
equi pment
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TABLE nil: ALGERIA'S TRADE WITH FRANCE 1963-1979 (millions of DA)
YEARS IMPORTS EXPORTS TOTAL TRADE BALANCE
1963 2795 2918 5713 - 23
1964 2449 2793 5242 + 344
1965 2329 2282 461 1 - 47
1966 2166 2070 4236 - 96
1967 1817 2 118 3945 + 241
1968 2273 2263 4536 - 10
1969 2200 2510 4710 + 310
1970 263 1 2667 5280 + 36
1971 2273 991 3264 -1282
1972 2023 1263 3383 - 657
1973 2844 1667 451 1 -1177
1974 4706 321 1 7917 -1495
1975 7937 2500 10437 -5437
1976 60 14 2863 10172 -4058
1977 7115 3057 10171 -40 58
1978 6599 2755 9354 -3844
1979 6015 4310 10825 - 1205
Source : Bulletin économique No.34: Document: A1 ger ian-French relations 
(Ministry of Commerce, Direction of statistics and documentation.
Algiers, 1981) p.6
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TableIII2: FRANCE'S PLACE IN ALGERIAN FOREIGN TRADE 1963-1979 (in 
percentage)
1963 1965 1969 1971 1973 1977 1979
IMPORTS 81 70 44 37,7 32 24 18,3
EXPORTS 75 72 54 23,5 22,2 12,6 3,3
TOTAL 78 71 49 31,8 27,5 18,9 17,4
Source : constructed from statistiques du Commerce extérieur. Ministry of
Trade Algiers December 1978
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Table HI3: ALGERIA'S TRADE DEFICIT WITH FRANCE 1973-79
YEARS GLOBAL TRADE 
BALANCE
TRADE BALANCE 
WITH FRANCE
IN PERCENTAGE
1973 - 1.397 - 1.177 83
1974 + 982 - 1.495
1975 - 7.068 - 5.437 77
1976 - 1.419 - 3.152
1977 - 5.445 - 4.058
1978 -10 . 145 - 3.844
1979 + 3.711 - 1.205 80
Total -28.203 -20.368
Source s Bulletin économique , op.cit p.8.



MAP IV 2 GREATER MOROCCO
-------- present time frontiers
-------- borders claimed by Allai Al Fassi
SOURCE : BARBIER,M : Le conflit du Sahara occidental 
(Paris, L'harmattan, 1982) p.177
Document IV3
PROTOCOLE D'ACCORD ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE SA MAJESTE LE ROI DU 
MAROC ET LE G.P.R.A. (6 Juillet 1961)
Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc et le Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Republique Algérienne, animés par les sentiments de 
solidarité et de fraternité maghrébines, conscients de leur de'stin 
africain et désireux de concrétiser les aspirations communes de leurs 
peuples, ont convenu ce qui suit:
Fideles a l'esprit de la Conférence de Tanger du mois d'avril 1958 
et fermement attachés a la charte et aux resolutions adoptées par la 
Conférence de Casablanca, les deux gouvernements décident d 'entreprendre 
l'édification du Maghreb Arabe sur la base d'une fraternelle association 
notamment dans le domaine politique et économique•
Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc, réaffirme son 
soutien inconditionnel au peuple algérien dans sa lutte pour son 
indépendance et son unité nationales* Il proclaime son appui sans réserve 
du gouvernement provisoire de la Republique Algérienne dans ses 
négociations avec la France sur la base du respect de l'intégrité du 
territoire algérien. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté' le Roi du Maroc 
s'opposera par tous les moyens à toute tentative de partage ou 
d'amputation du territoire alge'rien.
Le Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne reconnait 
pour sa part que le problème territorial pose par la délimitation imposée 
arbitrairement par la France entre les deux pays trouvera sa resolution 
dans les négociations entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc et du 
Gouvernement de l'Algérie indépendante.
/ fA cette fin, les deux gouvernements décident la création d'une 
commission algero-marocaine qui se reunira dans les meilleurs delais pour 
procéder à l'etude et à la solution de ce problème dans un esprit de 
fraternité et d ' unité* maghrébines.
De ce fait, le Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algérienne 
réaffirme que les accords qui pourront intervenir à la suite des 
négociations fr anco-algeriennes ne sauraient être opposables au Maroc 
quant aux délimitations territoriales algeVo-marocaines.
Sa Majesté Hassan II Son Excellence Ferhat Abbas
Roi du Maroc Président du G.P.R.A.
Rabat, le 6 Juillet 1961
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TREATY1 OF BROTHERHOOD, GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION 
BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO AND THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC 
OF ALGERIA.
Document IV4
The Kingdom of Morocco and
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood, friendship and 
good-neighbourly relations which are dictated by the long-standing 
historical ties existing between their two countries and peoples,
Prompted by their mutual desire to strengthen and reinforce the 
bonds of brotherhood between them in all fields, and especially in the 
economic and cultural fields, on the basis of mutual respect for national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the other Party and equality between the two Parties in their 
common interests.
Desiring to participate, through their mutual relations, in 
building the greater Arab Maghreb, unifying the Arab nation, strengthen­
ing African unity and attaining world justice and peace.
Wishing to establish mutual co-operation and consultation in all 
matters relating to the attainment of peace and in resistance to all 
forms of aggression in accordance with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter,
Convinced that the establishment and strengthening of friendly 
relations and mutual co-operation will benefit both fraternal countries 
and peoples.
Believing that their mutual relations will contribute to the 
attainment of the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
Charter of the League of Arab States, and the Charter of the Organization 
of African Unity,2
Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the following treaty, 
and have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:
His Excellency Dr Ahmed el-Iraqi, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Kingdom of Morocco, and
His Excellency Mr. Abdulazlz Boutefliqa, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have 
agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Kingdom of Morocco and the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria shall maintain perpetual peace, firm friendship and fruitful 
good-neighbourly relations, inspired by the spirit of the long-standing 
brotherhood between the two fraternal peoples, and shall strive to build 
a prosperous common future.
United Nations, Treaty Series, voi.479, p.39.
2Came into force on 15 January 1969 by signature, in accordance with 
article 7.
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Article 2
The two Contracting Parties undertake to strengthen their common 
bonds in all fields, and especially in the economic and cultural fields,, 
as a contribution toward expanding the areas of mutual understanding 
between the fraternal Moroccan and Algerian peoples and consolidating the 
friendship and good-neighbourly relations between them.
Article 3
Since mutual economic co-operation provides a firm basis for 
peaceful and friendly relations and leads to the advancement of both 
countries, the two Contracting Parties shall promote mutual efforts aimed 
at the expansion of co-operation in all fields, for the benefit of both 
countries.
Article 4
In the event of a dispute or conflict of any kind, the two 
Contracting Parties shall prohibit the use of force against each other 
and shall strive to settle the dispute by peaceful means, in a spirit of 
friendship, brotherhood and goal-neighbourly relations, in pursuance of 
the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, the League of Arab 
States, and the Organization of Africain Unity.
Article 5
Each Party undertakes not to join any alliance or confederacy 
directed against the other Party.
Article 6
In order to strengthen the ties of solidarity and brotherhood which 
bind their two fraternal peoples, in accordance with the spirit of 
good-neighbourliness and mutual confidence between them, the two Parties 
resolve to submit all matters pending between them to joint commissions 
which shall be responsible for finding appropriate solutions thereto 
within the framework of the relations between the two countries, 
employing such procedures as they deem appropriate to the attainment of 
their common wish to overcome all obstacles and to make swift progress 
toward establishing the co-operation which both Parties desire.
Article 7
This Treaty shall enter into force when it has been signed and the 
instruments of ratification have been exchanged.
Article 8
This Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years following the 
date of its entry into force, and shall be automatically renewed for a 
further period of twenty years unless one of the Contracting Parties 
informs the other Party in writing, one year before the expiry of the 
Treaty, of its desire to terminate it.
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Done at the royal palace of Ifrane, on 26 Shawwal 1388 ( 15 January 
1969) in two original copies in the Arabic language.
For the Kingdom of Morocco: For the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria:
Ahmed EL-IRAQI Abdulaziz BOUTEFLIQA
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Communique commun Marocain-Algérien of July 4, 1975
Monsieur Abdelaziz Bouteflika, membre du Conseil de la Révolution 
et ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Algérie a effectue* une visite au 
Maroc du mardi 1er juillet 1975, au vendredi 4 juillet 1975. Cette 
visite entre dans le cadre des liens de fraternité* qui unissent le Maroc 
a l'Algérie, et de la communauté' de leur destin dans le bonheur et 
la diversité
* »Cette visite entre egalement dans le cadre de la coopération
étroite qui existe entre les deux pays dans tous les domaines 
conformément aux nobles objectifs qu'ils poursuivent, tendant a 
l'édification du Maghreb Arabe et â la poursuite d'une politique de 
dialogue fructueux, de concertation et d'assistance mutuelle.
Cette politique résulte des rencontres historiques entre Sa Majesté 
le Roi Hassan II et Son Excellence le President Houari Boumedienne ainsi 
que des traites et conventions conclus entre les deux pays frères.
*Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II a reyu en audience M. Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika. Au cours de cette auiience caracterise’e par la franchise et 
la cordialité, le ministre algérien a déclaré que 1*Algérie, tout en 
réaffirmant qu'elle n'a aucune visee territoriale sur le Sahara 
Occidental sous domination espagnole, enregistre avec pleine satisfaction 
l'entente intervenue entre les deux pays frères, le Maroc et la 
Mauritanie, en ce qui concerne cette région, entente qui tend a la 
consolidation de la securité, de la tranquillité" et la stabilité' et de la 
coope'ration. Cette derniere aura, à coup sur, des effets be’nefiques sur 
cette région vitale du Maghreb Arabe.
Attachées au principe de la lutte contre le colonialisme sous 
toutes ses formes, les deux parties algérienne et marocaine ¿ont 
convaincues de la nécessité de parfaire la coordination de leur action en 
vue de mettre fin, dans les plus brefs délais a l’occupation espagnole et 
aux manoeuvres du gouvernement espagnol visant à maintenir d'une manière 
ou d'une autre sa domination au Sahara.
, •Soucieuses de consolider et d'élargir la coopération et de tout 
mettre en oeuvre pour lui assurer le plus grand succès, les deux parties 
entendent procéder à la réalisation des projets adoptes d'un commun 
accord et non encore réalisés et d ' entreprendre toute action propre a 
accélérer l'édification du Maghreb Arabe.
Document IV5
El-Moud jahid , July 5, 1975
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Document IV6
ACCORDS ET RESOLUTIONS SUR LE SAHARA OCCIDENTAL
1 - L'ACCORD TRIPARTITE DU 14 NOVEMBRE 1975
L'accord de Madrid, signe par l'Espagne, le Maroc et la Mauritanie 
contient les dispositions suivantes:
• I  ,
- l'Espagne reaffirme sa decision de décoloniser le Sahara Occidental, 
en cessant d'etre puissance administrante.
- Le rôle de puissance administrante est immédiatement confie* a une 
administration intérimaire, a laquelle participe le Maroc, la Mauritanie 
et la Jemaaj un gouverneur general espagnol, et deux gouverneurs 
adjoints, l'un marocain, l'autre mauritanien. La presence espagnole 
prendra fin definitivement avant le 28 février 1976.
* /- L'opinion de la population, exprimée par la Jemaa, sera respectee. 
En ce qui concerne les phosphates et "pour ce qui est de la Société* de 
Bou Craa proprement dite, l'accord de Madrid a trace un schema 
d'exploitation du gisement avec une participation marocaine de 65% et une 
participation espagnole de 35%".
2 - ACCORDS MAROCO-MAURITANIENS (14 avril 1976).
Son Excellence le Président de la Re*publique Islamique de 
Mauritanie et Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc, se référant à l'avis 
consultatif du 16 octobre 1975 de la Cour Internationale de justice 
reconnaissant l'existence de liens juridiques d'allégeance entre le Roi 
du Maroc et certaines des tribus vivant sur le territoire du Sahara et 
l'existence de droits, y compris certains droits relatifs a la terre, qui 
constituaient des liens juridiques avec l'ensemble mauritanien.
* / / ^En conformité avec la déclaration de principes signes a Madrid le
14 novembre 1975 et transmettant à l'administration intérimaire avec la 
participation du Maroc et de la Mauritanie et la collaboration de la 
Jemaa les responsabilités et les pouvoirs détenus par l'Espagne sur le 
Sahara.
Considérant la consultation de la Jemaa, réunie en session 
extraordinaire le 26 février 1976,
Décident de conclure la présente convention et désignent à cet 
effet leurs plénipotentiaires: M. Hamdo Ould Mouknass, ministre d ’Etat 
charge* des Affaires étrangères, et Docteur Ahmed Laraki, ministre d'Etat 
chargé des Affaires Etrangères, lesquels après avoir échangé leurs pleins 
pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit:
Article Premier. - Les Hautes Parties Contractanes conviennent d'un 
commun accord que la frontière d'Etat établie entre la Re'publique 
islamique de Mauritanie et le Royaune du Maroc est définie par la ligne 
droite, partant du point d'intersection de la côte Atlantique avec le 24e 
parallèle nord et se dirigeant vers le point d'intersection du 23e
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parallèle nord avec le 13e méridien ouest; l'intersection de cette ligne 
droite avec l'actuelle frontière de la République islamique de Mauritanie 
constituant la limite sud-est de la frontière du Royaume du Maroc.
A partir de ce dernier point, la frontière suit vers le Nord la 
frontière actuelle de la République islamique de Mauritanie jusqu-au 
point constitué par les coordonnées suivantes; 824/500 et 959, telles 
qu'elles figurent sur la carte paraphée et annexée a la présente 
convention.
Art. 2. - La frontière d'Etat entre la République islamique de Mauritanie 
et le Royaume du Maroc, telle que définie à l'article premier ci-dessus, 
constitue la frontière terrestre et délimite également dans le sens 
vertical la souveraineté dans l'espace aérien ainsi que l'appartenance du 
sous-sol. En ce qui concerne le plateau continental, la délimitation 
est constituée par le 24e parallèle nord.
Art. 3. - Il est créé une commission mixte maroco-mauritanienne en vue de 
procéder sur le terrain au bornage de la frontière entre les deux pays, 
telle que definie à l'article premier ci-dessus.
Art. 4 . - Au terme de ses traveaux, la commission mixte établira un acte 
constatant le bornage de la frontière maroco-mauritanienne. Cet acte 
sera joint a la présente convention.
Art. 5. - La présente convention entrera en vigeur a la date de l'échange 
des instruments de ratification conformement aux procedures 
constitutionnelles en vigeur dans les pays.
Art. 6 . - Des son entree en vigeur, la présente convention sera
enregistrée au secrétariat général des Nations Unies conformément a 
l'article 102 de la Charte des Nations unies.
Accord publié dans le Bulletin officiel du Royaume du 
Maroc, n® 3311 bis, 16 avril 1976.
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Document IV:7
- ACCORD MAURITANO-SAHARAOUI du 5 AOUT 1979
Les 3, 4, 5 août 1979, une délégation mauritanienne, conduite 
par la lieutenant-colonel Salem Ould Sidi, deuxième vice-president du 
comité militaire du salut national et ministre charge' de la permanence du 
comité', et comprenant le lieutenant-colonel Ahmed Ould Abdallah, membre 
du CMSN et chef d'état-major de l'armée, et une délégation saharaouie 
conduite par Bachir Mustapha Sayed, secrétaire général adjoint du Front 
Polisario, membre du comité executif du commandement de la révolution, et 
comprenant Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, ministre de l'information, membre du 
bureau politique du Front Polisario et du conseil national sahraoui, et 
Mahmoud Ould Abdelfattah, responsable du departement Europe du Front 
Polisario, se sont réunies à Alger, capitale de la République Algérienne 
Démocratique et Populaire.
suit:
Apres négociations, les deux parties ont convenu de ce qui
- Considérant l'attachement des deux parties mauritanienne et 
sahraouie au respect scrupuleux des principes des chartes de l'OUA et de 
l'ONU relatifs aux droits des peuples à disposer d'eux-memes, a 
1'intangibilite des frontières héritées de l'époque coloniale.
- Considérant le désir sincère des deux parties d'instaurer une 
paix juste et définitive, la République islamique de Mauritanie et le 
Front Polisario, conformément aux principes de la coexistence pacifique, 
du respect mutuel et du bon voisinage,
/ / / /- Considérant la nécessite impérieuse entre les deux parties de 
trouver une solution globale et definitive au conflit garantissant au 
peuple sahraoui ses pleins droits nationaux et à la région la paix et la 
stabilité'.
* fa) La Republique islamique de Mauritanie declare sole­
nnellement qu’elle n ’a et n’aura pas de revendications territoriales ou 
autres au Sahra Occidental.
b) La République Islamique de Mauritanie decide de sortir 
definitivement de la guerre injuste du Sahra Occidental suivant les 
modalités arretees en commun accord avec les représentants du peuple 
sahraoui, le Front Polisario.
- Le Front Polisario déclare solennellement qu’il n'a et n'aura 
pas de revendications territoriales sur la Mauritanie.
Le Front Polisario, au nom du peuple sahraoui et la République 
Islamique de Mauritanie, décident par le présent accord de signer entre 
eux une paix définitive. Les deux parties ont de'cidé de la tenue de 
rencontres périodiques entre elles en vue de veiller a l'éxecution des 
modalite's enoncees au paragraphe "a".
Les deux parties transmettront cet accord immédiatement apres 
sa signature au President en exercice de l'OAU, aux membres du comité' ad 
hoc, aux secrétaires ge'néraux de l'OAU et de l'ONU, ainsi qu'au Président 
des non' aligne's.
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La ceremonie de signature s'est déroulée en presence de M. Ahmed Taleb 
Ibrahimi, membre du Bureau politique, ministre conseiller a la Présidence 
et président de la Cour des Comptes, de M. Ablelhamid Mehri, membre du 
Comité central, ministre de l'Information et de la Culture, de M. M'Hamed 
Yala, membre du Comité central, ministre des Finances et de M. Ait 
Messaoudène, membre du Comite/ central, ministre des Industries légères.
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THE VOTES OF ARAB STATES ON THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION
(December 10, 1975)
Document IV:8
PRO-ALGERIAN RESOLUTION
Resolution 3458/A (XXX) as recommended by fourth committee A/10427 
adopted on December 10, 1975, meeting 2435 by roll call vote of 88 to O, 
with 41 abstentions.
Abstaining
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Oman
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Sudan
- Tunisia
- United Arab Emirats 
PRO-MOROCCAN RESOLUTION
Resolution 3458/B as recommended by fourth committee, A/10427, adopted by 
Assembly on December 10, 1975, meeting 2435, by roll call vote of 56 to 
42 with 34 abstentions.
In Favour
-  Bahrain
-  I r a q
-  Jordan
-  Kuwait
-  Lebanon
-  Mauritan ia
- Oman
-  Qatar
-  Saudi A rab ia
-  Tu n is ia
-  United Arab Eroirats
Source : Yearbook o f  the United N a t io n s ,  Volume 29, 1975 ( o f f i c e  o f  p u b l ic  
in fo rm a t io n .  Un ited  N a t io n s ,  New Y o r k ) ,  pp. 188-189.
Against
- (Algeria)
- DR of Yemen
Abstaining 
- Egypt
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Document IV:9
COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA REUNION DE RABAT 
du 30 Mars au 3 Avril 1983
/ / » «-Un communique de presse algero-marocain a ete rendu public samedi a 
Alger et Rabat, a l'issue de la visite au Maroc d'une délégation 
algérienne, conduite par M. M'Hamed Yala, membre du Bureau politique, 
ministre de 1'Intérieur.
Voice le texte integral du communique:
"Dans le prolongement de la rencontre historique du 26 février 
entre Son Excellence M. Chadli Benjedid, Président de la Republique, 
Secrétaire general du FLN et Sa Majesté Hassan II, roi du Maroc, et suite 
à la visite de travail effectue'e du 30 mars au 3 avril 1983 en Alge'rie 
par M. Driss Basri, ministre de l ’Intérieur du gouvernement de Sa Majesté 
le Roi, M. M'Hamed Yala, membre du Bureau politique, ministre algérien de 
l'Intérieur, a effectue, â la tete d'une importante délégation, une 
visite au Maroc du 25 au 27 mai 1983, à l'invitation de son homologue 
marocain.
Au cours de son séjour, M. M'Hamed Yala, porteur d'un message du 
President Chadli Bendjedid, a ete re^u par Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II.
Il a eu l'occasion de s'entretenir notamment avec les personantes 
marocaines suivantes:
-Le Premier ministre du gouvernement de Sa Majesté* le Roi, M6 Maati 
Bouabid.
-Le Président du Parlement, M. Bey Ould Sidi Baba.
-Le ministre d'Etat chargedes Affaires étrangères, Me M'Hamed 
Boucetta.
/ ! , , * *"Le séjour du ministre algérien de l'Intérieur a ete marque en
outre par une serie d'entretiens, empreints de fraternité1*, de franchise 
et de mutuelle compréhension avec son homologue marocain, au cours 
desquels les deux responsables ont fait un large tour d'horizon des 
principales questions intéressant en particulier les rapports entre les 
deux pays freres.
* » ,"Les deux parties, qui se sont vivement felicitees de l'évolution 
des relations entre les deux pays, ont convenu de tout mettre en oeuvre 
en vue d'une normalisation des rapports de solidarité et d'e'change entre 
les deux pays freres et s'engagent a oeuvrer ensemble avec toute l'ardeur 
qui convient en vue d'aplanir toutes les difficulte's et d ’éliminer tous 
les obstacles susceptibles de s'opposer a la normalisation engagée, afin 
de contribuer a l'édification d'un Maghreb uni et prospère.
Cette perspective a conduit a l'adoption d'un train de masures 
concretes visant:
-La libre circulation progressive des personnes et des biens
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-Le rétablissement des lignes aeriennes des le début du mois de 
juin 1983 et des lignes ferroviaires le plus rapidement possible des que 
seront levees certaines contraintes d'ordre technique.
-Le développement et l'intensification de la coopération aux 
multiples plans des collectivites locales, de la protection civile, des 
transmissions, de la Sûreté nationale et de la formation.”
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TRAITE DE FRATERNITE ET DE CONCORDE 
BETWEEN ALGERIA AND TUNISIA.MARCH 19, 1983
Article 1er:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a oeuvrer d'une 
fapon continue pour la sauvegarde de la paix et de la sécurité” entre
elles et d'une façon generale envers tous les pays du Grand Maghreb Arabe
et ce, dans le but de renforcer les relations de paix de fraternité” et de 
bon voisinage existant entre les deux pays et basées sur leur
appartenance au Grand Maghreb Arabe, sur l'uni te” de leur destin et sur le 
respect du principe de souveraineté nationale d'egalite des droits des 
peuples à leur droit de disposer de leur destin.
Article 2:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes, s'engagent à s'abstenir de 
recourir à la menace ou d'utiliser la force pour le reglement des
différends qui unissent les deux peuples, pour la préservation d'une 
coopération fraternelle et fructueuse et pour asseoir une paix durable 
entre-eux fondée sur le respect mutuel de l'intégrité territoriale, de 
1 ' intangibilite des frontières nationales, de la souveraineté” et de 
1 'indépendance politique de chacune d'elles. Elles s'engagent a résoudre 
les différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles par la voie de la 
consultation, de la négociation ou par toute autre voie pacifique.
Article 3:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a s'abstenir 
d'adhérer a toute alliance ou ensemble de nature militaire ou politique 
avec un ou plusieurs autres Etats contre 1 ’ inde'pendance politique,
l'intégrité” territoriale ou la sécurité d'une des parties contractantes. 
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a n'autoriser aucune 
initiative ou action de nature belliqueuse prise par un ou plusieurs 
autres Etats contre l'une des deux parties.
Artice 4:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a n'autoriser
aucune organisation ou activité ou concentration sur le territoire de 
l'une des deux parties de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité de 
l'autre partie, ou a son intégrité’ territoriale ou a une tentative de 
changer son régime par la violence.
Article 5:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes conservent leur complété
liberté d'action en vue de signer tout accord avec d'autres Etats s'il ne 
contredit pas les arrêtes du présent traite”.
Article 6:
* VCe traite reste ouvert a l'adhesion d'autres Etats du Grand Maghreb 
Arabe qui acceptent ces decisions avec l'accord des deux hautes parties 
contractantes.
Document IV: 10
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Article 7: / /La duree de ce traite est de vingt ans. Son approbation reste 
soumise aux dispositions constitutionnelles de chaque pays et entre en 
vigueur à compter de la date d'echange des instruments de ratification. 
Ce traite sera reconduit pour la meme duree si aucune des deux parties 
contractantes ne l'annule par e’crit, un an avant la fin de la duree en 
vigueur.
Ce traite a ete rédigé en langue arabe, a Tunis le 19 mars 1983. 
Il est signe par le president Chadli Bendjedid et le président Habib 
Bourguiba.
in El-Djeich, April 1, 1983.
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19eme- Conférence de l'OAU à ADDIS ABEBA June 6-11 1983
Resolution sur le Sahara occidental
Des Négociations directes Maroc-F.Polisario
Le débat sur le Sahara occidental a eu lieu vendredi soir avec 
l'examen du projet de résolution sur le Sahara occidental. Le Maroc a 
vainement tenté de bloquer la discussion en proposant une suspension de 
séance, mais sa proposition mise au vote, a été' rejetée par 30 voix 
contre 15 et 4 abstentions.
✓ , , -La resolution adoptée par le 19eme sommet a ete mise au point par
un comité de rédaction comprenant le Sénégal, la Mauritanie et 
l'Ethiopie,
Document IV:11
Voici le texte intégral de la resolution sur le Sahara occidental 
legerement amendé dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi apres un long débat 
par le 19ème sommet:
"La conférence au sommet des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de 
l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, réunie en sa 19eme session ordinaire 
à Addis Aleba (Ethiopie) du 6 au 11 juin 1983,
"Ayant examine le rapport du comité de mise en oeuvre des chefs 
d'Etat sur le Sahara occidental;
"Rappelant l'engagement solennel pris par Sa Majesté’ le Roi Hassan 
II lors du 18eme sommet d'accepter l'organisation d'un referendum sur le 
Sahara occidental en vue de permettre au peuple de ce territoire 
d'exercer son droit à l'autodétermination;
/ /"Rappelant avec gratitude que Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II a accepte
la recommandation de la 6eme session du ccmite ad hoc des chefs d'Etat 
sur le Sahara occidental contenue dans le document AHG-103 (XVIII) B 
Annexe 1, ainsi que son engagement à coopérer avec le ccmite ad hoc dans 
la recherche d'une solution juste, pacifique et durable;
* f  / I"Réaffirmant ses resolutions et decisions anterieures sur la 
question du Sahara occidental et en particulier la resolution AHG-RES.103 
(XVIII) du 27 juin 1981;
f"1) Prend acte du rapport du comité de mise en oeuvre des chefs 
d'Etat sur le Sahara occidental;
"2) Exhorte les parties au conflit - le Royaume du Maroc et le 
Front Polisario - à entreprendre des négociations directes en vue de 
parvenir a un cessez-le-feu visant à creer les conditions necessaires 
pour un referendum pacifique et juste sans aucune contrainte administra­
tive ou militaire en vue de l'autodétermination du peuple du Sahara 
occidental sous les auspices de l'OUA et des Nations unies, et demande au 
comité de mise en oeuvre de veiller au respect du cessez-le-feu;
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"3) Invite le Comité de mise en oeuvre à se reunir des que possible 
et en collaboration avec les parties au conflit pour définir les 
modalités et tout autre détail pertinent en vue de l'application du 
cessez-le-feu et de l'organisation du referendum dans les six mois a 
venir ;
"4) Demande aux Nations unies d'installer conjointement avec l'OUA 
une force de maintien de la paix au Sahara occidental en vue de garantir 
la paix et la sécurité au cours de l'organisation du deroulement du 
referendum;
”5) Donne mandat au comité' de mise en oeuvre de prendre, avec la 
participation ^des Nations unies, toutes les mesures necessaires afin 
d'assurer l'execution correcte de la presente resolution;
”6) Demande au comité' de mise en oeuvre de faire rapport a la 20eme 
conférence au sommet des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des résultats du 
referendum, en vue de permettre au 20eme sommet de prendre une decision 
finale sur tous les aspects de la question du Sahara occidental;
, _  »”7) Decide de continuer a etudier la question du Sahara occidental;
"8) Demande au comité de mise en oeuvre, dans le cadre de son 
mandat, de tenir compte des proces-verb aux des 18eme et 19eme sessions 
ordinaires sur le problème du Sahara occidental et a cet effet invite le 
secretaire general de l'OUA a mettre a la disposition du comité tous les 
textes des procès verbaux sus-spécifié s ;
/
”9) Se félicité de l'attitude constructive des dirigeants sahraouis 
qui, en se retirant volontairement et provisoirement, ont permis au 19eme 
sommet de se reunir".
in Revolution Africaine, June 17-23, 1983
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Table VI1: PLANNED INVESTMENTS 1967-1978
SECTORS IN VOLUME* IN PERCENTAGE
(millions of DA)
Hydrocarbons 91 46.09
Industry 88 44.58
Total Industry 179 90.67
Others 18.4 9.32
* prices of 1978
Source: Constructed from Bilan economique et social, 1980.
Table VI2: PER CAPITA GROWTH - Selected Sectors 1967 and 1978
SECTOR
1967
volume percentage*
1978
volume percentage
Hydrocarbons 14.2 35 24.6 28
Non-Hydrocarbon
Industries 4.6 1 1 12.1 14
Total Industry 18.8 46 36.7 42
Agriculture 13.6 12.9 6.7 7.7
Source : ibid
* as of GDP
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Table VI3 : HYDROCARBON EXPORTS (million of DA)
Hydrocarbons 
Exports 
(Crude Oil)
Natural Gas 
Exports
Total Exports 
(Croie Oil + 
N.G + Products)
Hydrocarbons 
Sector as
percentage of total
1968 2,8 12 148 4,097 75
1969 3, 118 174 4,951 70
1970 3,288 144 5,305 66
1971 2,972 133 4,565 69
1972 4,627 139 6,163 78
1973 5,675 192 8,751 72
1974 16,792 251 20,115 89
1975 15,131 317 19,115 85
1976 18,700 584 22,821
1977 22,342 672 26,320 90
1978 21,546 1,008 26,216 92
1979 30,824 2,210 37,990 95
1980 41,084 3,774 53,500 98
Source : A l g e r i a :  the  f i v e - y e a r  deve lopm ent p lan  and the medium-term 
p ro s p e c ts  f o r  1980-1984. Document o f  th e  World Bank, Report  N o .3668 AL 
Volume I I :  Annexes, June 25, 1982, p .6 9 .
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Table VI: 6 THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRICE OF THE ALGERIAN LIGHT CRUDE (in US$)
PERIOD 45® Hassi Messaoud 
FOB Bed j ai a
34® Saudi Light 
FOB Ras Tanura
1961-1963 2.65 1.80
1964-1970 2.35 1.80
1971 (i,ii) 2.65 1.80
1971 (iii,iv) 3.60 2.33 a/
1972 3.60 2.43
1973 (i) 3.00 2.59
1973 (ii.iii) 3.60 2.87
(iv) 5.00 5.12
1974 (i,ii,iii) 14.00 1 1.65
(iv) 12.75 a/ 11.65
1975 (i) 12.00 11.25
(ii,iii) 11.75 11.25
(iv) 12.75 11.51
1976 (i,ii) 12.90 11.51
(iii,iv) 13.10 11.51
1977 <i,ii) 14.30 12.09
(iii.iv) 14.45 12.70
1978 <i,ii) 14.25 12.70
Iiii,iv ) 14.10 12.70
1979 (i) 14.80 13.34
<ii> 19.36 a/ 14.54
(iii) 23.50 18.00
(iv) 30.00 21.00 “/
1980 (ii) 33.00 b/ 26.00
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(iii) 37.21 b/ 28.00
(iv ) O o o cr \ 28.00
(iv) 37.00 30.00
1981 (i) 40.00 31.45
(ii) 40.00 32.00
(iii) 40.00 32.00
(iv) 37.50 34.00
1983
( September ) 30.82 34.00
(December) 29.15' 28.26
1984
(January) 29.73 28.64
(March) 30.23 28.57
(June ) 29.40 28.12
(August) 28.26 27.79
( September ) 23.44 27.94
a/ Average (in terms of length of time applicable) of a number of price 
values for the first three quarters of 1980 include a $3.00 exploration 
fee.
Source : Period 1961-1981! Mazri, H. Les hydrocarbures dans l'économie 
AlgeVienne (Algiers, SNED, 1975), p.80; oil industry developments. Bank 
of America, Bechtel; revolution Africaine 6 June 1980) in Algeria: the 
five-year development plan and the medium-term prospects for 1980-1984, 
Report No.3668 AL, Document of the World Bank, p.71.
For the period 1983-1984, OPEC Bulletin, Vol.(15), No.9, November 1984, 
p ■ 49 •
